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Summary and main conclusions (1)
The most difficult period for budgetary policies 
since the launch of the euro1
The year 2002, and the early part of 2003, has been a dif-
ficult period both in terms of actual budgetary develop-
ments and as regards the implementation of the EU
framework for fiscal surveillance. The nominal deficit
for the euro area as a whole increased from 1.6 % of
GDP in 2001 to 2.2 % in 2002 and, according to the lat-
est Commission forecast, it is projected to rise to 2.5 %
of GDP in 2003. This aggregate outcome is the result of
striking contrasts in the performance across Member States.
By the end of 2002, only six EU countries, including four
euro area countries (accounting for some 18 % of euro
area output) had achieved budget positions (both in nom-
inal and cyclically-adjusted terms) that met the ‘close to
balance or in surplus’ requirement of the Stability and
Growth Pact, whereas two euro area countries (account-
ing for half of the euro area output) had deficits above
the 3 % of GDP reference value.
The Portuguese authorities succeeded in reducing the
nominal deficit from 4.1 % of GDP in 2001 to 2.8 % in
2002, although very significant challenges remain if the
deficit is to remain below 3 % of GDP in 2003 as much
of this improvement is due to one-off measures which
have only led to a transitory improvement in the budget
balance. A deficit of 3.6 % of GDP in 2002 has resulted
in Germany being placed in an excessive deficit posi-
tion: while the authorities are taking measures aimed at
reducing the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit, only a
very limited improvement in nominal terms is expected
in 2003 as growth conditions deteriorate. Despite clear
evidence of budgetary slippage emerging in early 2002,
the French authorities did not take corrective measures
and a deficit of 3.1 % of GDP occurred in 2002 resulting
in the excessive deficit procedure being activated. An
even higher deficit of 3.7 % of GDP is forecast by the
Commission services for 2003 on the basis of current
policies. Large deficits remain in Italy (2.3 % of GDP
in 2002 and in 2003) and by 2004 are projected to rise
above the 3 % of GDP reference value (2): budgetary
consolidation efforts in Italy continue to rely on one-off
measures rather than on reforms of a structural nature
needed to ensure a permanent improvement in the
budget balance. Deficits have also re-emerged in 2002 in
countries that had already reached balanced budget posi-
tions, notably Austria (0.6 % of GDP), the Netherlands
(1.1 %) and the UK (1.3 %). 
Higher nominal deficits are only partly 
due to the economic cycle
At first sight, these developments compare relatively
favourably with previous economic downturns when def-
icits reached much higher levels and debt ratios entered
rapidly increasing trajectories. In addition, governments
have not pursued fine-tuning policies and while fiscal
policies were slightly looser, monetary conditions have
eased thanks mainly to low real interest rates. 
However, a closer consideration of underlying budgetary
trends reveals that the deterioration in nominal deficits
also results from high and rising cyclically-adjusted def-
icits in several countries. This indicates a discretionary
loosening of the fiscal stance by some Member States
over the past two years, brought about by a combination
of unfunded tax cuts, discretionary expenditure increases
and failures as regards budgetary execution. While the
outcome of the euro area in 2002 was unchanged com-
pared to 2001, it should be noted that the cyclically-
adjusted budget balance for 2001 has recently been
revised upwards to 2.1 % of GDP from 1.5 % of GDP,
implying that the deterioration in the underlying budget
balance in that year was considerably worse than earlier
¥1∂ The summary and main conclusions of this report have been adopted by
the College of Commissioners in the form of a communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament ‘Public finances
in EMU — 2003’, COM(2003) 283, adopted on 21 May 2003.
¥2∂ European Commission spring 2003 forecast, 2004 figures are based on the
assumption of no policy change.1
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2 0 0 3estimates showed: moreover, the cyclically-adjusted
budget balance includes the impact of one-off budgetary
measures which only have a transitory effect on budget
positions. The deterioration has been particularly pro-
nounced in Germany (where the CAB increased to 3.2 %
of GDP in 2002) and France (to 3.3 %). In Italy, it remains
high at 2.1 % of GDP.
In a medium-term perspective, the latest updates of the
stability and convergence programmes contain a target
by most Member States to reach budget positions of
‘close to balance or in surplus’ by 2005 or 2006. How-
ever, it should be noted that the medium-term targets of
Member States are based on growth assumptions, which
in light of developments in recent months now appear
to be optimistic. In countries where large cyclically-
adjusted deficits remain, the time frame for reaching the
‘close to balance or in surplus’ objective has been
pushed back to 2006 or 2007: even this date will only be
met if additional consolidation measures are undertaken.
Commission proposals to strengthen 
the coordination of budgetary policies
The deterioration in budget positions has placed consid-
erable stress on the EU’s framework for fiscal surveil-
lance and three Member States have been placed in
excessive deficit positions. In response to these develop-
ments, and in line with a mandate from the Barcelona
European Council conclusions, the Commission adopted
a communication on strengthening the coordination of
budgetary policies (1). It identified a number of short-
comings with the implementation of the SGP in the first
four years of EMU and outlined a strategy based on
Member States reassuming political ownership of the
Pact. Inter alia, it called for more account to be taken of
underlying economic conditions when assessing budget-
ary positions, an interpretation of compliance with SGP
requirements that would (depending on country-specific
circumstances) cater for the budgetary impact of reforms
that enhance growth and employment, increasing the
emphasis placed on the sustainability of public finances
and outstanding debt positions, and improving the
implementation of the SGP, including stricter and more
timely recourse to the existing enforcement instruments.
At the same time, the Commission adopted proposals to
improve the governance of budgetary statistics which
provide the foundations for effective surveillance.
The European Council of March 2003 
endorsed key conclusions of the Ecofin Council
The spring European Council of March 2003, endorsed
a report of the (Ecofin) Council which shared many of
the Commission’s proposals on strengthening the coor-
dination of budgetary policies. It confirmed that the
achievement of a budget position of ‘close to balance or
in surplus’ is in the economic self-interest of Member
States both individually and collectively. In the short
run, it provides room for the automatic stabilisers to
operate freely and cushion the effect of economic
shocks; in the medium run it creates room for budgetary
manoeuvre to either cut taxes or divert expenditures to
more productive items such as investment and R&D; in
the long run, compliance will help Member States meet
the budgetary costs of ageing population while securing
adequate and accessible pensions and healthcare.
In addition to re-stating their commitment to the goal of
the SGP, the Council agreed that compliance with the
‘close to balance or in surplus’ requirement should be
assessed in cyclically-adjusted terms with due account
taken of one-off budgetary measures which only have a
transitory impact on budget positions. For euro-area
countries, agreement was reached that Member States
with deficits should achieve an annual improvement in
the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit of at least 0.5 % of
GDP until the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ require-
ment is reached. It underlined the need for automatic sta-
bilisers to operate symmetrically over the economic
cycle and the particular importance of avoiding a pro-
cyclical loosening of fiscal policies in good times. The
Council also confirmed the importance of running down
public debt at a satisfactory pace towards the 60 % of
GDP reference value and that the existing provisions of
the Treaty (i.e. the debt criterion of the excessive deficit
procedure) can contribute to achieving this goal. 
An opportunity to ensure consistent 
and transparent budgetary strategies
To ensure that the agreement of the European Council
represents a real progress towards a consistent and trans-
parent implementation of SGP, it is essential that the pol-
icy guidelines endorsed by the European Council, and
the specific budgetary commitments given by Member
States in their updated stability and convergence pro-
gramme, are respected. 
To this end, policies adopted at national level need to
respect the budgetary goals agreed at EU level. In
doing so, budgetary consolidation strategies need to be
¥1∂ Communication from the Commission ‘Strengthening the coordination of
budgetary policies’, COM(2002) 668 final of 27 November 2002.2
S u m m a r y  a n d  m a i n  c o n c l u s i o n sdesigned in a way that tackle, and do not exacerbate,
structural weaknesses leading to slow growth and missed
employment opportunities. This requires careful design
as regards the balance between measures on the revenue
and expenditure side, and choices on the composition of
public expenditures. Contrary to what is often argued,
the existing framework for budgetary surveillance can
simultaneously achieve a consistent approach that bal-
ances the need for budgetary consolidation, re-igniting
the recovery and strengthening growth potential. 
Significant advances have been made 
in the framework for budgetary surveillance 
This year’s report on Public finances in EMU — 2003
highlights three areas where substantial progress has
been made in the framework for budgetary surveillance
over the past year: (i) the integration of candidate coun-
tries into the EU’s fiscal surveillance framework, (ii) an
increased focus on the sustainability of public finances,
and (iii), an improvement in the governance of budgetary
statistics. These advances show that tangible progress
can be made to the benefit of Member States and the EU
as whole when there is a political will to do so. It also
shows that the framework for budgetary surveillance is
capable of evolving in the light of growing experience
and new policy challenges. 
Integrating acceding and candidate countries 
into the EU’s fiscal surveillance framework 
With 10 countries set to join the EU in 2004, a major
policy challenge is to prepare for their integration into the
EU economic policy framework, in particular for budget-
ary surveillance. A key requirement has been to develop
reliable government accounts and economic forecasts on
a par with existing EU countries. At the same time, the
EU surveillance of budgetary developments needs to
develop so that appropriate account is taken of the impor-
tant structural and institutional changes underway in
accession countries. These are partly due to the comple-
tion of the transition from a command to a market econ-
omy and partly due to the additional effects which EU
membership will entail (associated with the need to
upgrade public infrastructure and the commitment to
implement the acquis communautaire). 
Clear strides have been taken in recent years, although
budgetary data are still neither fully comparable across
countries nor completely in line with EU definitions.
Data reported by the candidate countries and forecasts
prepared by the Commission services indicate that budg-
etary developments are closely mirroring those in the
EU, with nominal and cyclically-adjusted budget deficits
in 2002 rising in most countries. Looking ahead to 2003
and 2004, the Commission forecast of spring 2003 envis-
ages an improvement in the budgetary balances of nine
countries, with marked deficit reductions forecasted in
Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey, and to a more limited
extent in Malta. However, very limited improvements in
budget balances are projected in the Czech Republic,
Poland and Cyprus.
An important step to integrate the candidate countries
into the existing surveillance process was completed in
November 2002, when the second set of pre-accession
economic programmes (PEPs) submitted by candidate
countries were examined. The annual programmes out-
line the medium-term policy framework, including pub-
lic finance objectives and structural reform priorities,
and moreover provide an opportunity for candidate
countries to develop their institutional and analytical
capacity. The 2002 updates revealed an improved effort
to develop a consistent and credible medium-term
macroeconomic framework, although further analytical
capacity building is called for.
The sustainability of public finances received 
increased prominence in the assessment 
of sustainability and convergence programmes
Progress has also been made as regards placing
increased emphasis on the sustainability of public
finances in the SGP as requested by the 2001 Stockholm
European Council. For the second time, an assessment of
the sustainability of public finances was carried out on
the basis of budgetary targets and measures announced
in the 2002 updates to stability and convergence pro-
grammes leading to firm policy conclusions by the
Council. The policy conclusions, which are based on
quantitative indicators and long-run budgetary projec-
tions prepared by the Economic Policy Committee and
national authorities, are worrying. 
Even assuming that all Member States achieve the
budget targets for 2006 set down in their stability or con-
vergence programmes, there is a risk of unsustainable
public finances emerging in about half the EU Member
States, especially Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain,
France, Italy, Austria and Portugal. To ensure sustaina-
ble public finances, Member States with deficits first
need to achieve and sustain the SGP goal of budget posi-
tions of ‘close to balance or in surplus’. Furthermore,
preliminary estimates by the Commission show that an
additional permanent budgetary adjustment of between3
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States where the sustainability of public finances is a
concern. To close this financing gap, governments
should try to avoid raising taxes (especially on labour),
and concentrate efforts on reducing (in terms of ratio to
GDP) age-related expenditure by reforming of pension
and healthcare systems and/or reducing non-age-related
primary spending while increasing employment rates
and fostering growth.
Progress has been made on the governance 
of budgetary statistics
The quality of economic statistics is crucial to ensure an
adequate understanding of the economic situation and
effective policy making. Budgetary statistics are the
foundation of the EU fiscal surveillance tools and their
quality has improved considerably over the last decade.
Government accounts are now more reliable, complete,
transparent and detailed, and are published in a much
more timely fashion than when the excessive deficit pro-
cedure was set up. However, some weaknesses remain:
in several countries, data on government deficit and debt
ratios are not yet as reliable as they should be and are
subject to large revisions. Furthermore, the government
accounts of several Member States are not fully transpar-
ent, and there have been problems in terms of their
timely submission. These concerns are clearly amplified
with the perspective of enlargement. 
To address outstanding challenges, the (Ecofin) Council
recently agreed to implement a code of best practice (1).
From the Member States’ side, this involves increasing
the transparency of government accounts in particular
for the lower government subsectors, the strict respect of
deadlines, an overall increase in the data quality, but also
a clarification of the independence statute of the national
statistical offices as the main compilers of government
data. The Commission (Eurostat) is aiming at reinforc-
ing its ability to scrutinise the Member States’ govern-
ment accounts in more detail, and accelerating the
decision-making process for deciding upon the record-
ing of government transactions. The new steps to com-
pile quarterly budgetary statistics is a major challenge
for statisticians, but also for economists, policy-makers
and budgetary policy analysts that will need to interpret
quarterly data with due care, since these will necessarily
be more volatile and perhaps less transparent than annual
data. 
The Commission role in upgrading the analysis 
of economic and budgetary policies 
In its communication on strengthening the coordination
of budgetary policies, the Commission committed itself
to upgrading the analysis of economic and budgetary
policies. To this end, a number of detailed studies are
contained in the report Public finances in EMU — 2003
as follows.
• Firstly, the report examines the impact of budgetary
consolidation on growth. It considers whether the
assertion that budgetary consolidation has a nega-
tive impact on output is always valid, or whether fis-
cal consolidations in EMU under certain conditions
can have a positive effect on output.
• Secondly, and as part of the effort to focus on the
quality of public finances, the report analyses public
investment. It examines the reasons why public
investment as a share of GDP has fallen in recent
decades and whether this is in part due to the process
of budgetary consolidation and the development of
fiscal rules at EU level. It also analyses the link
between public investment and productivity, and
considers the merits and feasibility of developing
specific provisions for public investment within the
EU’s framework for budgetary surveillance.
• A third chapter examines various aspects of the chal-
lenge facing national authorities in ensuring sound
public finances. It reviews the experience of Mem-
ber States in using expenditure rules as an instru-
ment to better manage public finances and improve
their quality. In addition, the chapter examines how
the allocation of public finance functions across dif-
ferent levels of governments influences the capacity
of Member States to fulfil their budgetary commit-
ments at EU level. This analysis is a good example
of the role of the Commission in undertaking com-
parative cross-country analyses that enable Member
States to learn from the experiences and best prac-
tices of other countries. 
Is fiscal consolidation always contractionary? 
While there is a broad consensus among both academics
and policy-makers on the need for fiscal discipline to
ensure the smooth functioning of EMU and provide
¥1∂ Conclusions of the 2 485th Council meeting, Economic and Financial
Affairs, Brussels, 18 February 2003.4
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tion, concerns have been expressed that budgetary
consolidation could have a negative effect on output in
the short run. This issue is relevant given the need for
several Member States to reduce large cyclically-
adjusted budget deficits, especially against the current
background of slow economic growth.
An empirical analysis of the experiences of EU Member
States, however, demonstrates that roughly half of the
episodes of fiscal consolidation undertaken in the past
three decades have been accompanied by an acceleration
in economic growth. These findings appear to be consist-
ent with theories that identify a positive impact of budg-
etary consolidation on consumer expectations of lower
taxes in the future inducing them to raise their consump-
tion plans, and/or on business expectations of higher
profitability enabling them to raise investment. Confi-
dence factors may play a more prominent role in the
future in the light of large unfunded pension liabilities. 
Simulations using the QUEST model confirm that if
appropriately designed, budgetary consolidation can
contribute significantly to the goal of the Lisbon strategy
in terms of raising output and employment in the
medium term. Budgetary consolidation has a slight
contractionary effect on output in the short run, depend-
ing on the composition of the budgetary adjustment.
However, budgetary consolidation has a positive impact
on output in the medium run if it takes place in the form
of expenditure retrenchment rather than tax increases.
Moreover, the effect of budgetary consolidation on out-
put could be reinforced, and even positive, in the short
run if fiscal consolidation is combined with structural
reform of factor and product markets and accompanied
with an accommodating monetary stance. Indeed, budg-
etary consolidation often acts as a catalyst for structural
reforms. 
Public investment 
Public investment as a share of GDP has fallen in most
industrialised countries in recent decades. It has been
claimed that the budgetary requirements of the Treaty
and SGP result in public investment expenditures being
at excessively low levels, and that a sustained growth in
public investment expenditures would improve the EU’s
growth potential. However, an analysis shows that the
decline in public investment rates is a long-run tendency
that started already in the 1970s, and affected all indus-
trialised countries and not just EU Member States.
Declining levels of public investment as a share of GDP
have been attributed to factors such as increased levels of
economic development (with developed countries already
having a high stock of physical capital and the emphasis
switching towards investment in human capital (1)) and
the changing boundaries between public and private
investment (in part linked to the process of privatisa-
tion). Some of the decline in public investment levels
appears to be related to efforts to consolidate public
finances, which was necessary irrespective of EMU. A
careful analysis of the data, however, fails to show any
clear-cut link between change in investment ratios and
the provisions of the EU’s framework for fiscal surveil-
lance. Indeed public investment expenditures in many
Member States have stopped falling after the beginning
of monetary union. 
Public investment can make an important contribution to
meet the output and employment goals of the Lisbon
strategy. However, in considering the links between pub-
lic investment and growth, it is important to focus on net
as opposed to gross investment levels (that is, taking
account of the depreciation of the existing capital stock)
and also the interaction between trends in public and pri-
vate investment level. Existing studies reveal that public
investment has a positive impact on output and produc-
tivity, although the results are not very strong. This is
explained by the fact that only a fraction of public invest-
ment expenditures are devoted to projects which aim at
directly raising productivity (for example, investment in
transport infrastructure), whereas a significant propor-
tion of public investment is devoted to projects that pur-
sue other objectives such as environmental protection or
redistribution across regions, which have an indirect
contribution to productivity. 
The important role of public investment is recognised in
the existing framework for budgetary surveillance: for
example, Member States are required to specify planned
public investment levels in their annual updates to stabil-
ity and convergence programmes and the BEPGs fre-
quently recommend that an increased share of public
expenditures be devoted to productive items. In brief, the
budget balance requirements of Treaty and SGP are
compatible with a high share of public spending being
devoted to public investment. The recent Commission
communication on strengthening the coordination of
budgetary polices sought to cater for the budgetary
¥1∂ Communication from the Commission ‘Investing efficiently in education
and training: an imperative for Europe’, COM(2002) 779. 5
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time respecting the commitment to sound and sustaina-
ble public finances (1).
Several calls have been made to introduce a so-called
golden rule into the SGP, which would allow govern-
ments to borrow to finance investment. However, there
are strong theoretical and practical arguments against its
introduction, especially in a framework of multilateral
surveillance such as the SGP. First, a golden rule based
on a national accounts system could lead to a bias in
expenditure decisions in favour of physical capital and
against spending on human capital (education, training)
or other productive items (healthcare, R&D) which also
contribute to growth and employment. Secondly, if
applied to gross investment, depending on the specific
design and implementation of the reform, the adoption of
a golden rule into the SGP framework may imply sub-
stantially higher deficits, thus compromising the objec-
tive of sustainability of public finances. Finally, the rel-
evant concept for the application of the golden rule
would be net investment. However, it is not always pos-
sible to compute reliable, comparable and timely data on
this type of investment. 
There is a growing practice of financing public purpose
investment projects through public–private partnerships
(PPPs). A large share of the PPPs in the EU finance
infrastructure and supplement public investment (2). The
main implication for public finances of choosing PPPs as
opposed to traditional public investment is, in fact, that
of converting up-front fixed expenditures into a stream
of future obligations. This practice has a sound micro-
economic rationale in that it can lead to increased effi-
ciency without compromising public objectives. It is
important, however, to avoid recourse to PPPs where
this is solely motivated by a desire to bypass budgetary
constraints by putting capital spending outside govern-
ment budgets. This could lead to PPP projects which
entail higher overall costs, which would not be in line
with the objective of sustainable public finances. Efforts
are also required to ensure transparency in national
accounts.
Efforts at national level to meet EU budgetary 
requirements: expenditure rules and fiscal relations 
across different levels of governments
Many Member States in recent years have introduced
expenditure rules as a means to improve the manage-
ment of their public finances, mostly in the form of
ex  ante targets rather than binding legal obligations.
National expenditure rules can enable Member States to
meet the budget balance requirements of the Treaty and
SGP by helping them to better control expenditure items
that are subject to overruns. The specific design and the
strength of the enforcement mechanisms are key to their
effectiveness. Depending on their design, they can also
contribute to other policy objectives such as avoiding a
pro-cyclical loosening of fiscal policy in good times, and
improving the quality of the composition of public
spending. 
There is a great deal of variety in the design of expendi-
ture rules across EU Member States, as regards the types
of expenditure covered by a rule, the time frame
involved and the robustness of surveillance and enforce-
ment mechanisms. Preliminary empirical analysis indi-
cates that the existing expenditure rules have not had a
visible impact on trends in public spending. However,
judging compliance with expenditure rules is difficult as
in many cases they cover several years and are subject to
revisions. In some countries, expenditure rules are not
ambitious enough and adherence with them is easily
reached: in other cases, the rule has been adjusted or
abandoned if it is perceived as being too ambitious.
Overall, even a relatively weak expenditure rule can pro-
vide useful guidance and signals to actors involved in the
budgetary process. 
The Treaty and SGP requirements are defined in terms of
the budget balance of the general government (that is,
central and local/state governments and social security),
although the specific budget targets in stability and
convergence programmes are set by the central govern-
ment. The challenge in meeting EU budgetary require-
ments is therefore affected by the way in which Mem-
ber States allocate fiscal functions (both revenues and
expenditures) across different levels of government.
This is especially the case in federal countries and the
Member States where local authorities have considera-
ble budgetary autonomy. The contribution of sub-central
authorities to the overall budget position is changing in a
number of countries in light of efforts to devolve certain
public functions to regional/local authorities. 
¥1∂ The Council has shown some flexibility in interpreting compliance with
the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ requirement to reflect significant
planned increases in public investment programmes.
¥2∂ See also communication from the Commission ‘Developing the trans-
European transport network: innovative funding solutions: interoperatibil-
ity of electronic toll collection systems’, COM(2003) 132 of 24 April 2003.6
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the general government deficit is generally limited since
all Member States apply restrictions to local government
borrowing: the exception is Germany, where net borrow-
ing by local and state governments accounts for nearly
half of the general government budget deficit in 2002.
However, it should be borne in mind that de facto central
governments often have to bear the cost of financing dif-
ficulties that emerge at sub-central level. To help comply
with the EU’s fiscal rules, the federal Member States and
Italy and Spain have recently introduced arrangements
that aim at coordinating the budgetary position across
levels of government (usually referred to as national
stability pacts). More experience with the implementa-
tion of these arrangements is needed before conclusions
can be drawn on their effectiveness in contributing to the
objectives of the EU fiscal framework. A priori, a strong
legal base and enforcement mechanism would be
expected to contribute to the credibility and effective-
ness of the arrangements.
The process of decentralising responsibility for some
policies raises a second issue in the context of EMU,
namely the operation of automatic stabilisers. Experi-
ence shows that, in general, systems are designed to
shield sub-national governments from cyclical varia-
tions. However, empirical evidence for the US and Ger-
many suggests some degree of pro-cyclical behaviour at
the level of the states. Further research would be useful
to analyse the possible interaction between fiscal decen-
tralisation and automatic stabilisation and to identify the
best practices to reconcile the process of decentralisation
with ensuring sound and sustainable public finances7

Part I
Current developments and prospects

Summary
Against a background of a prolonged period of low
growth, 2002 and the early part of 2003 has been a diffi-
cult period in terms of actual budgetary developments.
The nominal deficit for the euro area increased from
1.6 % of GDP in 2001 to 2.2 % in 2002 and is forecast to
rise to 2.5 % of GDP in 2003, according to the latest
Commission forecast. However, this aggregate outcome
is the result of striking contrasts in the performance
across Member States. By the end of 2002, only six EU
countries, including four euro area countries (accounting
for under 18 % of euro area output), had achieved budget
positions in both nominal and cyclically-adjusted terms
that respected the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ require-
ment of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP): in contrast,
two euro area countries accounting for half of the euro
area output had nominal deficits above 3 % of GDP.
Among the countries recording high deficits, Portugal
succeeded in reducing the nominal deficit from 4.1 % of
GDP in 2001 to 2.7 % in 2002, although very significant
challenges remain concerning 2003 as much of this
improvement is due to one-off measures such as a tax
amnesty. A deficit of 3.6 % of GDP in 2002 has resulted
in Germany being placed in an excessive deficit position,
and while the authorities are taking measures aimed at
reducing the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit, only a
very limited improvement is expected in 2003 as growth
conditions deteriorate. Despite clear evidence of budget-
ary slippage emerging in early 2002, the failure of
French authorities to take corrective measures resulted in
a deficit of 3.1 % of GDP in 2002: recent forecasts show
an even higher deficit for 2003 at 3.7 % of GDP, and that
the deficit in 2004 would be 3.5 % in 2004, that is, still
above the reference value of the Treaty. Large deficits
remain in Italy (2.3 % of GDP in 2002) and the deficit
level is projected to remain unchanged in 2003 and be
above the 3 % of GDP reference value by 2004: budget-
ary consolidation efforts in Italy continue to rely on one-
off measures rather than reforms of a structural nature
needed to ensure a permanent improvement in the
budget balance. Deficits have also re-emerged in coun-
tries that already had reached balanced budget positions,
notably Austria (0.6 % of GDP in 2002), the Netherlands
(1.1 %) and also in the UK (1.3 %). These three coun-
tries are forecast to record an important deterioration of
the deficit in 2003. 
At first sight, these developments compare relatively
favourably with previous economic downturns when
deficits reached much higher levels and debt ratios
entered rapidly increasing trajectories. In addition, gov-
ernments have not pursued fine-tuning policies and
while fiscal policies were slightly looser, monetary
conditions have eased thanks mainly to low real interest
rates. 
However, a closer consideration of underlying budget-
ary trends reveals that the deterioration in nominal def-
icits results from high and rising cyclically-adjusted
deficits in several countries. This indicates a discre-
tionary loosening of the fiscal stance by some Member
States, brought about by a combination of unfunded tax
cuts, discretionary expenditure increases and slippages
as regards budgetary execution. While the outcome of
the euro area in 2002 was unchanged compared to 2001,
it should be noted that the cyclically-adjusted budget
balance for 2001 has recently been revised upwards to
2.1 from 1.5 % of GDP, implying that the deterioration
in the underlying budget balance in that year was consid-
erably worse than earlier estimates showed: moreover,
the cyclically-adjusted budget balance includes the impact
of one-off budgetary measures which only have a transi-
tory effect on budget positions. The deterioration has been
particularly pronounced in Germany (where the CAB
increased to 3.2 % of GDP in 2002) and France (to 3.3 %).
In Italy it has improved but remained high (at 2.1 %). 
In a medium-term perspective, the latest updates of the
stability and convergence programmes contain a com-
mitment to reach the target of ‘close to balance or in sur-
plus’, both in actual and structural terms, by 2005 or
2006, although this is not explicitly stated by all Member11
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term targets of Member States are based on growth
assumptions, which in light of developments in recent
months now appear to be optimistic. For countries where
large underlying deficits remain, the date for reaching
the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ objective has been
pushed back to 2006 or 2007, and even this deadline will
only be met if additional consolidation measures are
undertaken. It is vital therefore that all efforts are made
to achieve these goals and maintain sound positions over
the medium term. This requires that budgetary consoli-
dation resumes vigorously as soon as growth picks up in
order to achieve the agreed objectives by the deadlines in
the programmes. Meeting these targets will allow all
Member States to let automatic stabilisers operate freely
during future cyclical downturns thereby mitigating the
policy dilemma that countries in deficit faced in 2002
and 2003. 
EU budgetary surveillance, for the second time, includes
a systematic assessment of the sustainability of public
finances on the basis of the updated stability and conver-
gence programmes submitted in late 2002. The analysis
shows that there is a risk of unsustainable public finances
in some half of EU countries, notably Belgium, Ger-
many, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria, and Portu-
gal. With a fast-closing window of opportunity prior to
the budgetary impact of ageing populations taking hold,
the risk of unsustainable public finances will increase
substantially higher if Member States with large deficits
do not achieve and sustain the budgetary consolidation
plans outlined in their stability and convergence pro-
grammes. In Spain and Greece, a substantial share of the
risk of emerging budgetary imbalances is due to a very
large projected increase in pension expenditure. In sev-
eral Member States (notably Germany, France, Austria
and Portugal) the risk of emerging budgetary imbalances
is a combination of factors including a projected increase
in public spending on pensions and healthcare, a slowing
in the pace of debt reduction and relatively low labour-
force participation rates of older workers. High-debt
countries (Belgium, Greece and Italy) face a particular
set of challenges, because they must be able to sustain
large primary surpluses over several decades. Several
Member States appear to have sustainable public finances
including Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Fin-
land, Sweden and the UK, but they nonetheless face
budgetary challenges as a result of ageing populations:
for example, the maintenance of high tax ratios at over
50 % of GDP raises concern about competitiveness in
the long run, and in some countries the financial sustain-
ability of the pension system depends on the perform-
ance of private pensions.
The framework for budgetary surveillance at EU level is
being prepared for the accession of 10 countries to the
EU in May 2004. The aggregate general government
deficit of these 10 countries widened but is projected to
improve in 2003 and 2004. Despite a significant acceler-
ation in growth, however, the projected reduction in the
aggregate deficit of the 10 acceding countries is not
sufficient to reverse the deterioration recorded in 2002.
This suggests that structural, rather than cyclical, factors
underlie current budgetary imbalances. Concerning the
13 candidate countries as a whole, the aggregate budget
position is influenced to a large extent by the exceptional
advance recorded in 2002 and forecast for the coming
years in Turkey.
Looking at the pre-accession economic programmes
submitted by candidate countries, an improvement by
2005 is envisaged in the large majority of cases. Nine
countries plan to reduce their budget deficits by 2005,
leading to a fall in the average deficit. Among the four
remaining countries, Bulgaria and Estonia plan to move
from a small surplus to a balanced budget, leaving only
Latvia and the Czech Republic with a projected increase
in the general government deficit over the programme
period. In 2005, projected budget outcomes would vary
from a balanced budget in Bulgaria and Estonia to a def-
icit of 5.5 % of GDP in the Czech Republic. Among the
candidate countries, only the Czech Republic, Malta and
the Slovak Republic refrained from targeting a deficit
below 3 % of GDP in 2005. According to the programmes,
general government debt-to-GDP ratios would fall or
remain virtually stable in all countries, with the excep-
tion of the Czech Republic and Poland where the debt-
to-GDP ratio is projected to rise considerably by the end
of the programme period. By 2005, however, all candi-
date countries with the exception of Malta and Turkey
would have a debt-to-GDP ratio below 60 %.12
1. Budgetary developments in the euro area 
and EU Member States 
1.1. Short-term developments 
and prospects for the budget balance 
and public debt 
In 2002, the euro-area budget position deteriorated again
(see Table I.1). The actual deficit reached 2.2 % of GDP,
0.6 % of GDP higher than the outcome in 2001, a devel-
opment which is largely explained by the working of the
automatic stabilisers in a period of slowing growth. The
euro-area cyclically-adjusted budget deficit in 2002
remained high at 2.2 % of GDP, almost unchanged from
2001. 
At first sight, this outcome does not appear to be unduly
negative against a background of slow growth. However,
it should be noted that the cyclically-adjusted budget bal-
ance figure for 2001 has recently been revised upwards to
2.1 from 1.5 % of GDP, implying that the deterioration in
the underlying budget balance in that year was consider-
ably worse than earlier estimates showed. Moreover, the
cyclically-adjusted budget balance includes the impact of
one-off budgetary measures which only have a transitory
effect on budget positions. Overall, this points to an
underlying budget position of the euro area which is less
favourable than in 1999–2000. 
The aggregate outcome for the euro area as a whole is the
result of striking contrasts in budgetary performance
across Member States. As shown on Table I.2, the
budget positions of Germany, France, Portugal and Italy
remained weak with deficits ranging from 2.3 % of GDP
in Italy to 3.6 % of GDP in Germany. As a result of the
developments in the course of 2002, Germany and Por-
tugal have already been placed in an excessive deficit
position (1) and the procedure has been launched against
France (see Part II.1 of this report). In contrast, six EU
Member States, and four in the euro area, had actual
budget positions in balance or in surplus in 2002. In spite
of the continued slowdown in growth, actual budget bal-
ances in 2002 did not deteriorate (or did so only margin-
ally) compared to the previous year in Belgium, Greece,
Spain, Finland, Italy (although this is because of a large
upward revision in the recorded deficit level for 2001)
and Portugal (partially as the result of one-off measures). 
Looking ahead to 2003 and 2004, the Commission fore-
cast of spring 2003 projects that economic growth in 2003
will remain below potential. The budget balance for the
euro area as a whole is expected to deteriorate further to
2.5 % of GDP, and to remain at a similar level in 2004. 
Developments in Member States show that Belgium,
Spain, Ireland and Luxembourg are expected to move
into small budget deficit positions in 2003. Under a no-
policy change assumption, Belgium and Spain are pro-
jected to move back towards a position of balance in
2004, while in Ireland and Luxembourg the deficit
would deteriorate further to around 1 % of GDP. 
On the basis of current policies, the Commission fore-
casts that Germany, France, Italy and Portugal will
have deficit levels above the 3 % of GDP reference
value in 2003 and/or in 2004. The budget deficit in
Germany is forecast to remain above 3 % of GDP in
2003, and to move only slightly below the reference
value in 2004. The situation in France is more worry-
ing, since the deficit is forecast to increase further in
2003 and remain well above 3 % of GDP in 2004 in
contradiction with the requirements of the excessive
deficit procedure. After the large reduction in the Por-
tuguese deficit in 2002, the balance is expected to dete-
riorate in 2003 and remain above 3 % of GDP in 2004.
The deficit in Italy is projected to breach the 3 % of
GDP reference value in 2004.        ¥1∂ The latter for the 2001 deficit discovered only late in 2002.13
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General government budgetary position — euro area, 1999–2004
(% of GDP)
1999 2000 (1) 2001 (1) 2002 2003 2004
Total receipts (1) 47.5 47.2 46.5 46.2 46.1 45.9
Total expenditure (2) 48.9 47.1 48.1 48.4 48.6 48.3
Actual balance (3) = (1) – (2) – 1.3 0.1 – 1.6 – 2.2 – 2.5 – 2.4
Interest (4) 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.5
Primary balance (5) = (3) + (4) 2.9 4.1 2.3 1.5 1.1 1.1
UTMS proceeds 1.1 0.0 0.0
Cyclically-adjusted balance (6) – 1.7 – 1.8 – 2.1 – 2.2 – 2.0 – 2.0
Cyclically-adj. prim. balance = (6) + (4) 2.6 2.2 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.5
Change in actual balance: 1.0 1.4 – 1.7 – 0.6 – 0.3 0.1
Due to — Cycle 0.3 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.4 0.1
— UMTS 1.1 – 1.1
— Interest 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
— Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.3 0.1 – 0.1
(1) Including UMTS receipts. UMTS receipts as a % of GDP would be equal in 2000 to 2.5 for DE, 0.1 for ES, 1.2 for IT, 0.7 for NL, 0.4 for AT, 0.3 for PT,
2.4 for UK, 1.1 for the euro area and 1.2 for the EU-15. In 2001, they would be equal to 0.2 for BE, 0.2 for DK, 0.5 for EL, 0.1 for FR, and 0 for the euro area and
the EU-15. In 2002, they would be equal to 0 for FR, 0.2 for IE and 0 for the euro area and EU-15.
NB: differences are due to rounding. 
Source: Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
Table I.2
Budget balances in EU Member States, 2001–04 
(% of GDP)
Budget balance, 
excluding UMTS
Cyclically-adjusted 
budget balance
Cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004
BE 0.3 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 6.2 6.1 5.7 4.9
DE – 2.8 – 3.6 – 3.4 – 2.9 – 3.0 – 3.3 – 2.6 – 2.4 0.3 – 0.1 0.6 0.8
EL – 1.9 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.0 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 1.9 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.0
ES – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.1 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.4
FR – 1.6 – 3.1 – 3.7 – 3.5 – 2.2 – 3.3 – 3.5 – 3.3 0.9 – 0.3 – 0.3 0.1
IE 1.2 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.9 0.0 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.1 1.5 0.4 1.2 1.6
IT – 2.6 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 3.1 – 3.1 – 2.1 – 1.8 – 2.7 3.3 3.6 3.5 2.4
LU 6.4 2.6 – 0.2 – 1.2 4.1 2.0 0.5 – 0.3 4.4 2.3 0.7 – 0.2
NL 0.1 – 1.1 – 1.6 – 2.4 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.1 2.5 2.2 2.6 1.8
AT 0.3 – 0.6 – 1.1 – 0.4 0.0 – 0.6 – 1.0 – 0.4 3.5 2.9 2.5 3.0
PT – 4.2 – 2.7 – 3.5 – 3.2 – 4.6 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.9
FI 5.1 4.7 3.3 3.0 4.2 4.8 3.7 3.3 7.0 7.0 5.8 5.4
EUR-12 – 1.6 – 2.2 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 2.2 – 2.0 – 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.5
DK 2.8 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.3 1.9 2.0 2.2 6.3 5.5 5.3 5.4
SE 4.5 1.3 0.8 1.2 3.6 0.9 1.1 1.5 6.8 3.8 3.9 4.2
UK 0.8 – 1.3 – 2.5 – 2.5 0.7 – 1.0 – 2.0 – 2.0 3.1 1.1 0.0 0.0
EU-15 – 0.9 – 1.9 – 2.3 – 2.2 – 1.4 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 1.8 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.4
NB: Concerning UMTS receipts, see footnote to Table I.1. Cyclically-adjusted figures are computed with the production function method, except for Germany, Spain,
Luxembourg and Austria, where the HP filter method has been used.
Source: Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.14
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in the UK it is projected to deteriorate to 2.5 % of GDP
in 2003 and 2004, while in the Netherlands the deterio-
ration would be progressive, to reach 2.4 % of GDP
in 2004.
In cyclically-adjusted terms, the deficit of the euro area
would decrease slightly in 2003 to 2.0 % of GDP and
remain unchanged in 2004, which underlines the fact
that the budgetary consolidation process has stalled in
recent years. At national level, the cyclically-adjusted
deficit is projected to remain above 3 % of GDP in
France, while in Italy it is expected to move close to that
level by 2004. Germany and Portugal are forecast to
move below 3 % of GDP by that year. Six euro-area
countries and eight EU Member States are expected to
comply in cyclically-adjusted terms with the ‘close to
balance or in surplus’ requirement of the SGP by 2004.
The negative effect of the cycle on the nominal balances
is expected to diminish progressively in 2004 (see
Table I.1), so that by that year nominal budgets in many
countries would be close to balance as well.
After stabilising in 2002, the general government gross
debt level of the euro area is expected to increase slightly
in 2003 to just below 70 % of GDP (see Table I.3). Debt
reduction should resume in 2004, but at a very slow pace
due to the large negative contribution of the interest rate-
growth rate differential and an insufficiently high pri-
mary surplus. Stock-flow operations — although modest
— would increase debt ratios. 
This overall picture conceals very different situations
across Member States. Italy, Belgium, and Greece
continue to have debt ratios above the 100 % of GDP. By
2004, only Italy should have a debt level above 100 % of
GDP. In Greece, debt increasing financial operations of
the government, as reflected in the large stock-flow com-
ponent, would offset to a large extent the positive contri-
butions of the primary balance and GDP growth. A high
deficit and the poor growth performance will impact the
debt developments in Germany where the debt ratio
went above 60 % of GDP in 2002, as well as in France
and in Portugal where the reference value is projected to
be breached in 2003 and 2004, respectively. In Austria,
Table I.3
Composition of changes in government debt ratio, in EU Member States, 2001–04 
(% of GDP)
Gross debt
Change in gross debt 
2002–04
Change in 2002–04 due to
2001 2002 2003 2004 Primary balance
Interest 
and growth 
contribution
stock flow 
adjustment
BE 108.5 105.3 102.7 98.9 – 6.3 – 10.1 3.4 0.4
DE 59.5 60.8 62.7 63.0 2.1 – 0.1 3.8 – 1.5
EL 107.0 104.9 101.0 97.0 – 7.9 – 8.0 – 4.3 4.4
ES 56.9 54.0 52.5 50.5 – 3.5 – 4.6 – 0.8 1.9
FR 56.8 59.1 61.8 63.1 4.0 0.7 2.8 0.5
IE 36.8 33.3 33.3 33.3 0.0 – 1.5 – 1.8 3.1
IT 109.5 106.7 106.0 104.7 – 2.0 – 5.0 2.3 0.6
LU 5.6 5.3 4.1 3.4 – 1.9 1.1 0.0 – 3.0
NL 52.8 52.6 52.4 52.8 0.2 – 2.0 2.5 – 0.3
AT 67.3 68.7 68.5 66.8 – 1.9 – 5.4 3.0 0.5
PT 55.6 58.1 59.4 60.2 2.1 0.7 1.3 0.1
FI 43.8 42.7 42.3 41.4 – 1.3 – 10.5 1.2 8.0
EUR-12 69.2 69.2 69.9 69.6 0.4 – 2.3 2.4 0.3
DK 45.4 45.2 42.7 39.9 – 5.3 – 10.4 3.2 2.0
SE 54.4 52.6 50.9 49.5 – 3.1 – 7.4 1.2 3.0
UK 38.9 38.4 39.0 39.8 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.0
EU-15 62.9 62.7 63.5 63.2 0.6 – 2.0 2.7 – 0.1
Source: Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.15
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2 0 0 3after the continuous increase in the debt level until 2002
to almost 69 % of GDP, debt should move onto a slow
downward path in 2003.
1.2. Government revenue and expenditure
The deterioration in the cyclically-adjusted budgetary
balance in the past two years (resulting in the euro area
moving further way from the SGP goal of ‘close to bal-
ance or in surplus’) is the result of diverging trends as
regards expenditures and revenue ratios. As shown in
Table I.4, the expenditure ratio for the euro area in cycli-
cally-adjusted terms remains static over the 2000–04
period. In contrast, cyclically-adjusted revenues for the
euro area fell from 46.5 % in 2000 to 46.1 % of GDP in
2001 (which contributed to increasing the deficit in
cyclically-adjusted terms) but started to rise to 46.4 and
46.6 % of GDP in 2002 and 2003 (which contributes to
lowering the deficit). 
At Member State level, the patterns are generally similar
to that of the euro area (Table I.5). Only in Germany and
Portugal are revenue ratios expected to increase over the
2002–04 period (although this is, to a large extent, due to
an improvement in the cyclical position). Strong
declines are set to take place in the Netherlands, Luxem-
bourg, Austria and Finland. Outside the euro area, reve-
nues in Sweden and the UK are set to increase over the
next two years, while in Denmark revenues will diminish
over the whole period. Expenditure ratios over 2002–04
are set to increase in France, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal and in particular the UK, where discre-
tionary spending measures are planned to improve
public services and address infrastructure needs.
By contrast, a marked decrease is expected in Greece,
Portugal and Denmark.
A number of lessons can be drawn from these develop-
ments. Firstly, tax reforms were introduced before Mem-
ber States had completed the transition to the ‘close to
balance or in surplus’ objective of the SGP, and there
was insufficient room for the automatic stabilisers to
operate when growth slowed down, resulting in deficits
in several Member States breaching the 3 % of GDP ref-
erence value. To prevent deficits from rising further,
several countries have had to take measures to raise
revenue ratios either by raising tax rates (such as Portu-
gal) or extending tax bases (such as Germany), thereby
reversing the effects of earlier reforms. Secondly, there
is some evidence that the relatively high growth rates
in 1999 and 2000) resulted in a degree of fiscal illusion
whereby authorities in some countries overestimated the
Table I.4
Euro area government resources and expenditures, 2000–04 
(% of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total resources 47.2 46.5 46.2 46.1 45.9
— Cyclically-adjusted 46.5 46.1 46.4 46.6 46.3
Taxes on imports and production 13.6 13.3 13.4 13.4 13.4
Current taxes on income and wealth 13.0 12.5 12.3 12.0 12.0
Social contributions 16.2 16.1 16.0 16.1 16.0
of which actual social contributions 15.1 14.9 14.9 15.0 14.9
Other resources 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.4
Total expenditure 47.1 48.1 48.4 48.6 48.3
— Cyclically-adjusted 48.3 48.2 48.4 48.5 48.2
Collective consumption 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.2
Social benefits in kind 11.7 11.7 11.8 11.9 11.8
Social transfers other than in kind 16.7 16.6 17.0 17.3 17.2
Interest 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.5
Subsidies 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2
Gross fixed capital formation 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.5
Other expenditures 2.5 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.8
NB: Including UMTS receipts, see footnote to Table I.1.
Source: Commission, 2003 spring forecast.16
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Total revenue and expenditure in EU Member States, 2001–04 
(% of GDP)
Revenue Expenditure
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004
BE 49.8 50.2 49.5 49.2 49.4 50.1 49.7 49.3
DE 45.5 45.0 45.4 45.5 48.3 48.6 48.9 48.4
EL 45.6 46.5 46.0 45.2 47.0 47.7 47.1 46.2
ES 39.2 39.6 39.3 39.5 39.3 39.6 39.8 39.6
FR 51.0 50.5 50.3 50.3 52.5 53.7 54.1 53.8
IE 35.2 33.7 33.5 32.8 34.1 33.7 34.0 33.6
IT 45.8 45.2 45.1 44.3 48.5 47.5 47.4 47.5
LU 46.6 48.1 46.0 45.1 40.2 45.5 46.3 46.4
NL 46.5 46.1 45.9 45.3 46.4 47.2 47.5 47.7
AT 52.3 51.4 51.0 50.7 52.0 52.0 52.1 51.1
PT 42.1 43.5 43.5 43.6 46.3 46.3 47.0 46.9
FI 54.2 53.9 52.8 52.0 49.0 49.2 49.5 49.0
EUR-12 46.5 46.2 46.1 45.9 48.1 48.4 48.6 48.3
DK 58.1 57.0 56.2 56.1 55.0 54.9 54.4 54.0
SE 61.7 59.5 59.9 59.7 57.2 58.2 59.1 58.5
UK 40.7 39.5 39.5 39.7 39.9 40.7 41.9 42.2
EU-15 46.1 45.6 45.6 45.4 47.0 47.4 47.8 47.6
NB: Including UMTS receipts, see footnote to Table I.1.
Source: Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
Graph I.1:  Euro area fiscal stance and cyclical conditions, 2000–04
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2 0 0 3level of structural revenues and/or the benefits that
would result from reforms of the tax system. Thirdly, tax
cuts in 1999 and 2000 were not matched by expenditure
savings, and indeed expenditure cuts made little or no
contribution to reaching the goal of budget positions of
‘close to balance or in surplus’. 
1.3. The fiscal stance and policy mix 
The fiscal stance and policy mix in the euro area
An appropriate policy mix can be defined as a combina-
tion of monetary and fiscal policies that ensures price
stability and keeps economic activity close to its poten-
tial level. In EMU, the policy mix results from a mone-
tary policy that is centralised and from fiscal policies
which are decentralised. In the euro area, national
authorities set fiscal policy at Member State level. In so
doing, national budgetary policies determine implicitly
the fiscal stance for the euro area as a whole. The aggre-
gate fiscal stance deserves special attention since it
affects the policy mix at the euro-area level, and there-
fore is one of the elements taken into account by the ECB
in setting monetary policy. In turn, the policy mix for the
euro area will have a feedback effect on the national pol-
icy mix via the common interest rate. This implies that
the policy mix needs to be assessed both from the per-
spective of the euro area as a whole and from the per-
spective of each Member State. 
Graph I.1 examines the fiscal stance (proxied by the
changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance,
CAPB) in relation to cyclical conditions (that is, the size
of the output gap (1)) for the euro area. In this graph, fis-
cal behaviour in accordance with the general philosophy
of the SGP would be represented by a line parallel to the
horizontal axis. In other words, countries would achieve
and sustain broadly balanced budgets over the economic
cycle and run a neutral fiscal policy (‘tax smoothing’).
Hence changes in the output gap would not result in
movements in the CAPB. Actual budget balances would
change reflecting the working of automatic stabilisers. In
the transition period, to the extent that a country has yet
to reach the medium-term target of the SGP, a restrictive
fiscal stance — that is, a rise in CAPB — would be
needed (2).
According to the Commission spring 2003 forecasts, the
fiscal stance loosened again slightly in 2002. This devel-
opment follows two years of a looser-than-expected fis-
cal policy (given the revision of budgetary positions con-
cerning 2001). Such a stance in the past three years,
coupled with the failure to improve cyclically-adjusted
budget balances when growth conditions were favoura-
ble, has resulted in the current economic slowdown in
nominal deficits of some Member States approaching or
breaching the 3 % of GDP reference value. Despite the
longer-than-expected economic slowdown which led
to the appearance of negative output gaps, Graph I.1
illustrates that Member States are not implementing
sizeable counter-cyclical measures. This is welcome,
as the medium-term losses of relaxing fiscal policy
would probably outweigh the uncertain short-term
gains (see Part IV on this issue). A broadly neutral fis-
cal policy stance is projected for 2003 and 2004.
Turning to the policy-mix in the euro area, Graph I.2
plots the fiscal stance on the vertical axis and on the hor-
izontal axis the monetary stance, proxied by the change
in the short-term real interest rates. Against a back-
ground of a prolonged slowdown of the global economy,
the monetary stance was loosened in 2001 and, to a more
pronounced degree, in 2002. Overall, the policy mix in
the early years of EMU has therefore been broadly
appropriate to provide conditions for economic growth
and macroeconomic stability. 
The fiscal stance and policy mix at the national level
The aggregate fiscal stance for the euro area conceals
quite disparate national responses to the economic slow-
down. Graph I.3 shows that most EU countries had a
negative output gap in 2002 as a result of growth below
potential in the 2001–02 period. 
France and Ireland loosened their stance in 2002 despite
having positive output gaps. Given the estimated level of
the output gap, the fiscal stance (in particular in Ireland)
appears to have been pro-cyclical: however, the judge-
ment on pro-cyclicality has to take into account the
uncertainty of the measure of output gap as well as the
poor economic conditions in 2002. Outside the euro
area, Sweden substantially eased the fiscal stance, in
spite of a slightly positive output gap, but in view of its
quick deterioration. 
Several EU countries loosened their fiscal policies in a
context of negative output gaps. However, the fiscal
¥1∂ In line with the Council agreement, the output gap used in this section is
computed with the production function method.
¥2∂ However, part of the adjustment towards balanced budgets may be origi-
nated by reducing interest payments.18
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exception of the UK where the policy was clearly coun-
ter-cyclical. Portugal stands out for a clearly pro-cyclical
policy in 2002, as it enacted a strong consolidation in
order to bring the deficit below 3 % from the level of
4.1 % recorded in 2001.
As pointed out above for the euro area as a whole, the
policy mix in 2002 has been slightly accommodative
with most Member States experiencing a simultaneous
loosening of the fiscal stance accompanied by declining
real interest rates: the real interest rate fell in all countries
except Finland and the Netherlands.         
While Graph I.4 shows the changes in the real short-
term interest rate, its level is also important in assessing
the policy mix. After the reductions in the nominal
interest rate decided by the ECB during 2002, the real
interest rate in the euro area (that is, the short-term
interest rate corrected by private consumption infla-
tion) was around a very low 1 % in 2002. However, this
aggregate figure for the euro area conceals significant
differences across countries due to differences in infla-
tion rates across countries. In spite of the reduction in
short-term real interest rates in 2002, real interests rates
in Germany, France, Austria and Finland were just
below 2 %, whereas in a number of countries (Greece,
Spain, Ireland and Portugal) the real interest rate
became slightly negative.
Regarding 2003, the fiscal stance is forecast to be
broadly neutral in most members of the euro area (see
Graph I.5). Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands are
expected to enact a tightening of the fiscal stance. In
stark contrast, France, Portugal and Italy — countries
which still have high budget deficits — are not expected
to make any sizeable progress towards improving their
budgetary positions in 2003. Finland, which is benefiting
from the past consolidation efforts and consequently
enjoys a large safety margin, is expected to ease the fis-
cal stance. Some pro-cyclical policy is projected for
2003 in Greece. Fiscal policy in the three countries
outside the euro area is expected to be neutral, with the
notable exception of the UK, where the fiscal stance
again is set to be loosened. 
Graph I.2:  Policy-mix in the euro area, 1999–2002
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2 0 0 3Graph I.3:  Fiscal stance and cyclical conditions in EU Member States in 2002
Graph I.4:  Policy-mix in EU Member States in 2002
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2. Overview of the 2002 updates of 
the stability and convergence programmes 
2.1. The medium-term budget targets 
The examination of the latest round of updates of the sta-
bility and convergence programmes covering the period
to 2005/06 was particularly prolonged. While for most of
the countries the assessment was completed between
January and March, the Austrian programme was only
examined in May and the Dutch programme was consid-
ered as provisional, pending the submission of a new
programme after the formation of the new government.
It should be underlined that the budgetary obligations of
the Treaty and SGP remain in force during periods when
new governments are being formed. 
To assess the reliability and ambition of budget targets
set by Member States in stability and convergence pro-
grammes, it is necessary to examine the underlying
growth assumptions on which the budgetary commit-
ment is given. The updated programmes projected a sus-
tained economic recovery in the euro area: GDP growth
would resume to 2.1 % in 2003, reach 2.6 % in 2004 and
stay at 2.7 % in the following years (see Table I.6).    
Graph I.6:  Potential and real GDP growth rate and output gaps for the euro area derived 
from the 2002 updates (1)
(1) Potential GDP growth and output gaps calculated by the Commission.
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Euro area — Growth projections and macroeconomic developments in the 2002 updates, 
and comparison with the 2001 updates and the Commission forecasts
Macroeconomic developments 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
2002 updates of the stability programmes
Real GDP growth, p.c. from previous year 1.6 1.0 2.1 2.6 2.7 2.7
GDP deflator 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8
HICP change 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.5
Employment growth 1.2 0.3 0.6 1.2 1.2 1.3
Labour productivity growth 0.3 0.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
2001 updates of the stability programmes 1.8 1.8 2.7 2.7
Difference – 0.3 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.1
Commission autumn 2002 forecast 1.4 0.8 1.8 2.6
Difference 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0
Commission spring 2003 forecast 1.5 0.9 1.0 2.3
Difference 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.3
NB: Discrepancies are due to rounding. For the 2001 updates, GDP growth rates used for Germany and the Netherlands are on the basis of the cautious scenario and of
the revised scenario, respectively. Since figures for the HICP were not available in the German programme, the Commission forecasts have been used to have a rep-
resentative aggregate.
Source: Commission services.
Table I.7
GDP growth projections in the 2002 updates
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Revision (1)
BE 0.8 0.7 2.1 2.5 2.5 – 0.5
DE 0.6 0.5 1.5 2.25 2.25 2.25 – 0.4
EL 4.1 3.8 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.6 – 0.1
ES 2.7 2.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 – 0.1
FR 1.8 1.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 – 0.4
IE 5.7 4.5 3.5 4.1 5.0 – 1.0
IT 1.8 0.6 2.3 2.9 3.0 3.0 – 0.8
LU 1.0 0.5 1.2 2.4 3.1 – 4.2
NL 1.3 0.25 0.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 – 0.9
AT 0.7 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.5 2.5 – 0.5
PT 1.6 0.7 1.3 2.7 3.1 3.5 – 0.8
FI 0.7 1.6 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.4 – 0.1
EUR-12 1.6 1.0 2.1 2.6 2.7 2.7 – 0.5
DK (2) 1.0 1.5 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.7 – 0.1
SE 1.2 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.3 – 0.1
UK (3) 2.0 1.5 2.75 3.25 3.0 – 0.1
EU-15 1.6 1.1 2.2 2.7 2.7 – 0.4
Standard deviation EUR-12 1.6 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.7
(1) Difference with respect to the 2001 updates in average growth over 2002–04. 
(2) Taking account of revised information provided by Denmark. For 2006 data provided for 2010 has been used.
(3) Mid-point of the range provided in the programme. 23
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2 0 0 3The implied euro-area potential growth would be stable
at 2.4 %. Based on these assumptions, the output gap in
2002 would be negative at 0.9 % of potential GDP and
widen further in 2003 to 1.1 %: thereafter it would close
and disappear by 2006 (see Graph I.6 and Table I.7). 
This projection contrasts markedly with the one
expected in the 2001 updates which foresaw a less
marked slowdown, and a less sizeable negative gap, so
that the output gap would already close in 2003 thanks
to the expected rebound.
The growth projections were more favourable than the
Commission’s autumn 2002 ones which provided the
basis for the assessment of the Commission and Council.
In view of the Commission spring 2003 forecasts, the
GDP growth assumptions in the programmes now seem
overly optimistic, especially for 2003 (for a comparison
concerning the euro area, see last row of Table I.6). 
Based on these growth assumption, the programmes pro-
jected that the budget balance for the euro area would
improve from a projected level of 2.2 % of GDP to below
1 % of GDP by 2005 and should reach zero in the euro
area by 2006 (see Table I.8). The overall improvement in
the budget balance relies strongly on the sizeable budget-
ary consolidation projected in the largest Member States,
such as Germany (a consolidation of 3.8 % of GDP over
the next four years in the actual balance), Italy (2.2 %) and
France (1.8 %). Also Portugal (2.3 %) and Greece (1.7 %)
foresee large improvements in the actual budget balance.
The other euro-area countries also project to improve their
budgetary position over the next four years, the only coun-
tries forecasting a deterioration were Finland which would
still post significant actual surpluses, and Ireland, where
the deficit would increase to above 1 % of GDP in 2005.
Outside the euro zone, Denmark and Sweden project to
maintain or slightly improve their surpluses over the pro-
jection period, while in the UK the deficit would remain
higher than 1.5 % in the financial year 2005–06.
Table I.8
Actual budget balances in the 2002 updates and in the Commission forecasts
(in % of GDP)
2002 updates of 
stability and convergence programmes (1)
Commission autumn 2002 
forecasts (1) (2)
Commission spring 2003 
forecasts (1)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004
BE 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 – 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1
DE – 2.8 – 3.75 – 2.75 – 1.5 – 1.0 0.0 – 3.8 – 3.1 – 2.3 – 3.6 – 3.4 – 2.9
EL – 1.2 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.4 0.2 0.6 – 1.3 – 1.1 – 1.1 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.0
ES – 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 – 0.3 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.1
FR – 1.4 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 2.7 – 2.9 – 2.5 – 3.1 – 3.7 – 3.5
IE (3) 1.6 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 1.2 – 1.2 – 1.2 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.9
IT (4) – 2.2 – 2.1 – 1.5 – 0.6 – 0.2 0.1 – 2.4 – 2.2 – 2.9 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 3.1
LU 6.1 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.1 0.5 – 1.8 – 1.9 2.6 – 0.2 – 1.2
NL 0.1 – 0.7 – 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.4 0.1 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 0.9 – 1.1 – 1.6 – 2.4
AT 0.3 – 0.6 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 1.5 – 1.1 – 1.8 – 1.6 – 1.5 – 0.6 – 1.1 – 0.4
PT – 2.8 – 2.4 – 1.9 – 1.1 – 0.5 – 3.4 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 3.5 – 3.2
FIN 4.9 3.8 2.7 2.1 2.6 2.8 3.6 3.1 3.5 4.7 3.3 3.0
EUR-12 – 1.5 – 2.2 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.1 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 1.8 – 2.2 – 2.5 – 2.4
DK (5) 2.8 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 1.8 2.1
SE 4.8 1.7 1.5 1.6 2.0 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.3 0.8 1.2
UK (6) – 0.2 – 1.8 – 2.2 – 1.7 – 1.6 – 1.1 – 1.3 – 1.4 – 1.3 – 2.5 – 2.5
EU-15 – 1.1 – 2.0 – 1.7 – 1.0 – 0.7 – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.6 – 1.9 – 2.3 – 2.2
(1) Excluding UMTS proceeds amounting in % of GDP in 2001 to: 0.1 in Belgium, 0.2 in Denmark, 0.5 in Greece, 0.1 in France; in 2002: 0.04 in France and 0.2 in
Ireland. 
(2) Based on pre-budget figures for Ireland and the UK. For 2004, on the assumption of unchanged policies.
(3) The targets for the final two years incorporate ‘contingency provisions against unforeseen developments’ — their size is 0.4 % of GDP in 2004 and 0.8 % in 2005.
(4) Including ‘future measures’ amounting to 1.6 % of GDP in 2004, 1.4 % of GDP in 2005 and 0.8 % of GDP in 2006.
(5) Including revised information provided by Denmark in the supplementary note. For 2006 used data relative to 2010. 
(6) Financial years for data in the convergence programme. Figures based on assumptions for output growth which are more prudent than those presented in Table I.7.24
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Member States (left panel of Table I.8) and by the
Commission forecast for 2003 and 2004 made in both
autumn 2002 and spring 2003 (1) (right panels) shows
that in most cases the projections in the programmes for
the budget balance are more favourable than the Com-
mission ones. This is mostly due to the more optimistic
growth assumptions presented in the national pro-
grammes. The only exceptions are Finland and, to a
much smaller extent, Ireland, reflecting their more cau-
tious growth assumptions. The differences in projected
budget balances, already noticeable for 2003, would
increase considerably in 2004 for the euro-area average.
This partly appears to be due to some Member States
incorporating planned, though not-yet-enacted, policy
measures in their projections.
Most countries provided figures for the cyclically-
adjusted budget balance (CAB) in their programmes
(see the left panel of Table I.9). The central panel of
Table I.9 shows the cyclically-adjusted balances com-
puted by the Commission and used in the individual
assessment of the programmes. According to these fig-
ures, the cyclically-adjusted balance of the euro area,
which deteriorated to 1.9 % of GDP in 2002, is projected
to increase by roughly  % of GDP per year over the
coming years. This is clearly more optimistic than what
was forecast by the Commission in autumn 2002 (2). 
According to the Commission calculations, of the nine
countries showing a cyclically-adjusted budget deficit in
2002 in the euro area, four are projecting to be in deficit
in 2006 (Germany, France, Austria and Portugal). The
¥1∂ For 2004, based on the assumption of unchanged policies. ¥2∂ For 2004, on the assumption of unchanged policies.
Table I.9
Cyclically-adjusted balances in the 2002 updates and in the Commission forecasts on the basis 
of the production function method
(in % of GDP)
2002 updates 
of the programmes (1)
Commission calculations based 
on the 2002 updates (2)
COM autumn 
2002 forecasts (2)
COM spring 
2003 forecasts (2)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004
BE 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0
DE – 3.0 – 2.0 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 0.5 – 3.1 – 2.0 – 0.9 – 0.7 0.0 – 3.3 – 2.4 – 1.9 – 3.3 – 2.6 – 2.4
EL – 1.5 – 1.6 – 0.8 0.0 0.0 – 1.6 – 1.5 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 1.7 – 1.8 – 2.0 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 1.9
ES – 0.3 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.1
FR – 2.1 – 1.9 – 1.4 – 0.9 – 0.5 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 2.7 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 3.3 – 3.5 – 3.3
IE – 1.0 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.1 – 1.0 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 1.4 – 0.8 – 0.2 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.1
IT – 1.2 – 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 – 1.4 – 0.9 – 0.2 0.0 0.1 – 1.8 – 1.6 – 2.5 – 2.1 – 1.8 – 2.7
LU 2.1 1.2 1.9 2.0 0.5 – 0.3
NL – 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 – 0.6 0.0 0.3 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.1
AT – 0.4 – 0.9 – 0.4 – 1.3 – 1.1 – 0.4 – 0.9 – 0.4 – 1.3 – 1.1 – 1.7 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 0.6 – 1.0 – 0.4
PT – 2.8 – 1.8 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 0.3 – 2.4 – 1.6 – 1.1 – 0.5 – 0.1 – 3.0 – 1.9 – 1.5 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.1
FI 3.5 2.5 2.0 2.6 2.9 3.6 2.7 2.4 3.1 3.5 3.7 3.3 3.6 4.8 3.7 3.3
EUR-12 – 1.7 – 1.1 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.1 – 1.9 – 1.3 – 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.1 – 2.0 – 1.7 – 1.5 – 2.2 – 2.0 – 2.0
DK (3) 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.5 1.9 2.0 2.2
SE 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.5 0.9 1.1 1.5
UK – 1.2 – 1.5 – 1.3 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.2 – 1.4 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.6 – 0.6 – 0.9 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 2.0 – 2.0
EU-15 – 1.5 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.3 – 1.6 – 1.4 – 1.2 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 1.8
NB: Footnotes to Table I.8 apply here. 
(1) Germany, Austria and Portugal provided figures based on the HP filter method. 
(2) On the basis of the PF method, except in the case of Germany, Spain and Austria, where the HP filter method has been used. 
(3) Commission calculations based on data from programme and information provided in the supplementary note. The latter did not provide revised cyclically-
adjusted balances.25
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2 0 0 3data show that the deficit countries plan to have an
adjustment in cyclically-adjusted terms of at least 0.5 %
of GDP per year over the next years (1). France and
Greece, however, would only start the adjustment in
2004. Outside the euro area, the UK is expected to record
a cyclically-adjusted deficit of 1.4 % of GDP in 2003, set
to increase slightly until 2006. 
The developments in the general government balance
can be decomposed by sectors of government (see
Table I.10) (2). For the euro area as a whole, the budget
deficit of the general government in 2002 is the result
of a large deficit of the central government sector (over
2 % of GDP) and a smaller deficit in the local govern-
ment roughly compensated by the small surplus in the
social security sector. The local sector is projected to
eliminate its deficit by 2004 and in 2006 should con-
tribute with the social security sector to broadly bal-
ance the deficit of the central government, projected to
remain at 0.7 % of GDP in that year.
The gross debt-to-GDP ratio in the euro area, after the
increase recorded in 2002, is set to resume its gradual
decline in 2003 to arrive to just above 65 % in 2006
(see Table I.11). This is again slower than projected in
previous updates, and is due to smaller primary sur-
pluses and nominal GDP growth contributions, espe-
cially for 2002. 
Table I.11 also shows that the estimated stock-flow com-
ponent contributes to increase the debt ratio on average
over the period (3). This could either stem from plans to
build up financial assets (for example in public pension
reserve funds which are invested in non-governmental
assets), or simply indicate that a certain degree of caution
has been used when setting the targets for debt.
Table I.12 shows that all Member States will be below
the 60 % of GDP ceiling in 2005, with the exception of
Belgium and Greece, where the debt ratio should fall
below 90 % of GDP in 2006 (4), of Italy, where it should
still be above 95 % of GDP in 2006, and of Austria,
where it should decrease very slowly and remain slightly
above 60 % in 2006. In the EU, the debt level in 2006 is
likely to be below 50 % in seven Member States (Spain,
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Swe-
den and the United Kingdom) of which four (Ireland,
Luxembourg, Denmark and the United Kingdom) will
have debt ratios below 40 %.            
2.2. Composition of the budgetary 
adjustment
The updated programmes show that both revenue and
expenditure ratios are expected to decline over the
projection period (see Table I.13). The euro-area total
receipts are projected to fall by almost 1 % of GDP
between 2002 and 2005 to slightly below 46 % of GDP
in 2005. This is more than compensated by reductions
Table I.10
Euro area: net lending by sub-sectors in the 2002 updates (1)
% of GDP 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
General government – 2.2 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.1
Central government – 2.0 – 1.8 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 0.7
State plus local governments – 0.4 – 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2
Social security funds 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
(1) Discrepancies are due to rounding and to the non-attribution to a specific sector of future measures in the Italian (for the years 2004–06) and German (for 2004)
programmes.
¥1∂ In accordance to the pace of adjustment endorsed by the European Council.
See Part II.2).
¥2∂ To simplify the presentation, Table I.10 presents the two sectors of state
and local government in one row, given that the state government sector is
relevant only for four countries.
¥3∂ As in the previous round of updates, very large positive contributions of the
stock-flow over the period are identified for Greece (but this time the yearly
average is around 2  of GDP, rather than 5 % of GDP implied in the previ-
ous update), Finland, Sweden and Ireland (on average around 2 %) and
Spain (on average around 1 %). In other countries the stock-flow operations
seem to compensate over the period. In Italy, they are over 2 % of GDP in
the last two years of the programme. 
¥4∂ For Belgium, assuming that in 2006 nominal GDP growth and the budget
balance are the same as in 2005. 26
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Euro area — Gross debt level and changes in the 2001 updates (1)
(% of GDP)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Gross debt level 69.5 69.7 68.7 66.8 65.4 63.5
Change in gross debt 0.3 – 1.1 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.9
Previous updates of the programmes 69.1 67.4 65.7 63.6
Difference 0.4 2.4 3.1 3.4
Contributions to change in gross debt: 
Primary balance – 1.5 – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.8 – 3.3
Interest payments 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.4
Nominal GDP growth – 2.2 – 2.8 – 3.1 – 3.0 – 2.9
Other factors influencing the debt ratio (2) 0.3 – 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.8
(1) Discrepancies are due to rounding.
(2) The programmes do not always contain enough information to identify directly the contribution from different factors to the development of the euro-area debt ratio.
Therefore, it has been necessary in some cases to identify the contribution from nominal GDP growth (GDP deflator plus real GDP growth multiplied by the debt
ratio). In this way, the stock-flow adjustment is derived as a residual.
Source: 2002 updates of the stability and convergence programmes.
Table I.12
Debt levels in the 2002 updates of the stability and convergence programmes 
(% of GDP)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE 108.6 106.1 102.3 97.9 93.6
DE 59.5 61.0 61.5 60.5 59.5 57.5
EL 107.0 105.3 100.2 96.1 92.1 87.9
ES 57.1 55.2 53.1 51.0 49.0 46.9
FR 57.3 58.7 59.1 58.9 58.3 57.0
IE 36.7 34.1 34.0 34.5 34.9
IT 109.9 109.4 105.0 100.4 98.4 96.4
LU 5.3 5.1 4.1 3.8 2.9
NL 52.8 51.9 51.2 49.0 47.4 45.3
AT 67.3 67.8 67.0 65.1 63.8 62.1
PT 55.4 58.8 58.7 57.5 55.3 52.7
FI (1) 43.4 42.5 41.9 41.9 41.4 40.7
EUR-12 69.5 69.7 68.7 66.8 65.4 63.5
DK (2) 44.7 43.9 42.1 39.2 36.7
SE (1) 56.6 53.6 50.9 49.3 48.0
UK (3) 38.2 37.9 38.8 38.9 38.9 39.1
EU-15 62.8 62.9 62.1 60.6 59.5
(1) Revised national accounts data for 2001 refer to a debt ratio of 43.5 % of GDP for Finland and of 54.3 % of GDP for Sweden.
(2) Figures for 2002–04 may not be consistent with those in the tables for GDP growth and budget balances, as they have not been revised by the supplementary note.
(3) Financial years.
Source: 2002 updates of the stability and convergence programmes.27
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2 0 0 3in the expenditure ratio which, over the same period,
will amount to 2.0 % of GDP. Both revenue and
expenditure ratios are reduced in most countries.
Strong reductions in revenue are projected in Finland,
Ireland, Greece, Italy (1), Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg and, outside the euro area, Sweden.
France, Denmark and Sweden still have revenue ratios
above 50 % of GDP in 2005 (2). The UK is set to
increase revenues by 2 % of GDP between 2002 and
2005. Such an increase should finance the almost
equivalent increase in total expenditure, which remains
among the lowest in the EU. All the other countries are
set to decrease total expenditure. In several countries
(that is, Germany, Greece, Italy, France and Portugal),
this ratio is expected to be reduced by around 2 percent-
age points of GDP or more.
Although the information provided in the programmes
on the budget components is not always complete (3), it
would seem that the reduction in taxes which has taken
place in most countries in the euro area in 2001 and in
2002 (on average – 0.8 % of GDP, see Table I.14) (4) is
not expected to continue thereafter, as the ratio would
remain constant around 25.1 % until 2006. Sizeable
reductions are expected in Finland and, to a smaller
extent, Italy, while Germany would increase the ratio by
one point by 2004. Outside the euro area, the tax to GDP
ratio in Sweden would remain constant after the large
reduction in 2002 — due to the reduced revenues from
high capital income and corporate taxes — while it
Table I.13
Expenditure and revenue ratios in the 2002 updates
Total revenues Total expenditures
2002 2005 2002–05 2002 2005 2002–05
BE 49.5 48.4 – 1.1 49.5 48.0 – 1.5
DE 45.0 44.5 – 0.5 48.5 45.5 – 3.0
EL 45.7 44.4 – 1.3 46.8 44.2 – 2.6
ES 39.8 39.8 0.0 40.1 39.7 – 0.4
FR 51.2 50.6 – 0.6 54.0 52.2 – 1.8
IE (1) 34.8 32.9 – 1.9 35.1 34.1 – 1.0
IT (2) 46.0 44.8 – 1.2 48.1 46.3 – 1.8
LU 46.6 45.6 – 1.0 47.0 45.6 – 1.4
NL 46.4 45.3 – 1.1 47.1 45.7 – 1.4
AT 51.5 49.5 – 2.0 52.1 51.0 – 1.1
PT 43.7 43.6 – 0.1 46.6 44.7 – 1.9
FI 51.3 49.0 – 2.3 47.5 46.4 – 1.1
EUR-12 46.2 45.5 – 0.8 48.4 46.4 – 2.0
DK (3) 55.1 54.2 – 0.9 52.9 51.8 – 1.1
SE (4) 56.5 55.4 – 1.1 54.8 53.8 – 1.0
UK (5) 38.0 40.0 2.0 38.9 40.8 1.9
EU-15 45.2 44.9 – 0.3 47.0 45.7 – 1.3
NB: Discrepancies are due to rounding. The improvement in net lending implied by this table may be different from the one resulting from other tables. This is due to
inconsistencies across tables in the programmes. 
(1) 2002 figures reflect corrected treatment of UMTS proceeds. 
(2) Not including for 2005 future unspecified measures amounting to 1.4 % of GDP.
(3) Figures for 2002–04 may not be consistent with those in the tables for GDP growth and budget balances, as they have not been revised by the supplementary note.
(4) 2004 and 2002–04.
(5) Financial years. 
Source: 2002 updates of the stability and convergence programmes. 
¥1∂ In the case of Italy, future unspecified measures amounting to 1.4 % of
GDP in 2005 have not been distributed across budgetary items.
¥2∂ However, as no adjustment is made for differences in institutional rules, the
comparability of tax ratios is limited across countries. 
¥3∂ No information was given by France and Luxembourg, only partial infor-
mation by Spain, and complete data but only up to 2004 by Sweden. In
some cases, erroneous classifications in the figures provided have been
identified.
¥4∂ With the notable exceptions of Austria, where taxes increased by 1.8 % of
GDP, and, in more limited measure, the Netherlands, where the progressive
increase in taxes is due to the tax reform which shifts revenue from social
contributions to taxes and reduces social contributions over time.28
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in Denmark and increase by the same amount in the UK.
Social contributions would be reduced further in the
coming years by around  % of GDP in the euro area
(see Table I.14). At national level, Germany would com-
pensate the increase in taxes by a reduction of a similar
size in social contributions, although in different years.
Italy, and to a smaller extent Belgium, are also expected
to reduce the ratios somewhat. Other revenues are
expected to decrease slightly over the period.
Graph I.7 presents the contribution, to the change in the
budgetary position, of four budget components: primary
current expenditures, interest payments, gross fixed cap-
ital formation and total revenues. A number of general
conclusions can be drawn. 
Firstly, the development of expenditure components over
the time frame of the programmes appears to be influ-
enced by the initial budgetary and cyclical position. Most
countries showing deficits in 2002 plan to reduce substan-
tially the expenditure ratios while most countries showing
substantial surpluses expect lower revenue. Germany and
Portugal, which plan to improve the balance substantially
over the period, expect to do so essentially via cuts in cur-
rent primary expenditure. However, Portugal would also
reduce public investment, while Germany also plans to
implement further tax cuts. Italy, Greece and France,
which plan to improve the balance by around 1 to 2 % of
GDP, would use part of the large reductions in primary
current expenditure and in interest payments to finance tax
cuts and increased investment (1). Secondly, after a slight
reduction in 2002 and 2003, gross fixed capital formation
is set to increase at the euro area level to 2.4 % of GDP.
This would reflect the large increase expected in public
investment in Spain, and to a smaller extent, in Greece,
which would more than offset the reduction expected in
Finland and in Portugal (2). Germany would maintain the
investment ratio constant, although at 1.5 % of GDP, a
level almost 1 percentage point lower than the euro-area
average. The UK projects to increase public investment by
0.7 % of GDP between 2002 and 2005 to 2.1 % of GDP,
still below the EU average. In Ireland, the reduction in
revenues is compensated by cuts in public investment and
reduction in primary current expenditure (3). 
¥1∂ The increase of public investment in Italy between 2002 and 2005 is, to a
large extent, due to an accounting effect (see also footnote 17).
¥2∂ The level of public investment in 2002 and 2003 has also been affected by
the accounting treatment of the sales of real assets by the Italian govern-
ment in those years, sales which were recorded as a reduction in invest-
ment. This effect should cease by 2004.
¥3∂ However, contingency provisions are made in the Irish programme which
are not included in these calculations.
Table I.14
Euro area: Budget developments for the general government
% of GDP 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Components of revenues
Taxes 25.5 25.1 25.1 25.2 25.1 25.1
Social contributions 15.4 15.3 15.3 15.0 14.9 14.9
Interest income
Other 4.1 4.2 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.8
Total receipts 46.6 46.2 46.0 45.8 45.5 45.5
Components of expenditures
Collective consumption
Social transfers in kind 14.7 14.8 14.5 14.1 13.8
Social transfers other than in kind 16.9 17.3 17.1 16.7 16.4
Interest payments 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.4
Subsidies 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Gross fixed capital formation 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4
Other 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1
Total expenditures 48.1 48.4 47.9 47.0 46.4 45.8
NB: Totals might not correspond to the sum of the components: while for totals information is available for all countries, several countries are not included in the aggre-
gation concerning budgetary components, which affects the ratio of the components.
Source: 2002 updates of the stability and convergence programmes.29
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improving the balance marginally, expect to reduce the
size of the public sector. This is most notably the case of
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and, in a smaller measure,
Spain and Belgium. Outside the euro area, this is the case
of Sweden and Denmark. 
Graph I.7:  Contributions to change in budgetary position 2002–05 (in points of GDP)
Source: 2002 updates of the stability and convergence programmes. A positive value indicates a positive contribution to net lending. A positive value in total 
variation of budgetary position (value is presented on top of columns) implies an improvement of the balance. For SE, data refer to 2002–04. For FR and LU 
values of primary current expenditures refer to primary expenditure. Net lending for Italy includes unspecified measures totalling 1.4 % of GDP in 2005. 
Revised figures for net lending for Denmark do not specify the impact of the revision on budget items.
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3. The sustainability of public finances 
based on the 2002 updates of stability 
and convergence programmes
3.1. Introduction 
In recent years, growing attention has been paid to the
need to extend EU budgetary surveillance beyond the
three or four year time horizon of stability and conver-
gence, and to consider whether public finances are
sustainable in the long run. This largely stems from
concerns about the potential impact of ageing popula-
tions on public finances. The importance of securing
sustainable public finances is not unique to EMU, but
there are additional implications in a monetary union.
An unsustainable public finance position in a partici-
pating Member State may complicate the implementa-
tion of the single monetary policy and possibly result
in interest rates being higher than they would other-
wise be. 
Since the launch of the euro in 1999, the Commission
has addressed the issue of the sustainability of public
finances along a number of lines (1). In particular, the
Commission has sought to integrate an examination of
the sustainability of public finances into the existing EU
framework for the surveillance of Member States’ eco-
nomic and budgetary policies, in line with the conclu-
sions of the Stockholm (March 2001) and Barcelona
(March 2002) European Council meetings. 
The chapter presents the second assessment of long-term
sustainability carried out by the Commission and the
Council on the basis of the 2002 updated stability and
convergence programmes which followed a similar
approach to that followed in the first exercise (see Euro-
pean Commission, 2002a). 
3.2. How the sustainability 
of public finances was assessed 
3.2.1. The quantitative indicators
In the absence of an agreed definition, a pragmatic defi-
nition of what constitutes a sustainable public finance
position was used, namely whether, on the basis of cur-
rent policies, Member States will continue to comply
with the budgetary requirements of EMU, and in partic-
ular, the Treaty requirement to keep debt levels below
the 60 % of GDP reference value (2). At the same time,
however, it was recognised that sustainability of public
finances is a multifaceted policy challenge. Aside from
avoiding deficits and debt accumulation, sustainability
in addition requires that tax burdens remain at reasona-
ble levels and that other non-age-related expenditures
(infrastructure, R&D) are not squeezed out. In recogni-
¥1∂ Firstly, projections for age-related expenditures were published for each
Member State up to 2050: additional projections covering the impact of
ageing on public spending on education and unemployment transfers will
be published in mid-2003. Secondly, on 4 and 5 March 2003, the Directo-
rate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs coorganised a conference
with the Centre for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) on ‘the economic
and budgetary implications of global ageing’. The conference papers are
available on the web site of DG ECFIN at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/
economy_finance/events/2003/events_brussels_0303_en.htm. Thirdly, the impact
of demographic changes on growth has been analysed (see Chapter 4 in
European Commission (2002b)). Fourthly, the need to ensure the financial
sustainability of pension systems has been addressed as part of the open-
method of coordination on pensions.
¥2∂ This definition, based on compliance with pre-determined and arbitrary
budgetary aggregates, can be justified on the grounds that continued com-
pliance with the SGP, and in particular the ‘close to balance or in surplus’
requirement, would de facto lead to the virtual disappearance of public debt
in the long run under reasonable assumptions on growth and interest rates.
Balassone and Franco (2000a) also review the various approaches to defin-
ing the sustainability of public finances. 31
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both quantitative and qualitative information.
On the basis of the work of the Economic Policy Com-
mittee (2001), two groups of indicators were used to
quantify the sustainability of public finances.
The first indicator consisted of extrapolating debt devel-
opments up to 2050 so as to verify whether continued
compliance with the debt requirements of the Treaty can
be expected on the basis of current policies. Under an
‘SGP compliance’ scenario, the starting position in
terms of the current budget balance, level of debt, pri-
mary spending and tax revenues are the figures reported
by the Member States for the final year of their 2002
updated stability or convergence programme: for most
Member States this is 2005 or 2006. The Commission
then extrapolated the evolution of the budget balance
and debt levels up to 2050 assuming that (i) the tax bur-
den and non-age-related primary expenditures remain
constant as a share of GDP at the 2005/06 level over the
projection period, (ii) the interest-growth rate differen-
tial converge towards an EU average level of around 2 %
in 2010 (1), and (iii) age-related expenditures evolve in
line with the projections of the EPC or alternative
national projections. It is then possible to verify whether
the projected level of debt respects the requirement to
stay below 60 % of the GDP reference value for public
debt at all times (2). Failure to do so would, a priori, indi-
cate that there may be a risk of budgetary imbalances
emerging in light of ageing populations and that meas-
ures may be required to place public finances on a more
sustainable footing. 
It should be noted that the ‘SGP compliance’ scenario
assumes that Member States actually achieve the
budget targets set down in their programmes, which
for several Member States implies a successful process
of budgetary consolidation to the ‘close to balance or
in surplus’ requirement. However, such an outcome
is by no means assured since several Member States
still have to complete the consolidation. A ‘2002
position’ scenario is therefore run in the same way as
the ‘SGP compliance’ scenario, excepting that the
starting budget position is different. Debt levels are
extrapolated from 2005/06 to 2050 assuming that no
budgetary changes occur during the programme period,
that is, the primary balance in 2005/06 is the same as
the 2002 level. The purpose of this scenario is to
demonstrate the long-term impact on debt develop-
ments, and consequently on the sustainability of public
finances, of a failure to achieve the ‘close to balance or
in surplus’ requirement of the Pact for those countries
still in deficit, in accordance with the timetable set
down in the Member States’ stability or convergence
programmes. 
For both scenarios the tax gap has been measured. It pro-
vides a gauge of the scale of budgetary adjustment which
would be required for a Member State to reach a sustain-
able public finance position. It measures the difference
between the current tax ratio and the constant tax ratio
over the projection period necessary to achieve a pre-
determined debt level at some date in the future. A posi-
tive tax gap indicates that there is a financing gap to
reach such an objective. 
The choice of both the targeted debt ratio and the length
of the projection period is arbitrary, and the Commission
therefore calculated three different tax gaps as follows.
• T-1 measures the difference between the current
and constant tax ratio required to reach the same
debt level in 2050 that would result from running a
balanced budget position over the entire projection
period. By definition, the debt ratio would converge
towards zero but the level reached in 2050 will dif-
fer across countries depending on the starting debt
level. This approach has the advantage that the debt
target to be achieved is consistent with the budget-
ary framework of the SGP and the fact that the EPC
projections for age-related expenditures cover the
period up to 2050. 
• T-2 recognises that a requirement for debt levels to
converge towards zero is an overly strict definition
to ensure the sustainability of public finances. It
therefore measures the difference between the cur-
¥1∂ Real growth is based on the projections included in the report of the
EPC(2001), that is, GDP growth convergence to some 1.75 % by 2030 in
most Member States reflecting the assumption on labour force participation
rates and in particular a prudent assumption on the rate of productivity
growth. An identical nominal interest rate was assumed for all countries.
The interest rate is defined as the sum of the inflation target of the ECB
(2 %), the real growth rate of the EU (converging to 1.75 % by 2030) plus
the differential of two between the nominal interest rate and nominal GDP
growth. This leads to assume a nominal interest rate close to 6 %. To avoid
a discrete jump in the debt projections, it is assumed that the implicit inter-
est rate on debt in the final year of the stability/convergence programme
converges towards the common nominal interest rate over 10 years in a lin-
ear fashion. 
¥2∂ For countries with debt ratios still above 60 %, it must converge
towards the reference value and stays below it for the remaining period
of projection.32
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level of 40 % of GDP in 2050 (1). 
• T-3 is a measure which is close to tax gap measures
found in the economic literature based on the present
value budget constraint. It indicates the change in
tax revenues as a share of GDP that would guarantee
the respect of the intertemporal budget constraint of
the government, that is, that equates the actualised
Box I.1: The impact of ageing populations on tax revenues and social contributions
Government revenues can be decomposed into four main categories according to the tax base: labour, capital, consumption
and social contributions. Revenues for each of these categories are simply the product of the respective effective tax rate
by the tax base. In the case of social contributions, it is the product of wages (the tax base) by the contribution rate. An
ageing population can have a direct effect on tax revenues through a modification of a tax base.
Few studies analyse the consequences of ageing populations on government revenues. Goudswaard and Ven de Kar (1994)
show that income tax revenues in the Netherlands would increase because of a rising share of older workers in the labour
force, as these are the highest paid group for seniority reasons. However, in the long run wages are driven by labour pro-
ductivity more than by seniority, and the impact of ageing on labour productivity could therefore be negative. Auerbech et
al. (1989) argue that the capacity to adapt to new technologies is lower for older workers, and that technological innovation
can render their human capital obsolete. Older workers are also less mobile (both geographically and within sectors and
labour tasks) and this implies a lower capacity of economic systems to adjust to structural changes. However, Cambridge
Econometrics (1997) argues that the evidence that at any given time older workers are paid more implies that they should
also be more productive. Alternatively, it would determine ‘a shift from profits to wages in national income without any
obvious reason that justifies this’. 
Ageing also affects consumption and thus savings. If consumption increases as a consequence of a higher propensity to
consume amongst elderly people, savings will decrease according to the life-cycle model, and this will negatively affect
long-term economic growth and revenues. Rosevaere et al. (1996) argue that national savings, both governmental and pri-
vate, will decline. In particular, it is estimated that an increase of the old-age dependency ratio in OECD countries of 20 %
in the next 30 years will reduce private savings by 6 %. 
Martinez-Mongay (2000) shows that the evolution of revenues has been driven mainly by the need to finance increased
levels of public expenditure. In particular, revenues have adjusted to the evolution of social transfers. He shows that
between 1970 and 1998, implicit tax rates on labour increased while the tax base (total wages as a percentage of GDP)
decreased. In contrast, tax rates on consumption did not change sharply. According to this study, demographic changes
would affect tax revenues only to the extent that they lead to additional expenditure. 
In any case, it is rather difficult to isolate the direct effect of ageing on revenues without taking into account the indirect
effect through changes in income levels and distribution. There is an endogeneity problem, as economic growth is affected
by ageing and this will determine tax bases and revenues. But taxation, together with social contribution rates, affects
employment and its structure, with relevant consequences on participation rates and on the general level of income as well
as its distribution. This makes it difficult to carry out any projection on the impact of ageing on tax revenues. 
To summarise, there is a great uncertainty over the effect of ageing populations on revenues. Several factors can lead to an
increase in government revenues, for example, a better-paid workforce (due to seniority effects), an increase in consump-
tion and participation rates. However, several factors could lead to a decline in tax revenues, for example, a fall in labour
productivity due to an older workforce and a decline in aggregate savings. Therefore, in making any long-run projection,
a very detailed knowledge of income distribution and its evolution is required (since this can change the tax bases for direct
and indirect taxes) and account needs to be taken of the indirect effect of taxation on labour participation and on income
levels. However, past experience already shows that the level of public spending is the main determinant of tax revenues
as a share of GDP.
¥1∂ Interestingly, the UK’s sustainable debt rule requires that net debt does not
exceed 40 % of GDP.33
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horizon (1). As such there is no target for the debt
ratio, what happens is that this will convergence to a
relatively low level. Moreover, there is no cut-off
date in 2050, and this requires the assumption that
age-related expenditures remain constant as a share
of GDP at the projected level in 2050.
It is important to interpret the results of these quanti-
tative indicators with caution. The projected evolution
of debt levels are not a forecast of possible or even
likely outcomes. Instead, they are a tool to facilitate
policy debate and at best provide rough indication of
the timing and scale of emerging budgetary chal-
lenges that could occur on the basis of ‘no policy
change’. In practice, it is likely that governments
would respond to either explosive debt trajectories or
the implosion of debt leading to the accumulation of
large net assets. 
A further limitation of both sets of indicators is that
they provide little guidance on what is the appropriate
budget target which Member States should aim for in
the light of the expected costs of an ageing population
and indeed other contingencies which may affect pub-
lic finances in the future. Moreover, a positive tax gap
does not imply that tax rates should be raised, but rather
that a financing gap exists which needs to be closed by
a variety of means including raising tax revenues, cut-
ting non-age-related expenditures and/or introducing
reforms to curb the growth in age-related expenditure
growth. The results are also sensitive to underlying
assumptions on parameters such as interest rates and
growth rates as well as the starting budget position. To
some extent account can be taken of this by running a
variety of sensitivity tests, but these provide no esti-
mate of the risk or probability of various budgetary sce-
narios emerging.
Finally, the utility of the exercise depends heavily on the
quality and comparability of the long-run budgetary pro-
jections. If greater weight is to be attached to the sustain-
ability of public finances in the EU surveillance process,
and in particular if the Commission and Council wish to
provide clearer recommendations on policy responses,
then considerable efforts should be made to upgrade the
projections. 
3.2.2. The data used 
The code of conduct on the content and presentation of
stability and convergence programmes requires Member
States to address the issue of sustainability and, on a vol-
untary basis, include long-run budgetary projections. All
Member States included a specific section on the sus-
tainability in their 2002 programmes, and there was a
marked improvement in the terms of the quality and cov-
erage of information compared with the 2001 pro-
grammes. 
Table I.15 summarises the budgetary projections
included in the programmes of Member States. Twelve
of the 15 programmes included budgetary projections
from national sources whereas three Member States
referred to the EPC projections. A trade-off exists as
regards the choice of which projections to use. The
EPC projections were made using common demo-
graphic scenarios and agreed assumptions on key
labour market and macroeconomic parameters, and
were subject to a peer review exercise by the Commis-
sion and Member States. However, national projections
may encompass the impact of recent reforms: they may
also capture in more detail the institutional complexity
of national tax and benefit systems.
Table I.16 presents the projections used by the Commis-
sion in running its quantitative indicators. A number of
important choices taken when doing the projections are
worth highlighting.            
• The Commission, as a general rule, used the national
projections when they consisted of updates based on
the EPC approach. For the most part, the differences
between the EPC and national projections were
modest and would not influence policy conclusions.
However, Spain, Germany and Austria submitted
revised projections for spending on public pensions
which indicated a much smaller increase in spending
over the projection period. The revised projection
for Spain indicated that spending on pensions will
increase by some 5 percentage points of GDP by
2050 compared with 8 percentage points in the EPC
projections, and the difference is due to a revised
¥1∂ The applied formula is the following:
,
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made by Germany takes account of the 2001 reform
of the pension system, and indicates that spending
on pensions would be 2 percentage points of GDP
lower than in the EPC exercise. The Austrian projec-
tion indicates that age-related spending by 2040 will
increase by 1.8 percentage points of GDP less than
what was projected by the EPC and is due to the use
of an alternative demographic scenario. Of this dif-
ference, 1 percentage point relates to public spend-
ing on pensions and 0.7 percentage points to lower
spending on acute healthcare. It should be noted that
none of these national projections have been subject
to peer review at EU level, and their use results in a
considerably more favourable profile for debt devel-
opment compared to what would have occurred on
the basis of EPC projections.
• EPC projections for spending on healthcare and long-
term care were included in the calculations even if
they were not mentioned in the stability or conver-
gence programme. Also, to ensure consistency, the
Commission excluded projections for non-age-related
primary expenditures indicated by some Member
States (for example, Sweden and the UK). Finally,
projections for changes in the tax ratio were included
for three Member States (Denmark, Netherlands, UK)
as these can largely be attributed to the deferred tax
revenue contributions to funded pension systems as
well as accumulated earnings prior to disbursement. 
Table I.15
Long-run budgetary projections included in the 2002 updates to stability and convergence programmes 
(% of GDP)
Source
Pensions Health 
and long-term care
Other age-related 
expenditure Tax revenues Net 
impact
2005 Change by 2050 2005
Change 
by 2050 2005
Change 
by 2050 2005
Change 
by 2050
BE national 8.7 2.7 6.2 2.0 7.3 – 1.6 3.1
DK national 4.7 2.5 7.4 1.9 54.1 2.2 2.2
DE national 11.1 3.8 6.0 1.1 17.7 1.3 3.6
EL national 12.4 10.2 5.0 1.6 44.4 4.6 7.2
ES national 7.9 5.1 n.a. n.a. 5.1
FR EPC 12.1 3.7 6.9 2.0 5.7
IE EPC 3.8 3.9 6.1 1.7 5.6
IT national 13.9 0.2 5.9 1.7 1.9
LU EPC 7.4 1.9 n.a. n.a. 1.9
NL national 8.3 5.3 7.3 3.1 2.3 2.9 5.5
AT national 14.6 1.8 5.8 2.1 3.9
PT national 13.3 2.0 n.a. n.a. 2.0
FI national 10.7 3.7 6.2 2.9 53.7 – 2.1 8.7
SE national 9.1 1.8 9.8 4.6 31.9 – 1.6 53.1 2.5 2.3
UK national 5.0 – 0.2 7.0 2.8 6.1 0.8 39.9 – 1.5 4.9
NB: BE: the starting data refers to 2000. Other expenditures include family allowances, unemployment and early retirement transfers, work-related accidents and sick-
ness and residual regimes. DK: of the change in tax revenues, the net tax on pension payouts increased by 2.4 p.p. of GDP from 2005 and 2050. Also, pension
assets are projected to increase from 119 % of GDP in 2005 to 206 % of GDP in 2040. DE: the starting data refers to 2010. Pension projections were made by the
BMGS (statutory pension insurance and public service workers pension). Healthcare projections only cover acute healthcare and were made by the EPC. Tax reve-
nues only concern taxation of payments to private households and was made by the German Institute for Economic Research. EL: Healthcare only concerns acute
healthcare. FR: starting date is 2000, and change refers to the period 2000 to 2040. IE: data in programme was reported as a % of GNP. It was converted to GDP
assuming a constant differential of 17 % over the projection period. NL: revenues projections refer to income tax revenues on pensions. PT: starting data refers to
2001. FI: starting year is 2000. SE: expenditure projections include a breakdown covering childcare, primary and secondary education, adult education, other trans-
fer payments (ill health, children/studies, labour market, transfer payments to firms, transfer payments abroad) and public investment.
Source: 2002 updates of stability and convergence programmes.
¥1∂ This is based on the recent census which indicates that the existing popula-
tion size is considerably higher than estimated by Eurostat and also impor-
tant differences as regards inward migration. The upshot is that the
population of working age is considerably higher in the revised projection
than assumed by the EPC. 35
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States’ budgetary positions is general government
gross debt. It measures the amount of existing finan-
cial debt the government will have to service and
reimburse. The only asset taken into account is gov-
ernment debt held within the government sector:
other financial assets, such as holdings of shares and
equity and real assets do not contribute to lower the
recorded level of debt. It has been argued that, when
assessing long-term sustainability, there is also a case
for looking at net debt figures. However, this would
entail a number of practical measurement problems as
a large part of government assets are of a non-finan-
cial nature. Real assets are typically not easy to value,
and moreover, it is questionable to what extent these
assets can be used to redeem outstanding debt or sub-
stitute for other revenues. In running the quantitative
indicators for Finland and Sweden (1), however, the
Commission took on board information on financial
assets (other than government bonds) in designated
pension funds, as well as information on financial
assets specifically designated for privatisation and
thus available for future debt reduction. It was
assumed that the yield on assets is the same as on
debt. 
3.2.3. The results of the quantitative indicators
The results of the quantitative indicators (both the
extrapolation of debt and the tax gap indicators) are pre-
sented in Table I.17 and Table I.18. The need to interpret
the results with caution is again underlined, and in par-
ticular to avoid drawing mechanical policy conclusions.
Notwithstanding the caveats, the indicators clearly illus-
trate that ageing populations pose a very significant
budgetary challenge, and the following broad conclu-
sions can be drawn.
First, even assuming that all Member States achieve their
budget targets for 2006 (SGP compliance scenario)
which in most cases represents a position of ‘close to bal-
ance or in surplus’, there is a risk of unsustainable public
Table I.16
Data used to run the sustainability indicators in the ‘SGP compliance scenario’ 
(% of GDP)
Level in 2005/6 (1) Change by 2050
Net 
borrowing Debt
Total 
revenues
Total non-
age-related 
spending
Pension Health-
care
Other age-
related 
expenditures
Tax 
revenues
Net 
change
BE 0.5 94 48.4 21.0 2.9 1.6 – 1.1 0.0 3.4
DK 2.2 26 53.6 26.6 2.0 2.0 0.2 0.0 4.2
DE 0.0 58 44.5 24.3 3.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 4.8
EL 0.6 88 44.3 21.8 10.2 1.6 0.0 0.0 11.8
ES 0.2 47 39.8 23.5 5.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 6.7
FR – 1.0 57 50.5 29.0 3.4 1.1 0.4 0.0 4.9
IE – 1.2 35 32.9 22.7 3.9 1.7 0.0 0.0 5.6
IT 0.1 89 44.6 19.4 0.2 1.7 0.0 0.0 1.9
LU – 0.1 3 45.6 38.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
NL 0.1 45 45.3 27.4 3.5 3.4 0.5 3.7 3.7
AT – 1.1 61 49.4 27.1 1.8 1.3 0.8 0.0 3.9
PT – 0.4 53 43.0 24.2 2.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.9
FI 2.8 – 17 48.9 26.0 3.0 1.0 1.5 0.0 5.5
SE 1.7 18 55.4 14.9 1.8 1.4 1.7 – 0.9 5.8
UK – 1.6 39 39.9 21.4 – 0.2 2.8 0.8 1.5 4.9 (2)
(1) Denmark’s levels are for 2010.
(2) The net change for UK includes the change in the total non-age-related spending of – 1.4 % of GDP. 
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ According to the last set of stability and convergence programmes, gross
government debt in Sweden in 2001 was 52.3 % of GDP while the net debt,
taking pension fund financial assets into account, was – 3.1 % of GDP. In
the Finnish programme, gross interest payments in 2001 was 2.8 % of GDP
while net interest payments was 0.7 % of GDP.36
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value) emerging in some half of EU Member States, and
indeed for the EU as a whole (see Graph I.8). Hence, cur-
rent policies are not sustainable and further policy meas-
ures are needed. 
Secondly, the risk of unsustainable public finances
increases considerably if all Member States do not
achieve the SGP goal of budget positions of ‘close to bal-
ance or in surplus’. An indication of this can be seen by
comparing the projected debt levels under the ‘SGP
compliance scenario’ with the ‘2002 position’ scenario
for the EU-15: the failure to reduce the deficit for its
2002 levels of some 2 % of GDP would result in debt
being some 100 % of GDP higher in 2050. In particular,
Graph I.9. compares debt developments under both sce-
narios for the four euro area countries with highest defi-
cits in 2002, i.e. Germany, France, Italy and Portugal.
Thirdly, debt developments for most Member States
follow a U-shaped pattern. In the coming decade or
20 years, debt levels are projected to decrease thanks to
the running ofa balanced budget position: however, this
trend would start to reverse once the budgetary impact of
ageing starts to take hold, with the largest increase in
most countries expected between 2020 and 2030. There
is therefore a limited, but fast closing, window of oppor-
tunity to reduce debt levels.
Fourthly, the tax gap indicators provide some order of
magnitude to the budgetary adjustment needed to ensure
sustainable public finances. In addition to consolidation
efforts to correct the 2002 aggregate underlying deficit
of some 2 % of GDP, the tax gap under the ‘SGP com-
pliance scenario’ indicates that an additional permanent
budgetary adjustment of between 1 and 2 percentage
points of GDP is needed in Member States where the
sustainability of public finances is a concern. A budget-
ary adjustment of this magnitude would be between one
third and one half the size of consolidation achieved as
part of the Maastricht process since 1995. However, the
scale of budgetary adjustment efforts could be even
greater if age-related spending increases faster than in
the baseline EPC/national projections and/or if account
is taken of the stated budgetary objectives of some Mem-
ber States, such as a reduction in the tax ratio. Also, and
as stated above, this does not suggest that taxes should be
increased, but rather that an appropriate combination is
needed of tax increases, reducing the level of non-age-
related primary spending and/or reform of pension and
healthcare systems to curtail the impact of ageing on
expenditure growth. The scale of such a budgetary chal-
lenge is presented in Table I.18.                              
Table I.17
Projected evolution of debt levels up to 2050
SGP compliance scenario 2002 budget position scenario (1)
2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050
BE 70 – 21 – 108 66 – 41 – 154
DK 26 – 23 – 51 9 – 79 – 172
DE 49 56 89 75 186 384
EL 70 48 160 70 64 201
ES 38 17 89 33 4 59
FR 54 107 248 62 144 335
IE 33 85 220 22 52 153
IT 77 17 – 38 88 72 91
LU 2 16 51 4 18 52
NL 39 48 99 37 43 91
AT 59 88 123 61 39 19
PT 46 51 107 61 120 281
FI (2) – 25 – 48 – 39 – 42 – 135 – 225
SE (2) 3 2 – 35 3 2 – 57
UK 38 43 78 39 49 90
(1) As calculated assuming primary balance constant at the level of 2002.
(2) Government debt net of financial assets.
Source: Commission services.37
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Results of the tax gap indicator
SGP compliance scenario 2002 budget position scenario
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3
BE  – 1.7  – 2.0 0.1  – 2.4  – 2.7 – 0.5
DK – 0.9 – 1.3 0.1 – 2.7 – 3.1 – 2.0
DE 1.0 0.6 3.2 4.8 4.5 6.9
EL 2.0 1.7 4.8 2.6 2.3 5.5
ES 1.1 0.7 2.4 1.0 0.6 2.4
FR 3.7 3.5 4.6 4.8 4.5 5.7
IE 3.4 2.9 5.1 2.4 1.8 4.0
IT – 0.8 – 1.0 0.3 0.9 0.6 1.9
LU 1.2 0.2 2.5 1.0 0.3 2.6
NL 1.2 0.7 4.6 1.0 0.6 4.5
AT 2.6 2.1 3.4 1.0 0.6 1.9
PT 1.3 1.0 2.0 3.7 3.3 4.3
FI – 0.6 – 1.1 – 0.5 – 3.2 – 3.7 – 0.8
SE – 0.6 – 1.1 0.2 – 0.9 – 1.4 – 0.1
UK 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.3 0.8 1.4
NB: T1 indicates the constant difference between projected revenues and the revenues required to reach in 2050 the same debt-to-GDP ratio as the close to balance posi-
tion holds for the whole projection period. T2 indicates the constant difference between projected revenues and the revenues required to reach in 2050 a debt-to-
GDP ratio equal to 40 %. T3 indicates the change in tax revenues as a share of GDP that guarantees the respect of the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government, that is, that equates the actualised flow of revenues and expenses over an infinite horizon.
Source: Commission services.
Graph I.8:  A comparison of debt projections for the EU-15 based on the ‘SGP compliance scenario’ 
and the ‘2002 starting position’ scenario
EU – non-compliance SCPs 2002 EU baseline
debt/GDP
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The policy conclusions in the Commission’s recommen-
dations for Council opinions on updated stability and con-
vergence programmes were drawn on the basis of qualita-
tive as well as quantitative analysis. They addressed three
policy questions as follows.
• In the light of projected budgetary implications of
ageing populations, is it likely that the SGP require-
ments will continue to be respected on the basis of
current policies? 
Graph I.9:  A comparison of debt projections for four Member States based on the ‘SGP compliance’ 
scenario and the ‘2002 position’ scenario
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measures outlined in the updates compatible with
improving the sustainability of public finances? (1)
• What is the main policy challenge facing Member
States and what reform measures should be envisaged?
Table I.19 below summarises the conclusions on each of
these questions based on the Commission’s assessment
of the 2002 updated programmes and the respective
Council opinions. The risk of unsustainable public
finances is evident in some half of EU countries, notably
Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria and
Portugal. There are also particular circumstances for
Belgium and Ireland which influence the quantitative
indicators of the sustainability of public finances, and
underline the need to avoid a mechanical interpretation
of results. It is possible to group countries according to
the source of potential budget imbalances and the seri-
ousness of the risk as follows.
• In two Member States (Spain and Greece) a large
share of the risk of emerging budgetary imbalances
is due to the very large projected increase in pension
expenditure. According to the EPC, public spending
on pensions alone is projected to grow by 8 % of GDP
between 2000 and 2040 in Spain and 12 % of GDP in
Greece, the highest projected increase of all EU coun-
tries, although both countries have submitted revised
projections showing substantially lower increases.
Spain has already achieved a budget position of ‘close
to balance or in surplus’ and Greece aims at doing so
in the coming two years. To ensure sustainability, the
main challenge is to reform the public pension system
so as to contain any increase in spending as a result of
ageing populations.
• In several Member States (notably Germany, France,
Austria and Portugal) the risk of emerging budgetary
imbalances is a combination of factors. First, public
spending on pensions and healthcare in these countries
is projected to grow at or above the average rate of the
EU in coming decades. Secondly, the pace of debt
reduction is slow due to persistent and large underly-
ing deficits. Finally, they have a relatively poor labour
market performance, and in particular low employ-
ment rates of older workers and a low effective retire-
ment age. Addressing sustainability therefore requires
a more ambitious and comprehensive approach tack-
ling all these challenges, rather than the unambiguous
and piecemeal approaches evident today. 
• High debt countries (Belgium, Greece and Italy) face
a particular set of challenges in ensuring the fast
reduction of debt levels. At first sight, the quantitative
indicators suggest that these countries appear to be rel-
atively well placed to meet the costs of ageing popula-
tions. But the favourable development in debt levels
(and consequently on interest payments) hides a
degree of fiscal illusion based on an implicit assump-
tion that high debt countries are able to sustain large
primary surpluses over a long period. Running the
actual budget surpluses implied by such assumptions
over time may be difficult to ensure for the govern-
ment, as they will be faced with competing budgetary
pressures for tax cuts and/or increased public expendi-
tures (2). In addition, the debt may evolve more slowly
than planned because of stock-flow adjustments. On
this aspect, the Council expressed concern about the
slow pace of debt reduction in Greece and Italy since
1999 due to large and persistent financial operations,
besides the unfavourable growth conditions and slip-
page from budget balance targets (3).
• Several Member States appear to have sustainable
public finances (Denmark, Luxembourg, the Neth-
erlands, Finland, Sweden and the UK). They have
¥1∂ The conclusion of the Stockholm European Council did not alter the goal
or purpose of the SGP, that is to ensure that Member States have medium-
term budget positions that are ‘close to balance or in surplus’. The Com-
mission and Council did not attempt to quantify what constitutes an appro-
priate budget position for a Member State in light of the budgetary costs of
ageing population. Whether countries should set more ambitious budget
targets (including surpluses) in the coming years prior to the budgetary
impact of ageing populations taking hold is clearly a policy issue which the
ECOFIN Council must address in the future. Indeed, several Member
States already go beyond budget positions of ‘close to balance or in sur-
plus’ and are running large surpluses with the explicit purpose of preparing
for the budgetary costs of ageing populations. However, the obligation on
Member States under the SGP remains unchanged.
¥2∂ An indication of this additional budgetary effort can be gauged by looking
at the required primary surplus needed to sustain a balanced budget posi-
tion. The Commission has calculated this using the same projected increase
in age-related spending and assuming that countries achieve the budget tar-
get set down in their stability and convergence programme. On average,
Belgium is estimated to require an average primary surplus of 3 % of GDP
over the 2010 to 2020 period, whereas Greece and Italy would require pri-
mary surpluses of 3.6 and 3.7 % of GDP respectively. This compares with
an estimated required primary surplus of between 1 and 2 % of GDP in
most other Member States with debt levels below the 60 % of GDP refer-
ence value.
¥3∂ Moreover, for Italy, the Commission and Council noted that the relatively
small projected increase in spending on public pensions is based upon an
assumption that the reforms enacted in the 1990s are implemented in full
(especially the indexation of the entitlement to prices and the adjustment of
benefits to increases of life expectancy), and on the basis of the assumption
of a significant increase in labour force participation rates in coming dec-
ades.40
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reform of their pension systems have strengthened
the link between contributions and entitlements.
Notwithstanding the favourable conclusion, ageing
populations will pose budgetary challenges for these
countries. The maintenance of high tax ratios at over
50 % of GDP in a number of Nordic countries
requires continued public support and raises concern
about competitiveness: there is also a risk that tax
bases may become more mobile in the future which
may make it more difficult for countries to raise rev-
enues. For the Netherlands, the Council considered
that some additional measures may be needed if the
Dutch authorities are to achieve the stated aim of
eliminating public debt within one generation. Lux-
embourg has to provide pensions to a large number
of non-residents: financial sustainability will be
influenced on the number of cross-border workers
Regarding the UK, the Council concluded that much
of the financial sustainability of the pension system
depends on the performance of private pension pro-
viders. If private provision produces significantly
less than the anticipated coverage or level of pen-
sions, future governments may face increased
claims of means-tested benefits. 
• In Ireland, the indicators point a policy challenge
that sooner or later needs to be addressed, despite
the improvement in public finances in recent years.
A financing gap may emerge if public spending on
pensions and healthcare in Ireland converge towards
levels in other EU countries and if the tax ratio, as a
share of GDP, remains unchanged (1).
Table I.19
Policy conclusions on the sustainability of public finances
¥1∂ A number of important qualifications need to be made. First, and as recog-
nised in the Commission’s assessment of Ireland’s stability programme, the
medium-term budget position may be substantially better than indicated by
the programmes’ targets as it includes an annual transfer of 1 % of GNP to
the National Pensions Reserve Fund and a contingency reserve of some
0.6 % of GNP. The projected evolution of debt levels would be different if
an adjustment was made for these items. Secondly, there is considerable
uncertainty as to what constitutes the potential growth rate of Ireland and
the time frame over which it could be expected to converge to levels seen in
other EU countries. The growth assumptions used in the sustainability indi-
cator are prudent based on recent experience in Ireland. Thirdly, it should
be borne in mind that the tax ratio in Ireland is the lowest of all EU coun-
tries, and thus there is greater scope to raise taxes if necessary.
Are public finances 
sustainable ?
Do the budgetary measures in the programme 
improve sustainability ? What are the key policy measures required?
BE Appears to be sustainable,
but conditional upon sustain-
ing large primary surpluses in
the coming decade or more.
Policy of sustaining high primary surpluses should
lead to a fast pace of debt reduction. But this
needs to be complemented with measures to
raise employment rates, especially amongst older
workers as the effective retirement age is one
amongst the lowest of all EU countries.
Some progress made as regards draft legislation
for setting up the framework for supplementary
pensions.
Sustaining high primary surplus over the long run
will be a challenge. At the same time, it is impor-
tant that the budgetary cost of structural
reforms, notably those involving tax and non-tax
burden reduction, be kept consistent with the
targeted budgetary adjustment and the reduc-
tion of the government debt ratio be ensured.
DK Appears to be sustainable. Yes. Comprehensive approach benefiting from
the running of budget surpluses, and a projected
accumulation of large net assets in both pension
funds and the government sector.
The tax ratio will remain high compared to other
industrialised countries, and consideration could
be given to further reductions in a framework of
sound public finances.
DE Clear risk of emerging budg-
etary imbalances.
If achieved, a balanced budget position by 2006
would help reduce debt at a faster pace. Pension
reform of 2001 has helped improve sustainability,
but the need for further reforms cannot be ruled
out. 
To ensure sustainability, compliance with SGP as
soon as possible is essential. This needs to be
accompanied with far-reaching reforms to raise
Germany’s very low growth potential. Urgent
reforms are needed not only in the labour mar-
ket, but also in social security and benefit systems
in general, and for a reduction in the regulatory
burden of the economy.
(Continued on the next page)41
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Are public finances 
sustainable ?
Do the budgetary measures in the programme 
improve sustainability ? What are the key policy measures required?
EL Clear risk of emerging budg-
etary imbalances.
Projected move towards a position of budget bal-
ance is welcome. But programme does not
address the core issue of pension reform. 
Further reforms are required to the pension sys-
tem to avoid an unsustainable increase in public
spending. The Greek authorities are encouraged
to promote supplementary privately-funded pen-
sion schemes and to take measures to raise partic-
ipation rates and to control the evolution of age-
related expenditures.
ES Clear risk of emerging budg-
etary imbalances.
Programme contains commitment to sustain a
balanced budget position and provides informa-
tion on measures to increase employment rates.
Measures to improve incentives for active ageing
and private pension schemes were taken. 
Risk of unsustainable public finances largely
stems from the projected increase in spending on
pensions (despite the recent downward revision
on estimate). Reform of the pension system
planned for in 2004 needs to address the issue of
financial sustainability. 
FR Clear risk of emerging budg-
etary imbalances.
Overall approach, and in particular a failure to
reach a position of ‘close to balance or in surplus’
by the end of the programme, is not consistent
with a commitment to sustainable public finances.
Some progress, however, has been made as
regards structural measures designed to curb
expenditures in the health sector and the actions
aiming at improving the control of budgetary
execution in the State sector. Also the French
authorities announced their intention to reform
pension and healthcare systems. 
To ensure sustainability, compliance with SGP as
soon as possible is essential. Need to pursue the
planned reform of pension system. 
IE Outlying country. Some risk
of emerging budgetary im-
balances given projected in-
creases in spending on pen-
sions and healthcare, but
there should be scope to
meet financing challenge
given low tax rates and low
levels of government debt.
Some concern as regards projected move to deficit
in coming years. However, when assessing sustain-
ability, due account should be taken of a contin-
gency provision of 0.8 % of GDP in the deficit of
the final year of the programme and of the even-
tual completion of a large programme of public
investment. Also, the gradual build up of assets in
the National Pension Reserve Fund (annual contri-
bution of 1 % of GNP) will help bear the budget-
ary costs of an ageing population.
In a good position to meet the costs of ageing
populations given high degree of funding of pen-
sions and the relatively low tax burden. However,
a long-term financing challenge may arise, as
spending on pensions and healthcare as a share
of GDP approach levels in other EU countries.
IT Clear risk of emerging budg-
etary imbalances.
Strategy to prepare for ageing populations gives
cause for concern. There is a need to implement a
sustained path of budgetary consolidation, with
one-off measures replaced with structural ones
on the expenditure side. Council is especially con-
cerned that the risks to the programme deficit
targets might imply too slow a pace of reduction
in the debt ratio. The slowdown in the rate of
debt reduction projected toward the end of the
programme period also in connection with some
‘below the line’ operations. Italy’s ability to cope
with the budgetary consequences of ageing is
based on implementation of the major pension
reforms adopted in the 1990s and a large increase
in the participation rate.
To ensure sustainability, compliance with SGP as
soon as possible is essential. It will be necessary,
given Italy’s high debt, to sustain primary sur-
pluses in the order of 5 % of GDP for many years.
Also, the goal of reducing the tax burden can
only be safely and effectively achieved within a
comprehensive reform plan on both the expendi-
ture and the revenue side. Italian authorities are
encouraged to adopt further measures to pro-
mote supplementary privately-funded pension
schemes and to address the outstanding critical
issue in the public pension system, namely, the
long transition period to the new contributions-
based system. This should be coupled with the
measures necessary to raise participation rates
and to control the evolution of age-related
expenditures.
LU Appears to be sustainable. Yes, comprehensive approach outlined with
measures announced to improve the attractive-
ness of third pillar private pensions.
Sustainability is sensitive to the number of cross-
border workers.
(Continued on the next page)42
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Are public finances 
sustainable ?
Do the budgetary measures in the programme 
improve sustainability ? What are the key policy measures required?
NL Appears to be sustainable. Yes, comprehensive approach outlined, although
additional measures may be needed if the Dutch
authorities are to achieve the stated aim of elimi-
nating public debt within one generation. The
conclusion on sustainability relies on projected
increases in the tax ratio, although in part this is
due to increases in the deferred taxes on pension
income.
The strategy hinges upon achieving a large and
sustained reduction in the debt ratio which may
prove challenging during economic downturns
and in the face of competing pressures to pursue
other budgetary objectives. While the stability
programme envisages additional savings being
made so as to absorb the projected increase in
age-related expenditures, there is a lack of clarity
on the precise measures which will be taken to
achieve this goal.
AT Clear risk of emerging budg-
etary imbalances. 
The Council welcomes the intentions of the Aus-
trian authorities to reform pension and health-
care systems in light of ageing populations. How-
ever, a greater degree of budgetary ambition is
required, and Austria should complete the transi-
tion to a position of budget balance, in line with
SGP requirements, without delay.
Need to sustain sound public finances, and possi-
bly consider further reform of pensions. It is vital
to put into operation the planned pension
reform, since the measures outlined in the update
address many of the key problems.
PT Clear risk of emerging budg-
etary imbalances. 
The programme sets down an ambitious pro-
gramme for budgetary consolidation which, if
successful, would make a significant improve-
ment to the sustainability of public finances.
To ensure sustainability, compliance with SGP as
soon as possible is essential. Also essential to pro-
ceed with reforms to achieve a better control of
public expenditures at all levels of government,
and in particular in the healthcare system. 
FI Appears to be sustainable. Yes, comprehensive approach outlined benefiting
from the sustained running of budget surpluses,
and a reformed pension system that has a high
degree of pre-funding. Programme also contains
information of reforms, both planned and under-
way, which aim at raising employment rates of
older workers
The tax ratio in Finland is high compared with
other industrialised countries. A major challenge
will be to carry out the planned tax reforms,
while safeguarding the achievements of the past
decade of placing public finances on a sustainable
footing. 
SE Appears to be sustainable. Yes, comprehensive approach outlined benefiting
from the sustained running of budget surpluses
of 2 % of GDP up to 2015, and a reformed pen-
sion system that automatically limits future
expenditure growth.
Policy aim of running large surpluses may prove
difficult over a long time period. A challenge will
be to complete the tax reform while safeguard-
ing the achievements of the past decade of plac-
ing public finances on a sustainable path.
UK Appears to be sustainable. The deficit targets in the programme raise some
concern as regards the sustainability of public
finances. A budgetary position of a limited deficit
in the medium term would help avoid any risk of
emerging budget imbalances in the context of
ageing populations and give greater assurance to
the programme view that ‘the public finances,
based on current policies, are sustainable in the
long-term’.
Much of the financial sustainability of the pen-
sion system depends on the performance of pri-
vate pension providers. If private provision pro-
duces significantly less than the anticipated
coverage or level of pensions, future govern-
ments may face increased claims of means-tested
benefits. 
Source: Based on the policy conclusions in the Commission’s assessment of the 2002 updates to stability and convergence programmes and the respective opinions of 
the Council.43
4. Budgetary developments 
in candidate countries
4.1. Short-term budgetary developments 
and prospects in candidate countries
In 2002, the aggregate budget position of the 13 candi-
date countries (CC-13) (1) improved, but only due to the
exceptional advance recorded in Turkey (see Table I.20) (2).
The aggregate general government deficit of the 10 coun-
tries set to become EU members in May 2004 (AC-10)
widened. This deterioration occurred despite the fact that
aggregate growth for the AC-10 continued at roughly the
same pace as in 2001 (3).
Aggregate budget positions are projected to improve for
all country groupings in 2003 and 2004. Despite a signif-
icant acceleration in growth, however, the projected
reduction in the aggregate deficit of the AC-10 is not suf-
ficient to reverse the deterioration recorded in 2002. This
suggests that structural, rather than cyclical, factors
underlie current budgetary imbalances.
Due caution, however, should be taken when interpret-
ing budgetary trends for the CC-13. Despite significant
progress, budgetary data for these countries are still not
fully comparable across countries nor completely in line
with EU definitions (see Box I.2). Significant revisions
in the budget positions of these countries are still possi-
ble, and from a methodological point of view, aggregat-
ing country figures is only possible to a limited degree. 
Aggregate figures tend to hide the differences among
individual countries. Outcomes for 2002 range from a
deficit of 13.7 % of GDP in Turkey to a surplus of 1.3 %
of GDP in Estonia (see Table I.20). Relative to 2001, the
budgetary position worsened in seven countries — and
by more than 1 % of GDP in the majority of cases. The
most noticeable improvement was recorded in the case
of Turkey followed by Romania and Estonia. 
Among the seven countries undershooting the budgetary
targets for 2002 set out in their pre-accession economic
programmes (PEPs) of 2002, Cyprus, Malta and, above
all, Hungary missed their objectives by a rather large
amount (see Table I.20) (4). Five countries, on the other
hand, overachieved their targets, most notably Estonia
which further increased its surplus position despite hav-
ing originally planned to run to a small deficit.
In most cases, country-specific factors rather than gen-
eral macroeconomic trends seem to lie behind countries’
budgetary performance relative to targets. Electoral
dynamics, for instance, appear to have played a relevant
role in the case of some of the countries missing their
PEP targets, such as Hungary, Latvia and the Slovak
Republic. Statistical reclassifications and one-off meas-
ures also played a part, most notably in the case of
Hungary (5).¥1∂ The CC-13 are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia
and Turkey. The AC-10 exclude Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. 
¥2∂ Accounting factors underpin this improvement. At 13.7 % of GDP, Tur-
key’s general government deficit remained very high in 2002 but nearly
halved relative to 2001 when expenditures were boosted on a one-off basis
by the inclusion (in a single year) of the large transfers to the agricultural
sector that had been channelled through the banking system in previous
years. 
¥3∂ The sources for all figures used in this section are the 2002 pre-accession
economic programmes, the 2002 fiscal notification and the Commission
forecast of spring 2003. Given the cut-off data for the preparation of this
report, new and revised budgetary data reported to the Commission in the
context of the 2003 fiscal notification exercise could not be taken into
account. 
¥4∂ Following elections, the new government of the Slovak Republic formally
revised upwards its PEP deficit targets prior to the finalisation of the Com-
mission’s assessements. The Slovak Republic is projected to have complied
with its revised deficit target for 2002, which was 3.2 % of GDP higher
than in the original PEP submission. 
¥5∂ Reclassifications also contributed to the upward revision of the PEP deficit
target of the Slovak Republic.44
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performances uniformly across countries. For instance,
of the eight countries for which growth in 2002 turned
out higher than envisaged in the PEP framework (see
Table I.21), only five achieved a better than targeted
budgetary balance (1).         
Looking ahead to 2003 and 2004, the Commission
spring 2003 forecast envisages an improvement in the
budgetary balances of eight countries, with particularly
marked deficit reductions in the cases of Turkey,
Hungary, the Slovak Republic and, to a more limited
extent, Malta (see Table I.20). With Estonia projected to
move from a surplus to a small deficit position, a rela-
tively small deterioration is also expected in the case of
Lithuania and Latvia. Relative to 2002, country positions
would become less diverse with deficits ranging from
0.6 % of GDP in the case of Estonia to 6.9 % in Turkey.
Box I.2: Candidate countries’ budgetary data and EU standards
The data utilised in this section approximate ESA95 definitions for the general government statistics as much as possible.
However, due to methodological and data availability problems, this is only partially possible. As the harmonisation of
statistics progresses, significant revisions of general government deficits may be needed. Problems of comparability also
affect data on the level of total expenditure and revenue and their components. 
In estimating the data used in this section, the Commission services relied upon the government deficit and debt figures
reported in the 2002 fiscal notifications. Candidate countries have been formally notifying fiscal statistics to the Commis-
sion since 2001, using the same format and aiming at producing the same data as the notifications provided by the Member
States in the framework of the excessive deficit procedure. By completing this exercise, candidate countries are becoming
familiar with the technical and quantitative requirements they will have to apply as soon as they become Member States. 
The April 2002 fiscal notifications showed that a majority of countries were well advanced in the application of the EU
methodology. However, further work was still required in all cases and progress remained uneven. In particular, Estonia
showed a degree of good practice, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia
were well advanced in the application of the EU methodology, and significant work was still necessary in Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Lithuania, Romania and Turkey. 
The following issues raised particular concerns.
• While the exhaustiveness of general government statistics had been improved by integrating the activities of privatisation
agencies and debt consolidation institutions as well as the quasi-fiscal activities of public enterprises and financial institu-
tions, further work was still necessary to verify that reclassified revenue and expenditure items were completely and correctly
taken into account.
• Despite a more extensive reliance on accrual figures, these often constituted only preliminary estimates. In many cases,
the correct statistical treatment of large tax and social contribution arrears posed a particular challenge. 
• There remained a need to determine with greater precision the component of budgetary support to the enterprise sector
that constituted a transfer element. 
• The classification of compulsory pension funds, either within the social security sub-sector of the general government
or within the insurance sector, remained an open question.
Candidate countries notified new figures in April 2003. This new set of fiscal notifications is expected to show further
progress in the quality and comparability of CC-13 government deficit and debt figures. However, this report could not
take them into account as their assessment by the Commission services was still ongoing at the time of publication.
¥1∂ These were Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and the Slovak Repub-
lic. A diverse picture also emerges if one compares budgetary performance
with the difference between actual and projected nominal GDP growth. 45
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General government balances in candidate countries 
(% of GDP)
Actual Forecast PEP target
2001 2002 2003 2004 2002 2004
CY – 3.0 – 3.5 – 4.0 – 3.5 – 2.6 – 0.6
CZ – 5.5 – 6.5 – 6.3 – 5.9 – 6.4 – 5.7
EE 0.5 1.3 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.2 0.0
HU – 4.2 – 9.1 – 4.9 – 3.7 – 5.7 – 3.0
LV – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 1.8 – 2.2
LH – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.9 – 2.0 – 1.9 – 1.6
MT – 7.0 – 6.1 – 5.2 – 4.1 – 5.2 – 3.9
PL – 3.1 – 4.2 – 4.2 – 4.0 – 4.1 – 3.3
SK – 5.4 – 7.7 – 5.3 – 3.8 – 7.8 – 3.8
SI – 2.5 – 1.8 – 1.5 – 1.2 – 1.8 – 1.0
AC-10 – 3.7 – 5.3 – 4.4 – 3.9 – 4.7 – 3.4
BG 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.8 – 0.5
RO (1) – 3.3 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.7 – 2.4
TR – 28.9 – 13.7 – 9.8 – 6.9 – 13.1 – 2.9
CC-13 – 12.4 – 7.1 – 5.7 – 4.5 – 6.6 – 3.1
(1) For Romania: 2003 spring forecast adjusted to estimated ESA95 balance.
Source: Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts and 2002 PEPs.
Table I.21
GDP growth in candidate countries 
(% p.a.)
2002 Average 2003–04
Forecast PEP Difference Forecast PEP Difference
CY 2.0 2.8 – 0.8 2.9 4.6 – 1.7
CZ 2.0 3.0 – 1.0 3.3 3.8 – 0.5
EE 5.6 4.3 1.3 5.0 5.8 – 0.8
HU 3.3 4.0 – 0.7 3.9 4.5 – 0.6
LV 6.1 5.0 1.1 5.7 5.6 0.1
LH 5.9 4.7 1.2 4.7 5.4 – 0.6
MT 3.0 3.3 – 0.3 3.4 3.3 0.1
PL 1.3 1.0 0.3 3.1 4.0 – 0.9
SK 4.4 3.8 0.6 4.1 4.2 – 0.1
SI 3.0 3.6 – 0.6 3.6 4.4 – 0.8
AC-10 2.4 2.5 0.0 3.5 4.2 – 0.7
BG 4.3 4.0 0.3 4.7 5.1 – 0.4
RO 4.9 4.5 0.4 4.9 5.4 – 0.4
TR 7.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 5.0 – 0.9
CC-13 4.3 3.1 1.2 3.9 4.6 – 0.7
Source: 2002 PEPs and Commission services.46
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AC-10 would have a general government deficit above
3 % of GDP in 2004. 
As a result of the trends outlined above, the Commission
forecasts that all countries will miss the 2004 targets set
out in the 2002 PEPs with the exception of Bulgaria,
Romania and the Slovak Republic (see Table I.20).
Targets would be missed by a particularly significant
amount in the cases of Turkey, Cyprus and, to a much
more limited extent, Hungary and Poland. Various fac-
tors drive these developments, including the slippage
from the targeted adjustment path accumulated by sev-
eral countries in 2002 and the worsening of economic
prospects (1). Moreover, in some cases like Latvia, gov-
ernments have modified their medium-term budgetary
targets following the submission of the 2002 PEPs.
Finally, in the case of Turkey, less optimistic assump-
tions on the projected decline of interest rates explain a
large part of the divergence between the Commission
forecast and the PEP targets. More information on the
latter is provided in the following section.
4.2. Overview of the 2002 updates of the 
pre-accession economic programmes 
4.2.1. Introduction
The examination of the second set of pre-accession eco-
nomic programmes (PEPs) submitted by candidate coun-
tries within the framework of the pre-accession fiscal
surveillance procedure (see Box I.3) was completed in
November 2002. 
Compared to the PEPs submitted for the first time by
candidate countries in 2001, the 2002 updates revealed a
good and improved effort to develop a consistent and
credible medium-term macroeconomic framework. The
programmes’ information content and their comparabil-
ity across countries was greatly enhanced by the presen-
tation of data through standardised tables based upon
those envisaged under the code of conduct for current
Member States as well as by the provision of detailed
estimates of fiscal variables in principle according to
ESA95 methodology (2). 
¥1∂ For all countries except Latvia and Malta, the average growth rate over the
2003–04 period is projected to fall below that envisaged in the 2002 PEPs
(see Table I.21). 
¥2∂ The only exception was Turkey which provided budgetary data based upon
GFS methodology. Apart from Cyprus, Lithuania and Romania, all countries
updated the estimates presented in the fiscal notification of April 2002.
Box I.3: The pre-accession fiscal surveillance procedure for candidate countries
(Continued on the next page)
In line with the call for the establishment of an annual fiscal surveillance for the candidate countries contained in the 1999
and 2000 accession partnerships, the so-called pre-accession fiscal surveillance procedure was established in 2001. The
PFSP aims at preparing the candidate countries for the participation in the multilateral surveillance and economic policy
coordination procedures currently in place in the EU as part of economic and monetary union. 
As explained in European Commission (2002a), the PFSP has three components.
1. The notification of budget positions — requires candidate countries to report data on their general government def-
icits and debt in the same format as that used by existing Member States. Notifications are then evaluated by the Com-
mission services in order to monitor the country’s fiscal positions, determine compliance with ESA95 standards, and
assess their quality as a basis for fiscal analysis.
2. The pre-accession economic programmes — are submitted on an annual basis by each candidate country for the
Commission’s evaluation. PEPs have two main aims. First, to outline the medium-term policy framework, including
public finance objectives and structural reform priorities needed for EU accession. Second, they offer an opportunity
to develop the institutional and analytical capacity necessary to participate in EMU with a derogation from the adop-
tion of the euro upon accession, particularly in the areas of multilateral surveillance and coordination of economic
policies. 47
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ahead for the acceding countries, the degree of detailed
analysis differed across countries and policy areas, as did
the specificity and credibility of the medium-term eco-
nomic and fiscal scenarios. A rather common problem
was that the costs of structural reforms were insuffi-
ciently quantified and integrated in the budgetary frame-
work. More generally, further analytical capacity-build-
ing still seemed required for all countries. More detailed
information on the sources of fiscal risks, the budgetary
costs of on-going reforms, the long-term sustainability
of public finances and cyclically-adjusted budget bal-
ances also appeared to be needed.
4.2.2. Medium-term budgetary developments
The medium-term macroeconomic framework for the
2002 PEPs covers the period 2001 to 2005. For most
countries, the framework envisages accelerating growth,
declining inflation and persisting external imbalances
(see Table I.22). Although growth projections were gen-
erally revised downwards relative to the 2001 PEPs in
view of the deterioration in the international economic
environment, growth is generally expected to accelerate
in the period 2002–05 relative to 2001 (1).
Against this background, and taking as a starting point
the 2001 general government balances, most budgetary
plans presented in the 2002 PEPs envisage an improve-
ment by 2005, with nine countries planning to reduce
their budget deficits by 2005, thus leading to a fall in the
average deficit for both the CC-13 and the AC-10 (see
Table I.23). Among the four remaining countries, Bul-
garia and Estonia plan to move from a small surplus to a
balanced budget leaving only Latvia and the Czech
Republic with a projected increase in the general govern-
ment deficit over the programme period. In the case of
the Czech Republic, in particular, the budget deficit was
projected to increase from 5 % of GDP in 2001 to 5.5 %
of GDP in 2005, after peaking at 6.4 % in 2002. In 2005,
projected budget outcomes would vary from a balanced
budget in Bulgaria and Estonia to a deficit of 5.5 % of
GDP in the Czech Republic. Among the AC-10, only the
Czech Republic and Malta refrained from targeting a
deficit below 3 % of GDP in 2005.       
Primary balances are also projected to improve over the
programme period both on average and for the majority
of individual countries. After being projected to worsen
in eight cases over 2002, in fact, by 2005, primary bal-
ances are targeted to improve relative to 2001 for eight
countries. The Czech Republic and Latvia would then be
the only countries left running a primary deficit. 
Compared to the 2001 PEPs, eight countries presented
less ambitious budgetary paths in the 2002 updates, lead-
ing to a deterioration in the average deficit target for the
AC-10 over the 2002–04 period. Among the factors
underpinning these revisions, the reassessment of eco-
nomic growth prospects does not seem to have played a
consistently relevant role (2). Contrary to what one may
expect, in fact, lower growth projections are met by
higher deficit targets in only five cases out of nine (and
to a significantly different degree in each of these). 
Box I.3 (continued)
3. The discussions in a multilateral context — allow present and prospective Member States to jointly debate the fiscal
notifications, the PEPs and their evaluation by the Commission. Discussions take place in two steps. First, at a high-
level meeting between the member of the Economic and Financial Committee and their counterparts from candidate
countries. Secondly, at a yearly ministerial meeting between Ecofin and their counterparts. 
In this context, on 5 November 2002, ministers concluded, inter alia, that ‘sound and credible fiscal policy is crucial not
only for coping with difficult economic policy choices, but also for enhancing confidence in the stability of the macro-
economic policy framework. The weak fiscal positions of several acceding countries argue strongly for taking decisive
steps towards sustainable fiscal consolidation in line with the EU’s fiscal surveillance procedures, inter alia so as to create
room for private investment. Effective public expenditure management and efficient tax collection should be central ele-
ments of any consolidation programme. Long-term challenges due to ageing populations have also to be factored in’.
¥1∂ Even when a deceleration is expected, as in the cases of Latvia, Lithuania,
and Romania, the average rate of growth is projected to remain above 5 %.
¥2∂ Other potential factors include: a worse starting position than originally tar-
geted in the 2001 PEPs, methodological changes in the statistics for the
general government sector, and, of course, changes in the political willing-
ness to pursue the budgetary targets originally set out in the 2001 PEPs. 48
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Macroeconomic projections in the 2002 PEPs
Real GDP growth
(Annual percentage change)
Consumer price inflation 
(Annual percentage change)
Current account balance
(percentage of GDP)
2001 2002–05 (1) Revision (2) 2001 2005 2001 2005
CY 4.0 4.2 – 0.6 2.0 2.0 – 4.3 – 1.4
CZ 3.3 3.7 – 0.3 4.7 3.4 – 4.6 – 3.5
EE 5.0 5.5 – 0.6 5.8 3.5 – 6.1 – 6.4
HU 3.8 4.6 – 1.2 9.2 3.0 – 2.2 – 3.3
LV 7.7 5.5 – 0.3 2.5 3.0 – 9.7 – 6.7
LH 5.9 5.3 0.3 1.3 4.1 – 4.8 – 7.0
MT – 0.8 3.4 0.1 2.9 2.4 – 5.0 – 2.4
PL 1.0 3.6 – 0.3 5.5 3.1 – 4.1 – 5.7
SK 3.0 4.3 0.0 7.1 4.5 – 8.6 – 4.2
SI 3.3 4.4 – 0.5 8.4 4.6 – 0.4 0.2
AC-10 2.5 4.0 – 0.4 5.9 3.3 – 4.3 – 4.6
BG 4.0 4.9 – 1.4 7.4 3.5 – 6.0 – 5.2
RO 5.3 5.1 – 0.2 34.5 8.0 – 5.9 – 3.5
TR – 7.4 4.7 n/a 54.4 9.8 2.3 – 0.8
CC-13 – 0.1 4.3 n/a 22.8 5.6 – 2.6 – 3.4
(1) Annual average over the period 2002–05. 
(2) Difference between the average rate of growth over the period 2002–04 in the 2001 and 2002 PEPs.
Source: 2001 and 2002 PEPs, Commission services.
Table I.23
General government balances in the 2002 PEPs 
(% of GDP)
Nominal balance Primary balance Cyclically-adjusted balance (3)
2001 2005 Change Revision (2) 2001 2005 Change 2001 2005 Change
CY – 3.0 – 0.3 2.7 – 0.9 2.6 4.8 2.2 n/a n/a n/a
CZ – 5.0 – 5.5 – 0.5 – 1.5 – 3.8 – 3.6 0.2 – 5.3 – 5.6 – 0.3
EE 0.2 0.0 – 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 – 0.2 n/a n/a n/a
HU – 4.1 – 2.5 1.6 1.7 0.2 0.7 0.5 n/a n/a n/a
LV – 1.6 – 2.0 – 0.4 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 1.1 – 0.1 – 1.9 n/a n/a
LH – 1.9 – 1.5 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.0 0.2 n/a n/a n/a
MT – 7.0 – 3.1 3.9 – 0.1 – 3.4 0.2 3.6 – 6.8 – 2.7 4.1
PL – 3.5 – 2.2 1.3 – 0.8 – 0.6 1.5 2.1 – 3.6 – 2.6 1.0
SK (1) – 5.4 – 2.0 3.4 – 0.4 – 2.0 0.4 2.4 – 3.9 – 2.7 1.2
SI – 2.5 – 0.8 1.7 – 0.7 – 0.5 0.9 1.4 – 1.8 0.9 2.7
AC-10 – 3.8 – 2.7 1.1 – 0.5 – 1.1 0.3 1.4 n/a n/a n/a
BU 0.4 0.0 – 0.4 0.8 4.1 3.2 – 0.9 n/a n/a n/a
RO – 3.4 – 2.4 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.2 – 0.5 – 3.1 – 2.3 0.8
TR – 15.1 – 0.5 14.6 n/a 8.6 7.8 – 0.8 n/a n/a n/a
CC-13 – 6.6 – 1.9 4.7 n/a 1.9 2.4 0.5 n/a n/a n/a
(1) Figures for the Slovak Republic refer to the first draft of its 2002 PEP because its officially revised draft did not include a full set of figures. The revised deficit target
for 2005 equals 3.3 % of GDP.
(2) Difference between annual averages over the 2002–04 period in the 2001 and the 2002 PEPs.
(3) Countries’ own estimates as presented in the 2002 PEPs.
Source: 2002 PEPs and Commission services.49
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ble indicators of cyclically-adjusted balances, but only
a few countries provided some preliminary estimates in
this regard in their 2002 PEPs. Moreover, these figures
still need to be interpreted with considerable caution.
The institutional capacity to estimate cyclically-
adjusted balances, in fact, is still being developed while
short time series and strong structural changes make it
difficult to isolate structural relationships. With the
sole exception of the Slovak Republic, however, the
estimates provided would indicate that the budget defi-
cits recorded in 2001 were generally equal to the struc-
tural deficits. With the cyclical component of the
budget playing a relatively small role in the planned
adjustment, structural changes in revenue and expendi-
ture would be required to achieve the targets set out in
the 2002 updates.
In line with decreasing deficits and high nominal GDP
growth, (see Table I.24) most countries expect their
general government debt-to-GDP ratios to fall, and
sharply so in the cases of Turkey and Bulgaria. The
only significant exceptions are the Czech Republic and
Poland where the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to rise
considerably by the end of the programme period. Nev-
ertheless, according to the projections presented in the
PEPs, by 2005, all countries would have a debt-to-GDP
ratio below 60 % except Malta and Turkey. In both of
these cases, however, the ratio would be on a declining
trend.  
Table I.24
General government debt in the 2002 PEPs 
(% of GDP)
2001 2005 Change
CY 54.6 51.2 – 3.4
CZ 23.6 34.7 11.1
EE 4.8 3.7 – 1.1
HU 53.0 50.0 – 3.0
LV 15.9 18.0 2.1
LH 23.1 23.1 0.0
MT 65.3 61.1 – 4.2
PL 38.7 45.6 6.9
SK 43.0 38.1 – 4.9
SI 27.5 24.4 – 3.1
AC-10 36.9 40.9 – 4.1
BU 66.3 46.3 – 20.0
RO 23.3 26.0 2.7
TU 122.8 73.0 – 49.8
CC-13 59.9 48.3 – 11.6
Source: 2002 PEPs and Commission services. For the Slovak Republic, first ver-
sion of the 2002 PEP.
Table I.25
General government revenue and expenditure in the 2002 PEPs 
(% of GDP)
Revenue Expenditure
2001 2005 Change 2001 2005 Change
CY 40.5 42.2 1.7 43.5 42.5 – 1.0
CZ 42.1 41.3 – 0.7 47.1 46.8 – 0.3
EE 38.6 38.4 – 0.2 38.4 38.4 0.0
HU 46.1 42.5 – 3.6 50.2 45.0 – 5.2
LV 41.4 38.6 – 2.8 43.0 40.6 – 2.4
LH 34.2 36.1 1.9 36.1 37.6 1.5
MT 37.4 35.8 – 1.7 44.4 38.8 – 5.6
PL 41.8 42.2 0.4 45.3 44.5 – 0.8
SK 41.2 39.8 – 1.4 46.6 41.8 – 4.8
SI 43.1 42.5 – 0.6 45.6 43.3 – 2.3
AC-10 42.1 41.5 – 0.6 45.9 44.2 – 1.7
BU 40.6 35.0 – 5.6 40.3 35.0 – 5.3
RO 36.7 34.6 – 2.1 40.1 37.0 – 3.1
TU 42.1 40.1 – 2.0 57.2 40.6 – 16.6
CC-13 41.5 40.2 – 1.3 48.2 42.2 – 6.0
Source: 2002 PEPs and Commission services. For the Slovak Republic, first PEP version.50
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The 2002 PEPs show that most countries plan to reduce
the size of the general government sector in terms of both
revenue and expenditure ratios (see Table I.25). Averag-
ing some 1.3 % of GDP, the planned reduction in reve-
nues appears particularly sharp in the cases of Bulgaria,
Hungary and Latvia. Only Cyprus, Lithuania and Poland
foresee an increase in revenues over the programme
period. As regards the composition of these changes, a
number of countries, including Bulgaria, Hungary,
Latvia and Lithuania, expect a significant cut in tax
receipts, often due to sizeable reductions in direct taxes,
and company taxation in particular. Being bound by spe-
cific acquis provisions, the changes in indirect taxes are
more limited (1). 
With the planned reduction in the revenue ratio tending to
increase budget deficits, the targeted improvements in
budgetary balances generally hinge upon a relatively
sharper reduction in the expenditure ratio (see Table I.25).
All countries programme a reduction in their expenditure
ratio with the exception of the two with the lowest ratio in
2001, that is, Estonia and Lithuania. Reduction targets
appear particularly ambitious in the case of Bulgaria,
Hungary, Malta and the Slovak Republic — each aiming
to cut outlays by some 5 % of GDP — and Turkey.
Turkey, however, constitutes a special case as the
planned cut in the expenditure ratio by nearly 17 percent-
age points of GDP is almost fully accounted for by the
dramatic fall in interest payments expected to follow the
normalisation of its macroeconomic situation. In the
other countries, instead, planned budgetary retrenchment
is driven in most cases by cuts in current expenditures,
and collective consumption in particular (see Table I.26
and Graph I.10).
Most of the PEPs also envisage a gradual reduction in
subsidies but only marginally in the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland, that is, three of the five countries
where in 2001 subsidies amounted to more than 2 % of
GDP. With the sole exception of  Poland and, to a lesser
¥1∂ Most of the adjustments required by the acquis in the area of VAT have
already been made, whereas in many countries there is still further need for
adjustment in the area of certain excise duties (such as for tobacco).
Table I.26
Composition of general government expenditure in the 2002 PEPs 
(% of GDP)
Collective 
consumption Social transfers Subsidies
Gross fixed capital 
formation
Others, including 
interest
2001 2005 Change 2001 2005 Change 2001 2005 Change 2001 2005 Change 2001 2005 Change
CY 9.7 7.8 – 1.9 14.9 15.7 0.8 1.6 0.6 – 1.0 3.7 3.7 0.0 13.6 14.7 1.1
CZ 8.1 8.1 0.0 24.5 24.5 0.1 2.8 2.6 – 0.2 5.0 4.7 – 0.3 6.8 7.0 0.2
EE 20.2 19.3 – 0.9 11.1 10.9 – 0.2 0.8 1.0 0.2 3.4 4.3 0.9 2.9 2.9 0.0
HU 10.1 8.2 – 1.9 21.4 23.4 2.0 2.9 2.4 – 0.5 5.1 3.9 – 1.2 10.7 7.1 – 3.6
LV 8.4 n/a n/a 22.9 n/a n/a 1.1 n/a n/a 4.1 n/a n/a 6.5 n/a n/a
LH 7.2 8.1 0.9 22.7 23.3 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.0 2.2 2.8 0.6 3.3 2.7 – 0.6
MT n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
PL 7.2 6.6 – 0.6 25.1 23.5 – 1.6 2.5 2.4 – 0.1 2.6 2.5 – 0.1 7.9 9.5 1.6
SK 10.0 8.0 – 2.0 18.6 19.4 0.8 1.2 1.0 – 0.3 2.7 2.2 – 0.5 14.0 11.8 – 2.3
SI 8.1 7.4 – 0.6 18.0 17.3 – 0.7 1.4 1.3 – 0.1 2.5 2.4 0.0 15.7 14.9 – 0.9
AC-10 (1) 8.3 7.6 – 0.8 23.1 22.7 – 0.4 2.4 2.2 – 0.2 3.4 3.1 – 0.3 8.8 8.8 0.0
BU 9.8 8.2 – 1.6 14.2 14.2 0.0 2.4 1.3 – 1.1 3.5 2.9 – 0.6 10.4 8.4 – 2.0
RO 6.3 5.3 – 1.0 9.9 9.9 0.0 2.1 1.6 – 0.5 3.2 4.0 0.8 18.6 16.2 – 2.4
TU 17.5 16.2 – 1.3 9.1 9.0 – 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.1 4.2 4.3 0.1 – 31.7 – 30.5 1.2
CC-13 (1) 10.7 9.7 – 1.0 17.6 17.3 – 0.3 1.9 1.7 – 0.2 3.6 3.5 – 0.1 – 1.3 – 1.3 0.0
(1) Weighted averages excluding Latvia and Malta.
Source: 2002 PEPs and Commission services. For the Slovak Republic, first PEP version.51
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2 0 0 3extent, Slovenia, social transfers (1) would not be cut sig-
nificantly in any country and would actually increase
quite markedly in Hungary. Apart from the latter, public
investment would be mostly shielded from expenditure
cuts with the (unweighted) average public investment
ratio remaining around 3.5 % of GDP (2). Over the
2002–05 period, the average ratio of government gross
fixed capital formation to GDP would be above 4 % in
the case of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and
Turkey.
4.2.4. Other considerations
When viewed against the rigidity of primary expenditure
recorded in the past (3), the fall in expenditure ratios
required to achieve the deficit and revenue reduction tar-
gets of the 2002 PEPs highlight the difficult task faced
by the authorities in implementing their fiscal plans.
Compounding this challenge and arguably weakening
the programmes’ credibility, expenditure cuts are back-
loaded in a large majority of the PEPs. In only three
cases, expenditures are expected to be already cut in
2002 and only Hungary, Malta and Romania aim to
achieve a large share of total expenditure adjustment in
2003. In seven cases, half or more of the total expendi-
ture cuts would have to be implemented in 2004 and
2005. In addition, as shown in Section 1.2, the Commis-
sion 2003 spring forecast indicates that 11 countries out
of 13 would fail to meet the PEP budgetary goals for
2004. An even larger adjustment than planned in the
2002 PEPs would therefore have to be implemented in
2005 to achieve the programmes’ end-targets. 
Quite apart from the possibility of partial implementa-
tion, a wide range of risks to countries’ budgetary plans
are identified in the 2002 PEPs, most of which stress the
danger posed by government’s off-budget liabilities. In
terms of overall stocks of guarantees, these seem to be
relatively high in Malta and Romania, moderate in
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania and
Slovenia, and relatively low in the other countries for
which information is provided. Of course, the assess-
ment of underlying fiscal risks cannot rely solely on the
level of the existing stock of guarantees. Yet, only a few
Graph I.10:  Contributions to change in budgetary position 2001–05 (1) (in points of GDP)
(1) Source: 2002 updates of the pre-accession economic programmes. A positive value indicates a positive contribution to the change in budgetary position.
A positive value for the total variation of the budgetary position (figure presented in bold) implies an improvement of the balance. For LV, primary cur-
rent expenditure refers to total expenditure as no data were provided for interest payment and gross fixed capital formation in 2005. For MA, no data
available on gross fixed capital formation.
¥1∂ In kind and other than in kind.
¥2∂ In Hungary, cuts in gross fixed capital formation (from 5.1 % of GDP in
2001 to 3.9 % of GDP in 2005) would account for nearly a quarter of the
planned reduction in the expenditure ratio. However, Hungary’s public
investment ratio was the highest among accession candidates in 2001 and
would remain above the (unweighted) average for the group in 2005. 
¥3∂ See World Bank (2002). 52
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budgetary impact stemming from these contingent liabil-
ities, making this a key area for the provision of further
information in the next PEP updates (1). 
This also applies to the assessment of the long-term sus-
tainability of acceding countries’ public finances. For the
first time in 2002, countries were asked, on a voluntary
basis, to provide data in this regard along the format pro-
vided for Member States’ convergence and stability pro-
grammes. Only very few countries, however, provided
(incomplete) data. 
Almost all countries, however, identified the reform of
the pension system as one of the key domestic policy
areas linked to medium-term fiscal sustainability. In
most cases, in fact, long-term demographic projections
suggest that the first (compulsory non-funded) pillar of
the pension system would become overburdened, thus
constituting a source of medium-term budgetary risks. In
view of this trend, all countries either intend to reform
their first pillar, or have recently done so, notably by
matching individual benefits more closely to individual
past contributions and, in same cases, by raising the
retirement age or by adjusting pension indexation rules.
About half of the candidate countries have introduced a
multi-pillar pension system with several others planning
to do so (see Table I.27) (2).¥1∂ As for the other identified risks, these appeared to be more country-spe-
cific. Lithuania, for instance, highlighted additional risks linked to hard-to-
predict remaining costs of the transition process such as those stemming
from the restitution of savings and real estate ownership rights, the debts of
State-owned enterprises, and the decommissioning of the Ignalina nuclear
power plant. Restitution issues could also represent a significant share of
GDP under the most pessimistic scenarios presented in the Polish PEP.
Romania identified policy failures, linked to the non-elimination of quasi-
fiscal deficits or to additional bank bailouts, as the main fiscal risk.
¥2∂ Healthcare reform is another area high on the agenda in most countries,
with considerable implications for the long term sustainability of public
finances. Planned and on-going reforms often include the introduction of a
mixed public–private model for insurance and health services provision.
Table I.27
Main measures in the PEPs concerning pension reform
Introduction 
of mandatory 
funded-pillar
Planned reforms
Bulgaria √ Balance 1st pillar by 2007
Increase contribution compliance
Cyprus √ Increase contribution to 1st pillar in framework of tax reform
Czech Republic × Reform planned, but no details in PEP
Estonia √ None; new lower estimates of costs of introduction of 2nd pillar scheme on 1st pillar scheme
Hungary √ Increase contribution rate to 2nd pillar
Make 2nd pillar compulsory for new entrants
Latvia √ Increase retirement age further
Lithuania × Introduction of 3 pillar system planned in 2004
Malta × Reform 1st pillar planned
Poland √ Administrative and legal changes to 1st pillar and interaction with 2nd pillar
Romania × Introduction of 3 pillar system is being discussed
Slovak Republic × Parametric reforms of 1st pillar
Introduction of 3 pillar system planned, privatisation revenue planned to fund transition cost
Slovenia × None
Turkey × None53

Part II
Evolving budgetary surveillance

Summary
The year 2002 and the early part of 2003 has been a dif-
ficult period as regards the implementation of the EU
framework for fiscal surveillance. With nominal deficits
breaching the 3 % of GDP reference value, Germany and
Portugal have been placed in excessive deficit positions.
An early-warning was issued to France in January 2002,
but subsequent data revealed that a nominal deficit of
3.1 % of GDP was recorded in 2002, and the Commis-
sion has consequently recommended that France be
placed in an excessive deficit position. 
A number of lessons can be drawn from these first expe-
riences with the enforcement mechanisms of the Treaty
and SGP. Firstly, the credibility in the rules-based
framework was not aided by the Council’s failure to
issue an early-warning in February 2002 to Germany and
Portugal: the recent experience with France further
underlined the need for early-warnings to be sent well
before nominal deficits are close to 3 % of GDP. Sec-
ondly, the repeated upward revisions of deficits under-
lined the importance of strengthening the process of col-
lection and verification of budgetary statistics. Thirdly
and on a positive note, surveillance at EU level (with its
binding deadlines for reporting data and the role of the
Commission in providing a neutral assessment of com-
pliance with agreed budgetary targets) has prompted
debates at Member State level on the need to face up to
difficult budgetary policy challenges. In the case of Por-
tugal and Germany, action at EU level has arguably
facilitated the introduction of painful reforms necessary
to prevent public finances from entering unsustainable
paths: the French authorities, however, have to date
failed to take measures to address the growing budgetary
imbalances despite these becoming apparent already in
mid-2002. 
In response to these developments, and in line with a
mandate from the Barcelona European Council conclu-
sions, the Commission adopted a communication on
strengthening coordination of budgetary policies. It
identified a number of shortcomings with the implemen-
tation of the SGP in the first four years of EMU and out-
lined a strategy that called for more account to be taken
of underlying economic conditions when assessing
budgetary positions, an interpretation of compliance
with SGP requirements which would (depending on
country-specific circumstances) cater for the budgetary
impact of reforms that enhance growth and employment,
increasing the emphasis placed on the sustainability of
public finances and outstanding debt positions, and
improving the implementation of the SGP including
stricter and more timely recourse to the existing enforce-
ment instruments. At the same time, the Commission
adopted proposals to improve the governance of budget-
ary statistics. 
The spring European Council of March 2003, endorsed
a report of the (Ecofin) Council which shared many of
the Commission’s proposals on strengthening the coor-
dination of budgetary policies. It confirmed that the
achievement of a budget position of ‘close to balance or
in surplus’ is in the economic self-interest of Member
States both individually and collectively. In addition, the
Council agreed that compliance with the ‘close to bal-
ance or in surplus’ requirement should be assessed in
cyclically-adjusted terms with due account taken of one-
off budgetary measures which only have a transitory
impact on budget positions. For euro-area countries,
agreement was reached that Member States with deficits
should achieve an annual improvement in the cyclically-
adjusted budget deficit of at least 0.5 % of GDP until the
‘close to balance or in surplus’ requirement is reached. It
underlined the need for automatic stabilisers to operate
symmetrically over the economic cycle and the particu-
lar importance of avoiding a pro-cyclical loosening of
fiscal policies in good times. The Council also confirmed
the importance of running down public debt at a satisfac-
tory pace towards the 60 % of GDP reference value and
that the existing provisions of the Treaty (that is, the debt
criterion of the excessive deficit procedure) can contrib-
ute to achieving this goal. 57
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path) is warranted to ensure that public finances are on a
sustainable footing in the light of the projected budget-
ary impact of ageing populations. In addition, the reduc-
tion of government debt will create room to pursue other
economic and social goals, in particular to enhance eco-
nomic growth. High debt levels also leave the credit
standing of the country vulnerable to unfavourable eco-
nomic circumstances. The challenge now is to operation-
alise the debt criterion of the EDP. When assessing debt
developments, careful attention should be devoted to all
the factors which determine its dynamics so as to evalu-
ate to what extent debt developments are due to factors
outside the immediate control of governments. It is
indeed essential to avoid a too mechanistic approach to
assess compliance with the debt criterion
Budgetary statistics are the foundation of the EU fiscal
surveillance tools and their quality has improved consid-
erably over the last decade. Government accounts are now
more reliable, complete, transparent and detailed, and are
published in a much more timely fashion than when the
excessive deficit procedure was set up. However, some
weaknesses remain: in several countries, data on govern-
ment deficit and debt ratios are not yet as reliable as they
should be and are subject to large revisions. Furthermore,
the government accounts of several Member States are not
fully transparent, and there have been problems in terms
of their timely submission. These concerns are clearly
amplified with the perspective of enlargement. To address
outstanding challenges, the (Ecofin) Council recently
agreed to implement a code of best practice. From the
Member States’ side, this involves increasing the transpar-
ency of government accounts, in particular for the lower
government subsectors, the strict respect of deadlines, and
an overall increase in data quality, but also a clarification
of the independence statute of the national statistical
offices as the main compilers of government data. The
Commission (Eurostat) is aiming at reinforcing its ability
to scrutinise the Member States’ government accounts in
more detail, and accelerating the decision-making process
for deciding upon the recording of government transac-
tions. The new steps to compile quarterly budgetary statis-
tics is a major challenge for statisticians, but also for econ-
omists, policy-makers and budgetary policy analysts who
will need to interpret quarterly data with due care, since
these will necessarily be more volatile and perhaps less
transparent than annual data. 58
1. Implementing the Stability 
and Growth Pact
1.1. Introduction 
The fiscal framework of EMU aims at combining
budgetary discipline with flexibility through two main
requirements. These are the Treaty requirement to avoid
excessive deficit positions (measured against reference
values for deficits and debt of 3 and 60 % of GDP
respectively), and the requirement of the SGP to achieve
and maintain a budgetary position ‘close to balance or in
surplus’ over the cycle. Compliance with the ‘close to
balance or in surplus’ requirement secures fiscal disci-
pline and the sustainability of public finances, and thus
contributes to maintaining an economic environment in
which monetary policy can effectively pursue price sta-
bility. It also provides the necessary room for manoeuvre
to allow the automatic stabilisers to play freely. The
rules-based framework of the Treaty and SGP consists of
both preventive and dissuasive elements, both of which
are backed up with enforcement procedures. 
The deterioration in the budget positions has required the
Commission and Council to apply the various enforcement
mechanisms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
against several Member States during 2002 and the early
part of 2003. Against a background of slow economic
growth, this has led to considerable tension in the Council.
The discussions on the implementation of the SGP gener-
ated negative reactions in the press and markets, and in part
motivated the Commission proposals to strengthen the
coordination of budgetary policies in November 2002 (1).
The remainder of this chapter summarises the debate on
the implementation of the SGP since spring 2002 (2).
Section 2 describes the enforcement mechanisms pro-
vided for in the Treaty and the SGP regulations (3).
Section 3 examines the specific cases of the three Mem-
ber States (Portugal, Germany and France) where the
Council has already taken action in the framework of the
excessive deficit procedure.
1.2. The enforcement mechanisms 
of the SGP
1.2.1. The preventive part of the Pact
Under the preventive arrangements of the Pact, Mem-
ber States submit annual stability or convergence pro-
grammes in which they set down their short and
medium-term budgetary strategies to reach and sustain
budget positions that are ‘close to balance or in sur-
plus’. The programmes are subject to peer review and
monitoring by the Commission and Council, with a
view to identifying any ‘significant divergence’ either
from the medium-term budget target or the adjustment
path towards it. This surveillance not only consists of
verifying whether nominal budgetary targets are met, it
also involves a close examination of the underlying
budget position taking account of cyclical economic
conditions. 
If the Council identifies such a significant divergence
from a budget target, it shall address a recommendation
to the Member State concerned with a view to give an
early warning in order to prevent the occurrence of an
excessive deficit. The Council recommendation is
adopted by qualified majority on the basis of a Commis-
sion recommendation following the procedure outlined
in Article 99(4) of the Treaty and Articles 6 and 10 of
¥1∂ COM(2003) 668 final. See Chapter II. for a discussion of the communication.
¥2∂ Part II.2 in last year’s report summarises the debate on the Commission’s
recommendation of February 2002 for ‘early-warnings’ to be sent to
Germany and Portugal. 
¥3∂ For a more detailed description see Cabral (2001), Costello (2001), and
Fischer and Giudice (2001).59
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ommendation to take prompt corrective measures can be
addressed to the Member States concerned if the Council
judges that the divergence is persisting or worsening. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 does not define
what constitutes a ‘significant divergence’ from budget-
ary targets or the conditions under which the early-warn-
ing mechanism is to be activated. To ensure consistency,
the Commission has developed and used the following
three factors in deciding whether to activate the early-
warning mechanism: 
• the size of the budgetary slippage, that is, the extent
to which budget positions diverge from the targets
set down in stability or convergence programmes;
• the reason for the budgetary slippage, that is,
whether the divergence of actual balances from the
target can be explained by cyclical or discretionary
factors;
• the risk of an excessive deficit position that is,
whether there is a risk of breaching the 3 % of GDP
reference value.
These criteria distinguish between slippage from budget-
ary targets in nominal and cyclically-adjusted terms, and
reflect whether or not a country has reached the medium-
term target of the SGP. In brief, more leeway is afforded
to countries with sound budget positions. An early-warn-
ing, however, can be issued even if the nominal deficit is
some way below the 3 % of GDP reference value. To
date, recourse has only been made to the early-warning
mechanism when deficits were well above 2 % of GDP,
and experience with Portugal, Germany and France has
shown that this is likely to be too late to prevent deficits
from going above 3 % of GDP.
1.2.2. The dissuasive elements of the Pact 
The dissuasive elements of the SGP are set down in Arti-
cle 104 which requires all Member States to avoid exces-
sive government deficits (2). Under the excessive deficit
procedure (EDP), the Commission monitors budgetary
developments and examines compliance with budgetary
discipline on the basis of two criteria, that is, ‘whether
the ratio of the actual or planned government deficit to
gross domestic product exceeds a reference value [3 %
of GDP]’ and ‘whether the ratio of government debt to
gross domestic product exceeds a reference value [60 %
of GDP], unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace’. 
The EDP is a complicated procedure involving several
steps. Article 104(3) states ‘If a Member State breaches
one or both of the these criteria, the Commission shall
prepare a report’. This report shall ‘take into account
whether the government deficit exceeds government
investment expenditure and take into account all other
relevant factors, including the medium-term economic
and budgetary position of the Member State’. After the
Commission adopts such a report, the EFC must give its
opinion thereon within two weeks. As of this point, three
possible courses of action are possible.
• the Commission could decide that there is neither a
risk nor existence of an excessive deficit position,
and the procedure would then stop; 
• the Commission could address an opinion on the risk
of an excessive deficit position in accordance with
Article 104(5). The Treaty does not specify the pre-
cise conditions as to what constitutes a risk of an
excessive deficit, but the most clear-cut scenario is a
forecast (either Commission or of the national
authorities) projecting a deficit level above 3 % of
GDP reference value (3). The Council is not required
to vote on the Commission’s opinion, and the proce-
dure comes to a halt at this stage. It would only be
reactivated if subsequent outcome data confirms
that the 3 % of GDP reference value has indeed been
breached;
• the Commission could adopt an opinion in accord-
ance with Article 104(5) on the existence of an
excessive deficit position. The Council is then
required to vote by qualified majority on whether an
excessive deficit position exists in accordance with
Article 104(6). To be placed in an excessive deficit
¥1∂ OJ L 209, 2.8.1997. In addition to these legal obligations on the early-
warning mechanism, the Commission, Member States and Council gave a
strong political commitment to the ‘strict and timely’ implementation of
the SGP in the resolution of the Amsterdam European Council on the
Stability and Growth Pact (OJ C 236, 2.8.1997). 
¥2∂ Under the provisions of its opt-out protocol, the UK is not required to avoid
excessive deficit positions but rather must endeavour to do so. 
¥3∂ However, a forecast deficit above the 3 % of GDP reference is not a prereq-
uisite requirement for the activation of the EDP. Article 104(3) states that
‘The Commission may also prepare a report if, notwithstanding the fulfil-
ment of the requirements under the [deficit and debt], it is of the opinion
that there is a risk of an excessive deficit position’. 60
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values have indeed been breached. The rationale
behind waiting for the outcome data is that being
placed in an excessive deficit position has poten-
tially serious consequences for a Member State, for
example, the possibility of negative reactions by
markets resulting in a higher risk premium on debt;
it could prevent a country from joining the euro
zone; it could eventually lead to the imposition of
financial sanctions on euro-area countries in breach
of its obligations. 
At the same time as it decides upon the existence of an
excessive deficit position, the Council must also adopt a
recommendation to the Member State concerned (in
accordance with Article 104(7)) with a view to bringing
the situation to an end within a given period. Article 3(4)
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 specifies that
Box II.1: What constitutes an ‘exceptional circumstance’ under the excessive deficit procedure
A nominal deficit above 3 % of GDP does not imply a country is automatically placed in an excessive deficit position,
as the Treaty and SGP regulations provide some room for interpretation to take account of ‘exceptional circumstances’.
Article 104(2) of the Treaty states that a Member State with a deficit to GDP ratio over 3 % is in an excessive deficit
position unless ‘… the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to
the reference value’. Against the background of the current economic slowdown and the effects of war in the Gulf, the
question has been raised as to whether countries could make recourse to this exceptionality clause to avoid being placed
in an excess deficit position. 
Before addressing this question directly, it should be noted that any breach must be at the same time exceptional and tem-
porary and close to the reference value, that is, the conditions are cumulative and thus recourse to this Treaty provision is
restricted to a very limited number of cases. Moreover, the issue of exceptional circumstances only arises when the Com-
mission and Council are deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit position in accordance with Article 104(6) of
the Treaty. There is no scope for the Council to give an ex ante exemption to any Member State allowing to breach the 3 %
of GDP reference value for deficits. Neither could it be applied retroactively to countries such as Portugal and Germany
which are already in excessive deficit positions. 
Article 2(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 provides some further clarification on what constitutes an exceptional
circumstance. The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional when ‘resulting
from an unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned and which has a major impact on the financial
position of the general government or when resulting from a severe economic downturn’. 
A priori the direct costs of participation in a military conflict could be regarded as an ‘unusual event outside the control of
the Member State concerned’ together with costs of additional security measures. However, it would need to be backed up
with evidence that these have had a ‘a major impact on the financial position of the general government’ and thus are a
major contributory factor to the deficit level rising above 3 % of GDP. Clearly, this argument would not apply to deficits
going above 3 % of GDP in 2002.
A more pertinent issue is whether the economic situation constitutes a ‘severe economic downturn’. Article 2(1) of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 establishes a general rule whereby a severe downturn is considered exceptional if
‘there is an annual fall of real GDP of at least 2 %’. The Member State concerned can demonstrate that even a fall of
annual real GDP of less than 2 % is ‘nevertheless exceptional in the light of further supportive evidence, in particular
on the abruptness of the downturn or on the accumulated loss of output relative to past trends’. In the resolution of the
European Council on growth and employment, Member States committed not to invoke the exceptional clause if GDP
fall is less than – 0.75 %. 
Based on the spring 2003 Commission forecast, a loss in output of 0.75 % is not projected in any Member State and there-
fore there is currently no case for considering recourse to the exceptionality clause. However, it could become relevant if
growth in some countries turns out to be substantially lower than is currently forecasted. 61
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Firstly, a deadline of four months at the most must be
established for the Member State to take effective action.
In addition, a deadline must be established for the correc-
tion of the excessive deficit position, which ‘… should
be completed in the year following its identification
unless there are special circumstances’. It is worth high-
lighting the fact that the initial requirement on the Mem-
ber State concerned is to take corrective action rather
than in achieving immediate results. As such, the will-
ingness of the Member States to respond to the repri-
mand of the Council is of critical importance. The failure
to take corrective actions would trigger the next stage of
the EDP and move the Member State closer to the stage
when it may receive sanctions. 
1.3. The use of enforcement mechanisms 
since spring 2002 (1)
1.3.1. Slippage from budget targets 
in many Member States
Throughout 2002, concern grew about the deterioration
in budget positions in several Member States participat-
ing in the euro area. Table II.1. compares the budget out-
comes for 2002 projected by the Commission in autumn
¥1∂ For documents concerning these procedures, see the section on fiscal sur-
veillance on the web site of the Directorate-General for Economic and
Financial Affairs: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activ-
ities/sgp/procedures_en.htm.
Table II.1
Comparison of growth and budgetary developments for 2002 between autumn 2002 Commission forecasts 
and the 2001 updates of the programmes
GDP growth 
in 2002 (% p.a.)
Budget balance in 2002 
(excluding UMTS) (% of GDP)
Difference from SP/CP budget target 
(% of GDP) due to:
 % of GDP SP/CP COM forecast
SP/CP 
target
EDP 
notification 
COM 
forecast
Difference 
COM 
– SP/CP
Impact 
of cyclical 
conditions 
in 2002
Non-cyclical 
factors
in 2002
p.m.
cyclical and 
non-cyclical 
factors in 2001
1 2 3 4 5 6 = 5 – 3 7 8 = 6 – 7 9
BE 1.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 0.2
DE 0.8 0.4 – 2.5 – 2.9 – 3.8 – 1.3 – 0.1 – 1.2 – 0.3
EL 3.8 3.5 0.8 0.8 – 1.3 – 2.1 0.0 – 2.1 – 1.8
ES 2.4 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 – 0.2 0.2 – 0.1
FR 1.5 1.0 – 1.8 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 0.9 – 0.1 – 0.8 – 0.1
IE 3.9 3.3 0.7 – 0.1 – 1.2 – 1.9 – 0.2 – 1.7 0.2
IT 2.3 0.4 – 0.5 – 1.1 – 2.4 – 1.9 – 0.7 – 1.2 – 1.1
LU 5.3 0.1 2.8 1.3 0.5 – 2.3 – 1.9 – 0.3 2.0
NL 1.3 0.2 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.6
AT 1.3 0.7 0.0 – 1.3 – 1.8 – 1.8 0.0 – 1.7 0.2
PT 1.8 0.7 – 1.8 – 2.8 – 3.4 – 1.6 – 0.3 – 1.3 – 2.0
FI 1.6 1.4 2.6 3.6 3.6 1.0 – 0.2 1.2 0.1
EUR-12 1.8 0.8 – 1.1 – 1.7 – 2.3 – 1.1 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.4
DK 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2
SE 2.4 1.6 2.1 1.8 1.4 – 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.4 0.2
UK 2.3 1.6 – 1.1 – 1.0 – 1.1 0.0 – 0.4 0.4 0.9
EU-15 1.8 0.9 – 1.0 – 1.4 – 1.9 – 0.9 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.2
NB: SP/CP = stability/convergence programmes submitted in Autumn 2001, EDP notification = September 2002; COM = autumn 2002 Commission forecasts; Impact
of cyclical conditions: shortfall = – ; bonus =
Source: European Commission.62
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stability and convergence programmes, that is, the infor-
mation which was available to ministers in late 2002
when key decisions on the implementation of the SGP
had to be taken. Significant slippage from budget targets
was evident in a large number of countries, although the
concern was focused on countries where deficits emerged.
Eventually, the Council took action against three coun-
tries (Germany, France and Portugal) although the defi-
cits in Greece, Italy and Austria also gave cause for
concern. 
As shown on column 8 of Table II.2., approximately half
of the deterioration in budget positions projected for
2002 was due to the automatic stabilisers in response to
economic cycle. Non-cyclical factors such as unfunded
tax cuts, discretionary expenditure increases and spend-
ing overruns also contributed to the slippage. This indi-
cates a reversal in some Member States of budgetary
consolidation efforts. In several Member States, how-
ever, most of the deviation from the 2002 target resulted
from the slippage that had already occurred by the end of
2001 (see column 9).
1.3.2. Portugal
On 5 November 2002, the Council decided that an exces-
sive deficit existed in Portugal, the first time the EDP
was applied since the launch of the euro in 1999 (1).
Budget difficulties in Portugal had been apparent for
some time (2), and in January 2002 the Commission
adopted a recommendation that an early-warning be sent
to Portugal for having missed its budget target for 2001
by a wide margin. At that time, the Commission (on the
basis of its autumn 2001 forecast) was projecting a defi-
cit of 2.2 % of GDP for 2001 compared with a target of
1.1 % of GDP set down its stability programme, see
Graph II.1. The Ecofin Council at its meeting of 12 Feb-
ruary 2002, however, decided not to endorse the Com-
mission recommendation for an early-warning. This
followed commitments given by the Portuguese authori-
ties to endeavour to prevent the deficit from going above
the 3 % of GDP reference value in 2002.
¥1∂ Council Decision 2002/923/EC, OJ L 322/30.
¥2∂ See Part II.2 in European Commission (2002a).
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confirmation from the Portuguese authorities that the
general government deficit in 2001 was to be revised
upwards from 2.2 % of GDP (reported in February 2002
EDP notification) to 4.1 % of GDP, an upward revision
of 1.9 percentage points of GDP (1). This revision fol-
lowed the submission of a report by a special task force
called the Commission for the Analysis of Public
Accounts established by the Portuguese Government
under the direct responsibility of the Governor of the
Bank of Portugal. This task force, set up following the
non-acceptance by Eurostat of budgetary data notified in
March 2002, was made up of representatives from the
Ministry of Finance, Bank of Portugal and the National
Institutes of Statistics.
The size of this ex-post revision and the delay in it com-
ing to light underlined serious deficiencies in the collec-
tion and processing of general government statistical
data in Portugal. A breakdown of the revised outcome
for data for 2001 shows that the difference of 1.9 per-
centage points of GDP was due in almost equal parts to
the reclassification of certain items in government
accounts (2) to bring them in line with the Eurostat defi-
nitions and due to a slippage in budgetary execution.
A deficit of 4.1 % of GDP in 2001 was confirmed in the
Portugal’s submission by 1 September 2002 under the
semi-annual reporting of government deficits and debt
levels, and the Commission activated the EDP by prepar-
ing, on 24 September 2002, a report in accordance with
Article 104(3) of the Treaty. In this report, the Commis-
sion drew attention to the failure on the part of Portugal
to achieve budgetary consolidation since the mid-1990s,
and that the deterioration in the budget balance could not
be explained by the cycle as the cyclically-adjusted
budget deficit had risen from 3 % of GDP in 1999 to
4.5 % of GDP in 2001 (using the HP filter method). On
the revenue side, the shortfall derives from the losses
implied by the reform of direct taxes implemented in
2001 and lower-than-projected efficiency gains in tax
collection and administration. At the same time, current
primary expenditures continued to grow faster than nom-
inal GDP, with the public sector wage bill and social
transfers repeatedly surpassing targets set by the govern-
ment. The Commission also concluded that the breach of
the 3 % of GDP reference value could not be attributed
to a severe economic downturn (that is, the exceptional-
ity clause could not apply). Moreover, the increase in the
deficit in 2001 could not be attributed to public invest-
ment as this remained constant at some 4 % of GDP over
the 1999 to 2001 period. 
The Economic and Financial Committee confirmed
these findings, and on the basis of an opinion and a rec-
ommendation proposed by the Commission adopted on
16 October 2002, the Council decided upon the existence
of an excessive deficit. It also adopted a recommenda-
tion with a view to bringing the situation to an end (3). As
required, two deadlines were set down in this recommen-
dation: (i) a deadline of 31 December 2002 was set for
the Portuguese authorities to take measures to correct the
excessive deficit position; (ii) a deadline for the correc-
tion of the excessive deficit position, which should be
completed in the year following its identification; this is
understood as being the end of 2003. 
The response of the Portuguese authorities began before
the Council had decided upon the existence of an exces-
sive deficit position (for more details see Part VI.12 on
Portugal). The newly elected government enacted a
rectifying budget which became law in June 2002. It
¥1∂ The impact of this upward revision for 2001 on the budgetary position for
2002 is evident on column 9 of Table II.1 above.
¥2∂ Regulation EC/2516/2000 requires that taxes and social contributions
recorded in the accounts may be derived from two sources: amounts evi-
denced by assessment and declarations or cash receipts. If assessments and
declarations are used, the amounts shall be adjusted by a co-efficient
reflecting assessed and declared amounts never collected. If cash receipts
are used, they must be time-adjusted so that the cash is attributed when the
activity took place to generate a liability. The Portuguese authorities opted
for the cash method with slight time adjustments notably as regards the col-
lection of VAT taxes. Portugal was granted a derogation from this provision
up to 30 June 2002.
Table II.2
Breakdown of revision of 2001 budget balance 
of Portugal
Reclassification of some operations as subsidies 
instead of capital injections 0.2
Recording of expenditure arrears from 
commitments made in 2001 0.3
Application of regulation EC/2516/2000 0.6
Recording of receipts associated with EC 
structural funds – 0.1
New information on budgetary execution 0.9
Total 1.9
Source: Portuguese Commission for the Analysis of public Accounts.
¥3∂ See the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs web site
for the relevant documents: http://europa. eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/procedures_en.htm.64
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GDP, notably via an increase in the standard VAT rate
from 17 to 19 %. It also included measures such as a
freeze on the hiring of civil servants and the end of inter-
est rate subsidies on new mortgage loans. 
In addition, a firm commitment was given to reduce the
deficit to 2.8 % of GDP in 2002, that is, below the 3 %
of GDP reference value already in the same year, thus
ahead of the formal deadline required under the EDP
regulations. Additional measures have been taken in an
attempt to meet this goal, a task made more difficult
by deteriorating growth conditions. According to the
March 2003 semi-annual notification, the deficit in 2002
fell to 2.7 % of GDP, an outcome which relied heavily
on one-off measures, especially a tax amnesty. 
Against a background of slow growth and the termina-
tion of one-off measures, Portugal will face a considera-
ble challenge in keeping the nominal deficit below the
3 % of GDP reference value. The Council will shortly
have to decide whether, in accordance with Article 104(11),
to abrogate the decision on the existence of an excessive
deficit. 
Both negative and positive conclusions can be drawn
from this first experience with the EDP in Stage III of
EMU. It underlined the importance of strengthening the
process of collection and verification of budgetary statis-
tics that underline the fiscal rules of EMU. On the posi-
tive side, however, the discrepancies in the statistical
reporting framework were picked up, albeit with an
unsatisfactory delay, and the resulting peer pressure has
facilitated the introduction of painful but necessary
reforms to prevent public finances continuing on what
was an unsustainable path. 
1.3.3. Germany
On 21 January 2003, the Council decided that an exces-
sive deficit exists in Germany (1). Significant divergence
of the budgetary position from targets had become
apparent already in late 2001, and in January 2002 the
Commission adopted a recommendation for an early-
warning to be sent to Germany. At that time, the Com-
mission (on the basis of its autumn 2001 forecast) was
projecting a deficit of 2.6 % of GDP for 2001 compared
with a target of 1.5 % of GDP set down its stability pro-
gramme, see Graph II.2. The Council decided the Com-
mission recommendation would not be put to vote and to
close the early-warning procedure. This followed com-
mitments from the German authorities to endeavour to
ensure that the 3 % of GDP reference value for the gen-
eral government deficit would not be breached in 2002,
and to reach a close to balance position by 2004 in line
with previous commitments.
Following general elections on 22 September 2002,
the re-elected federal government on 24 September
belatedly submitted the autumn notification of budg-
etary data, showing a deficit of 2.9 % of GDP and
confirming a debt ratio of 60.6 % for 2002. Subse-
quently on 16 October 2002, the Minister for Finance
publicly stated that the deficit for 2002 was likely to
exceed the Treaty’s reference value. On the basis of its
autumn 2002 forecast projecting a deficit of 3.8 % of
GDP for 2002, the Commission activated the EDP by
preparing a report in accordance with Article 104(3) of
the Treaty.
The report drew attention to the very weak growth per-
formance of Germany over the past decade. However,
the deterioration in the budget balance can only in part be
attributed to the effects of the economic cycle as the
cyclically-adjusted budget deficit, which had fallen con-
tinuously since 1995, started to increase as of 2000 and
grew to some 3.2 % in 2002. The origins of this budget-
ary slippage can be found in the 1998–2000 period:
insufficient efforts were made to strengthen the underly-
ing budgetary position when growth conditions were
favourable. Indeed, the cyclically-adjusted deficit started
to rise again as from 2000, not least due to stronger
expenditure growth at the regional level. Based on an
assumption of continued strong economic growth and a
so-called ‘dividend’ for public revenues, the government
opted for the carrying-forward to 2001 of the 2002 stage
of the tax reform and for a back-loading of the necessary
budgetary consolidation efforts. Thus, with the advent of
the business cycle slowdown, there was insufficient lee-
way for the operation of automatic stabilisers while at
the same time preventing the deficit from rising above
the 3 % of GDP reference value.
Although dramatic for the people involved, the floods
which occurred in August 2002 are not expected to have
constituted a serious drag on public finances in 2002:
Commission calculations show that the 2002 overall def-
icit-raising effect should not be higher than one tenth of
a percentage point of GDP (that is, around EUR 2 bil-
lion), given that the bulk of repair works would start only¥1∂ Council Decision 2003/89/EC, OJ L 34/16.65
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the special fund set up by the federal government offi-
cially began its operations on 1 January 2003. As in the
case of Portugal, the general government deficit had
been clearly higher than public investment, although
higher public investment induced by the flood damages
and the projected decline in the general government def-
icit should narrow the gap in 2003.
Outcome data for 2002 confirmed a deficit of 3.6 % of
GDP and the Council, on 21 January 2003, decided upon
the existence of an excessive deficit position and
adopted a recommendation with a view to bringing the
situation to an end. It should also be noted that the debt
level in 2002 reached 60.8 % of GDP, which is in excess
of the Treaty reference value, and on the basis of current
growth forecasts it is expected to increase further in
2003. Two deadlines were set in the Council recommen-
dation: (i) a deadline of 21 May 2003 was set for the Ger-
man authorities to take measures to correct the excessive
deficit positions; (ii) a deadline for the correction of the
excessive deficit position, which should be completed in
the year following its identification; this is understood as
being the end of 2004. Germany, however, was invited
to bring the deficit below 3 % of GDP already in 2003,
as planned in the updated stability programme, if the
growth conditions projected in the update (GDP growth
of 1 %) would materialise. The Council also recom-
mended that the German authorities ensure that the rise
in the debt ratio is brought to a halt in 2003 and reversed
thereafter. 
Based on the latest growth prospects, a correction of the
excessive deficit situation in 2003 appears uncertain.
Concerning 2004, the full implementation of the coali-
tion agreement and the achievement of the targets set
down in the updated stability programme (see Part VI.3
on Germany) would ensure a substantial decline in the
actual and cyclically-adjusted deficit, provided GDP
growth turns out as expected. Even in the event of
growth picking up further into 2004, the budgetary room
for manoeuvre is set to remain limited in view of the fur-
ther steps of income tax cuts envisaged. A sustained
improvement in the budgetary position will thus require
government expenditure to remain under firm control.
Important lessons can be drawn from the application of
EDP to Germany, the largest economy in the euro area
and a leading proponent of the SGP. The credibility in
the rules-based framework was not aided by the Coun-
Graph II.2:  Budgetary divergence from target in Germany 
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nor the subsequent ratcheting up of projections for the
deficit level throughout 2002. This called into question
the reliability of budgetary statistics and forecasts under-
lying the EU surveillance process, and indicated a lack of
capacity and willingness on the part of Member States to
deal with growing budgetary imbalances. However, it
also indicated that a debate on difficult budgetary policy
challenges could not be avoided on account of binding
deadlines in the SGP, even for large countries during
electoral campaigns. Arguably, the debate on the early-
warning ensured that the issue of sound public finances
played a prominent role in the electoral campaign, and
has been facilitating discussions on difficult policy
choices and trade-offs. 
Ultimately, however, the debate on the SGP has shown
that the rising budget deficit is the symptom but not the
cause of Germany’s economic problems. The key policy
challenge is the growth performance during the last dec-
ade with an average annual GDP growth rate of 1.3 %
between 1992 and 2002. Unless the causes of slow
growth are tackled at source, deficits in Germany will
remain high posing continuous stress on the SGP.
1.3.4. France 
On 21 January 2003, the Council adopted a recommen-
dation giving an early-warning to France in order to pre-
vent the occurrence of an excessive deficit. This is the
first time that an early-warning has been issued by the
Council, and occurred because there was a significant
divergence from the budget target set down in its stabil-
ity programme, (see Graph II.3). 
In its 2001 update of the stability programme, France pro-
jected a general government deficit at 1.4 and 1.3 % of
GDP in 2002 and 2003 respectively, under the assump-
tion of an increase in real GDP by 2.5 % in both years (1).
The Commission in its autumn 2002 forecast projected a
deficit of 2.7 and 2.9 % of GDP for 2002 and 2003 respec-
tively. An early warning was merited on account of:
• the size of the slippage from target, some 1.3 per-
centage points of GDP for 2002;
• the source of the budgetary slippage. According to
Commission services calculations, at most one half
of the total slippage can be attributed to cyclical fac-
tors. The cyclically-adjusted government deficit,
stable at around 2 % of GDP between 1999 and
2001, has increased in 2002 to slightly above 2  %; 
• the risk of a breach of the 3 % of GDP reference
value given the perilously close margins that were
projected at that time. 
In its March 2003 reporting of data, the French authori-
ties indicated that the deficit in 2002 was 3.1 (2), clearly
in excess of the reference value, considering also its fore-
cast for 2003 of a deficit still above 3 % of GDP. It
should be noted that this further deterioration in the
budget balance compared with the autumn 2002 forecast
cannot be attributed to effects of deteriorating growth
conditions, and instead is the result of a disappointing
budgetary execution. The Commission therefore acti-
vated the EDP and on 7 May 2003, recommended to the
Council to decide on the existence of an excessive deficit
in France and to address a recommendation to France to
put an end to the present excessive deficit situation as
rapidly as possible and by 2004 at the latest. 
The experience with the early-warning mechanism to
France has been far from smooth for three reasons.
Firstly, the fact that the deficit level in 2002 turned out to
be above 3 % of GDP and that the EDP was activated
some eight weeks after the Council had issued an early-
warning, forcefully illustrates that the mechanism is not
providing an advance signal to Member States on the
need for corrective action. Early-warnings to be effective
would need to be sent well before deficit levels are very
close to 3 % of GDP, a point made in the Commission
communication of November 2002 on strengthening the
coordination of budgetary policies (see Chapter II.2.). 
Secondly, the debate on the early-warning was charac-
terised by repeated revisions in budget projections for
2002, coupled with strong, but unfulfilled, commitments
to avoid excessive deficits position. In February 2002,
the French authorities adjusted their objective for the
2002 general government deficit upwards from 1.4 to
1.8 % of GDP reflecting the impact of deteriorating
cyclical factors. This revision took place very shortly
before the discussion of the French update in the Ecofin
Council, which created inconveniences with respect to
¥1∂ France subsequently revised its deficit target for 2002 to 1.8 % of GDP, as
reported in Table II.1.
¥2∂ The government deficit for 2002 has been revised from 3.0 % of GDP (as
notified by the French authorities) to 3.1 % of GDP, as a consequence of the
inclusion in the deficit of the capital injection by the French State to Réseau
ferré de France (RFF). See Press Release STAT/03/30 of 17 March 2003.67
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EFC. In May 2002, after the presidential elections, the
new government launched an audit on public finances,
which estimated the general government deficit in 2002
within a range 2.3–2.6 % of GDP: the revision brought
about by the audit was due to the consideration of the
cyclical effect on tax revenues and unemployment
expenditures, following the deceleration in economic
activity, estimated at 0.3–0.4 % of GDP, and also due to
an overrun in expenditures, particularly in the State and
the health sectors, estimated at 0.6–0.7 % of GDP. In
July 2002, the French authorities presented a corrective
budget bill for 2002 aimed at adjusting the government
budgetary forecasts in line with the results of the audit on
public finances and at implementing a cut in the income
tax by 5 %. In this corrective budget bill, the French
authorities decided to target a general government deficit
of 2.6 % of GDP in 2002, which is the highest value of
the range of the auditors’ projections, thus not correcting
the observed slippage in the budgetary situation. As
noted above, the autumn 2002 forecast and subsequent
reporting of data under the EDP has led to a further sub-
stantial upward revision.
Thirdly, and unlike the Portuguese and German authori-
ties which did not contest the application of the SGP, the
French authorities have to date failed to take any measures
to address the growing budgetary imbalances, despite
these already becoming apparent in mid-2002. Moreover,
they have failed to engage in a constructive dialogue at EU
level on the pace of budgetary consolidation towards the
‘close to balance or in surplus’ requirement (see the next
chapter for a discussion on these issues). In particular,
France was the only euro area country which did not
accept to pursue a continuous adjustment of the underly-
ing balance by at least 0.5 % of GDP per year starting
already in 2003, as agreed by all other ministers at the
Eurogroup meeting of 7 October 2002 (see Section II.2.1).
The French authorities continue to fail to start taking cor-
rective measures in 2003. This was demonstrated in the
budget targets of their 2002 stability programme which
provided for an improvement of only 0.2 percentage
points of GDP in its cyclically-adjusted budget balance.
The Council, in its opinion, urged ‘… the French author-
ities to seek an improvement in the underlying budget
position in each year…’. The start of the process of
budgetary consolidation cannot be postponed indefi-
nitely as the Council recommendation (in accordance
with Article 104(7)) on measures to correct an excessive
deficit position includes a deadline of no more than four
months for taking corrective actions. 
Graph II.3:  Budgetary divergence from target in France 
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2. Strengthening the coordination 
of budgetary policies
2.1. Background to the debate: a mandate 
from the Barcelona European Council 
The Treaty, supplemented by secondary legislation, has
bestowed on the Union a unique institutional architec-
ture for the conduct of economic and monetary policies.
The uniqueness of the framework resides in the fact that
a single monetary policy is entrusted to an independent
European Central Bank whilst the responsibility for
economic policies (budgetary and structural policies)
remains decentralised in the hands of national (or sub-
national) authorities but subject to some common rules.
In particular, Member States remain fully responsible for
their tax and expenditure policies, but within a frame-
work at EU level to monitor and, where necessary,
ensure that countries pursue the common goal of sound
and sustainable public finances. 
The appropriate degree and instruments of economic pol-
icy coordination cannot remain static or be subject to an
overly rigid literal interpretation of rules and procedures.
To remain effective, it must evolve over time so as to take
account of changing economic circumstances and/or the
convergence/divergence of political preferences. It is
especially important in the aftermath of a major regime
change such as the launch of EMU that a learning-by-
doing approach be followed, so that shortcomings are
corrected and the lessons of experience are drawn. 
On the basis of the experience accumulated in the early
years of EMU, the Commission, in February 2001,
adopted a communication on strengthening economic pol-
icy coordination within the euro area (1). This led to sev-
eral positive developments, including better and more
timely statistics covering the euro area, a quarterly report
on the euro area prepared by the Commission, the estab-
lishment of a Eurogroup working party attached to the
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) to help pre-
pare debates and regular communiqués (so-called terms of
reference) from the Eurogroup on important policy issues.
In addition, an important agreement had been reached on
the streamlining of policy measures in the BEPGs.
Subsequently, the Barcelona European Council of
March 2002 concluded that the euro area needed to make
further progress with policy coordination, and invited
the Commission to present proposals to reinforce eco-
nomic policy coordination in time for the 2003 spring
European Council. 
The initial response of the Commission to this mandate
was to suggest that all euro-area countries adhere to com-
mon standards for the conduct of economic policies in the
euro area. The objective of common standards would be
to clarify the respective role of economic policies in three
domains: (1) preserving macroeconomic stability, (2)
enhancing the economic growth potential of the euro area
and (3) responding to economic shocks that affect indi-
vidual Member States or the euro area as a whole. 
Concerning their format and status, the intention was for
common standards to complement the existing Treaty
provisions and Stability and Growth Pact regulations.
with non-binding guidelines on the policy stance
expected of authorities in various circumstances, that is,
a so-called ‘reaction function’. The aim was to facilitate
discussions amongst ministers on policy challenges as
they emerged, and thereby contribute to a more consist-
ent policy stance over time and across Member States.
Moreover, the Commission argued that setting down
broad ex ante guidelines on the conduct of economic and
budget policies would help demonstrate that the EU and
the euro area have a well-defined economic strategy with
medium-term orientation.¥1∂ COM(2001) 82 final of 7 February 2001.69
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the Eurogroup in July and September 2002 discussed
possible elements to be included in common standards
on the conduct of economic policies in the euro area.
However, these discussions became overshadowed by
the deterioration in budget positions in several Member
States described in Chapter II.1 and the challenges in the
implementation of the SGP. This forced a major re-con-
sideration on the part of the Commission on how to
respond to the mandate of the Barcelona European
Council. The intended approach of adopting common
standards on the conduct of economic and budgetary pol-
Box II.2: The Convention on the Future of Europe: the debate on the coordination of budgetary policies
In the two communications to the Convention adopted in the course of 2002 (1), the Commission has put forward specific
suggestions in the area of economic, and notably budgetary, policy coordination.
First, the Commission proposes to reinforce the Community dimension of the policy-coordination process. To this effect,
the instruments of economic policy coordination should be drafted on the basis of proposals from the Commission rather
than mere recommendations from which the Council may depart by qualified majority. As far as Article 99 of the Treaty
is concerned, this change would notably have an impact on the adoption procedure of the BEPGs, on the adoption by Coun-
cil of its opinions on the stability and convergence programmes, and on the Council recommendations to a Member State
which is pursuing economic policies which are not consistent with the BEPG or with the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Moreover, when the economic policies pursued by a specific Member State are not consistent with the broad guidelines or
risk jeopardising the proper functioning of EMU, the Commission should be able to issue warnings directly to the Member
State concerned. For example, the Commission could decide to issue a ‘direct’ early warning to any Member State with a
budgetary position which is significantly diverging from the budgetary target set out in its stability or convergence pro-
gramme. At the same time, it would preserve the possibility under Article 99(4) to invite the Council to make the necessary
recommendations to the Member State concerned. As already explained above, the Council’s decision would be based on
a Commission proposal, as opposed to a recommendation. These different measures will reinforce the Community dimen-
sion of the economic policy coordination framework by allowing the Commission to play its role as a representative of the
common interest and as the ‘referee’ who ensures that the rules of the game are being observed.
The Commission furthermore proposes to facilitate decision-making within the euro area. While the informal Eurogroup
would continue to exist, a ‘euro area’ Ecofin Council would also be established in order to allow the Member States belong-
ing to the euro area to take certain decisions which are mainly or exclusively relevant for participating countries. This insti-
tutional change would have important consequences for a number of decisions taken in the framework of the excessive
deficit procedure and the SGP (for example, early warnings adopted by the Council), particularly when participating Mem-
ber States are concerned.
The Convention has closely examined the functioning of the EMU framework. A Working Group on Economic Govern-
ance, chaired by Mr K. Hänsch, was established in order to examine a list of different issues falling under three headings:
monetary policy, economic policy and institutional issues. As far as the Stability and Growth Pact is concerned, a majority
of the Group agreed that the Commission should be allowed to issue first warnings on excessive deficits directly to the
Member State concerned. Some members also agreed with the need to transform Commission recommendations into pro-
posals, and supported the exclusion from the vote of the Member State concerned, for example in the case of an early warn-
ings issued by the Council, or in relation to decisions on the existence of an excessive deficit. The Working Group
considered that the Stability and Growth Pact is a political instrument to implement the Treaty provisions and that it should
therefore not be integrated into the Constitution. The results of the Working Group were discussed by the plenary on
7 November 2002, which largely confirmed the main views expressed by the Group. The Praesidium has indicated that a
first draft of Part II of the Constitution, which will describe the different policy areas, and the Convention’s proposals in
relation to each of them, will be made available in the course of May 2003.
(1) ‘A project for the European Union’ (COM(2002) 247 of 22 May 2002) and ‘For the European Union: peace, freedom, solidarity’ (COM(2002) 728 of
4 December 2002).70
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focused efforts to improve the functioning of the SGP (1). 
On 24 September 2002, Commissioner Solbes, with the
agreement of President Prodi, issued a communication
suggesting a strategy for dealing with pressing budgetary
challenges in the euro area (2). It underlined the impor-
tance of the SGP, but recognised the need to avoid
setting budget targets that would require very large
improvements in underlying budget positions in econo-
mies suffering from cyclical weakness. To this end, they
suggested that the medium-term objective of the SGP
should incorporate explicit references to cyclical consid-
erations. Also, countries which have not yet reached the
(cyclically-adjusted) ‘close to balance or in surplus’
objective should be required to undertake every year a
minimum adjustment of 0.5 % of GDP of their cycli-
cally-adjusted deficit. 
The Eurogroup meeting of 7 October 2002, produced
‘Terms of references on the budgetary developments in
the euro area’ very close to the approach of the Commis-
sion and which marked an important policy shift as
regards the implementation of the Pact. In particular
‘ministers re-affirmed their commitment to the Treaty
obligation to avoid excessive deficits, and to the Stability
and Growth Pact objective to achieve and maintain
budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus over
the economic cycle. Ministers and the ECB concurred
therefore with the Commission that those countries
which have not yet reached that objective, need to pursue
continuous adjustment of the underlying balance by at
least 0.5 % of GDP per year. All ministers but one
[France] accept this to start no later than in next year’s
budget’. 
The efforts described in this chapter on measures to
strengthen the coordination of budgetary policies should
not be confused with the broader debate underway in the
Convention on the Future of Europe. The need for a
broader and deeper debate on the future of the Union
became apparent at the European Council in Nice
(December 2000): see Declaration 23 to the Treaty of
Nice. One year later, the European Council, meeting in
Laeken, decided to convene a Convention to examine the
fundamental questions raised by the future development
of the Union. The different questions put forward in the
Laeken Declaration mainly relate to the definition of the
powers of the Union, the simplification of the Union’s
instruments (legislative instruments, implementation
measures, etc), the enhancement of democracy, transpar-
ency and effectiveness (for example, appointment proce-
dures for Commissioners and for the Commission Presi-
dent, EP powers and elections, role of the Council, role
of the national parliaments, etc) and the preparation of a
European Constitution. The Convention is chaired by
Mr Giscard d’Estaing and is composed of 105 members,
which represent the different Heads of State or Govern-
ment, the national parliaments, the European Parliament,
and the Commission. Its work is prepared by the Praesid-
ium, which is composed of 12 members. The Conven-
tion started its work in February 2002 and will present
the results of its work in mid-2003. An intergovernmen-
tal conference will be convened either in 2003 or in
2004, in order to formally amend the Treaty and propose
it for ratification to the different Member States. Box II.2
provides details on the proposals of the Commission
related to the coordination of budgetary policies and the
subsequent debate within the Convention.
2.2. Commission proposals to strengthen 
the coordination of budgetary policies 
2.2.1. A diagnosis of the shortcomings of the SGP 
in the first four years of EMU
The Commission adopted, on 27 November 2002, a
communication on strengthening the coordination of
budgetary policies (3). While arguing that the coordina-
tion of budgetary policies is essential for the smooth
functioning of EMU and that the SGP goal of budget
positions of ‘close to balance or in surplus’ remains an
economically valid objective (4), it provided a candid
diagnosis of significant shortcomings in its implementa-
tion as follows: 
• political ownership of the SGP by Member States
has diminished with a divergence between budget-
ary commitments and concrete actions to achieve
stated targets, and unwillingness to acknowledge the
implication of EMU on the conduct of fiscal policy
at national level. More generally, Member States
failed to play their role in exerting peer pressure on
countries that miss budgetary targets by a wide mar-
gin via the enforcement mechanisms of the SGP;
¥1∂ For a review of problems and challenges concerning the SGP see Giudice
and Montanino (2002).
¥2∂ SEC(2003) 1009/6 of 25 September 2002.
¥3∂ COM(2002) 668 final.
¥4∂ For an assessment of Maastricht’s fiscal rules, see Buti and Giudice (2002).71
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 3• it has been difficult to establish clear and verifiable
budget objectives which take account of underlying
economic conditions. While the targets for budget
balances are set down in stability and convergence
programmes in nominal terms, the effect of the eco-
nomic cycle on the budget position has to be taken
into account when assessing compliance with budg-
etary commitments, and in particular the adjustment
path to ‘close to balance or in surplus’. This proved
difficult in the absence of an agreed method to cal-
culate cyclically-adjusted budget balances, and also
because the nominal deficit targets in the pro-
grammes of Member States were sometimes based
on optimistic growth assumptions and with budget-
ary adjustment efforts back-loaded towards the end
of the time horizon of programmes. Measuring com-
pliance with budgetary commitments set down in
programmes has therefore not been straightforward
and this in turn weakened the enforcement mecha-
nisms of the SGP;
• the framework for the collection and assessment of
budgetary statistics has experienced a number of
difficulties. Of greatest concern are the reporting
anomalies detected in some Member States which,
in the case of Portugal, led to a very large upward
revision of deficit levels. Concern was expressed
about the fact that ex post revisions of budgetary
data are getting larger, and the discrepancy between
deficits recorded on accrual basis and debt issuance
in cash terms in some Member States. Finally, the
decision making processes of Eurostat on the classi-
fication of certain budgetary operations could be
speeded up;
• some Member States did not run sound budgetary
policies in good times. A failure to pursue budgetary
consolidation in 1999 and 2000 when growth condi-
tions were favourable led to a deterioration in under-
lying budget positions and inadequate room for the
automatic stabilisers to operate in the subsequent
economic slowdown. This failure to allow the auto-
matic stabilisers to operate symmetrically over the
economic cycle illustrates inadequate surveillance
and enforcement mechanisms to deal with unwar-
ranted pro-cyclical loosening of the fiscal stance; 
• the enforcement procedures of the SGP have been
found wanting at critical junctures. In particular,
the early-warning mechanism was not effective in
dealing with significant slippage from budget tar-
gets set down by Member States in their stability and
convergence programmes; 
• the SGP has struggled to develop into an effective
coordination framework for dealing with country-
specific circumstances in a consistent manner, assur-
ing the long-term sustainability of public finances
while supporting structural reforms that are designed
to enhance employment and growth potential; 
• it has been difficult to communicate effectively
with the press, markets and the public on the
benefits of achieving and sustaining sound public
finance positions, and also how the SGP works.
This is partly due to the fact that it takes time for
economic agents to adjust to the new policy frame-
work in place since the launch of the euro and also
because the institutional procedures of the SGP are
complex. In addition, effective communication has
been hampered by conflicting statements on the
appropriate conduct of budgetary policies.
The communication then set out a number of proposals
to tackle these shortcomings. It should be noted that they
implied no change whatsoever to the existing Treaty pro-
visions or SGP regulations: that is, the existing frame-
work would be unchanged and no additional procedures
were envisaged. On the one hand, they consisted of pro-
posals to clarify the interpretation of key SGP provisions
so as to strengthen the economic rationale underpinning
the policy decisions. On the other hand, there were pro-
posals to strengthen the implementation of SGP, includ-
ing the enforcement procedures. The main elements of
the Commission proposals are described below.
2.2.2. Avoiding pro-cyclical policies and accounting 
for transitory elements in the assessment
The Commission proposed that, in establishing budget-
ary objectives at EU level and in carrying out the surveil-
lance of Member States budgetary positions, due
account should be taken of the economic cycle. In partic-
ular, the Commission suggested that the ‘close to bal-
ance or in surplus’ requirement of the SGP would be
defined in underlying terms throughout the economic
cycle. To this end, it is necessary to isolate the impact of
transitory factors on the budget position, and in particu-
lar the effects of the economic cycle. 
The underlying budget balance is the actual balance net
of transitory elements. The main transitory element
taken into account is the cyclical component. However,72
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also have impact on the budget positions (both positively
and negatively), and thus need to be considered when
assessing the underlying position so as to avoid wrong
policy conclusions: this issue is examined in detail in
Box II.3. In other words, the economic cycle is one, but
not the only, transitory element that has an important
budgetary impact. Consequently, the cyclically-adjusted
budget balance (CAB) is not the same concept as the
underlying budgetary position. 
To illustrate how the Commission’s proposal would
work in practice (and in particular the relevance of the
cyclically-adjusted budget balances), Graph II.4 illus-
trates the budgetary position expected of Member
States in order to be in compliance with the ‘close to
balance or in surplus’ requirement of the SGP over the
economic cycle (1). It refers to a country that has com-
pleted the transition to the medium-term goal of the
Pact, and assumes that there are no other transitory
effects on the budget balance other than the effect of the
cycle — that is, the CAB corresponds to the underlying
budget balance. 
The underlying budget balance is represented in Graph II.4
by the bold line, which remains unchanged over the
economic cycle. However, the nominal budget balance
(blue line) fluctuates according to the output gap (dark
line). The degree of the fluctuation depends on the
cyclical sensitivity of the budget: on average, an output
level that goes 1 % below the potential implies an
increase in the nominal deficit of 0.5 % of GDP. How-
ever, automatic stabilisation should show its effects too
during upturns: as automatic stabilisers should operate
symmetrically over the economic cycle, this implies
running nominal budget surpluses when growth condi-
tions are favourable. A degree of caution must be used
when interpreting changes in cyclically-adjusted
budget balances, especially on an annual basis (2).
¥1∂ Buti and Giudice (2002) illustrate the benefits of focusing on cyclically-
adjusted balances for output stabilisation.
¥2∂ See Part II.3 of European Commission (2002a).
Graph II.4:  Compliance with the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ requirement 
for countries that completed the transition process
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(Continued on the next page)
The surveillance of budgetary positions aims at the maintenance of sound public finances and at ensuring their long-term
sustainability. In this respect, what is important to understand is what the underlying budgetary positions are beyond the
impact of the economic cycle and other transitory effects. In the context of the EU rule-based fiscal framework, the sur-
veillance carried out by the Commission and the Council should take into account the role of measures with only transitory
effect on the budget. As concluded by the Brussels European Council (21 March 2003) ‘in making an assessment [of the
improvement of the cyclically-adjusted budgetary position] one-off measures will be considered on their own merits on a
case-by-case basis’.
What could qualify as a one-off measure? According to Milesi-Ferretti (2001), ‘a measure implying an improvement in the
fiscal balances is considered to be creative accounting if it does not imply an improvement in the intertemporal budgetary
position’. ‘Creative accounting’ is used in the economic literature as meaning measures with temporary effect or one-off
measures. It is difficult to identify clearly what is transitory or permanent as this depends on what is the reference point
and the degree of country- and situation-specificity is large. In the context of EU surveillance, the Commission and the
Council have, inevitably, a margin of discretion to decide what measures to take into account in order to make the best
possible assessment. However, it is important that there is consistency, to the degree possible, across countries in the dis-
tinction between purely transitory elements and other more permanent trends. Some examples of transitory elements that
could be explicitly taken into account are as follows.
On the expenditure side, large individual sales of real assets such as real estate, and the UMTS receipts provide good exam-
ples. On the revenue side, a possible candidate is tax amnesties. Here, of course, what is ‘normal’ in the country concerned
is an important reference point, since some measures can be exceptional in one country while taking place regularly in
another. Other elements may be linked to ‘unusual’ events. Here size is clearly important as each year there are ‘unusual
events’. Possibly the short-term emergency costs from flooding could be an example. Large revenues or expenditures due
to specific court rulings could be another. 
Along the same line, the Congressional Budget Office of the United States produces an estimation for the so-called stand-
ardised budget, that nets the actual budgetary position from the cyclical component and other temporary factors (see ‘A
CBO report: the standardised and cyclically-adjusted budgets’, March 2003). It includes in these temporary measures the
following: unusually large discrepancies between tax payments and liabilities, swings in collection of capital gains taxes,
changes in the inflation component of the government’s net interest payments, temporary legislative changes in the timing
of revenues and outlays, asset sales, and receipts from auctions of licences to use portions of the electromagnetic spectrum.
However, the availability of fiscal data on measures with a transitory effect is limited given the difficulties of measurement
and the degree of arbitrary. Some countries, as done by Danish and Swedish authorities in their updated convergence pro-
gramme (2002), use of a refined cyclically-adjusted budget balance. More specifically, by correcting the budget balance
for the deviation of several special factors (that are by definition country-specific) to their calculated trend. Large, clearly
identifiable transitory items can be taken into account when assessing underlying budget developments. However, further
work in this area is necessary to upgrade the quality of the analysis. 
The question of measures that have only a transitory effect (one-off measures, ‘creative accounting’) on the budget position
is also relevant in terms of compliance with the fiscal rules. The economic literature proves that the imposition of numerical
budget rules by an outside agent encourages the use of ‘creative accounting’ (see, for example, Easterly (1999), Eichen-
green and Wyplosz (1998), Kopits and Craig (1998)). Policy makers can be induced to explore ways to fulfil budgetary
targets through creative accounting even when the rule results from an agreed commitment and not from an external
constraint. The simple reason to recourse to creative accounting is to avoid the implicit (reputational) or explicit (pecuni-
ary) sanctions that occur when the rule is breached. In the context of the EU rule-based fiscal framework, creative account-
ing may contribute to limit reputational sanctions that appear with the ‘early-warning’ and/or with the start of the excessive
tends to disappear in the long run due to its temporary nature, it is less likely that it can be helpful in avoiding eventual74
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for countries still in deficit 
The Commission communication built upon the agree-
ment of the Eurogroup that countries with underlying
deficits would be required to achieve an annual improve-
ment in the underlying budget position of at least 0.5 %
of GDP each year until the ‘close-to-balance or surplus’
requirement of the SGP has been reached. This proposal
makes clear that Member States with underlying deficits
must make continuous progress towards the medium-
term goal of the Pact and thus tackles the problem
whereby targets are being rolled over indefinitely in suc-
cessive updates of stability or convergence programmes.
Moreover, it recognises that account must be taken of
economic conditions when setting the pace of budgetary
consolidation.
An example of what this proposal implies in practice is
illustrated in Grapg II.5. The starting position shows that
the Member State has not completed the transition to the
‘close to balance or in surplus requirement’ of the SGP.
Note that there is an assumption of no other transitory
effects on the budget balance other than the effect of the
cycle, that is, the cyclically-adjusted budget corresponds
to the underlying budget balance at all times. 
The country is required to achieve an annual improve-
ment in its underlying budget position of at least 0.5 %
of GDP until the medium-term target of the Pact has
been reached: this minimum rate of underlying budget-
ary consolidation should be achieved irrespective of
growth conditions (see adjustment path illustrated by the
bold line). However, this does not imply that the nominal
budget balance must improve every year by an equiva-
lent amount. There may be some scope to allow the auto-
matic stabilisers to operate, as illustrated by the deterio-
ration in the nominal budget balance during the
downturn when growth falls below its potential rate
(between t0 and t1): however, a safety margin must be
provided at all times so as to ensure that the nominal
budget deficit does not risk breaching the 3 % of GDP
reference value.
The communication also states that the ‘… rate of
improvement in the underlying budget position should
be higher in countries with high deficits or debt. Also, a
more ambitious annual improvement in underlying
budget positions should be envisaged if growth condi-
tions are favourable’. The latter requirement is illus-
trated by a kink in the line representing the cyclically-
adjusted budget balance when the output gap starts to
improve. As shown, between t1 and t2 the output gap
starts to increase, and it closes in t2. The requested rate of
adjustment is higher than in the previous period and the
nominal budget balance improves at a faster rate than the
cyclically-adjusted budget position, reflecting the sym-
metric operation of the automatic stabilisers. As illus-
trated in Graph II.5, reaching a position of balance in
nominal terms would not necessarily represent compli-
ance with the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ require-
ment. The consolidation continues between t2 and t3,
when the nominal budget becomes positive, and the
close to balance position in underlying terms is reached.
From t3 onwards, the transitional period is finished and
the nominal and underlying budget balance are expected
to behave as in Graph II.4. 
Box II.3 (continued)
pecuniary sanctions implied by the EDP. If nominal budget unbalances is only temporary (due, for example, to an
economic shock) the recourse to one-off measures avoids overemphasising the imbalance, rightly correcting this temporary
situation as a temporary budgetary measure.
But using creative accounting also has costs. First, fiscal adjustment can be illusory because it temporarily lowers the
budget deficit or the public debt, but it does not improve the public sector’s net worth. This can imply future measures to
compensate the insufficient structural adjustment that becomes necessary once transitory measures end their effect on the
budgetary position. Second, the use of creative accounting entails a lack of transparency that could lead to a loss of confi-
dence by public opinion in respect of government actions. Loss of confidence could also affect financial markets and there-
fore the country concerned could face higher risk premium. Third, these transitory measures can cause distortions in the
markets. For example, a huge sale of real estate concentrated in a short period of time to reducing the deficit level can have
a destabilising impact on prices in the housing market.75
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ensuring that public finances contribute 
to growth and employment 
Perhaps the most innovative elements of the communi-
cation concern the proposal to introduce a more flexible
application of the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ require-
ment in light of the achievement of the goals of the Lis-
bon strategy. In particular, it is argued that there is a need
to ‘… cater for the intertemporal budgetary impact of
large structural reforms (such as productive investment
or tax reforms) that raise employment or growth poten-
tial in line with the Lisbon strategy and/or which in the
long term improve the underlying public finance posi-
tions’. The Commission did not consider it appropriate
to develop a list or catalogue of reforms which justify or
merit an exemption. This should be judged on a case-by-
case basis, but it referred to major structural reforms
identified in the BEPGs or as part of the Lisbon strategy
that have a clearly identifiable negative impact on the
budget in the short run (for example, a reform of the tax
system, pension reform, substantial increase in net pub-
lic investment) but a positive return in the medium to
long term on growth and the budgetary position. 
In making this proposal, the Commission was aware that
this initiative could easily be interpreted as a weakening
of the commitment to sound public finances or the core
budgetary goals of the SGP. To avoid the impression that
provisions of this nature would weaken the Pact, numer-
ous safeguards were outlined in the communication. A
distinction was drawn between deviations from the
‘close to balance or in surplus’ requirements of a ‘tem-
porary’ and ‘more permanent nature’.
Regarding the former, the communication stated that ‘a
small temporary deterioration in the underlying budget
position could be envisaged only if the Member State
concerned has already made substantial progress
towards the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ requirement
and if general government debt is below the 60 % of
GDP reference value’. The Commission did not specify
a numerical rule as to what would constitute ‘substantial
progress’: the key issue is to ensure that an adequate
safety margin exists to limit the risk of the nominal def-
icit breaching the 3 % of GDP reference value, and this
would imply that the underlying budget deficit should be
well below 1 % of GDP.
Graph II.5:  The budgetary adjustment path of Member States still 
in transition to the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ objective
de
fic
it
su
rp
lu
s
CAB (underlying BB)
Nominal balance
% of GDP
3 % reference value
time
Output gap
t 1 t 2 t 3
t 076
P a r t  I I
E v o l v i n g  b u d g e t a r y  s u r v e i l l a n c eThe communication added additional safeguards as fol-
lows. ‘In assessing the programme, the Commission
must ascertain that there is a clear and realistic deadline
for returning to a position of “close to balance or in sur-
plus” within the time horizon of the stability or conver-
gence programme. Budgetary projections must be based
on a sound and prudent macroeconomic scenario to be
verified against those of the Commission, with due
account taken of the need to avoid inappropriate pro-
cyclical policies. An adequate safety margin must be
provided at all times to prevent nominal deficits from
breaching the 3 % of GDP reference value. Finally, the
Member State concerned should pre-announce correc-
tive measures that would be introduced in the event of a
failure to stick to the adjustment path for returning to a
budget position of ‘close to balance or in surplus.’
An example of what this implies in practice is illustrated
in Graph II.6. The starting position shows a Member
State with an identical nominal (continuous line) and
cyclically-adjusted budget deficit (bold line): again, it is
assumed that there are no other transitory effects on the
budget balance other than the effect of the cycle, that is,
the cyclically-adjusted budget corresponds to the under-
lying budget balance at all times. 
From that starting position, in t1 the Member State imple-
ments a major structural reform that initially has a nega-
tive impact on the cyclically-adjusted budget balance:
this is evident from the downward slope in the CAB line.
There may be some scope to allow the automatic stabi-
lisers to operate: in the event of a slowdown in growth,
an even larger increase occurs in the nominal deficit
(continuous line). However, an adequate safety margin
must be provided at all times so as to ensure that the
nominal budget deficit does not risk breaching the 3 %
of GDP reference value. The nominal and the CAB are
equal when the output gap is zero (t2) and the Member
State concerned must return to a position of ‘close to bal-
ance or in surplus’ within the time horizon of the pro-
gramme (say in t3). 
The communication also sought to reflect differences
between the sustainability of public finances across
Member States. It therefore proposed that a ‘small devi-
ation from the “close to balance or in surplus” require-
Graph II.6:  Illustration of a small temporary deviation to cater 
for the inter-temporal budgetary effect of a large structural reform
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2 0 0 3ment of a longer-term nature could be envisaged for
Member States where debt levels are well below the
60 % of GDP reference value, and when public finances
are on a sustainable footing. This will require a careful
assessment to be made of outstanding public debt, con-
tingent liabilities (such as implicit pension obligations)
and other costs associated with ageing populations. An
adequate safety margin must be provided at all times to
prevent nominal deficits from breaching the 3 % of GDP
reference value’. 
2.2.5. Ensuring the sustainability of public finances
The communication also proposed that the sustainability
of public finances should become a core policy objective
at EU level and this requires that greater weight is
attached to government debt ratios in the budgetary
surveillance process. Countries with high debt levels
would be required to set ambitious long-term debt-
reduction strategies in their stability and convergence
programmes. Also, the Commission suggested that the
high-debt countries should be required to achieve a sat-
isfactory pace of debt reduction towards the 60 % of
GDP reference value, and that a failure to do so should
result in the activation of the debt criterion of the exces-
sive deficit procedure. Overall, these proposals were
considered necessary as the sustainability of public
finances cannot be assured simply by looking at a three-
or four-year time horizon of programmes. Chapter II.3
considers how, in practice, the debt criterion of the
excessive deficit procedure could be made operational.
2.2.6. Concrete measures for the enforcement 
of the Pact
In addition to suggestions on how to interpret certain
provisions of the SGP, the communication set down
detailed proposals to improve its practical implementa-
tion of how Member States needed to reaffirm their
political commitment to the Pact. 
Firstly, to ensure that Member States assume political
ownership of the SGP, the communication called for the
spring 2003 European Council to adopt a resolution on
strengthening the coordination of budgetary policies.
The reason for seeking support at the highest political
level is that achieving and sustaining the goal of budget
positions of ‘close to balance or in surplus’ is extremely
challenging and requires full commitment of all govern-
ment departments and all levels of government from the
federal authorities to local councils. Substantive conclu-
sions of the European Council were deemed helpful for
finance ministers, in their difficult task of negotiating
with spending ministries and representatives of sub-cen-
tral governments. 
Secondly, the communication recognised the need to
improve the quality of budgetary statistics, and to this
end proposed that all parties — Member States and the
Commission itself — commit themselves to a code of
best practice on the compilation and reporting of budget-
ary statistics (see Part II.4 of this volume). 
Finally, the communication underlined the fact that fis-
cal rules need to be backed up with effective and credible
enforcement procedures. To this end, the Commission
proposed to clarify the criteria to be used when deciding
whether to activate the early-warning mechanism. The
Commission also proposed that the interpretation of the
debt criterion of the excessive deficit procedure should
be clarified, in particular what would constitute a ‘satis-
factory pace’ of debt reduction towards the 60 % of GDP
reference value.
2.3. The agreement of the European 
Council on strengthening 
the coordination of budgetary policies
The Ecofin Council on 7 March 2003 (1) adopted a report
on strengthening the coordination of budgetary polices
which was fully endorsed by the European Council of
21 and 22 March 2003. The Council agreed that there
was no need to change the current fiscal rules of the EU,
and that improvements could be made to ensure an effec-
tive application of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
In its report, the Ecofin Council endorsed most of the
proposals of the Commission. It considered that compli-
ance with the close to balance or in surplus requirement
of the Stability and Growth Pact should be assessed in
cyclically-adjusted terms and that countries with deficits
must improve their cyclically-adjusted budget position
and, in the case of euro-area countries, by a minimum
annual reduction of 0.5 % of GDP.
The Council also called for automatic stabilisers to oper-
ate symmetrically over the cycle and, to this end, Mem-
ber States should avoid pro-cyclical policies, especially
when growth conditions are favourable. 
¥1∂ Ecofin Council report on ‘Strengthening the coordination of budgetary pol-
icies’, 7 March 2003, 6877/03 (Press 61).78
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tions from the ‘close to balance or in surplus requirement’
of the SGP was subject to intense debate. Concerns were
raised about the practical feasibility of making such a
proposal operational while at the same time safeguarding
the commitment to sound public finances. In the end, the
Ecofin Council agreed ‘… to pay particular attention to
country-specific circumstances, in particular to (i) the
long-term sustainability of public finances, (ii) sufficient
safety margins at all times, including an allowance for
automatic stabilisers to operate fully without breaching
the 3 % of GDP reference value and (iii) the coherence
between the evolution and quality of the public finances
in the stability and convergence programmes and the
close to balance or in surplus requirement’.
Finally, the Ecofin Council agreed to pay greater atten-
tion to the longer-term sustainability and the quality of
public finances with a view to increasing the growth
potential of the EU economies in conformity with the
Lisbon agenda. It recognised that the pace of decline in
public debt plays an important role in budgetary sur-
veillance, especially in highly indebted countries. In
conformity with the Treaty provisions, the excessive
deficit procedure should contribute to ensuring a satis-
factory pace of debt reduction.79
3. Public debt and the excessive 
deficit procedure 
3.1. Introduction 
As part of the recent debate on strengthening the coordi-
nation of budgetary policies, a consensus was reached on
the need to pay increased attention to debt developments
and the sustainability of public finances. One step to this
end is to enhance the assessment of the sustainability of
public finances on the basis of stability and convergence
programmes (see Part I.3 of this report).
The European Council of March 2003 also concluded
that ‘The pace of decline in public debt plays an impor-
tant role in budgetary surveillance, especially in highly
indebted countries. In conformity with the Treaty provi-
sions, the excessive deficit procedure should contribute
to ensuring a satisfactory pace of debt reduction’. Both
criteria defined in the Maastricht Treaty (the deficit crite-
rion of the 3 % reference value and the debt criterion) are
relevant to ensure sound public finances. A nominal def-
icit-to-GDP ratio below 3 % allows automatic stabilisers
to smooth (at least partially) the cycle without compro-
mising long-term budgetary positions. It also helps mon-
etary policy to keep inflation under control and to sustain
the economy during slowdowns. A debt-to-GDP ratio
below 60 % (or on a decreasing path) is warranted to
ensure that public finances are on a sustainable footing in
the light of the projected budgetary impact of ageing pop-
ulations. In addition, the reduction of government debt
will create room to pursue other economic and social
goals, in particular to enhance economic growth. High
debt levels also leave the credit standing of the country
vulnerable to unfavourable economic circumstances (1).
So far, neither the excessive deficit procedure, nor the
risk of excessive deficit have been launched for breach-
ing the debt criterion alone. The challenge is now to
ensure that the commitment of reducing debt levels
below 60 % of GDP is implemented. 
3.2. Compliance with the Treaty 
requirements 
Member States have a Treaty obligation to avoid exces-
sive deficit positions. To this end, Article 104(2) of the
Treaty states that ‘The Commission shall monitor the
development of the budgetary situation and of the stock
of debt in Member States with a view to identifying gross
errors. In particular it shall examine compliance with
budgetary discipline on the basis of the following two
criteria:
(a) whether the ratio of the actual or planned government
deficit […];
(b) whether the ratio of government debt to gross domes-
tic product exceeds a reference value [60 % of GDP],
unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approach-
ing the reference value at a satisfactory pace.’ 
Article 104(3) states that ‘If a Member State does not fulfil
the requirements under one or both of the these criteria,
the Commission shall prepare a report’. This report is the
first step in the process that eventually could lead to a
Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit
position. 
To make the debt criterion of the EDP operational
requires clarifying the conditions under which a debt
ratio above 60 % of GDP ‘…is sufficiently diminishing
and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory
pace’. ¥1∂ See Bank of America Corporation Economic Research, 7 February, 2003.80
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could be in an excessive deficit position for not respect-
ing the debt criterion even if the nominal deficit level
remains below 3 % of GDP. A priori, the answer is yes,
since the Treaty gives the same relevance to both criteria. 
The focus on government debt in the EU’s budgetary sur-
veillance process is not new. In its decision on Member
States to adopt the euro (Council Decision of 3 May
1998), the Council stated that several countries with a
government debt-to-GDP ratio still above 60 % respected
the convergence criteria on both the deficit and the debt,
since the latter was diminishing at a satisfactory pace. 
Furthermore, the ‘Declaration of 1 May 1998 by the
Ecofin Council accompanying the Council’s recommen-
dation on Member States adopting the EMU’ stated that
‘The higher the debt-to-GDP ratios of participating
Member States, the greater must be their efforts to
reduce them rapidly. To this end, in addition to maintain-
ing appropriate levels of primary surpluses in compli-
ance with the commitments and the objectives of the
Stability and Growth Pact, other measures to reduce
gross debt should be put in place’. As a result, high debt
countries remained committed to reduce their govern-
ment debt-to-GDP ratios towards the reference value.
For instance, Ireland committed to reduce its govern-
ment debt-to-GDP ratio to 70 % by 1999 (60 % deemed
achievable early in the 21st century). Italy stated that the
government debt-to-GDP ratio would fall below 100 %
in 2003, and thanks to a constant primary surplus, it
would continue to fall in the following years. Similar
commitments were taken by the Belgian authorities.
3.3. Debt dynamics in EU countries (1)
Table II.3 shows the average annual percentage change
of public debt-to-GDP ratios over the past 10 years in
two sub-periods, 1992–97 (the so-called period of ‘fiscal
consolidation’) and the years of the Stability and Growth
Pact (1998–2002). Over the whole period, the rate of
variation has been negative (on average) in only one
third of EU members and among those countries with a
government debt-to-GDP ratio still above 60 %, only
Belgium showed a declining path (– 2.2 % on average
each year). Thanks to the reduced deficit levels and the
further implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact
requirements, the debt-to-GDP ratio has had a more
accentuated declining path during recent years. How-
ever, in those countries that did not comply with the SGP
requirement and/or with very high levels of debt, the
speed of debt reduction has been slower than in other
countries. Six out of 15 countries have had a rate of
reduction of less than 3 % each year between 1998 and
2002, and among these countries there are the three big-
gest EU economies — Italy, France and Germany — that
represent more than 60 % of total EU public debt in 2002. 
The pace of debt reduction depends upon both factors
that can be shaped by government policies (primary bal-
ance, privatisation) and factors which lie outside their
immediate control (interest rate changes, growth and
inflation rates, exchange rate movements). Factors out-
side the immediate control of the government, whose
combined effect is commonly known as the ‘snowball
effect’, are as follows.
The interest rates on government debt: They include
expected inflation and a (diversification/default) risk
premium. A lower interest rate decreases the amount of
interest payments, making the reduction of the debt ratio
easier. Ceteris paribus, the market interest rate is likely
to decrease the more credible the economic policy is. 
Real GDP growth: A faster rate of real GDP growth
increases the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio. It
also affects revenues and therefore improves the budget-
ary position. 
Inflation rate: As the denominator of the debt-to-GDP
ratio is expressed in nominal terms, a faster inflation rate
reduces the value of the stock of debt. The inflation rate
has also an impact on government revenues and expen-
ditures, and in general tends to improve the nominal
budgetary position. Contrary to the past, given the clear
mandate of the ECB to maintain price stability and its
independence, this factor can no longer be expected to
contribute substantially to debt reduction. However, dif-
ferences in inflation across Member States could, ceteris
paribus, be reflected in the pace of reduction of the stock
of the debt.         
The factors more under governmental control are as
follows.
The primary balance: This factor is determined by
government policies (apart from cyclical components).
¥1∂ The definition of government debt is the one contained in the Protocol
annexed to the Maastricht Treaty: ‘debt means gross debt at nominal value
outstanding at the end of the year and consolidated between and within the
sectors of general government’. 81
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government debt-to-GDP ratio (or limit the deterioration).
Stock-flow adjustments: These result primarily from
financial operations, for example, debt issuance policy to
manage public debt, privatisation receipts, impact of
exchange rate changes on foreign denominated debt (1).
In general, these should tend to cancel out over time.
However, large and persistent stock-flows (especially if
they always have a negative impact on debt develop-
ments) should give cause for concern, as they may be the
result of the inappropriate recording of budgetary opera-
tions and can lead to large ex post upward revisions of
deficit levels. Also, the debt ratio may fluctuate consid-
erably because of changes in the government’s portfolio
of financial assets. For instance, if the social security
sector decides to shift its reserves from government
paper into private securities, the government debt as
defined in the Protocol annexed to the Maastricht Treaty
increases.
Table II.4 shows how the above-mentioned factors
affected debt development in high debt countries since
the mid-1990s. The impact of interest rates and nominal
GDP growth is represented by the so-called ‘snowball’
effect, measured as the difference between the two.
Since 1998, beside ‘pure’ public finance variables, the
behaviour of the stock of debt has been negatively
affected by stock-flow adjustments in all three high-debt
countries.
3.4. What could constitute a satisfactory 
pace of debt reduction
Table II.5 shows the expected debt dynamic for a country
with a starting government debt-to-GDP ratio of 100 %
under different nominal GDP growth conditions (the
range is between 3 % and 5 %) and when the ‘close to bal-
ance or in surplus’ requirement is always respected (2). As
shown, the government debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to
reach the reference value in maximum 17 years unless
growth conditions remain very adverse over the whole
period (that is, below 3 % in nominal terms). 
Respect of the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ require-
ment will clearly ensure a fast pace of debt reduction.
However, for the purpose of operationalising the debt
criterion of the EDP, a minimal requirement of what
constitutes a ‘satisfactory pace’ of debt reduction could
be defined, to be used as a reference in the assessment of
debt developments. This operational indicator should be
related to the level of the debt ratio, with a faster pace of
reduction required in countries where debt levels are
well above the 60 % of GDP reference value. It should
also be consistent with the overall policy framework.
The indicator should be strict enough to allow debt
reduction below the reference value in a reasonable
number of years but not be over-demanding.
A number of different methods can be used to measure a
satisfactory pace of debt reduction. Depending on how
parameters of the rule are fixed, the speed of debt reduc-
tion towards the reference value can be very different. A
first set of operational indicators can refer to the budget
balance position, either in terms of required primary sur-
plus or required budget balance. An example of how this
indicator could work in practice for a stylised country
with initial government debt at 100 % of GDP is shown
Table II.3
Average annual percentage change 
of public debt-to-GDP ratios
1992–2002 1992–97 1998–2002
Countries with debt ratio above 60 % in 2002
BE – 2.2 – 1.1 – 3.2
DE 3.7 7.4 – 0.1
EL 2.1 4.7 – 0.6
IT 0.0 2.3 – 2.3
AT 1.8 2.6 0.9
Countries with debt ratio below 60 % in 2002
DK – 3.5 – 1.2 – 5.8
ES 1.8 7.7 – 4.1
FR 4.2 8.5 – 0.1
IE – 10.3 – 8.2 – 12.4
LU 0.3 5.8 – 5.2
NL – 3.8 – 2.1 – 5.5
PT 0.8 1.8 – 0.2
FI 1.2 6.9 – 4.5
SE – 4.0 – 1.5 – 5.6
UK 0.0 5.5 – 5.4
EUR-12 1.2 4.1 – 1.7
EU-15 – 0.8 2.1 – 2.5
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ Exchange rate developments may affect the flow of interest payments and
hence the implicit interest rate paid on debt, when part of the latter is
denominated in a foreign currency. ¥2∂ Nominal implicit interest rates are set up at 6 %.82
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growth and primary surpluses (1). 
The exact minimum primary surplus required would
depend on the pace of debt reduction which would be
considered necessary and feasible. A main conclusion to
be drawn from the table is the critical influence of the
nominal GDP growth rate. If nominal growth rates are
low, then the pace of debt reduction slackens considera-
bly for a given primary surplus. For example, if the nom-
inal growth rate would be 3 % instead of 4 %, it would
take 26 as opposed to 17 years for debt to fall below the
reference value with a primary surplus of 4 % of GDP.
While primary surplus is the policy variable that drives
debt reduction over which the government has most
control, the budgetary effort becomes higher the lower
the debt-to-GDP ratio is. In fact, the implied rate of
reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio increases the lower is
the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Table II.4
Development in debt levels in several EU high-debt countries since the mid-1990s
Belgium 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Debt level (% GDP) 134.0 130.2 124.8 119.6 114.9 109.6 108.5 105.3
Change in debt level – 1.9 – 3.8 – 5.4 – 5.2 – 4.7 – 5.3 – 1.1 – 3.2
Due to: Primary deficit (1) – 4.9 – 5.0 – 6.0 – 6.8 – 6.5 – 6.9 – 7.0 – 6.1
Snowball effect 4.5 5.7 1.9 3.1 1.7 1.3 3.6 2.9
Stock-flow adjustment – 1.5 – 4.5 – 1.2 – 1.5 0.1 0.3 2.3 0.0
p.m.
Implicit interest rate on debt 7.1 6.8 6.4 6.3 6.1 6.2 6.2 5.8
Real GDP growth (p.a. %) 2.4 1.2 3.6 2.0 3.2 3.7 0.8 0.7
GDP deflator (p.a. %) 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.3 2.0 2.3
Greece 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Debt level (% GDP) 108.7 111.3 108.2 105.8 105.1 106.2 107.0 104.9
Change in debt level 0.8 2.6 – 3.1 – 2.4 – 0.7 1.1 0.8 – 2.1
Due to: Primary deficit (1) – 1.0 – 3.1 – 4.2 – 5.3 – 5.4 – 5.1 – 4.9 – 4.3
Snowball effect – 0.5 0.7 – 2.5 – 0.9 0.6 – 0.5 – 1.2 – 2.2
Stock-flow adjustment 2.3 5.0 3.6 3.9 4.1 6.8 6.9 4.4
p.m.
Implicit interest rate on debt 11.6 10.7 8.2 7.8 7.3 7.1 6.3 5.6
Real GDP growth (p.a. %) 2.1 2.4 3.6 3.4 3.6 4.2 4.1 4.0
GDP deflator (p.a. %) 9.8 7.4 6.8 5.2 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.7
Italy 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Debt level (% GDP) 123.2 122.1 120.2 116.3 114.9 110.6 109.5 106.7
Change in debt level – 0.6 – 1.1 – 1.9 – 3.9 – 1.4 – 4.3 – 1.1 – 2.8
Due to: Primary deficit (1) – 3.9 – 4.4 – 6.7 – 5.2 – 5.0 – 5.8 – 3.8 – 3.4
Snowball effect 2.3 4.0 4.1 3.1 3.1 0.7 1.5 2.3
Stock-flow adjustment 1.1 – 0.7 0.6 – 1.8 0.6 0.8 1.1 – 1.8
p.m.
Implicit interest rate on debt 10.1 9.9 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.9 6.0 5.5
Real GDP growth (p.a. %) 2.9 1.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 3.1 1.8 0.4
GDP deflator (p.a. %) 5.0 5.3 2.4 2.7 1.6 2.1 2.7 2.7
(1) The primary surplus include UMTS proceeds, which amounted to 1.2 % of GDP in Italy in 2000; 0.2 % of GDP in Belgium and 0.5 % of GDP
in Greece in 2000.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ Nominal implicit interest rates are set up at 6 %.83
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 3Alternatively, the ‘satisfactory’ pace of debt reduction
can be defined looking directly at the rate of reduction of
the debt ratio. For instance, this can fall by a fixed per-
centage of the debt ratio each year (Table II.7a) or as a
fixed percentage of the distance between the actual debt-
to-GDP ratio and the 60 % reference value (Table II.7b).
Note, this approach is defined in terms of a specified per-
centage of reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio each year
and not in terms of a fixed reduction of debt as a share of
GDP.
Table II.7a shows the required primary surplus at the
beginning and at the end of the adjustment period (for
example, first three years and last three years before
reaching 60 %) according to different annual rate of
reduction and nominal growth assumptions when a fixed
rate of reduction is set up (1). For instance, a reduction in
the debt ratio of 3 % each year would bring the debt level
from 100 to 60 % of GDP within 17 years. If nominal
GDP growth is assumed constant at 5 %, this would
require an average primary surplus of 3.8 % of GDP in
the first three years of the consolidation process. As debt
levels fall over time, a lower primary surplus would be
needed to achieve a constant reduction in the debt ratio
of 3 % each year: in the last three years of the consolida-
tion process, an average primary surplus of 3.3 % of
GDP would be sufficient.          
Table II.7b shows the debt development when the rate of
reduction of the debt ratio is based on the distance of the
debt ratio from 60 %. As the debt ratio declines towards
60 %, the further reduction that is required becomes
smaller and approaches zero the closer it gets to 60 % (2). 
Throughout a fixed rate of debt reduction, the Member
State reaches the reference value of 60 % in a reasonable
number of years without the rule being over-demanding
at the beginning of the adjustment path. However, it
could be too stringent for countries with a government
debt-to-GDP ratio below 65 % but still above 60 %.
Conversely, a percentage of debt reduction that decrease
as the debt approaches 60 % of GDP makes a clear dis-
tinction between very high and high debt countries.
Table II.5
Debt dynamic according to different budget 
balances and nominal GDP growth rates 
(initial government debt-to-GDP ratio: 100 %)
Nominal GDP growth rate
5 4 3
Budget balance Years to reach 
60 %
Years to reach 
60 %
Years to reach 
60 %
0 10 13 17
– 0.5 12 15 22
– 1.0 14 19 30
– 1.5 17 25 53
Source: Commission services.
Table II.6
The implied rate of debt reduction by a constant primary surplus
(starting point: 100 % of government debt-to-GDP ratio)
Nominal GDP growth 
3 4 5
Average primary
surplus
Annual rate 
of reduction
Years to reach 
60 %
Annual rate 
of reduction
Years to reach 
60 %
Annual rate 
of reduction
Years to reach 
60 %
3 % GDP 0.2 >30 1.1 29 2.1 19
4% GDP 1.2 26 2.2 17 3.2 13
5 % GDP 2.3 16 3.3 13 4.4 10
NB: The table shows the average annual reduction in debt levels as p.p. of GDP in the first five years of a budgetary consolidation programme for different combinations
of a constant primary surplus and interest-growth rate differential. It also shows the number of years required to bring debt levels from 100 to 60 % of GDP.
¥1∂ Nominal implicit interest rates are set up at 6 %.
¥2∂ The formula to be applied is the following: bt = bt – 1 – x (bt – 1 – 60) where bt
is government debt-to-GDP ratio at time t; bt – 1 is government debt-to-GDP
ratio at time t – 1; x is the fixed percentage of reduction, i.e 0 < x ≤ 1.84
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decreasing speed, without ever reaching it (1). In addi-
tion, to achieve the reference value within a reasonable
period of time, the required adjustment at the beginning
of the period could become unsustainably high in terms
of the required primary surplus.
Graph II.7 compares the implied debt dynamic of the
three described approaches with the expected path if a
country complies with the Stability and Growth Pact
requirement of a budget balance ‘close to balance or in
surplus’. The three approaches are set in order to deliver
the same rate debt reduction in percentage points of GDP
during the first year for a stylised country with initial
government to GDP ratio of 100 % (2). Once the param-
eters are fixed, the approach is then maintained over the
years. 
To summarise, the pace of debt reduction depends upon
both factors that can be shaped by government policies
(primary balance, privatisation) and factors which lie
outside their immediate control (interest rate changes,
growth and inflation rates, exchange rate movements).
When assessing debt developments, careful attention
should be devoted to each of these factors so as to eval-
uate to what extent unfavourable debt developments are
Table II.7
The implied primary surplus by defining a rate of reduction of the debt ratio 
(a) Implied primary surplus by a constant rate of debt reduction
(starting point: 100 % of government debt-to-GDP ratio)
Nominal GDP growth
3 4 5
Annual rate 
of reduction
Years to reach 
60 %
First 3 years Last 3 years First 3 years Last 3 years First 3 years Last 3 years
3 % 17 5.6 4.8 4.7 4.1 3.8 3.3
4 % 13 6.5 4.3 5.6 3.7 4.6 3.1
5 % 10 7.2 5.0 6.3 4.4 5.5 3.8
NB: The table shows the implied primary surplus in the first and last three years of a budgetary consolidation process necessary to achieve a constant annual reduction
in debt levels as a % of GDP. Implicit interest rates constant at 6 %.
(b) Implied primary surplus by a fixed percentage of debt reduction based on distance from 60 % reference value
(starting point: 100 % of government debt-to-GDP ratio)
Nominal GDP growth
3 4 5
Fixed percentage 
of debt reduction
Years to reach 
60 % (1)
First 3 years Last 3 years First 3 years Last 3 years First 3 years Last 3 years
7.5 39 5.6 2.1 4.7 1.5 3.8 0.9
10 29 6.4 2.2 5.5 1.6 4.6 1.0
15 19 7.7 2.4 6.9 1.8 6.0 1.2
(1) Since the rule is asymptotic to 60 %, it never reaches the reference value. Therefore, the table shows the number of years to approach the reference value (i.e. to
reach 62 % of government debt-to-GDP ratio). The table shows the implied primary surplus in the first and last three years of a budgetary consolidation process by
a fixed percentage of debt reduction. Implicit interest rate is constant at 6 %.
¥1∂ To avoid the asymptotic problem at 60 %, it could be proposed to move the
target to a value lower than 60 %, say 40 %, when the country has already
reduced its debt-to-GDP ratio to a value well below 100 % but still far from
60 %, e.g. 80 %.
¥2∂ The implied reduction in the first year is 3 percentage points of GDP, i.e.
government debt-to-GDP ratio falls from 100 to 97 %. Primary surplus at
4 %; constant rate of reduction at 3 %; fixed percentage of reduction at
7.5 %. Implicit interest rate at 6 %. Nominal GDP growth at 5 %. 85
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 3due to factors outside the immediate control of govern-
ments. Also, the year-on-year development of the debt-
to-GDP ratio can be influenced by the volatility of some
variables and, for this reason, the dynamic of the debt
should also take into account government debt develop-
ments in previous years. It is indeed essential to avoid a
too mechanistic approach to assess compliance with the
debt criterion. 
Graph II.7:  Pace of adjustment for the debt ratio 
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4. The governance of budgetary statistics 
in EMU
4.1. Introduction
The quality of economic statistics is crucial to ensure an
adequate understanding of the economic situation and to
contribute to effective policy making. Low quality statis-
tics may lead to poor economic analysis, mistaken con-
clusions about the behaviour of economic agents and
even to inappropriate policy decisions. The quality of the
budgetary statistics of Member States is particularly
important given that these statistics are the foundation of
the budgetary surveillance framework.
The quality of budgetary statistics is used here as a very
generic term. It includes the appropriateness of the
accounting rules, compliance of data with the account-
ing rules, the reliability, credibility, completeness, time-
liness, across-time and across-country comparability,
consistency and transparency of data.
The quality of the statistics depends primarily on their
governance. Governance includes the accounting princi-
ples, rules, procedures and behaviour of institutions on
the compilation and publication of figures, on the distri-
bution of responsibilities among different institutions
and on the mechanisms to resolve technical difficulties
or even to mediate conflicts.
Throughout the last decade, since the Maastricht Treaty
came into force, there has been considerable progress
in the budgetary statistics in the EU. Government
accounts are now more reliable, complete, transparent
and detailed, and are published in a much more timely
fashion than when the excessive deficit procedure (EDP)
was set up. Moreover, the governance of statistics has also
improved, with the respective roles of the Member States
and of the Commission being progressively clarified. 
However, some weaknesses can be still identified in the
compilation and publication of government accounts by
the Member States. In several countries, the government
deficit and debt ratios are not yet as reliable as they
should be and are subject to large revisions. Further-
more, the government accounts of several countries are
not fully transparent, and there have been some problems
in terms of timeliness and of inappropriate political
pressure on the national statistical institutes. All these
concerns are clearly amplified with the perspective of
enlargement, since most acceding countries have statis-
tical systems that are less developed than in current
Member States and some of them have serious budgetary
imbalances (see Part I.2).
The next section of this chapter describes the main ele-
ments of the governance of budgetary statistics in EMU.
Section 3 assesses the quality of the main budgetary
indicators, the government deficit and debt, in terms of
reliability, transparency and timeliness. Section 4 is on
recent progress to improve the quality of budgetary sta-
tistics: the first steps towards the compilation of govern-
ment accounts with a quarterly frequency and the code of
best practice recently endorsed by the Ecofin Council.
Section 5 concludes and describes the challenges for the
future.
4.2. The governance of budgetary statistics 
in the EU
4.2.1. Main elements
The main elements of the governance of budgetary sta-
tistics in EMU were established already in 1992 in the
protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to
the Maastricht Treaty. The authors of the Maastricht
Treaty were already mindful that an effective implemen-
tation of the budgetary surveillance in the EU depended87
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supported by good governance. 
ESA as the accounting reference. The protocol states
that the data for the budgetary surveillance should be
compiled according to the objective and well-defined
accounting rules of the European system of integrated
economic accounts (ESA). A main advantage of an eco-
nomic accounting system like ESA (1) is that transac-
tions and policy measures are recorded in a meaningful
and suitable way for economic analysis, forecasting and
policy making. In addition, the ESA accounts try to
reflect the economic reality irrespective of the legal and
administrative arrangements and therefore lead to com-
parable results, even if the Member States have quite
different institutional settings.
There is a wide agreement that ESA is an appropriate
tool to assess economic developments. The usefulness of
ESA for budgetary surveillance is also widely accepted,
although the accounting system was not developed spe-
cifically for budgetary surveillance purposes. 
The Commission authority. The protocol also helps to
ensure sound governance by stating that the statistical
data to be used for the implementation of the excessive
deficit procedure are to be provided by the Commission.
This implies that the Commission is the statistical
authority in this domain. This principle is understanda-
ble and logic. Since the budgetary data will be used by
the European institutions to check whether Member
States adhere to fiscal discipline, it is sensible that these
data are officially provided by an impartial institution
and not by the Member States themselves. The provision
of the budgetary data by the Commission ensures that
such statistics are properly checked, their quality is per-
manently monitored and that they are comparable among
Member States. 
However, this does not mean that the budgetary data are
compiled directly from basic sources by the Commission
services. That would clearly be an inefficient option. The
compilation of government accounts involves collecting
data on millions of transactions by thousands of govern-
ment units: by the central government, including the
State and several other public units, such as public
autonomous funds and services, public hospitals, univer-
sities and other education units, by the regional and local
governments and by the social security. Clearly, the
Commission does not have the means to compile the
government accounts of each Member State. According
to the principle of subsidiarity, this task belongs to each
Member State. However, the statistics compiled by
Member States are then reported to the Commission
which validates them after a thorough examination. 
4.2.2. Other aspects of the governance 
of budgetary statistics
Besides the basic elements of governance of budgetary
statistics contained in the protocol, there are some other
important aspects that were developed in secondary
legislation or that evolved over the last decade. These
include the rules on the reporting of EDP-related data to
the Commission, the rules on the transmission to the
Commission of more complete budgetary statistics and
the role of Eurostat as the Commission service that exer-
cises the Commission’s role as statistical authority. 
EDP reporting. Given the Commission task of officially
providing the statistical data for the excessive deficit
procedure, there was a need to organise the transmission
or reporting of data by Member States. This was done in
a Council regulation of 1993 (2). Member States report
their deficit and debt figures twice a year, for 1 March
and 1 September.
This twice a year reporting is adequate. The first report-
ing allows the Commission to get a first estimate of the
outcome of the budgetary implementation in the previ-
ous year so that the formal implementation of the exces-
sive deficit procedure can be put in motion shortly after
the end of the year. The second reporting confirms or
revises the estimate with data that are much more stable
and reliable.
The reporting tables contain important information to
check whether the deficit and debt data comply with the
accounting rules. Namely, Member States should report
information that explains the adjustments made to the
cash-basis deficit to transform it into the ESA definition
¥1∂ The version of ESA that was in force in 1992 was ESA79. This system was
replaced in 2000 with the European system of national and regional
accounts or ESA95. The adoption of ESA95 as the accounting framework
for the budgetary surveillance in Europe in 2000 was a major step in the
compilation of national accounts and, in particular, of government
accounts. ESA95 is a modern system of national accounts, which has a
strong legal basis in the form of a legally binding regulation, while the pre-
vious accounting system was simply an administrative document.
¥2∂ Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93. This regulation was slightly revised
in 2000 and 2002.88
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mit information on the contribution of the government
deficit and the other relevant factors to the variation in
the government debt level, that is the so-called stock-
flow adjustment. In practice, this consists of transmitting
information on the government financial transactions
(such as privatisation, loans, etc) that affect the govern-
ment debt, but are eligible to be excluded from the gov-
ernment deficit.
Transmission of other budgetary statistics. The EDP
reporting covers the data that are strictly indispensable
for the surveillance of the budgetary situation in the EU
and that are specifically mentioned in the Treaty as
convergence criteria. That is the government deficit and
debt. However, there are plenty of other elements that
are relevant when analysing budgetary policy and the
developments in the fiscal position of Member States.
In fact, Member States transmit many other budgetary
statistics to the Commission. These other statistics are
transmitted according to the transmission programme of
national accounts and include: 
• the complete government account which is transmit-
ted thrice a year at the end of March, end of August
and end of December. This is detailed information
on tax revenue and on all other government receipts,
on salaries paid, on purchases of goods and services,
on investment and on all other government expend-
iture categories. The data transmission of December
is even broken down by sub-sector (central, State
and local government and social security);
• the government financial account which is transmit-
ted at the end of September. This is information on
transactions on financial assets, such as the sales and
purchase of enterprises’ shares, loans granted by the
government, and on all government liabilities; 
• the government financial balance sheets, which are
transmitted at the end of September. This is informa-
tion on the stocks of assets and liabilities owned or
owed by government; 
• details on taxes and social contributions collected by
the general government and each of its sub-sectors,
which is transmitted in December for the previous
year; 
• the breakdown of government expenditure by func-
tion, which is also transmitted in December for the
previous year.
All this information is disseminated by Eurostat.
Although these other statistics are compiled under a
legal context other than EDP, they may be used for eco-
nomic analysis in the context of the budgetary surveil-
lance and for cross checking the deficit and debt figures
reported for 1 March and September. 
The role of Eurostat. In the internal organisation of the
Commission, the statistical authority role is exercised by
Eurostat. The aim of this delegation of powers was that
the accounting and statistical issues are treated inde-
pendently, by an impartial and technically competent
body that guarantees the quality of data and lends credi-
bility to the whole process.
The tasks of Eurostat in this field have developed along
two lines. The first has been checking and validating the
data reported by Member States. This work has been
done on the basis of the reporting tables, on other infor-
mation transmitted by Member States when reporting
their EDP data and on regular technical meetings with
the national authorities in charge of compiling the deficit
and debt figures.
In practice Eurostat has become progressively more
active and stricter when checking the data transmitted
by the Member States. Several times, notably during
the last two years, the control of data by Eurostat led the
Member States to amend the reported figures. Moreover,
Eurostat has itself amended the reported government sta-
tistics figures and publicly expressed reservations about
the quality of data reported by a few Member States, thus
contributing to the transparency and credibility of budg-
etary surveillance.
The second part of the Eurostat task has been in clarify-
ing the application of the accounting rules whenever
there were doubts over how specific measures and trans-
actions should be recorded. In fact, despite the high level
of detail of the ESA accounting rules, there are govern-
ment transactions for which the accounting treatment is
not straightforward. This owes to the specificity of each
country, as the same accounting system is applied by
countries with fairly different institutional arrangements,
to the diversity and multitude of operations performed
by government each year and also to the increasing89
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that data reported by each country are comparable, there
is a need to interpret the accounting rules in these cir-
cumstances.
The accounting issues with relevance for the government
deficit and debt that had so far to be considered by Euro-
stat can be classified in four broad groups: 
• issues about the delimitation of general government,
that is whether a specific publicly owned or control-
led unit is government, or whether it should be
classified outside general government as a public
enterprise in the corporate sector; 
• issues about the nature of specific transactions, that
is to know whether a specific government transac-
tion has any direct impact on the government deficit.
In more technical terms, this means that one should
decide whether a transactions has a financial or a
non-financial nature. In the former case, the transac-
tion has no direct impact on the deficit, while in the
latter case, the deficit improves or deteriorates;
• issues about the time of recording of transactions.
This issue is particularly relevant since in ESA
transactions are recorded on an accruals basis. The
accruals basis imply that transactions are recorded
when economic value is created, transformed or
extinguished, or when claims and obligations arise,
are transformed or extinguished, which does not
necessarily coincide with a cash disbursement;
• issues about the calculation of the government debt.
Eurostat had to decide about the inclusion in the
government debt of unusual financing instruments,
such as share-convertible and share-exchangeable
bonds, of bonds issued by the government specifi-
cally for the financing of public enterprises and of
bonds issued by special purpose vehicles in the con-
text of securitisation.
The Eurostat decisions have been very important to
ensure comparable results. In some cases, they have had
substantial impact on the accounts of some Member
States.
Multilateral discussion and accountability. Given that
the accounting decisions on specific transactions may
have significant consequences on the government deficit
and debt ratios of Member States, Eurostat has taken its
decisions as openly as possible after discussion with the
statistical authorities of all Member States and the con-
sultation of the CMFB (1). Although the CMFB opinion
is not binding, Eurostat always takes the utmost account
of the opinions expressed by the CMFB. In practice, in
most cases, Eurostat follows the opinion expressed by
the majority of CMFB members, whenever it was a
question of deciding on the accounting treatment of gov-
ernment transactions. Furthermore, the Eurostat deci-
sions and the CMFB opinions on the recording of gov-
ernment transactions and the respective rationale are
made public, thus ensuring accountability.
4.3. Assessing the quality 
of budgetary statistics 
The section above described governance of budgetary
statistics. In particular, the distinction between the
Commission and the Member States’ role is widely rec-
ognised as adequate and contributing to the quality of
budgetary statistics. However, the quality of statistics
must be assessed directly, that is, whether the budgetary
figures, in particular the deficit and the debt ratios
reported by Member States, are reliable, transparent,
consistent and timely.
4.3.1. Reliability
The reliability of statistics is difficult to measure and
even to define. The concept of reliability that is used here
refers to the successive revisions in data. Are the deficit
and debt ratios reported in March each year reliable in
the sense that they are only slightly revised after six
months or later, or are deficit and debt figures subject to
large revisions after the publication of the first estimate?
Over the last three and half years (that is since 2000,
when ESA95 replaced ESA79 as the accounting frame-
work for the compilation of government accounts), the
average absolute revision in the deficit ratios of Member
States has been 0.15 % of GDP after six months, 0.22 %
after one year and 0.26 % after 18 months (2). This is a
very small figure if one considers that the EU average of
¥1∂ The CMFB, or Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payment
Statistics, gathers senior statisticians and national accountants from the
national statistical institutes and national central banks of all Member
States, as well as Commission and ECB representatives.
¥2∂ This indicator is the GDP-weighed average of the absolute difference
between the deficit (or debt) ratio for year t reported in March t+1 and the
deficit (or debt) ratio for the same year reported in September t+1 and
March t+2.90
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the deficit is around 47 % of GDP. 
However in some cases, the revisions in the government
deficit ratios were unacceptably high. For example, the
deficit to GDP ratio for 2001 as reported by Portugal was
revised upwards by 2 % points from spring 2002 to
spring 2003; by Greece by 1.5 % and by Italy by 1.2 %.
The government surplus of Luxembourg for 2001 was
also revised upwards by 1.4 % of GDP.
Concerning the debt ratios, the average absolute revision
in data has been 0.31 %, 0.38 % and 0.41 % of GDP after
six, 12 and 18 months. The largest revisions in the debt
ratio in recent years took place in Greece and Austria (1).
In most cases, the revisions in the deficit and debt ratios
are because the national statistical institutes received
better data from their basic sources. However, in other
occasions, the revisions were because Eurostat requested
countries to amend their data since the accounting rules
had not been fully respected or following a clarification
of such rules. In some cases, the revision in the GDP fig-
ures also played a role in the revision of deficit and debt
ratios.
Therefore, while the deficit and debt ratios reported by
Member States have been generally reliable, there were
very large revisions in a few countries. Although all
countries may still improve the reliability of their data,
this issue is particular relevant for the countries for
which the deficit and debt data were recently signifi-
cantly revised.
4.3.2. Transparency and consistency
All Member States publish complete government
accounts, that is, they publish not only the government
deficit figures but also details about their expenditure
and revenue, even if in most cases such information
appears around one month after the transmission of the
deficit data. In this sense, government accounts are
transparent as one may understand what is behind any
movement in the deficit ratio (in terms of increase or
decrease in specific revenue and expenditure categories)
from one year to the other.
For the sake of consistency, it is also important that a link
is established between the ESA government deficit and
the cash-based public accounts deficits. This is impor-
tant because the cash-based balances are easier to com-
pile and to monitor as they are directly observable. In
addition, the public accounts deficits are scrutinised by
the national institutions like the national parliaments and
courts of auditors. Therefore, if one is able to explain the
link between the two deficit concepts, the ESA govern-
ment accounts profit from the scrutiny made at the level
of the public accounts. 
All countries transmit to the Commission data on the link
between the cash basis figures and the ESA government
deficit for central government. However, for several
countries, this information is relatively confusing or not
complete or there are important statistical discrepancies.
Moreover, only one Member State (Spain) has transmit-
ted detailed information on the link between the cash fig-
ures and the ESA accounts for the lower subsectors
(regional and local authorities and social security). This
is clearly an area where there is still much progress to be
made.
4.3.3. Timeliness
Most countries always transmit their data to the Com-
mission within the reporting deadlines. However, some
countries consistently report their data to the Commis-
sion several weeks after the established deadlines. In
most cases, these delays are because of technical diffi-
culties in compiling the government accounts in time for
the reporting deadline. However, in a few occasions,
Member States have also postponed the transmission of
data on purpose for political reasons, such as the proxim-
ity of elections.
These delays may hinder an effective and expedited
implementation of the budgetary surveillance mecha-
nisms both for the concerned countries, but even for all
other countries. Moreover, delays in the transmission of
data by Member States lead to delays in the publication
of the EU aggregates and impede a proper validation of
data by Eurostat.
¥1∂ From spring 2002 to spring 2003, the Greek government debt ratio for 2001
was revised upwards by 7.3 % of GDP, mainly because of the inclusion in
the debt of bonds issued in the context of securitisation, of share-exchange-
able bonds and of share-convertible bonds. In Austria, the debt ratio was
revised upwards by 4.1 % of GDP, mainly because of the inclusion in the
government debt of bonds issued by the federal government for the financ-
ing of public enterprises (Rechtsträgerfinanzierung).91
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the quality of budgetary statistics
4.4.1. The code of best practice
The Ecofin Council of 18 February 2003, endorsed a
code of best practice on the compilation and reporting of
EDP data. The aim of the code, which follows the Com-
mission communication on the need and the means to
upgrade the quality of budgetary statistics, of 27 Novem-
ber 2002 (1), is to streamline procedures both at Member
States and Commission level that may contribute to
improving the quality of budgetary statistics.
The main elements of the code of best practice (the full
text of the code of best practice as endorsed by the Coun-
cil can be found in the annex) are the following: 
• the authority of the Commission (and of Eurostat on
behalf of the Commission) in assessing the quality
of reported data and in interpreting the accounting
rules is clarified and reinforced; 
• the Member States’ responsibility to compile and
report data to the Commission, and their commit-
ment to strictly respect the accounting rules and the
reporting deadlines; 
• the need to ensure transparency and consistency in
budgetary statistics and to report figures that are as
updated as possible; 
• the reporting tables will be revised, as experience
has shown that more precise and detailed informa-
tion is needed (2), while each Member State will
provide an inventory of methods, procedures and
sources (3);
• Member States are encouraged to address account-
ing issues at the earliest stage, when there are doubts
on the correct accounting treatment of a government
measure. Eurostat should be formally consulted on
the recording of specific transactions;
• the procedure leading to the Eurostat decisions on
accounting issues is streamlined and accelerated. As
a rule, no accounting issue should be left pending at
the time of the EDP reporting of 1 March and 1 Sep-
tember. Moreover, as a general rule, the Eurostat
decisions should be taken within six weeks (4) after
a formal request has been received; 
• Eurostat is entitled to examine in depth the ESA
government accounts of each Member State to
check compliance with the accounting rules, to
express reservations to the reported figure and to
amend such figures if need be.
In the above-referred communication of 27 November
2002, the Commission concluded that ‘an improvement
in the quality of budgetary statistics requires effort and
strong commitment from all parties. The Commission
believes that the reliability of budgetary statistics would
profit from a clarification and streamlining of procedures
followed both by the Member States and by the Commis-
sion. This clarification and streamlining should take the
form of a code of best practice that all concerned parties
commit themselves to implement’.
4.4.2. Towards quarterly accounts
EU budgetary surveillance is based on annual data. This
means that data that are relevant for deciding whether a
country is complying with the SGP requirement of
budget positions of ‘close to balance or in surplus’, or
whether such a country is in an excessive deficit position
are the deficit and debt ratios for each year. Given that
the government budgets are adopted by the political
institutions of each country and implemented in a yearly
frequency, it would not make any sense to implement the
EDP and SGP on a basis other than annual. 
However, quarterly accounts for general government can
be very important for budgetary surveillance for several
reasons. First, quarterly government data allow the
budgetary policy analysts to better understand the inter-
action between the fiscal positions of countries and the
economic activity. Second, quarterly data allows policy
makers to better calibrate their measures within each
¥1∂ COM(2002) 670 final.
¥2∂ This concerns in particular the lower government subsectors, given that the
central government is already relatively well covered. The new reporting
tables will be prepared by the Commission in cooperation with the CMFB
and will be implemented from March 2004.
¥3∂ Such an inventory is a kind of document that the national statistical insti-
tutes have already prepared in other circumstances. It is an important tool
to check that deficit and debt figures are compiled according to the account-
ing rules and that the data sources and estimation methods are appropriate.
The inventory requested by the Council in the code of best practice should
be ready for each Member State by the end of 2004.
¥4∂ Please note that this deadline of six weeks does not appear specifically in
the code as there is a cross reference to the CMFB rules of procedure.92
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dent. Third, the budgetary efforts made by any country
can be better and more quickly appreciated by the Coun-
cil and the Commission. Moreover, experience from
other statistics shows that the compilation of data with a
higher frequency (quarterly or monthly figures) has a
favourable impact on the quality of statistics with a
lower frequency (annual data).
The compilation of quarterly statistics for general gov-
ernment is still at an early stage and should be under-
stood as a medium-term project. The quarterly govern-
ment accounts are governed by three legal acts. 
First, according to Regulation (EC) No 264/2000, all
Member States are required to transmit to the Commission
quarterly data on taxes and social contributions and on
social benefits other than in kind, since mid-2000. These
data are transmitted with a three-month lag after the end of
the respective quarter. Such data have not yet entered the
usual rhythm of regular publication, as their quality is still
being assessed by both the Commission and the Member
States. However, one expects that the publication of these
figures would start later in 2003. Although the variables
covered by Regulation (EC) No 264/2000 represent a rel-
atively small part of the complete government account
and do not allow the compilation of a quarterly govern-
ment deficit, they have the potential of becoming very rel-
evant indicators as they are the government account items
that are most sensitive to economic activity.
Second, according to Regulation (EC) No 1221/2002,
Member States should compile and transmit quarterly
data for all other items of the government account, lead-
ing to the compilation of a quarterly government deficit.
Most countries are already compiling these figures and
all of them will do so by mid-2004. However, as in the
case with the data on taxes, social contribution and social
benefits, such figures will be subject to a quality assess-
ment period and the publication of data per country is not
expected before the end of 2005.
Third, the compilation of quarterly statistics on the gov-
ernment financial transactions and of the government
financial balance sheets is being envisaged. The relevant
legal acts still have to be adopted by the European Par-
liament and the Ecofin Council, but the plans are that
these data will be compiled from 2003 or 2004 on.
For the time being there is no legal act on the compilation
of the government debt with an infra-annual frequency,
although a few Member States do compile such figures.
4.5. Conclusion and challenges 
for the future 
This chapter described the main elements of the govern-
ance of budgetary statistics in Europe. The main ele-
ments of the governance — well-defined accounting
rules and a clear distinction of roles between the Com-
mission and the Member States — have shown to be nec-
essary, adequate and have contributed to the increase in
the quality of budgetary statistics in the EU.
However, there is still scope to improve the reliability,
the transparency and timeliness of budgetary statistics in
many countries. A strict implementation of the recently
agreed code of best practice will also give a major
contribution to the quality of budgetary statistics. From
the Member States’ side, this requires increasing the
transparency of government accounts in particular with
respect to the government subsectors, a stricter respect of
deadlines, an overall increase in the data quality, as well
as a reinforcement of the independent role of the national
statistical institutes as the main compilers of government
data. From its side, the Commission needs to reinforce
its ability to scrutinise the Member States’ government
accounts in more detail. Moreover, it should accelerate
the process to decide whenever there are doubts how
specific government transactions are recorded in the
accounts.
ESA has performed well as the accounting reference and
its usefulness as a budgetary surveillance tool has not
been challenged. However, one should acknowledge that
it is an extremely complex system which is not always
properly understood by policy makers and that the com-
pilation of the ESA government deficit and debt is noto-
riously difficult, lengthy and costly. This is partially
because the foundations of the accounting system were
developed in a context other than budgetary surveillance
and before EDP and SGP were set up.
Moreover, in a context of evolving surveillance, the
accounting rules need to be further developed to take due
account of innovative transactions or the changing
nature of government units (1). The accounting system
should remain consistent, provide policy makers with
¥1∂ For example, the reform of the public pension schemes, the development of
the securitisation of government assets or of the partnerships between the
public and private sectors for the construction of public infrastructures and
the provision of public services, etc.93
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2 0 0 3reliable data, and the adequate set of incentives to remain
the appropriate tool for budgetary surveillance.
The compilation of quarterly budgetary statistics is a
major challenge for the next years. The challenge is
mainly for the statisticians who will compile the data,
since the quarterly data are notoriously more difficult to
compile than annual figures. However, it is also a chal-
lenge for economists, policy-makers and budgetary pol-
icy analysts who will need to learn how to read quarterly
data, since these will necessarily be more volatile, sub-
ject to more revisions and perhaps less transparent than
annual data. Anyhow, whilst quarterly data will give a
significant contribution for the public finance analysis,
the formal budgetary surveillance mechanisms will
remain on a yearly basis.94
Annex A. Budgetary surveillance 
for long-term sustainability 
in EU Member States
Part I.3 of this report described how the sustainability
of public finances is assessed on the basis of annual
updates to stability and convergence programmes, and
explained that the Economic Policy Committee is con-
tinuously working on the production of more compara-
ble long-run projections on the budgetary impact of
ageing populations on public expenditures. As part of
its work on the sustainability of public finances, the
working group on ageing populations attached to the
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) recently carried
out a questionnaire survey on whether and how the
sustainability of public finances is systematically
addressed as a part of the budgetary-setting process in
Member States. 
This annex presents a short summary of the results. The
questionnaire was divided into two main parts. A first
section examined how Member States carried out the
long-run budget projections. A second part of the survey
examined how such projections are used in the budget-
ary-setting process, and in particular whether considera-
tions on the sustainability public finances are taken on
board in the setting of short- and medium-term budget-
ary priorities. 
Long-term projections: 
coverage and updating
All Member States currently produce long-term projec-
tions for at least some expenditure or revenue items. Pen-
sions and healthcare represent the most relevant public
expenditures affected by ageing and they are generally
fully covered in the projections exercise, mainly thanks
to the common projections carried out by the EPC at the
end of 2001, see Table II.9.) (1). 
The coverage of revenue projections is more limited due
to methodological difficulties. Any projection of tax
revenues should make assumptions on development of
tax rates, as they tend to adjust to the level of public
expenditures (2). It also requires a detailed knowledge of
income distribution and its evolution, since this can
change the tax bases for direct and indirect taxes. More-
over, the indirect effect of taxation on labour participa-
tion and on income levels should be assessed to project
the likely impact of ageing on revenues.
A key issue is the demographic scenarios used to
perform the projections of age-related expenditures and
revenues. All Member States run several projections to
take account of different possible scenarios to take into
account uncertainty over long-term demographic devel-
opments. The demographic scenarios are not fully con-
sistent across countries, since in many cases they are
based on national projections and not on Eurostat data.
However, the use of national scenarios makes it easier to
take on board the latest demographic projections which
take account of fast-changing variables such as migra-
tion flows.
In most Member States, long-term projections are regu-
larly updated to take into account at least changes in the
economic environment and/or the demographic scenario.
In Denmark, the UK and Sweden they are updated more
¥1∂ The information provided below comes from a survey across Member
States carried out by the Economic Policy Committee of the European
Union.
¥2∂ See Martinez-Mongay, C. (2000).95
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2 0 0 3often than once a year; in Belgium, Germany and Italy,
projections are updated annually (1). Longer time spans
are considered in Ireland (two years), Austria (three
years) and the Netherlands (four years). Irregular updat-
ing is being done in France, Finland and Portugal. In
Greece, a ‘National Actuary Authority’ has just been
established, and it will produce long-term projections on
a regular basis in the coming years.
The process of producing long-term budgetary projections
generally involves several actors. In most cases the final
responsibility for producing the projections is within a gov-
ernmental body, mainly the Treasury/Finance Ministry or
the Labour/Social Affairs Ministry. Social partners, inde-
pendent experts and social security institutions are fre-
quently involved at some stage in the preparation of techni-
cal assumptions and in the feedback of the first wave of
results. In many Member States there are ad hoc public bod-
ies (committees and working groups) composed of officials
from the public administration and external experts, social
partners and representatives of the national Parliament. 
For instance, in Germany, consultation is a regular fea-
ture of each annual update: a workshop on methodology
and the main assumptions that involve the Pension Insur-
ance Institutions (VDR) and the Federal Ministry of
Health and Social Affairs is organised. Other institutions
are also consulted, and at the end of the process a special
advisory board assesses the results and forwards the
assessment to the Federal Parliament. In Austria, a con-
sultant body to the federal government composed of min-
istry representatives, social partners and researchers dis-
cusses projections and it presents subsequently a report to
the government. In Portugal there is an interministerial
working group on ageing that discusses technical aspects
of the projections. An ad hoc group is also established in
the Irish Finance Ministry (the Long-Term Issues Group)
and in Belgium (Comité d’etudes sur le vieillissement).
In France, a body attached to the Prime Minister’s Office
coordinates the consultation with many different actors
(social partners, Parliament, Ministry of Finance etc.).
The use of projections 
in budgetary procedures
All Member States use long-term projections at some
stage of the budgetary process, reflecting a shift in recent
years from budgetary procedures that only focused on
short-term targets, to procedures that incorporate more
longer-term considerations. 
Currently, long-term projections are used in Sweden,
Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark as a
tool in setting the medium-term budgetary targets of the
government. 
Long-term projections are also used in the majority of
countries at the design stage of major reforms, in partic-
¥1∂ In the case of Germany this applies to projections performed for the gen-
eral statutory pension scheme.
Table A – Long-term public expenditures development covered by national projections
BE DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI DK SE UK
Pensions of public employees X X X X X X n.a. X X X X X X
Pensions of private employees X X X X X X X n.a. X X X X X X
Pensions of employers X X X X X X X n.a. X X X X X
Second pillar pensions X n.a. X X
Third pillar pensions n.a. X X
Healthcare X X X X n.a. X X X X X X
Education X X n.a. X X X X
Others (1) X X X n.a. X X X X X X X
(1) IE: Other areas of social welfare, such as child benefit and unemployment benefit payments; NL: All other expenditure items (for example, defence, general gov-
ernment transfers abroad); FI: Services: long-term care, child day care; Benefits: family allowances, unemployment benefits, sickness insurance allowances, hous-
ing allowances, living allowances, etc; DK: unemployment benefits, labour market- and maternity leave, cash benefits, early retirements benefits, pension benefits
payable between early retirement and normal retirement (efterløn), child care and residential support for elderly; SE: All public sector expenditures; UK: All spend-
ing, for example long-term care, non-pension social benefits (for example, child benefit, incapacity benefit, housing benefit), net transfers abroad etc; IT: age-
related lump sums other than pensions will be projected in the coming years; AT: contributions and federal transfers; PT: long-term care projections available in
December 2003; BE: all social security expenditures are included: sickness and disability. Family allowances, unemployment, early retirements.96
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are generally used as additional information for prepar-
ing specific provisions of legislation. In some countries,
there is a legal obligation for each new law or amend-
ment to be accompanied by a technical report on the
long-term budgetary effects for which the use of projec-
tions is indispensable. For instance, in Italy the long-
term (10 year) impact of a pension reform must be
assessed and annexed to the law proposal. In the UK,
individual reforms are generally assessed for their long-
term fiscal sustainability before policies are imple-
mented. In Germany, such projections were used when
the 2001 pension reform was devised. 
The assessment of long-term sustainability 
of public finances
The assessment of long-term sustainability of public
finances is conducted primary by ministries of finance/
economy but there are cases where the Social/Labour
Ministries or other public institutions are involved
(Table B). 
A key issue is the definition of long-term sustainability
of public finances. It can refer to debt dynamics or to a
budget balance position. In the Netherlands and Den-
mark, public finances are considered sustainable if debt
is not on an ‘explosive path’, implying a constant debt-
to-GDP ratio over the long term. Other countries refer to
the Treaty requirement of 60 % in the debt-to-GDP ratio
as in Sweden where a sustainable debt path is one which
never exceeds the Treaty reference value. In Italy, there
are currently two ways to assess long-term sustainability
of public finances. One has been developed in the 2002
updated stability programme for the first year and refers
to a debt reduction towards 60 % of GDP. A second def-
inition of sustainability refers to the impact of different
debt structure scenarios on the cost of debt and on real
GDP growth rates. This analysis is then used to project
the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio in a long-term
perspective. 
Belgium and Austria refer more explicitly to the defini-
tion given by the EPC, that is, each year to maintain a
budget position which is balanced or in surplus. A rather
different definition is the one used in the UK, where sus-
tainability is defined as meeting the government’s sus-
tainable investment rule, which says that net debt should
remain below 40 % of GDP over the economic cycle. 
On the basis of the above-mentioned definitions of long-
term sustainability, countries use a number of indicators: 
• budget balance: the country is not sustainable if the
budget balance cannot be maintained for the whole
period covered by the projections;
• fiscal gaps, tax ratios (whether the current tax ratio
is sustainable);
• increase of expenditure and revenue which are sen-
sitive to changes in the composition of the popula-
tion (mainly pension expenditures); 
• economic dependency ratios;
• a measure of generational fairness where benefits
from government expenditure enjoyed by a genera-
tion minus taxes paid by this generation should be
similar across generations.
Table B – Who makes the assessment of long-term sustainability
BE DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI DK SE UK
Ministry of Finance/Treasury/Economy X X n.a. X n.a. X X X X X X X
Ministry of Health X n.a. X n.a.
Ministry of Social Affairs/Labour X n.a. n.a. X
Others (1) X X n.a. n.a. X X
(1) BE: Conseil Supérieur des Finance - public research institute; NL: Netherlands Bureau of economic policy analysis; DK: independent institutions; DE: Ministry of
the Interior (if the civil servants’ pension scheme is assessed).97

Part III 
Public investment and its interaction 
with the EU’s budgetary rules 

Summary
Public investment as a share of GDP has fallen in the EU
in recent decades, and currently, public investment
expenditures are relatively low compared with other
industrialised areas. There is a widespread perception
that the process of budgetary consolidation (both before
and after the launch of the euro) and the application of
the EU’s fiscal rules has contributed to excessively low
levels of public investment: it is claimed that a sustained
growth in spending would improve the EU’s growth
potential in accordance with the Lisbon strategy. 
However, data analysis shows that the decline in public
investment rates is a long-run tendency that had already
started in the 1970s, and affected all industrialised coun-
tries and not just EU Member States. Declining levels of
public investment as a share of GDP have been attributed
to factors such as economic development and structural
change (with developed countries already having
acquired a high stock of physical capital) and the chang-
ing boundaries between public and private investment
(in part linked to the process of privatisation). Some of
the decline in public investment levels appears to be
related to efforts to consolidate public finances, which
was necessary irrespective of EMU. A careful analysis
of the data taking account of other explanatory variables,
however, fails to show any clear-cut link between
changes in investment ratios and the provisions of the
EU’s framework for fiscal surveillance. Indeed public
investment expenditures in many Member States have
stopped falling since the beginning of monetary union. 
Public investment can make an important contribution to
meet the output and employment goals of the Lisbon
strategy. However, in considering the links between pub-
lic investment and growth, it is important to focus on net
as opposed to gross investment levels (that is, taking
account of the depreciation of the existing capital stock)
and also the interaction between trends in public and pri-
vate investment levels. Existing studies reveal that pub-
lic investment has a positive impact on output and pro-
ductivity, although the results are not very strong and
depend quite crucially on the analytical methodologies
employed. This is explained by the fact that only a frac-
tion of public investment expenditures are devoted to
projects which aim directly at improving the allocation
of resources and raising productivity (for example,
investment in transport infrastructure): a significant pro-
portion of public investment is devoted to projects that
pursue other objectives such as environmental protection
or redistribution across regions, which only indirectly
contribute to output. 
Understanding and measuring the links between public
and private investment is also crucial to assessing the
overall impact of public investment on the economy and
its growth potential. A priori, both a complementarity or
a substitution relationship can be expected between pub-
lic and private investment, depending on whether crowd-
ing-out effects via reduced savings and increased interest
rates are compensated by higher productivity of private
capital associated with enhanced public infrastructure. In
recent decades, both public and private investment rates
have declined in the EU as a whole, although there are
significant differences across countries. In some coun-
tries, such as Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal,
both public and private investment have been rising.
Conversely, both type of investments have been falling
in other countries, such as France, Germany, Italy and
the Netherlands. Finally, in other countries, such as Aus-
tria, Denmark and the UK, the fall in public investment
has been coupled with a moderate increase in private
investment. The analysis of the data shows that public
investment has a poor explanatory power on the dynam-
ics of private investment: the effect is generally not sig-
nificant, with the exception of the UK, where there is
some evidence of crowding-out, and that of Portugal and
Spain, where instead the evidence indicates a crowding-
in effect. In summary, the hypothesis that a generalised
increase in public investment expenditures in the EU
would contribute to growth via higher private investment
receives little empirical support.101
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2 0 0 3The important role of public investment is recognised in
the existing framework for budgetary surveillance: for
example, Member States are required to specify planned
public investment levels in their annual updates to stabil-
ity and convergence programmes and the BEPGs fre-
quently recommend that an increased share of total pub-
lic expenditures be devoted to productive items such as
investment. In brief the budget balance requirements of
the Treaty and SGP are compatible with a high share of
public spending being devoted to public investment. The
recent Commission communication on strengthening the
coordination of budgetary policies sought to cater for the
budgetary impact of large investment projects while, at
the same time, respecting the commitment to sound and
sustainable public finances.
Several calls have been made to introduce a so-called
golden rule into the SGP, which would allow govern-
ments to borrow to finance investment. However, there
are strong theoretical and practical arguments against its
introduction, especially in a framework of multilateral
surveillance such as the SGP. First, a golden rule based
on a national accounts system could lead to a bias in
expenditure decisions in favour of physical capital and
against spending on human capital (education and train-
ing) or other productive items (healthcare and R & D)
which also contribute to growth and employment. Sec-
ond, if applied to gross investment, the adoption of a
golden rule into the SGP framework may imply substan-
tially higher deficits, thus compromising the objective of
sustainability of public finances. Finally, to be effective
it would need to apply to net investment: however, data
on net investment is neither reliable nor timely. 
There is a growing practice of financing public purpose
investment projects through public–private partnerships
(PPPs). The main implication for public finances of
choosing PPPs as opposed to traditional public invest-
ment is, in fact, that of converting up-front fixed expen-
ditures into a stream of future obligations. While this
practice has a sound microeconomic rationale (increased
efficiency without compromising public objectives),
there is the risk that the recourse to PPPs is increasingly
motivated instead by the purpose of putting capital
spending outside government budgets, in order to bypass
budgetary constraints. If this is the case, then it may hap-
pen that PPPs are carried out even when they are more
costly than purely public investment. Efforts are also
required to ensure a transparent recording of PPP trans-
actions in national accounts.102
1. Introduction
Public investment as a share of GDP has fallen in most
industrialised countries in recent decades prompting
many commentators to argue that this is having negative
consequences on productivity. In the EU context, it has
been claimed that the deficit targets of the Treaty and
SGP may contribute to keeping public investment
expenditures at excessively low levels, and that consid-
eration should be given to allowing for a special budget-
ary treatment for public investment.
This part of the report analyses and discusses the issue of
public investment in the framework of the EU’s fiscal
rules. Public investment is analysed from a long-run,
macroeconomic perspective. Issues related to sectoral
patterns or microeconomic efficiency (for example, cost-
benefit analysis) are therefore left aside and the focus is
on the aggregate trends in public investment and their
determinants and on the impact of public investment on
output, growth, and private investment. 
While the effects of public investment on output and
growth have been extensively studied empirically in the
past decade, there is little work investigating systemati-
cally how public investment relates to private investment
in EU countries. New empirical analysis is thus carried
out to investigate this issue. Original analysis is also
undertaken to study the relationship between public and
private investment in EU countries and the impact of the
advent of EMU on the evolution of public investment. 
Chapter 2 provides a definition of public investment and
describes the broad trends in public investment level in
developed economies in recent decades. 
Chapter 3 examines the economic rationale for public
investment and its potential impact on productivity. In
particular, it surveys the main empirical findings on this
matter. 
Chapter 4 takes a closer look at developments as regards
public investment in EU Member States. It focuses on
the relationships between public and private investment
levels in EU countries, and also considers whether public
investment levels have been affected by the Treaty and
SGP budgetary requirements both before and after the
launch of the euro. While this section focuses on the link
between budgetary consolidation and investment, it
should also be borne in mind that a reverse causation
could exist, as transparent public procurement proce-
dures can contribute to budgetary savings (1).
Chapter 5 is forward looking and examines the pros and
cons of proposals to modify the existing EU fiscal rules
to include a golden rule for public investment. It also
presents the main features and the budgetary implica-
tions of public–private partnership agreements for
undertaking public investments.
¥1∂ OECD (2003a).103
2. Public investment: 
definition and broad trends
2.1. The definition of public investment 
Through public investment, governments increase and
improve the stock of capital employed in the production
of the goods and services they provide. It is important to
note that the term ‘public investment’ used in this chap-
ter refers to a rather unique definition used in national
account statistics and thus excludes certain expenditures
which typically might be considered as constituting
investment (Box III.1). It includes the relevant transac-
tions that lead to changes in the stock of physical capital,
but excludes a large amount of expenditures related to the
accumulation of human capital. For example, the construc-
tion of research laboratories or the purchase of computer
software is included in the definition of public invest-
ment, but wages paid to researchers and scientists are
not: in national account statistics, this type of spending is
classified as current expenditures of the public sector, in
spite of the fact that the labour services provided by these
professional categories contribute to the accumulation of
human capital. Equally, investment in knowledge (edu-
cation, training or R & D) also enhances productivity
performance in the long run by favouring more knowl-
edge-intensive, higher value-added job creation, but this
is not captured by the national account definition (1).
With regard to the contribution of the stock of public
capital, a distinction should also be drawn between gross
and net investment by the public sector. Only the con-
cept of net investment takes into account depreciation
(that is, the loss of economic value of the current capital
stock due to usage or obsolescence) and as such is the
correct measure of the actual change in value of the stock
of public capital. However, the available statistics on net
investment are the result of estimation methods, and are
of limited reliability. It is therefore common to refer to
the statistical aggregate ‘gross fixed capital formation of
the general government’ to obtain country-level infor-
mation on public investment.
2.2. Broad trends of public investment 
in industrialised countries 
In most OECD countries, (gross) public investment has
on average been below 5 % of GDP in the past 30 years,
a fraction about five times lower than private investment.
From the 1970s onwards, public investment rates have
been falling significantly in a number of OECD coun-
tries, although the picture is quite differentiated across
countries (see, for example, Roubini and Sachs, 1989,
Oxley and Martin, 1991) (2). 
Focusing on the EU, US and Japan, Graph III.1. shows
that gross public investment as a share of GDP fell visi-
bly in the US and in the EU during the 1970s and the first
half of the 1980s, whereas in Japan the trend was broadly
positive (3).    
¥1∂ European Commission (2002d).
¥2∂ A downward trend in public investment as a share of GDP is quite substan-
tial in non-EU OECD countries such as Norway, Canada, Australia, Iceland
and New Zealand. In Switzerland, the share of public investment on GDP
has instead remained quite stable. The main exceptions among OECD
countries are Japan and South Korea where, on average, the role of public
investment has been growing.
¥3∂ In the whole analysis, data to Germany in the years before unification refer
to West Germany only. Moreover, in this part of the report, ESA95 gross
public investment data are linked with those referring to the previous clas-
sification systems system according to the following criterion: 
,
where the subscript ‘Former’ refers to the classification used before ESA95.
This linking methodology assumes that the growth rates in the variables are
the same irrespective of the accounting system employed and has the advan-
tage of avoiding ‘jumps’ in time series in correspondence with the year in
which the accounting system changes.
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Box III.1: Public investment in national account statistics
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In national account statistics, investment is defined as expenditures in fixed assets, for example, in items that last for more
than one year. So, while for instance teachers’ wages are classified as current expenditures, buildings or furniture used in
the education sector enter the definition of investment. The most common statistical definition of public investment is the
gross fixed capital formation of the general government. Since the general government is the relevant institutional unit,
this definition includes investments carried out by the central government and by local authorities, but excludes invest-
ments by public enterprises classified as market units.
In the ESA95 system of accounts (see Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96), gross fixed capital formation consists of ‘res-
ident producers’ acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed assets during a given period plus certain additions to the value of non-
produced assets realised by the productive activity of producer or institutional units. Fixed assets are tangible or intangible
assets produced as outputs from processes of production that are themselves used repeatedly, or continuously, in processes
of production for more than one year’.
Some remarks concerning the above definition are warranted. First, gross fixed capital formation does not take necessarily
positive values. Negative values may be recorded if the public capital stock is reduced through sales of assets. Second,
changes in inventories are excluded, meaning that the stock of items other than fixed assets that can be cumulated and car-
ried over (for example, materials and supplies used as intermediate inputs in production) are not part of gross fixed capital
formation. Third, fixed assets are not necessarily physical. Intangible assets, like patents or software enter, in fact, the def-
inition of gross fixed capital formation. Finally, it should be noted that some types of military expenditures such as the
‘purchase of military weapons and their supporting systems’ are not included in the category of gross fixed capital forma-
tion, whereas all military expenditures with a possible civilian use (for example, hospitals) are included. This is a major
difference with respect to the accounting system previous to ESA95.105
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to fall throughout most of the 1990s, but started to rise in
later years. In contrast, public investment in the US had
started to rise already by the mid-1980s; and by the end
of the 1990s it had surpassed the EU. 
A large body of studies has identified several factors that
could explain this downward trend in public investment
levels (1). First, there are reasons linked to economic
structural development. The supply of public capital
(public infrastructure especially) depends upon the level
of economic development of a country. At very low lev-
els of development, the supply of public infrastructures
is limited by the availability of financial (savings) and
technical resources. At intermediate levels of develop-
ment, the limiting role of these factors weakens and the
contribution of public infrastructure to the economy
becomes more important. At high levels of development,
the marginal productivity of public physical capital starts
decreasing, while the role of knowledge and human cap-
ital becomes more important. In brief, public investment
levels are likely to be highest in countries at intermediate
levels of economic development. 
Second, there are reasons related to the changing
boundaries between the public and private sector as
regards the provision of overall investment in the econ-
omy. In recent decades, the private sector has increas-
ingly replaced the government in the realisation of risky
long-term projects due to the development of more effi-
cient capital markets and better possibilities of hedging
risk via market instruments. Also, many industrial and
industrialising countries in the 1980s and 1990s have
been characterised by privatisation practices, through
which activities owned and managed by the public sector
have been transferred totally or partially to the private
sector (2). Moreover, in a number of countries a growing
share of investments in public interest have been carried
out through the operation of public–private partnership
agreements (PPPs). Frequently, investments carried out
in this way are not registered as government investment
in national account statistics (see Section 5.3 of this
chapter).
Finally, there are reasons related to the need to consoli-
date public finance positions. From the 1980s onwards,
many industrial countries, especially in Europe, were
faced with rising public deficits and debts. In many
instances, governments found it easier to achieve a part
of the consolidation of public finances by reducing pub-
lic investment.
Overall, the trend towards falling levels of public invest-
ment has led to an extensive debate as to whether this is
in part responsible for lower productivity and growth
rates. This issue is examined in the next section of this
chapter. There has been an added dimension to this pol-
icy debate in the EU, namely whether the need to respect
the budgetary requirement of the Treaty and SGP has
affected the level of public investment, an issue which is
taken up in Section 4. 
Box III.1 (continued)
The concept of net fixed capital formation takes into account the flow of resources that are used up during the year in main-
tenance operations (repairing or substituting capital goods) and the depreciation of existing fixed assets of the public sector.
The quantification of net fixed capital formation is obtained by subtracting capital consumption from gross fixed capital
formation. In available national account statistics, capital consumption figures are the result of an estimation method. In
the ESA95 system of classification the suggested estimation method is based on the value of the stock of fixed assets
(obtained through the perpetual inventory method) and the probable average economic life of the different capital items.
¥1∂ For empirical evidence on this issue see, for instance, de Haan, Sturm, and
Sikken (1996).
¥2∂ Privatisation practices may result in falling public investment figures
because of two reasons. The first is that the sales of non-financial assets
owned by the general government enters with a negative sign in the defini-
tion of government investment statistics. The second is that after privatisa-
tion the investments related to the transferred activities (for example, to
improve or expand their services) stop being undertaken by the government
and exits from public investment statistics.106
3. Public investment: 
its rationale and impact on efficiency
3.1. The rationale for public investment 
Public sector economics identifies a number of reasons
why governments should undertake public invest-
ment (1). In many instances, the promotion of economic
growth is not the main (or even minor) rationale for a
government to undertake a particular public investment,
and therefore the link between public investment and
efficiency (productivity) is very often only of an indirect
nature. 
A first reason for public investment is the supply of pub-
lic goods, that is, goods for which there is no rivalry in
consumption and that would be under-supplied by the
private sector alone. A typical example would be public
investment in transport infrastructures such as roads,
harbours or railways. In general, these are intermediate
public goods, that is, they produce their benefits as
inputs in the production process rather than as final
goods, and have an important impact on the efficiency of
the private sector investments. However, not all govern-
ment investment on public goods is likely to have a
direct impact on productivity. For example, investment
in infrastructures to ensure clean air and water, while
essential for the general welfare of citizens, may only
indirectly feed through to efficiency. 
A second rationale for public investment comes from the
presence of various sources of market failures. Invest-
ments in infrastructures with environmental purposes
serve to deal with pollution or other types of environ-
ment-related externalities. Investment in the education
sector can be justified on the ground of human capital
externalities and knowledge spillovers. Due to such phe-
nomena, the social marginal productivity of education
would exceed the private one. In the absence of public
intervention, under-investment in schooling and educa-
tion-related activities would arise (2).
Another category of market failures that justifies public
intervention in the provision of infrastructures comes
from the presence of increasing returns and natural
monopoly-type arguments. The provision of network
infrastructures (in energy distribution or telecommunica-
tion for instance) could be subject to increasing returns
associated with so-called network externalities resulting
in a natural tendency towards monopolisation. In such
industries, public intervention through the direct supply
of services or the regulation of the sector is desirable to
overcome the inefficiencies associated with the under-
supply by the private sector. Since public utilities pro-
vide important intermediate inputs in private sector pro-
duction, their efficient provision has an impact on over-
all productivity. However, it should be pointed out that,
due to technological and institutional innovation (for
example, international liberalisation of air transport and
public utilities) in recent decades, the role of natural
monopolies has been shrinking, thereby enabling gov-
ernments to leave the provision of such goods and serv-
ices to the private sector. 
A third argument in favour of public investment is that
of missing markets for capital or insurance that result
from asymmetric information problems. In the absence
of properly functioning capital and insurance markets,
private firms may not be willing to undertake risky
projects or projects that can be recovered only over a
very long time horizon. In these cases, the only alterna-
¥1∂ For a general treatment of the rationale for public sector activity see, for
example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1990). See also European Commission
(2002a).
¥2∂ It should be noted, however, that only spending on education infrastruc-
tures (such as school buildings etc) is recorded as public investment in
national account statistics, whereas spending on teachers’ salaries is
recorded as current expenditures.107
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the public sector. 
Summarising, there are several reasons that justify the
desirability of public investment in terms of a more effi-
cient allocation of resources. It should be noted though
that in many cases the principal rationale for a particular
public investment is not to increase efficiency in the sup-
ply of goods and services that enter production statistics
(GDP), but rather to pursue some other policy objective
that raises overall welfare, for example, protection of the
environment or a fair distribution of resources. This is
also the case for investment related to the provision of
several types of welfare state services (for example, hos-
pitals, public housing, …) (1). Hence, a priori, a strong
link between government investment, productivity and
growth should not be expected. 
In principle, public investments are desirable until the
social marginal benefit of public capital exceeds its
social marginal cost. Social marginal benefits exceeding
social marginal costs indicate that public capital is in
short supply and that higher public investment would
improve social welfare. In practice, however, the supply
of public capital can be far from the welfare maximising
level for several reasons. 
A basic reason has to do with the lack of information of
the policy-makers about the costs and benefits of public
investment. The outcome of the actual economic evalu-
ations of policy-makers concerning public investment
(for example, though cost-benefits analysis) is subject to
potentially large errors related to limited information on
the technical characteristics of projects and on citizens’
preferences (free-riding problem). The potential dis-
crepancy between the outcome of actual cost-benefit
analyses and the ‘true’ social marginal costs and benefits
become evident by considering that an appropriate esti-
mate of social costs should refer to the concept of oppor-
tunity cost (which requires an estimation of the benefits
from alternative uses of public funds) and should take
into account the cost of alternative means of financing
public investment, including an assessment of the impact
of distortionary taxation.
Political economy considerations may also lead to
investments which are not welfare increasing for the
society as a whole. A basic reason is that public invest-
ments such as infrastructures tend to concentrate the
benefits among a clearly identifiable and relatively small
subset of the population, while the costs tend to spread
among a larger and more diffused group. Such types of
‘pork-barrel’ projects may end up being over-provided
by the public sector (see, for example, Drazen, 2000, on
this subject) (2).
In sum, for a number of reasons public capital may either
be in short or in excess supply. Understanding whether
public investment is socially desirable in a particular
country or region is most often an empirical matter.
3.2. Public investment, productivity 
and growth: the empirical evidence
In the 1990s, a large amount of research was carried out
with the aim of measuring the contribution of public
capital in terms of increased production possibilities,
reduced costs for the private sector or enhanced growth
prospects. In spite of the different approaches and meth-
odologies followed and different measures of public cap-
ital employed (for example, total public investment from
national account statistics, estimates of the net public
capital stock, estimates of the stock of public infrastruc-
tures, or estimates of transport infrastructure only), all
these analyses assume that public capital is a production
factor of a particular type. 
Aschauer (1989a) found a significant and strong positive
impact of public investment on aggregate output for the
US case, whereby a 1 percentage point increase in the
public capital stock would raise aggregate output by
almost 0.4 percentage points. This result generated a
vivid debate in academic and policy circles. Empirical
work proliferated, investigating alternative datasets (dif-
ferent periods or countries) and following new method-
ologies. In these subsequent analyses, not only is the
estimated impact of public investment on output smaller,
but quite often the results are insignificant or even nega-
tive (see Box III.2 and Table III.1).
¥1∂ By definition, such investments will not necessarily have a direct positive
impact on overall efficiency. However, by contributing to social cohesion
they may improve a country’s ‘social capital’ and to its long-run productive
potential: an efficient allocation of resources.
¥2∂ This does not mean that political economy factors lead to a bias of public
expenditure in favour of investment expenditure. Political economy reasons
(existence of political clienteles and pressure groups) may equally explains
a bias towards excessive current public expenditure.108
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particular country or period considered, the level of
aggregation of the dataset and the way dynamic rela-
tions among the variables are modelled seem to matter.
Some work (for example, Bernd and Hansson, 1991,
Conrad and Seitz, 1994, La Ferrara and Marcellino,
2000) compare estimates of the social marginal benefits
(proxied by shadow prices) with estimates of the social
marginal costs of public capital, with the aim of deter-
mining whether public capital is in short or in excess
supply (1). Quite often, the results are not supportive of
the view that public capital is under-supplied.
Box III.2: Empirical evidence on the effects of public investment: methodologies and results
In recent empirical analyses, different methodologies have been followed to analyse the impact of public investment on
economic activity. A first strand of studies follows the so-called ‘production function approach’. The aim is that of esti-
mating the parameters of an aggregate production function in which public capital enters as a separate productive factor.
The obtained estimate of the marginal productivity of public capital is thus chosen as a measure for the benefits of public
investment. This approach has been followed for the first time in the seminal work of Aschauer (1989a). The analysis fol-
lowing this approach generally finds quite ambiguous results (see Table III.1). Results appear to depend quite crucially on
the level of aggregation of the dataset and the way dynamic relations among the variables are modelled. In general, studies
using panel datasets disaggregated at the state or regional level find a weaker or insignificant impact of public investment.
Concerning dynamics, once proper techniques are used to obtain stationary series (thus avoid estimating possible spurious
relations between public capital and output), results tend to become ambiguous. 
In other studies a different approach has been followed. Instead of production functions, cost or profit function of private
sector firms have been estimated. The idea is that public capital affects the costs and profits of firms as an unpaid fixed
input. This approach has the advantage of imposing less restrictions on the equations to be estimated and allowing for the
estimation of the shadow price of public capital. In most of the cases public capital is found to reduce the costs of private
sector firms. However, in several studies (for example, Berndt and Hansson, 1991, La Ferrara and Marcellino, 2000) it is
found that public capital is in excess supply, since its social marginal productivity (proxied by its shadow price) is lower
than its social marginal cost. 
Some analyses followed an atheoretical approach. Instead of deriving measures of the contribution of public capital
from the estimation of production or cost function equations, these studies investigate the dynamic relationship between
public investment and other aggregate variables (output, private investment, etc) through vector auto regressions (VAR)
analysis. Under this approach, no a priori assumptions are made concerning causal relations: all variables are jointly
determined. In most of this work, measures of public investment are found to increase aggregate output, but there are
exceptions (see Table III.1) (1).
A different strand of studies analyses the impact of public capital on the growth potential of countries or regions. The idea
is that public capital (transport or communication infrastructure, for instance) has an impact on the accumulation possibil-
ities of the economy, rather than on the level of output. The empirical methodology to test this hypothesis is that of cross-
section growth regressions. Growth rates in per-capita income over a given time period for a collection of countries or
regions are regressed on initial conditions and a list of conditional variables (for example, measures of human capital
stock), including the stock of public capital. Results from these studies appear to be very fragile. Depending on the set of
countries and regions considered the impact of public capital may or may not be significant. 
(1) Such results are obtained by means of Granger causality tests.
¥1∂ The shadow price of public capital measures the impact on private sector
firms’ costs of a unitary increase in the stock of public capital. This meas-
ure is thus an adequate proxy of the social marginal productivity of public
capital, under the assumption that the main role of public capital is as an
intermediate input. Estimates of public capital shadow prices are com-
monly used in cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation. Measures for
the social cost of public capital are based on estimates of the public invest-
ment deflator, rates of return and depreciation rates.109
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has a positive impact on output, productivity or growth.
However, results appear to be quite weak and fragile.
When positive, the estimated impact in most of the stud-
ies is not a strong one, and there are cases in which the
impact is insignificant or even negative. A certain con-
sensus is emerging that public investment is not as
important for growth as other factors, such as invest-
ments in human capital (see, for example, Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 1998). 
These results are mainly explained by the fact that the
purpose of a non-negligible share of public investment
expenditures is not that of (static or dynamic) efficiency
but rather that of supporting the provision of welfare
services and affecting the distribution of income. Data
on the sectoral distribution of public investment in EU
countries indicate that the investment projects directly
affecting overall productivity and growth potential are
hardly the majority (1). Even if the most important cate-
gory is transport infrastructure (roads and bridges in par-
ticular), which accounts by itself for almost one third of
the gross fixed capital formation of the general govern-
ment in the EU, the rest is devoted to purposes not nec-
essarily related to productivity and growth. A share
between 10 and 15 % of public investment is absorbed
by fixed expenditures for education and health (for
example, construction and maintenance of school build-
ings and hospitals), while the provision of public hous-
ing and community amenities (for example, water and
sewers) accounts for roughly 10 % of public investment.
The remaining share is mainly devoted to general public
services (for example, administration), defence and
security. 
¥1∂ Matha et al. (2000).110
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The effect of public investment on output, productivity and growth
Study Data Results
1. Production function approach
Aschauer (1989a) US, time series 1949–85 Positive effect of public capital on output
Sturm and De Haan (1995) US, time series 1949–85 Positive effect of public capital on output; insignificant 
effects using time differences
Evans and Karras (1994) US, panel data on 48 states, 1970–86 Insignificant effect of public capital on output 
Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995) US, panel data on 48 states, 1970–86 Insignificant effect of public capital on output
Garcia Milà et al. (1996) US, panel data on 48 states, 1970–83 Insignificant effect of public capital on output
Aschauer (1989c) G-7, panel data, 1966–85 Positive effect of public capital on output
Ford and Poret (1991) 11 OECD countries, time series 1960–89 Significant positive effect in Belgium, Canada, and Germany
Merriman (1990) Japan, panel data on 9 regions, 1954–63 Positive effect of public capital on output
Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993) Spain, time series 1964–88 Positive effect of public capital on output
Dalamagas (1995) Greece, time series 1950–92 Ambiguous effects
Kavanagh (1997) Ireland, time series 1958–90 Insignificant effect of public capital on output
Ligthart (2000) Portugal, time series 1965–95 Positive effect of public capital on output
La Ferrara and Marcellino (2000) Italy, regional panel, 1970–94 Negative effect of public capital on output
2. Cost or profit function approach
Berndt and Hansson (1991) Sweden, time series 1960–88 Reduction in costs. Public capital in excess supply.
Conrad and Seitz (1994) Germany, panel on three sectors, 1961–88 Reduction in costs. Public capital in short supply during 
1961–79; in excess supply during 1980–88.
Dalamagas (1995) Greece, time series, 1950–92 Reduction in costs
Lynde and Richmond (1993a) UK, time series 1966–90 Reduction in costs
Lynde and Richmond (1993b) US, time series, 1958–89 Increase in output
Morrison and Schwartz (1996a) US, panel on 48 states, 1970–87 Infrastructures have a negative impact on costs
Morrison and Schwartz (1996b) US, panel six New England states, 1970–78 Public infrastructure reduces costs, but less than private 
investment
Seitz and Licht (1995) Germany, panel on 11 states, 1971–88 Reduction in costs
La Ferrara and Marcellino (2000) Italy, regional panel, 1970–94 Insignificant effect on costs. Public capital in excess supply 
for Italy as a whole.
3. VAR studies
Clarida (1993) US, France, Germany, UK, time series 
1964–89
TFP and public capital are cointegrated, but direction of 
causality is unclear
Sturm et al. (1999) Netherlands, time series 1853–1913 Public infrastructure Granger-causes output
Otto and Voss (1996) Australia, time series 1959–82 No significant relation between public capital and output
Ligthart (2000) Portugal, time series 1965–95 Public investment Granger-causes output
4. Cross-section growth regressions
Barro (1991) 76 countries, 1960–85 No effect of public investment on per capita GDP growth
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 100 countries, 1970–88 Insignificant effect of public investment on per capita GDP 
growth, significant effect of transport and communication 
spending
Crinfield and Panggabean (1995) 282 US metropolitan areas, 1960–77 Ambiguous or insignificant effects of local and federal 
public capital on per capita GDP growth
Host-Eakin and Schwartz (1994) 48 US states, 1971–86 Insignificant effects of public capital on per capita GDP 
growth
Mas et al. (1994) 17 Spanish regions, 1955–91 Not always significant effects of public capital on per capita 
GDP growth
Matha et al. (2001) EU countries, 1960–97 Positive effect of public investment on per capita GDP 
levels, negative on output growth
La Ferrara and Marcellino (2000) Italian regions, 1970–94 (panel structure) Positive effect of public infrastructure investment on TFP 
growth111
4. A closer look at public investment 
in Member States and the interaction 
with the EU fiscal rules
4.1. The evolution of public and private 
investment in EU countries 
4.1.1. Trends in recent decades 
The EU has been characterised by a prolonged down-
ward trend in public investment rates in recent decades.
There is a quite widespread view that such a tendency
may have contributed to reducing the productive poten-
tial of EU countries. However, since what matters for
output and growth is the accumulation of overall capital
rather than that of public capital only, to support this
argument one needs to assess how the decline in public
investment shares relates with trends in private invest-
ment in EU countries. 
On average, gross public investment in the EU in the
1970–2002 period has been slightly above 3 % of GDP.
Over the same period, private investment averaged about
19 % of GDP in the 1970–2002 period. The difference
between public and private investment is less marked
when using net fixed capital formation figures. The share
of net public investment in GDP was about 1.4 % of
GDP over the same period, while that of net private
investment is just above 6 %. This smaller difference is
mainly explained by the fact that, as on average the stock
of private capital is higher than that of public capital, a
large part of the investment is devoted to maintenance.
Graph III.2 provides a breakdown of average gross pub-
lic, private and total investment-GDP shares over the
1970–2002 period for each Member State. Regarding
public investment, the lowest shares are recorded for
Italy, Germany and the UK, while the highest are those
of Ireland, Luxembourg, and Sweden. 
Evidence concerning net investment is reported in
Graph III.3 (1). Net investment shares are generally less
than one half of gross investment shares. In Denmark
average net public investment during the 1974–2001
period has been particularly low compared with gross
investment, being slightly negative. At the opposite end,
in Ireland, Spain and Portugal, net public investment has
been relatively high in comparison with gross figures.
These differences across countries between gross and net
investment figures reflect primarily differences in the
size and composition of the capital stock, but may also
be related to non-uniform practices for imputing depre-
ciation.
Graph III.4 reports average annual changes in the share
of gross private, public and total gross fixed capital for-
mation during the period 1970–2002. For the EU-15, a
reduction is observed in both the public and private com-
ponent of investment, resulting in a reduction of the total
investment share of about half a percentage point per
year. The average annual reduction is stronger for the
public component, which is above 1.6 percentage points
per year.                              
Overall, the evidence shows that investment shares
differ quite widely across countries. Differences in
investment shares seem mainly to reflect differences in
per-capita income and levels of economic develop-
ment. Cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal
and Spain) registered relatively high overall investment
shares and both public and private investment rates
¥1∂ Data are reported for the 1974–2001 instead of 1970–2002 due to missing
values.112
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average values for the period 1970–2002, (1) 
(1) Gross fixed capital formation.
Graph III.3:  Net public, private and total investment, % of GDP, 
average values over the period 1974–2001 (1) 
(1) Net fixed capital formation.
(2) Excluding Greece and Luxembourg.
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(1) Gross fixed capital formation.
Graph III.5:  Cross-country relations between growth rates in public and private investment 
(average annual changes in shares, 1970–2002) 
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Conversely, investment rates have been generally rela-
tively low and falling in countries with relatively high
per-capita income. This is particularly evident by look-
ing at changes in public investment rates, with strong
negative values observed for countries such as Austria,
Belgium, Germany and Sweden, characterised by per-
capita income higher than the EU average.
Another factor that helps to explain cross-country differ-
ences in the evolution of public investment rates is the
occurrence of changes in the ownership structure of pro-
ductive assets. The reduction in the investment activity of
the public sector is partly the result of privatisation initi-
atives especially in the UK, Austria and Germany (2).
4.1.2. Is there a link between changing levels 
of public and private investment ?
A relevant question is the following: how does the fall in
public investment relate with changes in private invest-
ment? A clear a priori effect of public investment on pri-
vate investment is not evident. On the one hand, as with
other types of public expenditure, public investment
tends to crowd out private investment via reduced avail-
able savings and higher interest rates. Public investment
may also crowd out private investment if the public
sector engages in activities that are strictly substituted
with those normally carried out by the private sector
(for example, productive investment by publicly owned
enterprises). On the other hand, public investment may
exert a positive effect on private investment (crowding
in) via increased productivity of private sector firms,
higher expected profits and better investment opportuni-
ties. This is typically the case of public infrastructures
that are used as common inputs in private sector firms’
activities (for example, transport and communication
facilities). 
In Graph III.5, growth rates in private investment are
regressed against growth rates in public investment
across countries. The relationship appears to be positive,
although weak, indicating that the countries experienc-
ing bigger reductions in public investment are more
likely to also experience bigger reductions in private
investment. Such an analysis, however, does not provide
any information on the direction of causality, so that it is
not possible to say if it is public investment causing pri-
vate investment, if it is the opposite, or if there is a third
factor that is simultaneously affecting both public and
private investment. To investigate this issue further, time
series analyses have been performed separately for each
country, with the aim of assessing the effect of changes
in public investment on future developments in private
investment (see Box III.3 and Table III.2). Results are
weak and vary considerably across countries. In most
countries, public investment did not play a significant
role. Crowding-in effects are found for Spain and Portu-
gal, while for the UK there is evidence of crowding-out. 
In sum, there is no evidence that changes in public
investment had a relevant or systematic impact on pri-
vate investment developments in EU countries.          
4.2. Budgetary consolidation 
in light of EMU and its impact 
on public investment
Among the factors that may have contributed to explain
the downward trend in public investment has been the
efforts by Member States, especially during the mid-
1990s, to consolidate public finances in light of mount-
ing public debt which was accompanied by a consequent
increase in interest expenditure. While budgetary con-
solidation was necessary in any event, the prospect of
stage III of EMU and the entry into force of EU budget-
ary rules may also have played a role. With the entry into
force of the Maastricht Treaty, Member States commit-
ted to avoid excessive deficits and high debt levels (an
entry condition for joining the euro area). An additional
budgetary requirement came into force with the launch
of the euro in 1999, namely the objective of the Stability
and Growth Pact to achieve budget positions of ‘close to
balance or in surplus’.
The purpose of this section is to examine the impact of
budgetary consolidation on public investment rates in
EU countries. It should be stressed that this analysis
examines the relationship between budgetary consolida-
tion in terms of deficit levels and changes in public
¥1∂ An additional reason why public investment shares may have been in gen-
eral higher and growing in cohesion countries is the availability of Commu-
nity structural funds. However, this should not be considered as a structural
determinant, and the size and direction of structural funds will change after
the accession of new Member States.
¥2∂ The shift of ownership concerned mainly energy and telecommunication
infrastructure. As a result of privatisation, public investment in these coun-
tries became even more concentrated into fewer sectors, such as transport
infrastructure, health and education (OECD, 1998). In the UK case, after
the privatisation of telecom and energy companies, and of airports and rail-
ways, about 15 % of UK gross fixed capital formation was transferred out-
side the general government sector (Pollitt, 2000).115
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crowding in or crowding out?
The purpose of this analysis is to assess which impact public investment had on private investment in EU countries. A
common methodology followed in time-series analyses to test whether one variable has a significant impact on another
variable (or set of variables) is through Granger causality tests. This test permits the understanding of whether the past
values of the variable to be tested (public investment in this case) adds explanatory power to an existing relationship
between one variable (private investment) and its lags (1).
Granger causality tests are performed for all 15 current EU countries. Yearly data are used, ranging from 1970 to 2002. The
chosen specification to perform Granger causality tests is the simplest possible, and it is the same for all countries. Private
investment at time t is assumed to depend upon its own value at time t-1 and upon public investment at time t-1. This formu-
lation permits to save degrees of freedom, given the limited number of time series observations. Variables are expressed as
first differences of their logarithm. This transformation permits to obtain stationary time series, so that ordinary least squares
estimation methods can be used. The logarithmic transformation permits the interpretion of the variables employed in the
regressions as growth rates of the underlying variables. Formally, the equations to be estimated are as follows:
,
where  (resp., ) is the difference between the log of private (resp., public) investment at time t and time t-1, while
 is a random term. 
Testing whether public investment has an impact on private investment (Granger causes) in the above specification simply
amounts to test whether the parameter γ is significantly different from zero. A significantly negative value for γ indicates
crowding out, a positive value would be associated with crowding in. 
Results are reported in Table III.2. for all EU-15 countries. The coefficient of public investment normally turns out to be
not significant, with the exception of three countries: Spain, Portugal and the UK. For Spain and Portugal, the estimated
impact of public on private investment is positive; conversely, for the UK it is negative. A possible interpretation of the
results for Spain and Portugal can be related with decreasing returns in public capital. Spain and Portugal are character-
ised by a relatively low public/private investment ratio during the period considered (see Graph III.2.). For these coun-
tries, since the stock of public capital is relatively low (and thus its marginal productivity relatively high), an increase in
public capital results in higher productivity for the private sector and then in enhanced profits and better investment
opportunities for private firms (2). In the case of the UK, a possible explanation comes from the process of privatisation
of the 1980s and 1990s and the growing involvement of private sector firms in the realisation of projects of public interest.
Due to changing ownership of assets from the public to the private sector, falling public investment in the UK may have
coincided, to a certain extent, with a corresponding increase in investment by the private sector. Something else to note
is the negative and almost significant coefficient for public investment in the case of Sweden. In this country the public/
private investment ratio is higher compared with the rest of EU countries. This may indicate a relatively low marginal
productivity of public capital, so that an increase in public investment would mainly crowd out private investment
through reduced available savings and higher interest rates (3).
(1) In existing studies on the relation between public investment and private investment using Granger causality tests, results depend on the particular coun-
tries and periods analysed and on the specific methodology followed (for example, Aschauer, 1989c, Eremburg, 1993), Flores de Frutos et al., 1998 find
evidence of crowding-in, while Monadjemi et al., 1998, Lightart, 2000 and Voss, 2001 find support of the crowing-out hypothesis). Among the existing
studies, there is none analysing systematically all EU countries. 
(2)  The result for Spain is consistent with those found in previous studies (for example, Flores de Frutos et al., 1998), while Lightart (2000) finds no
evidence of crowding-in in the case of Portugal.
(3) This interpretation for the Swedish case is consistent with existing work estimating that the stock of public capital in Sweden is above the optimal one
(Berndt and Hanson, 1991).
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cific provisions of the EU framework for budgetary sur-
veillance (1).
Graph III.6 shows that in EU countries public investment
and interest expenditure followed quite opposite tenden-
cies during the past decades. It shows that the share of
interest expenditure reached its maximum in the mid-
1990s and declined in subsequent years. Public invest-
ment reached its minimum level around 1997 and stayed
broadly constant afterwards. Table III.3 presents evi-
dence consistent with the hypothesis that fiscal
consolidations induced by high debt levels and the need
to satisfy the Maastricht criteria coincided with rela-
tively larger cuts in public investment. For each Euro-
pean country, the average annual change occurred in
government revenues, total primary expenditures and
public investment (shares on GDP) during consolidation
periods is reported. With the exception of Greece and
Portugal, public investment in all countries dropped dur-
ing phases of consolidation and in general did so more
markedly than total primary expenditures.         
Table III.3 also reports the average annual change in
government revenues, total primary expenditures and
public investment for the EU-14 aggregate separately for
the overall period, for consolidations periods only, and
for consolidation periods occuring after 1985 only. Pub-
lic investment cuts during consolidations occurred
throughout the whole period, but were on average deeper
during consolidations that took place after 1985, which
were concentrated on the expenditure side.
Graph III.7 reports the average annual change in public
investment shares in each EU country and in the EU
aggregate during the 1990s, distinguishing several sub-
periods. The first sub-period (1991–93) coincides with
phase I of EMU. The second sub-period (1994–98) cor-
responds to phase II of EMU. It is in those years that the
Maastricht calendar for monetary unification exercised
the strongest pressure on governments, urging them to
keep their budget deficits below 3 % of GDP as a condi-
tion for entering EMU. Between 1994 and 1998, public
investment in the EU registered the largest drop. How-
ever, it can be noted that, during this period, public
investment also fell in all the countries that chose not to
join the single currency (2). The third sub-period (1999–
2002) coincides with the years of operation of the euro.
In spite of the fact that in this period the Maastricht
Table III.2
Public and private investment. 
Granger causality tests
Dep. 
Variable: N. obs Adj. R 
squared
BE 0.213
(0.189)
– 0.114
(0.137)
31 0.0385
DK 0.194
(0183)
0.101
(0.161)
30 – 0.0118
DE 0.473 (2)
(0.1749
– 0.024
(0.117)
31 0.159
EL 0.063
(0.204)
0.06
(0.173)
31 – 0.0577
ES 0.491 (3)
(0.152)
0.158 (1)
(0.081)
31 0.271
FR 0.449 (2)
(0.165)
0.012
(0.141)
31 0.155
IE 0.25
(0.191)
– 0.084
(0.155)
29 – 0.063
IT 0.287
(0.179)
– 0.076
(0.106)
31 0.036
LU – 0.153
(0.199)
0.122
(0.264)
31 – 0.047
NL 0.301
(0.177)
– 0.137
(0.149)
31 0.066
AT – 0.002
(0.178)
– 0.026
(0.121)
31 – 0.069
PT 0.39 (2)
(0.16)
0.262 (1)
(0.138)
31 0.227
FI 0.6 (3)
(0.154)
0.05
(0.182)
31 0.32
SE 0.438 (2)
(0.163)
– 0.246
(0.176)
31 0.223
UK 0.377 (2)
(0.161)
– 0.144 (2)
(0.07)
31 0.234
NB: Estimation method: OLS, constant term included. (3), (2), (1), denote,
respectively, significance at 1, 5, 10 % level. Coefficient standard devia-
tions are reported in parentheses.  is the difference between the (log of)
real gross fixed capital formation of the private sector at time t and at time
t-1.  is the difference between the (log of) real gross fixed capital for-
mation of the general government at time t and at time t-1. The deflator
used is that of gross fixed capital formation, total economy.
Data source: AMECO database.
¥1∂ The EU framework for budgetary surveillance is presented in previous
issues of this report. See European Commission (2000, 2001 and 2002a).
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¥2∂ While in Denmark and Sweden this reduction was not particularly strong,
the UK is the European country registering the largest drop in public
investment in this period. The reduction of UK public investment in this
period concerned mostly central government investment in health, educa-
tion and defence (Clarke, Elsby and Love, 2001).117
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Graph III.7:  Public invest changes in the 1990s (average annual changes in GDP shares) (1) 
(1) Gross fixed capital formation, general govenment.
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visions contained in the Stability and Growth Pact) contin-
ued to operate, the share of public investment in GDP
stopped falling in the EU aggregate (1). In several countries
public investment shares actually rose (Ireland especially).
On the basis of the data, it appears that public investment
in EU Member States has been cut, especially during the
periods of fiscal consolidation occurring in the late
1980s and in the 1990s. These dynamics may be partly
explained by the fact that in periods of financial distress,
public investment is often more likely to be cut than cur-
rent public expenditure since the former is made of fixed
expenditures which can be delayed or moved to future
periods with relatively low political costs. The evidence
also seems to suggest that the effects of the fiscal disci-
pline provisions of EMU were quite different before and
after the introduction of the euro. The years preceding
the introduction of the euro coincided with a particularly
strong reduction in public investment shares in most
countries. Conversely, and also thanks to the progress
made in reducing interest expenditure, the introduction
of the euro coincided with a halt in the downward trend
in public investment that characterised the EU since the
early 1970s. Interestingly, the trends are similar in coun-
tries that do not form part of the euro zone 
Results of regression analysis presented in Table III.4
(see also Box III.4) suggest that the requirements of fis-
cal discipline associated with EMU have produced both
a direct and an indirect effect on public investment, with
opposite signs: 
Table III.3
The composition of fiscal consolidations, 
general government (1970–2002)
Total 
revenues
Total 
primary 
expenditure
Gross fixed 
capital 
formation
EU-14 average
Overall period 0.9 0.977 – 0.98
Consolidation 
periods
1.52 – 0.86 – 4.13
Consolidation 
periods 
after 1985
0.59 – 1.48 – 4.62
Individual countries, during consolidation periods
BE 0.59 – 0.75 – 6.00
DK 0.78 – 2.14 – 2.34
DE 0.89 – 0.06 – 6.83
EL 2.60 – 0.45 3.73
ES 0.50 – 1.00 – 6.30
FR 1.94 0.91 1.70
IE 2.91 – 2.17 – 5.32
IT 2.44 – 0.31 – 4.78
NL 2.46 – 1.40 – 2.35
AT 1.61 0.50 – 8.00
PT 0.53 1.12 1.45
FI 0.14 – 2.43 – 4.28
SE 1.73 – 2.90 – 4.46
UK 2.10 – 0.95 – 10.70
NB: Figures refer to average annual % changes in shares on GDP. Cross-coun-
try averages are unweighted. The years of fiscal consolidation in each EU
country are those reported in European Commission (2000), p. 20 for the
1990s, while for the remaining period are those reported in IMF (1996),
p. 57. 
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ For the EU aggregate, public investment shares are constant at 2.3 GDP
percentage points for the 1999–2001 period and equal to 2.2 percentage
points in 2002.
Table III.4
The determinants of public investment in the EU: 
Regression analysis (EU-15, 1970–2002)
RPCGDP(t-1) – 0.112 (3)
(0.011)
– 0.145 (3)
(0.013)
– 0.172 (3)
(0.014)
RLIR(t-1) – 0.036 (2)
(0.014)
– 0.022
(0.014)
– 0.021
(0.014)
CAB(t-1) – 0.038 (3)
(0.013)
– 0.057 (3)
(0.013)
– 0.064 (3)
(0.013)
DEBT(t-1) – 0.021 (3)
(0.002)
0.025 (3)
(0.002)
– 0.024 (3)
(0.002)
TOTGREV(t-1) 0.051
(0.012)
0.051 (3)
(0.012)
0.055 (3)
(0.012)
EMU 0.566 (3)
(0.122)
0.881 (3)
(0.149)
EMU*CAB(t-1) 0.115 (3)
(0.032)
R squared, 
within groups 
0.44 0.47 0.48
NB: Dependent variable: Gross fixed capital formation, general government
(% of GDP). 
Estimation method: fixed effects panel regression.
Country effects coefficients are not reported. 
Hausman tests rejected random effects in linear panel regressions.
(3), (2), (1), denote, respectively, significance at 1, 5 and 10 % confidence. Coeffi-
cient standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
RPCGDP(t-1): Real per capita GDP, lagged one year. 
RLIR(t-1): Real interest rate on 10 year government bonds, lagged one year.
CAB(t-1): Cyclically-adjusted budget balance, % of GDP), lagged one year.
DEBT(t-1):Gross nominal public debt % of GDP), lagged one year.
TOTGREV(t-1): Total revenue, general government % of GDP), lagged one year.
EMU: dummy variable equal to 1 for years following 1993 and for EMU countries.
Source: Commission services.119
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lic investment shares, keeping other factors constant.
This direct effect may be associated to changed gov-
ernments’ expectations concerning the state of their
public finances induced by the framework for fiscal
stability. The expectation of lower future deficits and
debts may have induced governments to increase
expenditures devoted to public investment;
• on the other hand, EMU appears to have reduced pub-
lic investment indirectly, by inducing a negative effect
of budget deficits on public investment. This may
indicate that in order to qualify for the adoption of the
euro, countries running relatively large budget deficits
had to reduce their public investment expenditures to
respect the EMU requirements of fiscal discipline. 
The overall effect of monetary unification on public
investment expenditures in EU countries is therefore not
clear-cut, and may be different depending on the country
considered. While the net effect on countries running rel-
atively large budget deficits in the 1990s may have been
negative, public investments in countries with relatively
low deficits and debt levels may have instead received a
stimulus (1).                                         
¥1∂ Gali and Perotti (2003) in their empirical analysis report evidence consist-
ent with these findings. They similarly do not find support for the hypothe-
sis that the advent of EMU reduced public investment rates in EU
countries. Their analysis, however, shows that with EMU public investment
has become more pro-cyclical. 
Box III.4: The determinants of public investment in the EU: an empirical analysis
(Continued on the next page)
The aim of this analysis is to investigate the main factors affecting the evolution of public investment across EU countries
in the past decades, with a special focus on the impact of the process of monetary unification. To that end, panel data regres-
sions have been performed. The dataset includes all Member States and covers the period 1970–2002 (1). The data source
is the AMECO database.
The dependent variable is the share of public investment (gross fixed capital formation, general government) on GDP at
current market prices. As for explanatory variables, the real GDP per capita (RPCGDP) captures the different role that pub-
lic investment has in different stages of countries’ development. Public investment is likely to exert a more prominent role
in countries at intermediate stages of development. Since in the European context, all countries are at an advanced or inter-
mediate stage of development in the period considered, the expected effect of RPCGDP on public investment is negative. 
To take into account the opportunity cost of funds used up in public investment, real long-term interest rates (RLIR) are
added in the equation to be estimated. This variable also hase an effect on public investment through the current and
expected cost of public debt. The expected sign for the coefficient of RLIR is thus negative. The fiscal stance is captured
by the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB). It has been found in previous empirical analysis (for example, Sturm et
al., 1996), that budget deficits can be negatively associated with public investment expenditure, so that the expected sign
for the coefficient of CAB is thus positive (in CAB, deficits are negative entries, while surpluses are positive entries). A
further variable is the stock of gross public debt as a share of GDP (DEBT). Other things being equal, the larger the stock
of accumulated debt, the higher the flow of interest payments to be paid by governments. Hence, the expected sign for the
coefficient of DEBT is negative. 
To account for the cross-country variation in the scope of government intervention and for its evolution in time, the share
of government revenues on GDP (TOTGREV) is included in the equation. A higher value for TOTGREV is an indication
of a greater role of the public sector in the economy. The expected sign for the coefficient of TOTGREV is positive, since
a higher value for TOTGREV is likely to be associated with a higher share of resources devoted to public expenditure,
including public investment. To overcome endogeneity (reverse causation) problems, all the above-mentioned variables
(1) Due to missing observations for some variable in particular years and countries the total number of observations used in regressions is somewhat lower
than the maximum of 15 × 33 = 495.120
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have been used with a one-year lag. Finally, a dummy variable (EMU) equal to one in all EMU countries in all years fol-
lowing the start of phase II of EMU (1994) is included to have a measure of the effect played by the fiscal constraints of
monetary unification on public investment. All the remaining idiosyncratic factors that may explain differences in public
investment expenditures across countries (for example, public/private ownership of infrastructures, etc.) are captured by
country effects (1).
Results are displayed in Table III.4. The first specification tested excludes the EMU dummy. All variables have the
expected sign. When the EMU dummy is included as a constant term, its coefficient is significantly positive and close to
0.5. The interpretation is the following: other things being equal, EMU is associated with larger public investment by about
half a percentage point of GDP. Keeping unchanged per capita GDP, public debt, deficit, government revenues and interest
rates, a country would devote a larger fraction of resources to public investment. Under this specification, the assumption
is that EMU only has a direct effect on public investment. It may be argued, however, that EMU also produces an indirect
effect on public investment, by changing the impact of budget deficits. To test for this hypothesis, the EMU dummy has
been interacted (multiplied) with the CAB variable (EMU*CAB). Under this specification, the effect on EMU is both direct
and indirect. The impact of CAB outside EMU is captured by the coefficient of the CAB variable when not interacted, the
one on EMU is given by the sum of this coefficient and that of the CAB variable interacted with the EMU dummy. Results
show that while outside EMU the impact of CAB is negative, in EMU it is significantly positive. In fact, summing up the
coefficient of CAB and that of EMU*CAB yields a positive value. It is also to note that EMU still plays a significant direct
effect on public investment, represented by a significantly positive coefficient for the constant EMU dummy. 
The overall results can be interpreted as follows. The requirements of macroeconomic convergence and fiscal discipline
accompanying the process of monetary unification appear to have produced both a direct and an indirect effect on public
investment. On the one hand, EMU is associated with a shift of resources towards public investment, keeping other factors
constant. This direct effect may be due to reduced interest expenditure but also to changed government expectations con-
cerning the state of their public finances induced by the EMU fiscal framework. The expectation of lower future deficits
and debts may have induced governments to devote a higher amount of resources to public investment. On the other hand,
monetary unification induced a negative effect of budget deficits on public investment. Starting with phase II of EMU, the
requirement of fiscal discipline was strengthened by specific time deadlines and started to be perceived as binding; this
translated into countries running larger budget deficits making bigger cuts in public investment.
(1) The regressions results presented in Table III.4. hold qualitatively unchanged under alternative specifications. The exclusion of the variable TOGREV
(which due to its correlation with CAB leads to multicollinearity problems) does not alter significantly the coefficients of the remaining variables. A list
of additional explanatory variables affecting the expected benefits of public investment (the net stock of capital over GDP, private investment as a share
of GDP) and representing cyclical factors (inflation rate, growth rate of real GDP) have also been considered, but their coefficients resulted in being
insignificantly different from zero in all specifications. Specifications including a time trend have also been tested. In such specifications, the time trend
turns out to have a significant negative effect on public investment, while real per capita GDP and the debt variable result in being insignificant. 121
5. Catering for public investment needs 
in the Stability and Growth Pact 
5.1. How public investment is treated 
under the existing Treaty 
and SGP rules
The Treaty obliges countries to avoid excessive deficit
positions (defined as general government deficit below a
reference value of 3 % of GDP), and the SGP requires
countries to achieve budget positions ‘close to balance or
in surplus’. These requirements imply that most public
expenditure, including those in investment projects,
have to be funded from current revenues. 
While the existing framework provides for no special
treatment of public investment as regards the definition
of the budget balance (and consequently in terms of
the budgetary objectives which Member States must
respect), the framework for budgetary surveillance does,
however, take account of public investment as part of the
assessment of Member States’ fiscal position. For exam-
ple, Member States are required to report public invest-
ment levels and plans in their annual updates to stability
and convergence programmes. The Council has shown
some flexibility in interpreting compliance with the
‘close to balance or in surplus’ requirement to reflect
significant planned increases in public investment pro-
grammes (for example, see recent Council opinions on
the stability programme of Ireland and on the conver-
gence programme of the UK). 
Moreover, public investment levels are taken into
account in the excessive deficit procedure. As described
in Part II.2, the Commission activates the EDP by pre-
paring a report if the actual or planned deficit goes above
3 % of GDP. Article 104(3) states that when preparing
its report, the Commission ‘…shall also take into
account whether the government deficit exceeds govern-
ment investment expenditure…’. 
In brief, public investment does feature in the existing
framework for budgetary surveillance, and in particular
concerning the assessment of the budgetary position of
Member States. This chapter considers whether there is
scope for a more specific treatment of public investment
expenditures in the EU’s framework for budgetary sur-
veillance. Two specific issues are examined. 
First, it has been suggested by several scholars and pol-
icy makers to amend or reinterpret the EU legislation in
such a way as to exclude investment expenditures from
the deficit ceilings relevant to the EDP, that is to intro-
duce a ‘golden rule’ (1). Section 5.2 considers the merits
and feasibility of applying a golden rule for public
investment in the EU’s budgetary rules.
Second, private sector corporations are increasingly
involved in the building and operating of public projects
in EU countries (2). Section 5.3 examines the rationale
for public–private partnerships (PPPs) and how these are
handled within the existing framework for budgetary
surveillance.
The issue of a more specific and flexible treatment of
public investment within the EU framework for budget-
ary surveillance is timely. In the communication
‘Strengthening the coordination of budgetary policies’
adopted on November 2002, (3). the Commission pro-
posed to introduce a more flexible application of the
‘close to balance or in surplus’ requirement to better
achieve the goals of the Lisbon strategy. Point 5 (iv) of
the communication states that there is a need to ‘…cater
¥1∂ For the academic debate on this point, see, for instance, Balassone and
Franco (2000b), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), Buiter and Grafe (2002)
and Buti, Effijnger and Franco (2002). 
¥2∂ See, for instance, European Commission (2003) on alternative proposals to
finance trans-European transport networks, including partnerships between
governments and private operators. 
¥3∂ European Commission (2002c). See also Part II.2 of this report.122
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reforms (such as productive investment or tax reforms)
that raise employment or growth potential in line with
the Lisbon strategy …’. The Commission made clear
that this should not put in jeopardy the core budgetary
commitment to sound public finances, and therefore
stated that ‘small temporary deteriorations’ in underly-
ing budgets position can only apply to countries already
having made substantial progress towards the ‘close to
balance or in surplus’ requirement and whose debt is
below the 60 % of GDP. In other words, the Commission
did not propose a golden rule per se, but rather that, on a
temporary basis, a planned increase in public investment
could provide grounds for a flexible interpretation of the
‘close to balance or in surplus’ requirement provided
there was an adequate safety margin ensuring respect of
the 3 % of GDP reference value for deficits. 
5.2. Public investment and the golden rule
5.2.1. A rationale for the golden rule?
The golden rule consists of excluding investment spend-
ing from the computation of the deficit measures which
are considered for the definition of fiscal discipline tar-
gets. This is not a new idea, and was debated already in
the 1930s (1). A number of countries (for example, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands and Sweden) adopted this rule
during the 1950s and 1960s, but subsequently aban-
doned it. The golden rule debate has been revived
recently, partly as a consequence of decisions taken by
some governments (UK, Australia and New Zealand) to
allow for public borrowing to finance public investment. 
The idea behind the golden rule is relatively simple. As
with private companies, a government should not
attribute entirely the full cost of a project that is likely to
generate gains for a long time period to a single year’s
accounts. Since public investments normally imply
returns over several years (and in some cases over a very
long time horizon), the cost should be distributed over
several years as the returns materialise. 
A proper working of golden rule provisions requires
adopting a dual public budget: one budget should only
include current operations, a separate budget should be
devoted to capital operations (2). Gross investments would
enter only in the asset side of the capital budget, while in
the liabilities side of the capital budget would be regis-
tered the cumulative amortisation of the public capital
stock and the deficit of the current budget. As for the
current budget, it would be affected only by the amorti-
sation of the capital stock, which would be recorded on
the expenditure side (3). Since the balance of the current
account equals general government net lending/borrow-
ing after subtracting net public investment, for countries
adopting a dual-budget system, targets for the balance of
the current budget are equivalent to standard budgetary
targets amended by the golden rule. A dual budget
system would have the added advantage of improving
information on the contribution of public investment to
the net worth of the public sector (see, for example,
Fottinger, 2000).
Several arguments have been advanced in favour of
adopting a golden rule. First, in the presence of deficit
limits, socially desirable public investment projects may
not be undertaken. This may happen for several reasons.
• Financing investment from current revenues may
clash with consumption-smoothing objectives of
policy authorities. If policy-makers are inclined to
avoid large variations of consumption possibilities
over time, they may decide not to carry out poten-
tially profitable investment projects if this implies a
substantial reduction in current disposable income.
When growth prospects and public investment
returns are high, while public borrowing is not too
costly, constraints that impose financing all public
expenses through current revenues may be counter-
productive. In such conditions, in fact, profitable
investments may be rejected under a balanced
budget rule because the additional gains generated
by public investment projects will only materialise
in the future — when income is expected to be high
— while current consumption would be further
reduced by higher taxation. Under such conditions,
amending the balanced budget constraint by a
golden rule may increase profitable investments,
since deficit finance permits current consumption
not to be compressed.
• A more subtle motive for under-investment arising
from deficit ceilings builds on the analysis of
¥1∂ See, for example, Musgrave (1939).
¥2∂ As it is currently done in the UK and, in the past by Belgium, the Nether-
lands and Sweden.
¥3∂ So, by construction, the balance of the capital budget equals net investment
minus the balance of the current budget.123
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ments may have a tendency to run large deficits for
strategic purposes (1). In this setting, Peletier, Dur
and Swank (1999) analyse public investment expen-
ditures, and show that, in the presence of deficit ceil-
ings, governments may be induced to under-invest
for strategic reasons. The reason is that by reducing
investment current policy-makers can assure them-
selves of a high level of current expenditure of the
preferred type, reducing at the same time the amount
of resources that will accrue to future governments
from the returns on investment. Under such a frame-
work, a golden rule that excludes investment expend-
iture from the deficit ceiling could help to avoid the
tendency towards strategic underinvestment.
A second reason why potentially desirable investment
projects may not be carried out in the presence of deficit
limits is the existence of institutional or political constraints.
It has been argued (for example, Oxley and Martin (1991),
Lane, 2002) that cutting public investment is often polit-
ically easier to do than to achieve reductions in current
expenditure or raising taxes. Under such circumstances,
investment may not take place simply as a result of
finance constraints of institutional and political origin. 
A third rationale in favour of a golden rule concerns
intergenerational equity. As emphasised, for instance, in
Balassone and Franco (2001), the adoption of deficit
ceilings that do not distinguish between current and
investment expenditure may redistribute income away
from current generations due to the creation of a ‘double
burden’. Current generations continue to pay back the
debt accumulated to finance investment undertaken by
past generations (in the form of taxes levied on their
incomes). However, budget rules prohibiting deficit
financing would require them to also pay entirely for
new investments carried out by themselves without the
possibility of deferring their cost to future generations
through debt. The double burden issue is a transitory one
that continues until all the debt of previous generations
is repaid. Once achieved, all future generations will only
have to pay for their current investment, without inherit-
ing debt used to finance past investment. However, the
transition may be very long, penalise the generations
alive during the shift in the financing regime, and lead to
a bias towards excessively low investment levels for a
prolonged period.
5.2.2. Limitations and drawbacks
In spite of the potential benefits of a golden rule there
are also considerable drawbacks and implementation
problems.
A first set of basic problems with a golden rule relates
to its desirability, effectiveness and relevance. As illus-
trated in Section 1.2.1, there are no strong theoretical or
empirical arguments in favour of the view that govern-
ments undertake too few public investments. If the proc-
ess of public decision-making produces a bias towards
excessive rather than insufficient public investment,
then the adoption of a golden rule may prove counter-
productive (2). 
A further substantial drawback of the golden rule has to
do with possible distortions in resource allocation. The
idea of the golden rule is that of distributing over time
the costs of public projects that are likely to generate
income streams across several years. This is a principle
that is normally followed in private sector accounting.
However, the analogy is very limited, since there are
major differences between the concepts of economic
returns for the public and the private sector. While for
private firms economic returns of investment projects
must translate into financial returns at least in the long
run, this is not necessarily the case for the public sector
(such as, for instance, concerning investment projects
with environmental purposes). Moreover, the adoption
of a golden rule is likely to produce an effect on the com-
position of productive public expenditure. Finance con-
straints would be released on investment in fixed assets
with a physical component (normally covered by the
definitions of public investment from national account
statistics), while investments in human capital may
remain constrained by deficit ceilings. This may lead to
a distortion in the allocation of resources in favour of the
physical. 
A sound application of the golden rule would require that
it should be investment net of amortisation which is
excluded from the computation of the deficit. However,
implementation problems arise especially with the deter-
mination of net investment. The calculation of amortisa-¥1∂ When current governments have a preference over a certain type of current
expenditure, but are uncertain about the preferences of future governments,
a bias towards too-high deficits may emerge, since by running deficits, pol-
icy authorities will influence the composition of current expenditure and
limit the spending possibilities of their successors. ¥2∂ See, for example, Fottinger (2001) for a formal development of this argument.124
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Moreover, the difficulties with the computation of net
investment may induce opportunistic accounting prac-
tices, with the consequence of an overestimation of
amortisation rates.
5.2.3. Practical experiences
Though not a very common practice, some form of
golden rule has been operational in some countries or
sub-national jurisdictions. In the European context, the
countries currently operating some form of a golden rule
are Germany and the UK. In both cases, the rule is
designed in such a way that budget deficits should not be
higher than some definition of public investment, but the
characteristics of the German and the UK golden rule are
quite different (1).
In the German legislation, Article 115 of the Constitution
states that the annual budget deficit of the general govern-
ment cannot be higher than gross fixed capital formation
in the federal budget. Exceptions are permitted to avoid
‘disturbances to the overall economic equilibrium’. A
crucial feature of the German golden rule is that the target
is defined in terms of gross public investment, not net
investment as would be preferable in principle.
In the UK, since the institution of the Code for Fiscal
Stability in 1997, the general government and the
broader public sector are allowed to borrow only to fund
investment, while current spending must be fully
financed from current revenues. The compilation of sep-
arate current and capital budgets facilitates the distinc-
tion between gross and net investment in national
accounts. Consistently, the UK golden rule applies to net
investment. It can also be noted that the UK golden rule
is applied over the budget cycle, so that a transitory
decline in revenues would not affect medium-term
expenditure targets. Finally, it is to be remarked that the
golden rule in the UK is complemented by a rule aimed
at guaranteeing that leaving net investment out of defi-
cits is not incompatible with sustainable public finances.
This is the so-called ‘sustainable investment rule’ which
requires the debt-to-GDP ratio to be maintained at below
the prudential 40 % ceiling.
Is the golden rule effective in stimulating public invest-
ment expenditures by reducing finance constraints? In
spite of the fact that a number of countries have experi-
enced alternative forms of the golden rule, very few sys-
tematic analysis of the effects of such rules on public
investment exist. One notable exception is the analysis
by Poterba (1995) who studies the impact of the different
budgetary rules across states in the US. The analysis
allows to identify the states that make a budgetary dis-
tinction between capital and current expenditures and
those that use pay-as-you-go constraints to finance pub-
lic projects. The results show that, on average, separate
capital budgets are associated with higher capital expen-
ditures. 
The cross-section dimension used in the analysis by Pot-
erba (1995) for US states is lost when analysing EU coun-
tries, since only Germany and the UK adopted a golden
rule in recent years. By simply looking at the evolution of
public investment figures, one notes that, in spite of the
presence of a golden rule, Germany is among the EU
countries in which public investment has been falling
more markedly in past decades (see Graph III.7). As far as
the UK is concerned, the evolution of net public invest-
ment after the introduction of the golden rule does not
seem so far very different from that before its introduction
(see the section on the UK in part VI.15 of this report). 
5.2.4. Why a golden rule would not be desirable 
for EMU
Various proposals have been made to introduce some
form of a golden rule into the EU’s fiscal rules, that is,
exclude investment expenditures from the measure of
budget balance. This would imply shifting from budget-
ary targets and ceilings common to all countries and
fixed ex ante in numerical terms, to country-specific
ceilings and targets related to some form of investment
expenditure planned by national governments. The pre-
cise effect of such a move would depend on the way the
a golden rule is designed and implemented. For example,
a golden rule could concern the upper ceiling for nomi-
nal deficits in the EDP (as in the German golden rule),
and/or the medium-term target of ‘close to balance or in
surplus’ (as in the UK golden rule). Box III.5 examines
how the EMU’s fiscal architecture would be affected if a
golden rule was introduced along the lines of German
and UK approaches. 
Overall, and building upon the drawbacks and limita-
tions identified in Section 5.2.2 above, there are several
arguments which suggest that the adoption of the golden
¥1∂ Note that the working of a golden rule in Germany and the UK is not incon-
sistent with the respect of the budgetary requirements of the Treaty and the
SGP. In both countries, deficits are required to be below ceilings defined in
terms of investment expenditures. These ceilings will be binding only if
more stringent than the Maastricht 3 %. Moreover, these ceilings are not
inconsistent with the medium-term goal of ‘close to balance or in surplus’. 125
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possible benefits as follows.
First, the likely impact of a golden rule on actual levels
of public investment and its share in total public spend-
ing is questionable. For example, a golden rule which
allows deducting net investments from medium-term
budgetary targets (as in the UK) would probably only
have a limited impact. An indirect indication of the order
of magnitude can be inferred from past values of net
investment in European countries. During the 1980s and
1990s, average annual net public investment rates in the
EU-15 area were well below 2 % of GDP, with values
around 1 % of GDP for countries like Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, the UK and Sweden, while the average rate was
negative for Denmark (see Graph III.5). 
Second, the introduction of a golden rule could undermine
efforts to improve the sustainability of public finances, if
(either because of the way the rule is designed or imple-
mented) the medium-term target for deficits ends up
being increased by an amount equal to planned gross
investment rates. Simulations show that if governments
run constant deficit levels of 2 % of GDP over the period
2005–50, then debt levels would be some 45 percentage
points of GDP higher in 2050 than what would result
from running a balanced budget position over the pro-
jection period. The difference would amount to some
90 percentage points were governments to run constant
deficits of 4 % of GDP (equivalent to the gross invest-
ment ratio in some Member States). The impact of defi-
cits (either temporary or permanent) on the sustainability
of public finances depends on many factors, not least the
projected increase in age-related expenditures in coming
decades. As pointed out in Part I.4, debt reduction has a
key role to play in the strategies of many countries to
meet the costs of an ageing population, and the risks of
an unsustainable public finance position is greatly
increased by a failure to respect the ‘close to balance or
in surplus’ requirement of the SGP. 
Box III.5: How would the introduction of a golden rule modify the fiscal architecture of EMU?
(Continued on the next page)
The impact of the introduction of a golden rule on the EMU fiscal architecture depends crucially on how the golden rule
is designed. The current requirements of the Treaty and the Stability Pact are: (i) nominal budget balances below 3 % of
GDP at each year t; (ii) a budget position ‘close to balance or in surplus’. Graphically, the present state of the EMU fiscal
architecture can be described as in Graph III.8.a). The nominal budget balance and the cyclically-adjusted budgets are plot-
ted as functions of the output gap. Assuming a constant sensitivity of the budget deficit with respect to the output gap, the
nominal budget balance can be represented by a linear function of the output gap. The ‘close to balance’ requirement con-
strains the CAB to be non-negative. This constraint is represented by the continuous horizontal line in correspondence with
a value of zero. Deficits must not breach the 3 % reference value set by the Treaty: this ceiling is represented by the dotted
horizontal line.
The application of a golden rule of the German type would prescribe nominal deficits in each year to be lower than the
programmed gross investment/GDP share. Compared with the current situation, the only change that would be a revision
of the value for the nominal deficit ceiling, that is, the SGP objective of ‘close to balance or in surplus’ would be
unchanged. As illustrated in Graph III.8.b), the upper ceiling for a deficit would change from 3 % to the planned gross
investment share at time t, denoted by It. 
Amending the EMU fiscal architecture with a UK-type golden rule would instead change the medium-term target, but leave
the 3 % of GDP reference value unchanged. As illustrated in Graph III.8.c), the revised ‘close to balance or in surplus’
requirement would require the CAB to be at most equal to the average net investment/GDP rates planned over the cycle
(denoted by NIAV ).
It has also been proposed (for example, by Modigliani et al., 1998, Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002) to modify the EMU
fiscal framework by excluding net investments from the definition of deficits, both nominal and CAB. Such a reform would
result in a revision of both the upper ceiling for deficits and the medium-term targets. Both would increase by the amount
of planned net investment rates. In other words, the medium-term objective would be the same as in the UK proposal (NIAV)
whereas the upper ceiling would be equal to 3 %+NIAV.126
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Graph III.8:  Nominal budgets, structural budgets, the SGP, and the golden rule
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in implementing a golden role in a multilateral setting.
The crucial distinction is the one between net and gross
investment. As illustrated in Section 3.2.1., an applica-
tion of the golden rule in accordance with its economic
rationale would require using the concept of net invest-
ment. However, EU countries normally do not dispose of
a dual-budget accounting system, which would instead be
required for an efficient application of the golden rule
applied to net investment. As stressed previously, the cal-
culation of amortisation is a complex process, which
requires estimating the economic value of each public
capital item and its expected life period. These difficul-
ties would become particularly relevant in a multilateral
framework. Amortisation rates should be evaluated by all
countries following common methodologies, but oppor-
tunistic accounting practices may be difficult to avoid,
with governments attempting to underestimate amortisa-
tion rates. Finally, a golden rule applied to net investment
in a multilateral framework would discriminate against
the countries with a larger stock of public capital. For a
given amount of gross investment, net investment for
these countries will normally be lower, since amortisa-
tion applies to a larger public capital stock. However,
cross-country differences in the magnitude of the public
capital stock may simply relate to a different allocation of
ownership of facilities and infrastructures between the
public and the private sector, so that a larger public capi-
tal stock does not necessarily imply a weaker need for
public investment. 
5.3. Public–private partnerships
5.3.1. Definition, taxonomy, and recent experiences
The involvement of private sector corporations to build
and operate public projects has become an increasingly
widespread practice in EU countries. Following the
experience of the UK private finance initiative, the con-
struction and operations of infrastructures such as roads,
bridges or airports are made jointly in a number of coun-
tries by the government and private sector enterprises
that finance the projects through so-called public–pri-
vate partnership (PPPs). Currently, PPPs cover about
15 % of the finance provided yearly to publicly spon-
sored investment projects in the UK (Spackman, 2002).
In other European countries, such as Germany, Spain,
France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria and Finland,
PPP projects have been recently carried out, mainly in
the field of transport infrastructure. Almost all the other
EU Member States have planned PPP projects.
There is no unambiguous definition of what constitutes a
PPP. Broadly speaking, PPPs concern the transfer to the
private sector of investment projects that traditionally
have been executed or financed by the public sector (see,
for example, Grout, 1997). Four elements, however,
seem required to qualify PPPs:
• the project should concern the construction or the
operation of physical assets in areas characterised by
a strong public function (for example, transport,
urban development, security, etc) and involve the
public sector (general government) as the principal
purchaser. Although PPPs are especially relevant in
transport infrastructure, examples of public–private
partnerships can be found in the provision of
defence, health, education and cultural services, the
building and operation of prisons or the area of
water and waste management;
• the PPP must involve a corporation outside the gen-
eral government (normally a private corporation) as
the principal operator, that is, the agent that carries
out the project;
• the principal finance of the project should not come
from public debt but from other sources, such as pri-
vate bonds;
• by way of the partnership, the way the project is exe-
cuted must change compared with the alternative of
pure public supply. This means that in PPPs, the pri-
vate operator provides significant inputs in the
design and conception of the project and bears a rel-
evant amount of risk. 
The main distinction between PPPs and alternative pri-
vatisation schemes is that the public sector plays a key
role as purchaser of services. While in the case of pure
privatisation (for example, of public utilities), the clients
of the private operator are private users, in the case of
infrastructure building realised though PPPs, the govern-
ment normally pays for the services to be supplied or has
an influence in their specification. What instead distin-
guishes PPPs from the traditional public procurement
model is the origin of the funds to accomplish the
project. Instead of relying on government borrowing,
most PPPs are financed through bonds issued by the pri-
vate operator. 128
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is useful to classify PPP schemes according to the type
of financial operations involved as follows (1).
Sale of services. After having funded and executed the
project, what the private operator sells to the purchasing
government is the flow of services from a capital asset (for
example, a road, a bridge, a prison). In addition to the
services emanating from the use of the assets, additional
services can be provided by the private counterpart for the
regular operation of the asset (for example, maintenance).
The contracts specify on which conditions the government
can access these services. This is the most frequent case of
PPP and has been extensively used in the financing, build-
ing and operation of infrastructures such as prisons, rail-
ways or roads. In a sense, PPPs can be assimilated to a
form of leasing rather than a case of asset purchase. 
Financial free standing. The private operator designs,
builds, finances and operates the asset, and recovers the
costs through direct charges to users without direct pay-
ments from the government. The involvement of the
public sector is in the provision of licenses, in securing
conformity of the project with public purposes and in
regulating the private operator. This scheme has been
used especially in projects concerning transport infra-
structures such as bridges and highways. Compared with
the classic privatisation schemes, the government plays
a greater role in contributing to the definition of the char-
acteristics of the services to be provided by the asset.
Joint ventures. In this case the finance to build the
project does not come fully from the private operator, but
is partially provided by the government. 
Also relevant for accounting and evaluation purposes are
the characteristics of the private operator involved in the
PPP and how the contract is designed. The private oper-
ator can be either an existing firm or a new firm created
on purpose. Its activities can either be multiple and
diversified or confined to those of the PPP contract.
Moreover, the operator may be fully private or partici-
pated in by the public sector. In particular, a number of
recent PPPs are dealt through operators that are public
enterprises not belonging to the general government sec-
tor (so called ‘project vehicles’).
Regarding the design of the contract, a crucial aspect is
the specification of the modalities with which payments
are made to the private operator by the government. Pay-
ments may be in fixed yearly amounts, proportional to
some measure of the cost of the asset provided by the
operator (for example, in the case of road building, pro-
portional to the length of the road) or proportional to the
effective flow of services provided by the asset (for
example, still in the case of roads, proportional to the
number of vehicles using the road). The way government
payments are specified in the contract are crucial in
determining how risks are shared between the govern-
ment and the private operator. Also key in determining
the sharing of risk between the public and the private
counterparts is the possible presence of guarantees by
which the government backs the bonds issued by the pri-
vate operator to finance the project. 
Another characterising feature of PPP contracts are their
long-term nature (due to the fact that the revenues for the
private operator must be distributed over sufficiently
long time horizons to cover up-front costs) and the pos-
sible inclusion of clauses by which the government com-
mits to buy back the asset after a given number of years. 
5.3.2. The economics of PPPs
Which is the rationale for using PPP schemes to finance
and operate public purpose investment?
In the policy debate, it is often emphasised that PPPs have
the desirable property of putting capital spending outside
government budgets, thus easing the effects of external
budgetary constraints on public investment. Though very
popular, this argument has little substance. First, it does
not address why PPPs should be preferred to alternative
schemes to finance capital formation with public purposes
that do not imply an increase in government borrowing
(for example, classical privatisation). Second, even if the
impact on current budget balances of PPP schemes is most
likely to be smaller compared with the alternative of pure
public procurement, the long-term impact of PPPs on pub-
lic finances is to be assessed carefully. 
The main implication for public finances of choosing
PPPs as opposed to traditional public investment is that
of converting up-front fixed expenditures into a stream
of future claims. In computing the actuarial value of the
government commitments of PFI schemes, one has to
estimate not only the size and distribution of the regular
payments specified in the contract, but also the cost of
the possible buy-back of the asset and the possibility that
¥1∂ This taxonomy has been proposed by Pollitt (2000) to classify UK private
finance initiative projects. Note that the taxonomy is not fully exclusive,
since PPP cases may have characteristics common to more than one of the
cases identified. 129
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PPPs schemes on the actuarial value of public finances
with that which would arise from traditional public
investment is thus a complex issue which requires a great
deal of information. The argument that PPP schemes are
preferable to publicly funded investment expenditures
from the viewpoint of long-term public finance sustain-
ability is thus not well grounded. The distinguishing fea-
ture of PPPs is rather that of permitting to smooth out the
cost of public investment. This, in turn, may be effective
in releasing finance constraints on public investment in
the presence of formal ceilings on budget deficits (1). 
The rationale for the use of PPP schemes is rather that of
microeconomic efficiency. Even assuming that competi-
tive tenders for the selection of private counterparts are
feasible and efficient, pure privatisation schemes may not
be optimal when there are reasons that justify a form of
control on the design of the project by the public sector.
This is the case when the project concerns the delivery of
pure public goods (for example, a prison), when external-
ities are particularly relevant (for example, when projects
have a considerable environmental impact) or when the
distributive consequences of the project are a major con-
cern (for example, the provision of health facilities). In
those cases, regulation mechanisms may not be sufficient
to ensure that public objectives are satisfactorily met. The
standard alternatives are direct public provision or public
procurement through competitive tenders. 
In many instances, public procurements (contracting out)
guarantees higher cost-efficiency than direct public provi-
sions (2). In both alternatives, however, it is the public sec-
tor that provides the financial funds to carry out the project
and that exercise the control on the design of the asset.
PPP schemes offer a third alternative. In such a case, the
finance of the project is provided by the private sector, as
in privatisation schemes, but the public sector plays a rel-
evant role as client of the services provided by the asset.
In particular, PPP contracts may specify that the private
operator will be remunerated only if the actual supply of
services is judged to be successful. The fact that the object
of PPP contracts is the supply of services rather than the
provision of the asset can make a major difference with
respect to public procurement schemes. Specifying and
monitoring the desired characteristics of services is nor-
mally easier than specifying and monitoring those of
assets. Thus, contracts that have as their object the flow of
services rather than the building of assets help to reduce
the incentives that the private supplier may have to cut on
quality, while preserving the incentives to contain costs
(Grout, 1997) (3). The microeconomic rationale of PPP
schemes is thus that of shaping incentives in such a way as
to achieve cost efficiency without compromising public
objectives relating to the quality and characteristics of the
services provided by the asset (4).
5.3.3. Public–private partnerships 
and budgetary practices in EMU
Although there are microeconomic reasons that may jus-
tify the use of PPP schemes, there is the risk that PPPs
are increasingly used by EU governments to evade SGP
constraints on public deficits. As already pointed out, the
impact of PPPs on long-run public finance sustainability
as an alternative to traditional public investment depends
upon a complex set of factors and should be assessed
case by case. In general, when resorting to PPP schemes,
governments should conform to the Eurostat guidelines
on accounting practices and to a series of transparency
principles.
Concerning the treatment of PPP schemes in national
accounting, Eurostat fixes a set of guidelines that national
statistical institutes should respect A crucial issue is that
of evaluating the effective sharing of risk and rewards
between the general government and the project operator
associated with the building and operation of the asset.
According to the Eurostat guidelines, whenever there are
regular payments made by the government to the opera-
tor, the asset should be recorded in the balance sheets of
the contracting party that effectively bears most part of
the risks and rewards form the project. 
¥1∂ The conditions under which external constraints on budget deficits can
effectively reduce public investment have been discussed in Section 5.2.1.
¥2∂ The reasons are well-known (see, for example, Domberger and Jensen
(1997) for a survey). In particular, bureaucracy theories suggest that gov-
ernment officials tend to focus on objectives different from that of cost
minimisation (e.g. maximising the size of their budget).
¥3∂ Hart Shleifer and Vishny (1997) develop an incomplete-contracts model of
public procurement and show that, compared with direct public provisions,
private operators will, in general, have higher incentives to keep costs low
but lower incentives to keep quality high. They provide supporting evi-
dence in the context of prisons in the US. 
¥4∂ The resort to PPPs to finance trans-European transport infrastructure is also
considered by the Commission in its communication COM(2003) 132 final).
There, the view is expressed that ‘Use of public–private partnerships
(PPPs) to supplement public financing may be envisaged for some types of
project. However, there are still too many unknowns regarding the projects
to be carried out — particularly railway and cross-border projects — and
regarding transport policy choices. The private sector has insufficient confi-
dence to commit to financing them. Moreover, PPPs almost always require
major public financial support in the form of subsidies and guarantees’.130
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major implications for the computation of public deficits
and debts. If it is the operator that bears most of the risks,
then the budget balance of the government will be
affected only by the regular payments made by the gov-
ernment. If, instead, most of the risk lies with the govern-
ment, then public debts and deficits will be affected by
the full cost of the project. Given the uncertainties sur-
rounding the appropriate evaluation of risk-sharing in
PPP schemes, it is desirable that national statistical
offices exchange (among themselves and with Eurostat)
detailed information on the criteria used to make such
evaluations. It may also be desirable to have the defini-
tion of further operational guidelines concerning risk
evaluation on the part of Eurostat.
It is also relevant that national statistical institutes con-
form to transparency principles concerning the recording
of operations giving origin to so-called contingent liabil-
ities. Contingent liabilities normally arise when, in PPP
contracts, governments offer a guarantee to the debt
issued by the private operator to finance the project. Pub-
lic guarantees do not constitute effective government lia-
bilities because there is no certainty that they will trans-
late into increased debt in the future. However, this may
be the case if certain contingencies occur, that is, in the
case of default of the private counterpart. Since with
public guarantees there is no certainty concerning the
impact on public debt, they are recognised only under
cash accounting, if and when the contingent event (the
PPP counterpart default) actually occurs and payment is
made. However, given the possible relevant debt impact
of contingent liabilities, the inclusion of information
(also quantitative when possible) on each provision giv-
ing raise to contingent liabilities in supplementary budg-
etary documents is recommended in international codes
of fiscal transparency (for example, the OECD best prac-
tices for fiscal transparency).131

Part IV 
Can fiscal consolidations in EMU 
be expansionary? 

Summary
While there is a broad consensus among both academics
and policy-makers on the need for fiscal discipline to
ensure the smooth functioning of EMU and to provide
conditions conducive to growth and employment creation,
concerns have been expressed that budgetary consolida-
tion could have a negative effect on output in the short run.
This issue is relevant given the need for several Member
States to reduce large cyclically-adjusted budget deficits,
especially against the current background of slow eco-
nomic growth. 
According to standard macroeconomic models, a restric-
tive fiscal stance would result in short-run negative
impact on aggregate demand and then on output and
employment. However, the indications of the standard
models approach have not always been supported by the
facts. Growing evidence has been accumulated that the
value of fiscal multipliers is likely to be quite small and
falling over time. Moreover, there is evidence that, in the
case of fiscal consolidations, the effects of fiscal policy
on short-run growth may be even opposite to those pre-
dicted by traditional macroeconomic models. Cases have
been documented of EU countries in which tax increases
or expenditure cuts have been followed by accelerated
growth in the short run. Through systematic cross-coun-
try analysis, new evidence is reported in this part
showing that roughly half of the episodes of fiscal
consolidations undertaken in EU countries in the past
three decades have been followed by an immediate
acceleration in growth.
Academic research in the past decade focused on the
identification of the most relevant offsetting factors that
may explain the emergence of possible expansionary
effects of fiscal consolidations. A number of rationalisa-
tions have been provided for what are commonly called
‘non-Keynesian’ effects of fiscal policy. Some of these
factors concern the impact of fiscal policy on private
consumption. In particular, it has been shown that the
reduction of budget deficits may lead to an increase in
aggregate consumption already in the short run through
wealth and confidence effects. In this sense, the credibil-
ity of consolidations is crucial, that is, fiscal adjustment
should be perceived to lead to a permanent increase in
future disposable income streams via reduced taxation.
Consolidations leading to a substantial improvement of
the budget balance or starting from situations of high
debt-to-GDP ratios are more likely to affect consumers’
expectations and induce an immediate increase in con-
sumption through confidence and wealth effects. With
the awareness of the implications of ageing, the effects
of fiscal consolidation on confidence may have become
more important. Fiscal consolidations may also affect
aggregate supply, via the investment channel. They may
lead to higher-expected profits and then higher invest-
ment by reducing the tax burden on firms and inducing
wage moderation. In this respect, the composition of the
fiscal adjustment and the institutional characteristics of
the labour market may play a major role. 
Consistently with the predictions of theory, the empirical
evidence reported in existing studies shows that the size
and persistence of the fiscal adjustment (as measured by
a sufficient degree of improvement in cyclically-adjusted
budget balances), the composition of adjustment (that is,
the extent to which it is achieved through tax increases or
expenditure cuts) and the initial state of public finances
(mainly the debt-to-GDP ratio) are relevant for episodes
of expansionary consolidations. 
Interpreting cross-country evidence ex-post is subject to
a number of problems, above all difficulties in isolating
the effect of concomitant factors (other than fiscal
adjustment) that may have acted on growth. Model sim-
ulations have therefore also been carried out to investi-
gate whether fiscal consolidations can actually produce
expansionary effects. The policy experiments performed
with the European Commission QUEST model refer to
the German economy and focus on the composition of
the adjustment. They permit the evaluation of the likely
impact of fiscal retrenchment obtained either through tax
increases or via cuts in different expenditure items, con-135
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 3trolling for other factors, such as the stance of monetary
policy. 
The results of simulations using the QUEST model con-
firm that, if appropriately designed, budgetary consoli-
dation can contribute significantly to the goal of Lisbon
strategy in terms of raising output and employment in the
medium term. Budgetary consolidation have a slight
contractionary effect on output in the short run, depend-
ing on the composition of the budgetary adjustment.
However, budgetary consolidation has a positive impact
on output in the medium run if it takes place in the form
of expenditure retrenchment rather than tax increases.
Moreover, the effect of budgetary consolidation on out-
put could be reinforced, and even positive, in the short
run if fiscal consolidation is combined with structural
reform of factor and product markets and accompanied
with an accommodating monetary stance. Indeed, budg-
etary consolidation often acts as a catalyst for structural
reforms.136
1. Introduction
There is consensus among both academics and policy-
makers on the need for fiscal discipline to ensure the
smooth functioning of EMU and provide conditions that
are conducive to growth and employment creation. This
consensus is reflected in the Treaty requirement to avoid
excessive deficit positions and the goal of the Stability
and Growth Pact for Member States to achieve and
maintain budget positions of ‘close to balance or in sur-
plus’. With significant cyclically-adjusted budget defi-
cits remaining, even increasing, in several Member
States (see Part I of this report), the process of budgetary
consolidations needs to resume if these budgetary goals
are to be achieved. 
Concerns, however, have been expressed that budgetary
consolidation could have a negative effect on output in
the short run, and this is particularly relevant against the
current background of slow economic growth. This sec-
tion of the report analyses whether the assertion that
budgetary consolidation has a negative impact on output
in the short run is always valid, or whether it can have a
positive effect on output and the conditions under which
this can occur. It builds on the work on automatic stabi-
lisers and discretionary policy presented in the 2001 and
2002 reports on public finances in EMU. 
Chapter 2 presents a survey of the existing theoretical
explanations, based on consumption-side or investment-
side effects, through which fiscal consolidation may lead
to higher output in the short run. 
Chapter 3 reviews the empirical evidence from existing
studies on the impact of fiscal consolidations on output.
It then carries out a statistical analysis on the effects of
past fiscal consolidations in the EU. 
Chapter 4 presents simulations made using the QUEST
model investigating the effects on output of various
types of fiscal consolidations in a representative EU
country. It examines a variety of consolidation scenarios
on both the expenditure and revenue side, as well as the
implications of budgetary consolidation through spend-
ing cuts being accompanied with an accommodating
monetary policy response or structural reforms.137
2. Can budgetary consolidations 
be expansionary? 
What the theory says 
2.1. Budgetary consolidations: 
the standard view
Following the textbook macroeconomics approach, a fis-
cal consolidation has a negative impact via the multiplier
on domestic demand, national output and employment.
Disposable income and private consumption would be
negatively affected by tax increases, while a cut in public
spending would directly reduce aggregate demand.
Given that the simple form of the multiplier (the standard
Kahn-Keynes multiplier) depends on the responsiveness
of consumption to income, its value is by definition
higher than one (1). 
The models generated by the so-called neo-classical syn-
thesis (the IS-LM model and its variants) develop the
original Keynesian approach to consider also the effects
of various characteristics of the real and money markets
on the fiscal multiplier. In these models, several factors
are likely to interact with the direct effect of fiscal policy
on aggregate demand. The final impact of the fiscal con-
solidation may be therefore smaller, implying that the
value of the multiplier may be below 1. Several factors
have to be considered for the evaluation of fiscal policy
multipliers in complex open-economy neo-Keynesian
models.
Real sector substitution effects and investment crowding
out. Substitution effects are likely to reduce somewhat
the multiplier: some of the goods or services no longer
demanded by the public sector would be demanded by
the private sector; or could be directed towards the
export markets. The sensitivity of investment spending
to interest rates and income is also relevant. A larger sen-
sitivity to interest rates would imply a bigger adjustment
of aggregate demand to reduced interest rates (i.e. would
flatten the IS curve), leading to a more extensive offset-
ting of the initial fiscal contraction. By contrast, current
income could affect investment more than proportion-
ally (as in the case of multiplier-accelerator models)
which may depress investment more markedly in case of
a fiscal consolidation.
The functioning of the money market. The lower activ-
ity implied by the fiscal consolidation would be
accompanied by a reduced demand for money. This
would lead to a fall in interest rates which would in
turn create an incentive for increased investment, off-
setting part of the effect of the consolidation on output.
This effect crucially depends on the responsiveness of
money demand to income and interest rates. If the
demand for money is highly sensitive to income and a
little to interest rates (that is, the LM function is steep),
the reduced activity will have a strong effect on the
demand for money, implying a very large adjustment
in interest rates. The effect of fiscal policy would
eventually be small, due to the offsetting behaviour of
private investment. In such a case, most of the initial
adjustment would be rapidly absorbed via a change in
interest rates.
Wealth effects. In ‘modern’ neo-Keynesian models, con-
sumption is determined not only by current disposable
income but also in some measure by current wealth. The
larger the importance of financial wealth in determining
private consumption is, the more it is likely that a wealth
effect would offset the contraction in public sector
¥1∂ This value hinges on the typical assumption that output is determined by
aggregate demand: this results from excess capacity with rigid prices which
do not adjust (at least in the short run) to the mismatch between demand
and supply. 138
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lower interest rates or, in an open economy, by fluctua-
tions in the exchange rates. Lower interest rates increase
the value of nominal fixed-rate debt holdings and of
other assets held by households, with the size of its effect
on consumption depending on the level of debt holdings
and maturity. In an open economy, a similar effect could
arise following a depreciation or a devaluation of the
exchange rates, which would affect the nominal value of
assets denominated in foreign currencies.
Openness. The degree of openness of the economy and
the exchange rate regime affect the way the external sec-
tor responds to the fiscal adjustment (this is evident in
the Mundell-Fleming open economy version of the
IS-LM model). The more open an economy is, the more
the external sector is likely to react to the change in mon-
etary conditions induced by the fiscal adjustment. The
extent to which fiscal policy will be crowded-out via the
current account crucially depends on the exchange rate
regime. With flexible exchange rates, the currency will
tend to depreciate after a fiscal contraction as a result of
capital outflows. The currency depreciation in turn stim-
ulates net exports, which reduces the effect of the fiscal
contraction on output. Conversely, with fixed exchange
rates, an automatic monetary policy response to keep the
exchange rate constant increases the effectiveness of
fiscal policy on output (2).
The interaction between the labour and goods markets.
The degree of price flexibility is a crucial factor in the
determination of the impact of the fiscal consolidation.
In the neo-classical synthesis prices are assumed to be
rigid in the short run. Softening this assumption changes
the effects of a fiscal adjustment. The reduction in aggre-
gate demand caused by the fiscal contraction will be
followed by an adjustment process whereby price
reductions (or a lower inflation) increase demand in the
direction of a new equilibrium. Naturally, the magnitude
of this effect will depend on the degree to which prices
are assumed to be less rigid in the short run (3).
In general, even if according to the standard models in
the Keynesian tradition fiscal multipliers are expected to
be positive, there are several instances that can justify
small fiscal multipliers also within this approach. This is
especially the case for economies with a high degree of
openness. Adjusting the real exchange rate would be
helpful: if fiscal consolidations occur in countries whose
exchange rate floats, the output effects of fiscal policy
will be offset by an improvement in the current account
balance. In countries adhering to exchange rate regimes,
the negative output effects of fiscal consolidations could
be offset by accompanying devaluation policies. Moreo-
ver, the value of multipliers will be lower the higher the
relevance of wealth in determining consumption as
opposed to that of current income, which in turn depends
upon the availability of financial instruments to smooth
income and the efficiency of financial markets.
Increased openness and financial wealth may explain the
fact that the value of estimated multipliers has been fall-
ing in the last decades, when the pace of economic inte-
gration was accelerating and financial markets devel-
oped as a result of liberalisation and institutional and
technological innovation (4).
2.2. Non-Keynesian effects 
of fiscal consolidation
While successive developments of the neo-Keynesian
approach explain why the value of fiscal multipliers is
falling, they all assume the multiplier to be positive.
The idea that fiscal policy may have short-run effects
opposite to those predicted by the Keynesian model
was first suggested by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990)
who, looking at the fiscal consolidation experiences of
Denmark and Ireland in the mid-1980s, documented in
both cases an acceleration in growth just after the gov-
ernments put in place measures that drastically reduced
budget deficits.
Table IV.1 shows deficits and debt ratios, as well as GDP
growth rates in Denmark and Ireland during the cited fis-
cal consolidation episodes and in Sweden during the
early 1990s, when its deficit and debt rose dramatically.
While growth accelerated after the Irish and Danish
consolidations, the Swedish fiscal stimulus was followed
by an output contraction.
¥1∂ These wealth effects are often referred to also as Pigou effects or real bal-
ance effects.
¥2∂ Needless to say, for individual euro-area countries the impact of exchange
rate movements on the fiscal multiplier is absent or negligible.
¥3∂ While in a closed economy price reductions (or a lower inflation) would
reduce the output effect of the fiscal consolidation, in an open economy
price flexibility softens the effects of the exchange rate regime described in
the previous parafigure: in a fixed exchange rate regime there will be more
crowding out (that is, a lower fall in output) than with price rigidity and in a
flexible exchange rate regime the crowding out is less (that is, output would
fall more) than with sticky prices. The price-wage loop will determine the
speed and relevance of this factor.
¥4∂ On this issue see European Commission (2002a). For a recent survey on the
estimated value of fiscal multipliers see, for instance, Hemming, Kell and
Mahfouz (2002).139
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effects has attracted increasing attention among academ-
ics. Some studies aimed at further investigating empiri-
cally the case of expansionary fiscal consolidations (see
Chapter 3 of this part). Some of the research was directed
at providing a conceptual framework in which non-Key-
nesian effects of fiscal policy could be rationalised. 
Starting from the 1970s, the so-called new classical
macroeconomics paradigm has challenged many of the
founding assumptions of the standard neo-classical syn-
thesis models, with major implications for the concep-
tual grounds for macroeconomic policy-making. Among
the basic tenets of the so-called new classical macro-
economics, there is the acknowledgement that agents
take their economic decisions from a forward-looking
perspective and that, in so doing, they will use rationally
all the information available to them. 
While according to macroeconomic models in the Keyne-
sian tradition consumption is essentially a function of cur-
rent income, in new classical macroeconomics models
consumers are assumed to be forward looking, that is, to
base their consumption decisions upon the expected future
streams of income (permanent income) (1). Moreover, while
planning consumption decisions, consumers are also in the
position to identify the intertemporal budgetary constraint
which has to be respected by solvent governments. 
Concerning the modelling of how expectations are
formed, macroeconomic models before the neo-classical
synthesis generally were based upon static or adaptive
expectations. The idea was that agents’ expectations
about the future could not be too dissimilar from the
observed present. This view has been challenged in
new classical macroeconomics by the requirement that
expectations should be rational, that is, economic agents
should rationally use available information. This means
that past errors will be considered when formulating new
expectations in a continuous learning process. More-
over, in this context, perceptions about the behaviour of
the government become relevant, especially about the
nature of the measures taken by the authorities. In partic-
ular, if it is perceived that current policy measures will
affect future variables credibly and permanently, then
agents will adapt their behaviour immediately. 
The emphasis of the new classical macroeconomic para-
digm on forward-looking behaviour and expectations
help to rationalise the apparent puzzle of fiscal consoli-
dations with expansionary effects. Recent theoretical
models belonging to this paradigm show that consump-
tion may react to fiscal policy measures in an opposite
way than predicted by standard models in the Keynesian
tradition, thus leading to effective output expansions
(contractions) when fiscal policy is meant to be contrac-
tionary (expansionary). The same has been shown in the
case of investment: under particular circumstances, pol-
icy measures aimed at adjusting the budget deficit may
lead to a boost in investment, with a potentially expan-
sionary effect on aggregate output. The ‘consumption
channel’ and the ‘investment channel’ through which
fiscal policies may operate in a non-Keynesian fashion
are illustrated below.
Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy: 
the consumption channel
If agents are forward-looking and rational in forming their
expectations, they will anticipate that a tax cut today,
financed by government debt, will translate into higher
taxes at some point in the future. If, in addition, govern-
ment intervention is non-distortionary, capital markets are
perfect and consumers sufficiently long-lived, the so-
called Ricardian equivalence should hold, namely, perma-
nent income will be unaffected by fiscal policy, and so
consumption. Under these abstract circumstances, fiscal
multipliers will be zero, since higher government savings
Table IV.1
Some puzzling effects of fiscal policy
Country Year Deficit/GDP (1)
Debt/ 
GDP
GDP
growth (2)
Denmark (3) 1982 8.9 % 62.5 % 3.0 %
1986 – 3.3 % 62.3 % 3.6 %
Ireland 1986 10.5 % 113.8 % 0.3 %
1989 1.7 % 100.1 % 6.2 %
Sweden 1989 – 5.4 % 45.3 % 2.4 %
1993 12.2 % 75.8 % – 2.2 %
The table presents the changes in the fiscal stance and its impact on debt and
GDP growth. Values are shown for the year before the consolidation (stimulus)
started and its last year.
(1) Negative values correspond to a surplus.
(2) Annual change.
(3) In Denmark, the debt was on a downward path after a peak of 73.4 % in
1984 and real GDP growth accelerated to 4.4 % in 1984 before returning to
the previous level in 1986.
Source: Giavazzi and Pagano (1996).
¥1∂ However, in this respect it should be mentioned that forward-looking
behaviour was also incorporated in some Keynesian consumption models,
notably the life-cycle model. In the original formulation of these models,
however, there is no requirement of consumers’ expectations to be rational.140
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sated by an equivalent reduction in private savings (1). 
However, if distortions introduced by taxation are taken
into account, a first reason for expecting non-Keynesian
effects of fiscal policy emerges. This can be the case, for
instance, when a current expenditure cut is expected to
be offset in the future by a reduction in future distortion-
ary taxes. Such a case for non-Keynesian effects of fiscal
policy was first illustrated by Blanchard (1990). In this
model, it is shown that the effects of fiscal policy on
aggregate consumption are likely to be non-linear. The
reason is that the dead-weight loss of taxation increases
significantly with the extent of taxation. So, if a consol-
idation is made starting from a low level of current debt,
a traditional positive fiscal multiplier will result (2). If,
instead, a fiscal consolidation is made starting from a
high debt level, consumption may react positively as a
result of an expected increase in permanent income. The
reason is that by consolidating now, the government will
not raise taxes too much in the future to pay back the
debt. This reduces the dead-weight loss imposed by
taxes, thus raising agents’ permanent income (3).
A different motive to expect fiscal policy to have non-lin-
ear effects has been proposed by Bertola and Drazen
(1993). The assumption here is that when public expend-
iture becomes alarmingly high, then agents start antici-
pating a future major fiscal adjustment to occur. This may
offset any loosening of fiscal policy. At the same time, a
consolidation occurring when public spending is high
may then change agents’ expectations concerning a
future major retrenchment, and the lower expected level
of taxes raises permanent income and consumption (4).
A further rationale for possible non-Keynesian effects
through the consumption channel emerges if fiscal
consolidations are assumed to affect the risk of govern-
ment insolvency. By reducing their budget deficits, gov-
ernments will signal to markets their willingness to
switch to ‘sound finances’. If this signal is taken as cred-
ible, interest premiums on government bonds will fall.
The consequent reduction in interest rates will in turn
contribute to raise agents’ permanent income, since they
will discount future income streams at a lower rate. The
crucial ingredient of this explanation for the emergence
of non-Keynesian effects is the credibility of government
action to make public finances sustainable. As empha-
sised, for instance, by Feldstein (1982), the credibility of
the regime shift can be enhanced by the size of the con-
solidation. While small adjustments in the budget may be
believed to be short-lived or not enough to correct the
imbalances, major fiscal retrenchments may signal the
willingness of the government to face the political costs
associated with the shift to sound public finances. Fur-
thermore, as illustrated for instance by Cotis et al. (1998),
the introduction of fiscal rules for the maintenance of
budgetary discipline (like the SGP) may increase the per-
ception of the intertemporal budget constraint, and
thereby the credibility of the fiscal adjustment and the
likelihood of the emergence of non-Keynesian effects.
Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy: 
the investment channel
Expansionary consolidations working through the
consumption channel act on aggregate demand, leaving
supply conditions unaffected (factor supply, TFP, …).
Output expansions above potential obtained through
the consumption channel are therefore inevitably short-
lived. However, recent empirical research has shown
that fiscal consolidations may produce significant
short-run expansionary effects also through the invest-
ment channel, thus affecting not only demand but also
supply factors (Alesina and Ardagna 1998, Alesina,
Perotti and Tavares, 1998, Alesina et al., 2002). 
The rationale for fiscal policies producing non-Keyne-
sian effects through an investment channel has been for-
malised in Alesina et al. (2002). The highlighted channel
goes beyond possible reductions in real interest rates
associated with fiscal contractions as predicted by stand-
ard macroeconomic models. The link between fiscal
policy and investment behaviour is rather represented by
the labour market. 
As in models rationalising non-Keynesian effects through
the consumption channel, agents are assumed to be for-
ward-looking and to behave on the basis of the actual
value of future income streams. The relevant agents are in
this case firms, that decide about their factor service pur-
chases by looking at the present value of profits. Invest-
ment decisions are driven by the expected present value of
the net marginal product of capital, which in turn is a
negative function of real wages. Fiscal consolidations
¥1∂ If consumers have short-term horizons or are affected by liquidity
constraints Ricardian equivalence will no longer hold, and fiscal policy will
affect consumption according with the predictions of standard models in
the Keynesian tradition (see, for example, Blanchard, 1985).
¥2∂ In Blanchard (1990) this is due to the fact that agents’ horizons are short
term, since each of them are faced with a constant positive probability of
death. Hence, Ricardian equivalence does not hold in this model even in the
absence of tax distortions. 
¥3∂ Results similar to those to Blanchard (1990) are obtained in Perotti (1999).
In this model, however, Ricardian equivalence does not hold on aggregate
because a fraction of consumers are assumed to be liquidity-constrained.
¥4∂ A similar non-linear effect of fiscal policy is obtained in Sutherland (1997). 141
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investments via reduced wage pressures for a number of
reasons. A reduction in the government wage bill will in
general contribute to wage moderation in the private sec-
tor as well. A similar effect would be obtained by means
of reductions in government transfers. The possibility for
fiscal consolidations to exhibit non-Keynesian effects
through the investment channel will then crucially depend
upon the composition of adjustment (expenditure cuts ver-
sus tax increases) and on institutional factors, above all the
working of the labour market (1).
In sum, in view of the latest developments in the theoret-
ical paradigm, a number of reasons have been identified
in the theoretical literature that may explain why fiscal
consolidations may have expansionary effects. The pos-
sibility of non-Keynesian effects working through the
consumption channel is expected to be mainly affected
by factors affecting the credibility of the adjustment and
agents’ expectations, such as the size of the consolida-
tion and the initial state of public finances. The likeli-
hood of non-Keynesian effects acting via the investment
channel is instead crucially affected by the composition
of adjustment. As illustrated in the next chapter, the
empirical research on budgetary consolidations has
focused on the above factors to identify the characteris-
tics of expansionary consolidations and the relevant
channels.
¥1∂ Clearly, adjustments in the tax structure which — within an overall fiscal
consolidation — favour a reduction in the tax wedge on labour, would also
imply an increase in the net present value of profits.142
3. Characteristics and effects 
of fiscal consolidations in the EU: 
evidence from cross-country analysis
3.1. Survey of existing studies
In existing cross-country studies (see Table IV.2) the
hypothesis that fiscal consolidation may have expan-
sionary effects is analysed empirically in several ways.
Crucial to this end is the definition of what fiscal consol-
idation is. Usually, it is defined in terms of a given
improvement in the budget balance as a fraction of GDP
achieved over a time period of several years. In order to
exclude changes in the budget balance associated with
the economic cycle, measures of the cyclically-adjusted
budget balance have generally been used. Moreover, to
better isolate fiscal policies of a discretionary type, inter-
est expenditures have been deducted from the structural
budget balance in most studies, that is, changes in the
primary cyclically-adjusted budget balance have there-
fore been adopted to identify consolidation periods. 
Depending on the particular study considered, the
concept of fiscal consolidation has been focused either
on the idea of a sufficiently strong fiscal adjustment
achieved in a given period (size criterion), or on the idea
of a sufficiently long time period during which the
budget balance constantly improves (persistence crite-
rion). Some studies refer to a further refinement of the
concept of consolidation, by defining as successful those
consolidations that manage to bring about a sustained
reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
The methodologies adopted in the existing studies differ
quite widely. In almost all studies there is a descriptive
analysis of the sample characteristics of relevant fiscal
and macroeconomic variables before, during and after
consolidation periods. This allows for the checking of
the general requirement for the identification of expan-
sionary fiscal consolidations: the occurrence of positive
growth development after the fiscal adjustment. By
looking at sample averages of fiscal variables it is possi-
ble to describe the characteristics (in terms of size of
adjustment, initial conditions of public finances or com-
position of adjustment) of fiscal consolidations, and to
identify how these characteristics differ depending on
whether consolidations turned out to be expansionary or
contractionary. In some studies, Probit/Logit regressions
have also been performed in order to identify economet-
rically the main factors affecting the probability for fis-
cal consolidation to be successful (Von Hagen, Hughes-
Hallet and Strauch, 2001) or expansionary (Alesina and
Ardagna, 1998). Sample evidence on relevant macroeco-
nomic variables (for example, interest rates or exchange
rates) permits to judge whether fiscal consolidations
have, in general, been accompanied by active monetary
policies or devaluations. Some studies complement
descriptive sample statistics with country case studies,
aimed at better understanding the policy environment
during consolidation periods (for example, wage agree-
ment policies, exchange rate devaluations, etc).
In a number of studies, empirical verifications of theoret-
ically grounded hypotheses are also provided. Giavazzi
and Pagano (1996) estimate consumption functions to
test whether fiscal consolidations may have non-
Keynesian effects via the consumption channel, due to
consumers’ revised expectations and increased expected
life-time income. Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000)
perform a similar test by estimating saving functions.
Alesina et al. (2002) instead verify empirically the
hypothesis that non-Keynesian effects of consolidations
may come from the investment channel by estimating
investment equations.143
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Cross-country evidence on fiscal consolidations
Study and sample Definition of consolidation Aim of the analysis Type of analysis Main findings
McDermott and 
Westcott (1996), 
IMF (1996).
20 OECD countries, 
1970–95.
The primary structural balance
improves by at least 1.5 % of
GDP over two years and does not
decrease in any year.
Analyse the characteristics and
effects of successful consolida-
tions, that is, of consolidations
leading to a 3 % of GDP reduc-
tion in debt.
Descriptive. Successful consolidations leads on
average to increased growth, un-
successful to reduced growth. Size
and composition both important to
identify successful consolidations.
Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1996).
19 OECD countries, 
1970–92.
The cumulative change in the
primary structural balance is
above a given threshold as a %
of GDP (5, 4, or 3) over a given
number of years (resp. 4, 3, or 2).
Analyse the existence of non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal con-
solidations via the consumption
channel.
Panel data estima-
tion of consump-
tion functions.
Size of adjustment is relevant to
identify episodes exhibiting non-
Keynesian features.
OECD (1996).
18 OECD countries, 
1975–95.
The cumulative change in the
structural budget balance is
above 3 % of GDP over a period
of at least two years.
Analyse characteristics and ef-
fects of fiscal consolidations.
Descriptive. There were fiscal consolidations
during which growth was above
potential. Accommodating mone-
tary policy seems to matter to limit
output contractions.
Cour et al. (1996). 
17 OECD countries, 
1970–94.
Continuous improvement in the
primary structural budget bal-
ance, with a period of at most
three years during which the pri-
mary structural budget balance
improves by at least 3 % of GDP.
Analyse characteristics and ef-
fects of fiscal consolidation epi-
sodes with a particular focus on
the consumption channel of
non-Keynesian effects.
Descriptive and
estimation of con-
sumption func-
tions.
Size of adjustment is relevant to
identify expansionary episodes.
Alesina, Perotti 
and Tavares (1998). 
19 OECD countries, 
1960–95.
The primary structural balance
improves by at least 1.5 % of
GDP.
Analyse characteristics and ef-
fects of fiscal consolidation, ex-
ploring alternative channels for
non-Keynesian effects. 
Descriptive. Successful consolidations more
likely to lead to expansions. Com-
position more important than size
to identify expansionary episodes.
Labour market structure also
matters.
Alesina and Ardagna 
(1998). 
20 OECD countries, 
1960–94.
The primary structural balance
improves by at least 2 % of GDP
or by at least 1.5 % of GDP per
year over two years.
Analyse characteristics and ef-
fects of fiscal consolidation, ex-
ploring alternative channels for
non-Keynesian effects.
Descriptive, Probit
regressions, collec-
tion of case studies.
Composition more important than
size to identify expansionary epi-
sodes. Wage agreements and ex-
change rate devaluations are also
relevant accompanying factors. 
Perotti (1999). 
19 OECD countries, 
1965–94.
n.a. Analyse whether initial fiscal
conditions are relevant for the
effects of fiscal policy.
Estimation of dy-
namic consump-
tion functions.
High debt levels are associated with
a higher probability for fiscal policy
to have non-Keynesian effects. 
Giavazzi, Jappelli and 
Pagano (2000). 
18 OECD countries, 
1970–96.
The structural balance improves
by at least 1.5 % of GDP per year
over two years.
Analyse the existence of non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal con-
solidations via the consumption
channel.
Panel data estima-
tion of saving
functions. 
Size of adjustment is relevant to
identify episodes exhibiting non-
Keynesian features. Non-Keynesian
effects more likely for tax changes
than expenditure changes and for
fiscal consolidations than for fiscal
expansions.
Von Hagen, 
Hughes-Hallet 
and Strauch (2001).
20 OECD countries 
1960–98.
The structural balance improves
by at least 1.25 % of GDP per
year over two years or by at least
1.5 % of GDP in one year and by
a positive amount in a consecu-
tive year.
Describe characteristics and ef-
fects of fiscal consolidations with
special reference to the EU.
Descriptive analy-
sis, case studies,
Probit regressions,
estimation of out-
put equations and
monetary and fis-
cal policy reaction
functions.
Fiscal policies exhibit in general
Keynesian effects, but in the EU in
the nineties there is no evidence
neither in favour nor against Key-
nesian effects.
Alesina et al. (2002).
18 OECD countries 
1960–96.
The primary structural balance
improves by at least 2 % of GDP
or by at least 1.25 % of GDP per
year over two years.
Analyse the existence of non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal con-
solidations via the investment
channel.
Estimation of in-
vestment equa-
tions, descriptive
analysis.
Cuts in public expenditure, particu-
larly in public employees’ compen-
sations, boost investment.
Expansionary consolidations
associated with acceleration in
investment growth.144
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ogy, a number of results are common to almost all stud-
ies.
• There is evidence of fiscal consolidations likely to
exhibit non-Keynesian features in almost all studies.
• Consolidations leading to a permanent reduction in
debt (‘successful’) are more likely to be expansion-
ary.
• During expansionary consolidations, both an accel-
eration in private consumption and business invest-
ment is observed.
• The policy environment in which fiscal consolida-
tions are undertaken matters. In particular, the
monetary, exchange rate and wage policies accom-
panying consolidations may affect significantly the
impact of fiscal adjustments on growth.
Where consensus is missing is on the specific factors
determining the expansionary effects of fiscal consolida-
tions. Some papers find that fiscal adjustments with
expansionary effects are more likely when the size of
consolidation is large (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996,
Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano, 2000). In other studies
instead it is found that what is most significant to char-
acterise expansionary consolidations is the composition
of the adjustment. Fiscal adjustments based on expendi-
ture cuts rather than tax increases have expansionary
effects with a higher probability, especially if expendi-
ture cuts are concentrated on public employees’ compen-
sations and on government transfers (Alesina, Perotti
and Tavares, 1998, Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, Alesina
et al., 2002). Finally, there are studies that emphasise the
initial state of public finances. Consolidations are more
likely to have non-Keynesian effects when they occur in
countries and periods where debt-to-GDP ratios are high
(Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, Perotti, 1999).
Overall, although cross-country empirical analyses permit
to shed light on several features of fiscal consolidations,
the results arising from such analyses need to be inter-
preted with caution for a number of reasons. First, there
are problems in measuring and defining fiscal
consolidation episodes. In particular, relying on deficit-
based measures tends to exclude fiscal reforms with a lim-
ited impact on current budget balances but potentially
large effects on long-term public finances such as pension
reforms. Second, existing empirical analyses quite often
fail to take properly into account relevant factors, such as
developments in monetary and exchange-rate policies,
that contribute to shaping the links between fiscal consol-
idations and economic activity (1). Third, when interpret-
ing the links between fiscal policy and economic activity
simultaneity issues are to be taken into account. Not only
fiscal consolidations affect output growth, but actual and
expected growth affect budget balances and policy mak-
ers’ choices (2). Finally, there is the possibility that results
are driven to some extent by a sample selection bias prob-
lem. Most of the episodes of fiscal consolidations that,
once started, have been aborted early due to very adverse
growth consequences are by definition missing from the
samples used in cross-country analyses. 
3.2. Were there expansionary fiscal 
consolidations in the EU? 
A close look at the data
3.2.1. How to define periods of budgetary 
consolidation with expansionary effects
This section carries out a statistical analysis of the fiscal
consolidations that took place in the EU in the past dec-
ades. It covers the current EU countries with the excep-
tion of Luxembourg during the period 1970–2002 (3).
The source of the data used in the analysis is the
AMECO database developed by the Directorate-General
for Economic and Financial Affairs.
The main purpose of the analysis is that of identifying and
describing the characteristics of the fiscal consolidation
episodes that appear to be expansionary. An analysis of
the macroeconomic scenario preceding and following the
fiscal consolidation episodes is also provided. Compared
with existing event studies of expansionary fiscal consol-
idations, the focus here is on testing the robustness of this
concept with respect to alternative definitions of fiscal
consolidation episodes and of their expansionary status.
As shown in the previous section, in the existing
literature analysing fiscal consolidation episodes using
¥1∂ In Von Hagen, Hughes-Hallet and Strauch (2001) there is an attempt to
take into account the links between fiscal and monetary policies by esti-
mating, together with output equations, fiscal and monetary policy
reaction functions.
¥2∂ Some studies (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996, Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano,
2000) account for possible simultaneity problems by using 2SLS estima-
tion techniques.
¥3∂ The exclusion of Luxembourg is due to missing data. As will be clear in the
following exposition, the very last years of the sample are necessarily
dropped when identifying expansionary consolidations since it is not possi-
ble to evaluate countries’ growth performances after those years.145
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fiscal consolidation have been proposed, so that the com-
parison of findings is not always easy and immediate. In
the statistical analysis carried out here, in order to cap-
ture changes in the government budget balance of discre-
tionary nature, consolidation periods are generally iden-
tified by looking at changes in cyclically-adjusted
figures for budget balances budget balance (possibly net
of interest payments to isolate discretionary fiscal adjust-
ments from developments in the interest rates). 
By fiscal consolidation period it is generally meant
either (see Table IV.2):
(i) a period in which a given country experiences a suffi-
ciently large improvement in its budget balance due to
discretionary policy; or
(ii) a period of continuous improvement of the budget
balance due to discretionary policies;
(iii) or a combination of both the above criteria. 
Criterion (i) emphasises the size aspect of the adjustment
in a given time period, while criterion (ii) focuses on the
persistence aspect, that is, the fact that fiscal consolida-
tions are protracted policy actions, which are not
reversed in their immediate aftermath. For instance, the
definitions provided in Alesina and Ardagna (1998) or
Alesina et al. (2002) mainly refer to the size criterion,
while those in Cour et al; (1996), Giavazzi and Pagano
(1996) or OECD (1996) refer especially to the persist-
ence criterion (see Table IV.2).
As mentioned in the previous section, in several analyses
there is reference to a further refinement of the concept
of fiscal consolidation, that is, that of successful fiscal
consolidation (see, for example, Alesina and Ardagna,
1998, or Von Hagen, Hughes-Hallet and Strauch, 2001).
By ‘successful’ consolidation it is meant a consolidation
episode that contributes to improve the budget balance
over a relatively long time period (that is, debt levels are
permanently lowered). In the following analysis the
notion of successful consolidations is not used (1).
Concerning the definition of expansionary fiscal consoli-
dations the criteria used in existing work differ widely. In
general, for a fiscal consolidation period to be defined as
expansionary, the economy must perform sufficiently
well (for example, growth sufficiently fast with respect to
previous years or some benchmark growth rate) after the
fiscal adjustment takes place. It is to note that the refer-
ence period considered to evaluate the growth perform-
ance of consolidating countries is generally a relatively
short-term one (one to three years after consolidation).
The benchmark definition of fiscal consolidation used in
this study is taken from Alesina and Ardagna (1998).
According to this definition, a year of fiscal consolida-
tion is a ‘year in which the cyclically-adjusted primary
balance improves by at least 2 % of GDP or a period of
two consecutive years in which the cyclically-adjusted
primary balance improves by at least 1.5 % per year, in
both years’. This notion of fiscal consolidation puts
emphasis on the size of the improvement in the primary
budget balance. 
The benchmark notion of expansionary fiscal contrac-
tion used in the present study is the same as that pro-
posed by Alesina et al. (2002). This criterion classifies as
expansionary an episode of fiscal consolidation if ‘the
average real GDP growth in each adjustment year and in
the two years after is greater than the average real GDP
growth in the two years before’ (2).
In order to test the sensitivity of the results to the differ-
ent definition of both the fiscal consolidation and of the
expansionary effects, in Section 3.2.2, while keeping
constant the benchmark definition of expansion, expan-
sionary consolidation periods will be identified and
described according with the benchmark size-based def-
inition of consolidation and with an alternative criterion
of consolidation based on persistence.
In Section 3.2.3 instead, while keeping constant the
size-based benchmark definition of consolidation,
¥1∂ The focus of the present analysis is, in fact, on the distinction between
expansionary and non-expansionary consolidations. Moreover, the concept
of successful consolidation tends to overlap with that of fiscal consolida-
tion based on a persistence criterion.
¥2∂ The above criterion is different, for instance, with respect to that employed in
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) which specifies that the average real GDP
growth rate (in difference from the G7 average) in the period of consolidation
and in the two years after it must be greater than the average value of the
same variable across all episodes of consolidation. Therefore, the concept of
expansion used in Alesina and Ardagna (1998) identifies those consolidation
episodes after which growth has been higher relative to the average consoli-
dation periods of the sample. In this study, the criterion based on growth
acceleration proposed by Alesina et al. (2002) is chosen as the benchmark
because it is better suited to identify fiscal consolidation episodes specific to
the country and potentially exhibiting non-Keynesian features.146
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and described according to the benchmark definition of
expansion based on growth acceleration and to alterna-
tive expansion criteria: acceleration in trend growth, in
the cyclical component of growth and on the growth
differential with the EU average. 
In identifying expansionary consolidations, a further dis-
tinction will be made, in order to isolate those expan-
sionary consolidation episodes that are unlikely to be
attributable to concomitant monetary policy easing or
exchange-rate devaluation policies. It has been shown, in
fact, that fiscal contractions have been quite frequently
accompanied by expansionary monetary policies in EU
countries (see, for example, OECD, 1996, Alesina and
Ardagna, 1998). The notion of ‘pure’ expansionary fis-
cal consolidation is thus proposed as one during which
short-term real interest rates do not fall (1). 
Using the different definitions, several characteristics of
consolidation periods are analysed in the next two
sections, including their size, the initial state of public
finances and how the fiscal adjustment is achieved
(tax increases or expenditure cuts). The macroeconomic
environment before, during and after consolidation peri-
ods is analysed by reporting average statistics on growth,
output gaps, interest rates and on the change in the com-
ponents of aggregate demand.
3.2.2. When does a fiscal consolidation occur?
The first exercise is to identify consolidation episodes by
comparing the characteristics of expansionary fiscal con-
solidations that arise using different definitions. To this
end, the results obtained when using the benchmark defini-
tion by Alesina and Ardagna (1998) based on the size of
adjustment are compared with an alternative definition
based on the persistence of adjustment. According to this
alternative criterion, fiscal consolidations occur when the
primary cyclically-adjusted budget balance improves by at
least 3 percentage points of GDP over three consecutive
years (the note to Table IV.3. provides a formal definition).
Table IV.3. reports the number of fiscal consolidations
identified and describes which countries and in which peri-
ods experience expansionary episodes. In the sample of
462 observations used (14 EU countries, 33 years) 49 fiscal
consolidation episodes have been identified which are
consistent with the definition based on size (2). Using the
concept of fiscal consolidation based on persistence, the
number of consolidation episodes rises to 59.
Among the episodes of fiscal consolidation identified,
roughly half of the total number of consolidation experi-
ences amount to being expansionary. This result does not
seem to depend on the definition of fiscal consolidation
employed (size or persistence). Refining further the con-
cept of expansionary consolidation to account for the
monetary stance or possible devaluations, about half of
them are found to be ‘pure’ (11 and 16 episodes using,
respectively, the size and the persistence concept of con-
solidation period). 
Concerning the description of the expansionary consoli-
dation episodes, the evidence of expansionary effects
registered in Belgium, Denmark and Ireland reported in
previous studies is confirmed. Sweden also appears to be
have experienced expansionary consolidations during
the mid-1980s and in the late 1990s. The identification
of expansionary consolidations in the remaining EU
countries depends quite strongly on the concept used to
define consolidation periods. Overall, the correlation
index between ‘size’ and ‘persistence’ expansionary
consolidation indicators is positive but quite low
(0.33) (3).
Table IV.4 reports statistics concerning the characteris-
tics (size of adjustment, initial state of public finances,
composition of adjustment) of the fiscal consolidations
identified, distinguishing whether the consolidation
proved to be expansionary or not.
Results appear to be very robust with respect to the
concept of fiscal consolidation employed (size or persist-
ence) and supportive of findings reported in previous
studies (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, Alesina et al., 2002).
In particular, it is not the simple fact that an adjustment is
carried out that really matters, rather it is the composition
of the adjustment which explains its expansionary effect.
Indeed, the amount of the adjustment (measured by the
¥1∂ Under likely assumptions, non-decreasing real interest rates tend to exclude
both monetary expansions under floating exchange rates and devaluation
policies under fixed exchange rates regimes. This is the case, for instance,
in a Mundell-Fleming open economy setting with uncovered interest rate
parity (see, for example, Krugman and Obstfeld, 2001).
¥2∂ The episodes may not coincide with those reported in Alesina and Ardagna
(1998) because the method used to obtain cyclically-adjusted figures differ
(HP filter in the present study, Blanchard-type trend regressions in Alesina
and Ardagna, 1998). 
¥3∂ Expansionary consolidation indicators take the value 1 for country/year
combinations in which an expansionary consolidation occur and zero
otherwise.147
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ance) does not seem to be significantly different between
expansionary and non- expansionary consolidation peri-
ods, using both definitions of fiscal consolidation. What
appears to be relevant to distinguish expansionary from
non-expansionary periods of fiscal adjustment — using
both definitions of consolidation — is its composition.
Fiscal adjustments based on expenditure cuts are more
likely to be expansionary than consolidation periods
based on tax increases. Looking at overall values for
primary expenditure and for government revenues
(cyclically-adjusted or not) differences are statistically
significant irrespective of the concept of consolidation
employed (size or persistence). The definition of consol-
idation appears to matter instead as far as the composition
of expenditure is concerned. In particular, the reduction
in the public wage bill, found to be relevant to character-
ise expansionary fiscal consolidations in other studies, is
significantly higher in expansionary than in non-expan-
sionary consolidations only when adopting a persistence-
type definition of fiscal consolidation. 
Concerning the initial state of public finances, the average
value of debt/GDP ratios are found to be higher in expan-
sionary fiscal consolidation periods by about 10 GDP
percentage points, irrespective of the concept of consoli-
dation employed (size or persistence). However, t tests
show that this difference is not statistically significant (1).
Table IV.5. presents data characterising the macro-
economic environment preceding, during and follow-
ing consolidation periods. Several results emerge. First,
consolidations are more likely to be expansionary after
periods characterised by relatively low growth and by
negative output gaps (2).
Second, growth appears to accelerate during the consol-
idation year and during the following year for expan-
sionary episodes, while in non-expansionary episodes
growth is more likely to decelerate. Interestingly, trend
growth accelerates in expansionary consolidation peri-
ods when consolidation is defined according to persist-
ence, while trend growth appears to be constant before
and after consolidation when using a definition based on
size. As for unemployment, it worsens during non-
expansionary consolidations, while this is not the case
for expansionary fiscal adjustments. 
Third, both private consumption and business investment
accelerate during expansionary consolidation periods, with
investment registering a much higher acceleration. By con-
trast, investment decelerates during non-expansionary
periods, and even drops after the consolidation (negative
growth rates of investment) (3). Moreover, an acceleration
Table IV.3
Expansionary consolidations: description of episodes 
with alternative definitions of consolidation
Size Persistence
Number of consolidation episodes 49 59
Number of expansionary episodes 24 31
Number of ‘pure’ expansionary 
episodes
12 16
Description of expansionary episodes
Size Persistence
BE 1984, 1985 1985, 1986, 1987
DK 1983, 1984 1984
DE 1982 1982, 1983, 1984
EL 1982,1987, 1994, 1996 1994, 1997, 1998
ES 1986
FR 1996, 1997
IE 1976, 1987, 1988 1984, 1987, 1988, 1989
IT 1976, 1977, 1993 1993
NL 1993 1982, 1983
AT 1996, 1997
PT 1986
FI 1993 1977
SE 1983, 1987, 1995, 1998 1982, 1983, 1984, 
1995, 1997, 1998
UK 1997 1981, 1982, 1997
Definitions of fiscal consolidation.
Size: The primary cyclically-adjusted budget balance improves by at least 2 per-
centage points of GDP at time t or by 1.5 at least points in two consecutive
years (i.e., t and t-1 or in t and t+1).
Persistence: The primary cyclically-adjusted budget balance improves by at least
3 percentage points of GDP over three consecutive years (i.e., between t-2
and t, or between t-1 and t+1 or between t and t+2) and in each year the
change in the primary cyclically-adjusted budget balance cannot be below
–0.5 percentage points of GDP:
Definition of an expansionary fiscal consolidation.
A fiscal consolidation in which the average real GDP growth between t and
t+2 is greater than between t-1 and t-2.
Definition of a pure expansionary consolidation.
An expansionary fiscal consolidation in which the average change in real
short run interest rates between t-1 and t+1 is non-negative.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ When performing comparisons between variables, t tests permit to take into
account both measures of position (averages) and of variability (standard
deviations). This helps in understanding when apparently large differences
in averages are mainly driven by the fact that variables are highly volatile.
¥2∂ This effect, however, may be due in part to the autonomous development of
the business cycle which resumes from a period of below potential growth.
¥3∂ It should be noted that, in spite of the greater variation in investment, the
contribution of consumption changes to growth is always higher than that
of investment, due to the larger weight on total aggregate demand. 148
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balance, while during non-expansionary consolidations a
marked worsening of the current account is observed, this
is not the case for expansionary consolidations.
Finally, during consolidation periods, both expansionary
and non-expansionary, there is a reduction in nominal
interest rates, irrespective of the definition of consolida-
tion employed. This finding is consistent with the fact
that, in these periods, the fiscal stance is meant to be con-
tractionary. Moreover, falling short-term nominal
interest rates are a possible indication of concomitant
monetary expansions or exchange rate devaluations (1).
3.2.3. When is a fiscal consolidation expansionary?
The second exercise undertaken is that of analysing the
robustness of the characteristics of expansionary fiscal
consolidations with respect to different criteria to iden-
tify expansionary episodes. 
For this purpose, after having seen that alternative defi-
nitions of consolidation produce similar results, the
benchmark size-based definition of consolidation is kept
constant and different definitions of expansion are used.
Two alternatives to the benchmark expansion definition
by Alesina et al. (2002) are proposed. 
The first definition employs the notion of trend output
growth as opposed to the of real GDP growth to identify
expansionary episodes (see note to Table IV.6 for the for-
mal definition). Resting on the assumption that fiscal pol-
icy may affect potential output, the idea is that an episode
of fiscal adjustment is meant to be expansionary provided
it is associated with an acceleration of trend output. Such
definition of expansion permits to distinguish consolida-
tion periods associated with positive developments in the
economic cycle from those which are associated with
positive output developments of a more structural nature.
The second criterion defines as expansionary those fiscal
consolidations that are associated with an increase in the
difference between the growth rate in countries’ GDP and
the EU average GDP. The aim of this criterion is that of
identifying those expansionary episodes which are associ-
ated with a growth acceleration which is not attributable to
the EU-wide economic cycle (2).      
Table IV.4
Size and composition of expansionary consolidations: alternative definitions of consolidation
Criterion of fiscal consolidation: Size Persistence
Non exp. Exp. t test for 
(1) ≠ (2)
Non exp. Exp. t test for
(3) ≠ (4)Variables (change as a % of GDP) Average values Average values
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary CAB 2.9 2.8 0.8 1.7 1.6 0.2
Debt (level as a % of GDP) 65.4 75.1 – 0.9 61.9 76.0 – 1.5
Primary expenditure 0.0 – 1.6 2.9 (2) 0.1 – 1.1 2.8 (2)
Government investment – 0.2 – 0.3 1.6 – 0.1 – 0.3 2.0 (2)
Public employees compensation 0.0 – 0.2 1.4 0.0 – 0.2 1.9 (1)
Total government revenues 2.3 1.0 4.1 (2) 1.4 0.5 2.9 (2)
Total cyclically-adjusted government revenues 2.4 1.1 3.3 (2) 1.3 0.4 2.6 (2)
NB: t test values labelled by (1) and (2) refer, respectively, to cases in which the average value of variables during expansionary and non-expansionary consolidations are
statistically different at a 90 and 95 confidence interval.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ Depending upon the evolution of inflation, falling nominal interest rates
may not correspond necessarily to effectively monetary easing. However,
in most of the cases, real interest rates also appear to fall between t and t-1,
both during expansionary and non-expansionary consolidations, while
changes between t and t+1 show a less clear pattern (unreported). Concern-
ing nominal exchange rates, it is found that during both expansionary and
non-expansionary consolidations the exchange rate of the consolidating
country with respect to the US dollar tends to depreciate overall the whole
period between t-1 and t+1 (unreported).
¥2∂ A third definition of expansion complementary to the first one as also been
tested. According to this definition an episode of fiscal consolidation is
expansionary provided it is associated with an increase in the difference
between actual and trend output growth. The results however are particu-
larly close to the baseline scenario (correlation index at 0.98) given that
most of the movements in this variable is due to changes in actual growth.
Therefore, the results of such exercise are not shown.149
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identified and describes which countries and in which
periods experience expansionary episodes. An interest-
ing result is already that, irrespective of the definition
used to identify expansionary episodes, the number of
expansionary consolidations is about 20, that is, roughly
half the total number of consolidation experienced in EU
countries. Most of the country-specific cases are identi-
fied under the three definitions. 
Adopting the narrower definition of ‘pure’ expansionary
consolidation, that is, excluding the expansionary consolida-
tion periods likely to be associated with monetary expan-
sions or exchange rate devaluations, the number of expan-
sionary episodes reduces to about 10. Again, this result is
fairly robust with respect to the definition of expansion used. 
So, irrespective of the definition of expansion used,
about half of the consolidation periods experienced by
Table IV.5
Macroeconomic environment in expansionary consolidations: alternative definitions of consolidation
Criterion for fiscal consolidation Size Persistence
Variables Non-exp. Exp. Non-exp. Exp.
Growth rate of real GDP (%)
t-1 2.6 1.6 2.6 1.2
t 1.1 2.1 2.0 2.2
t+1 0.7 3.4 2.4 3.1
Output gap (% of trend output)
t-1 0.4 – 1.1 0.3 – 1.8
t 0.2 – 1.5 0.2 – 1.6
t+1 – 0.3 – 0.8 0.7 – 1.0
Trend GDP growth
t-1 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.5
t 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.6
t+1 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8
Growth rate of real private consumption (%)
t-1 2.4 1.4 2.3 1.3
t 1.4 1.8 1.7 1.9
t+1 1.5 3.0 2.3 2.6
Growth rate of real business investment (%)
t-1 3.5 0.3 5.4 0.6
t – 0.6 3.7 0.5 3.5
t+1 – 3.3 6.7 – 1.5 6.4
Growth rate in real current account surplus (%)
t-1 3.0 0.1 3.1 0.0
t – 0.1 – 0.2 – 4.1 0.0
t+1 – 0.2 0.4 – 4.3 – 0.5
Growth rate in TFP (% change)
t-1 0.9 1.0 1.2 0.9
t 0.2 1.6 0.8 1.7
t+1 0.2 2.1 1.3 2.1
Unemployment rate (% of labour force)
t-1 6.5 8.7 7 9.5
t 6.9 9 7.6 9.4
t+1 8.9 8.9 7.9 9.1
Short -term nominal interest rates
t-1 11.3 12.5 10.9 9.7
t 10.9 11.5 10.2 9.3
t+1 9.9 10.2 9.8 8.6
Source: Commission services.150
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quarter appear to be ‘pure’ expansionary (not likely to
be accompanied by expansionary monetary policies or
devaluations).
Turning to the description of the expansionary consoli-
dation episodes, all criteria used to identify expansion-
ary episodes permit to isolate the experiences of Den-
mark (1983–84) and Ireland (1987–88) which, since
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), are known to be the clas-
sical examples of fiscal adjustment exhibiting possible
non-Keynesian features. Expansionary fiscal consoli-
dations are found in Spain and Portugal in 1986 as well
as in West Germany in 1982. Non-expansionary epi-
sodes are instead found in France. Findings concerning
Greece, Italy, Sweden and the UK depend quite cru-
cially on the criterion chosen to define an expansionary
adjustment. Concerning Finland, not surprisingly an
expansionary period in 1993 is found using all criteria
except that based on trend growth, since results are very
much driven by the strong output contraction experi-
enced in 1991. 
Correlation indexes (reported in Table IV.1.) among
expansionary consolidation indicators based on different
definitions of expansion help to understand the extent to
which alternative criteria tend to yield overlapping
results. The benchmark criterion based on the accelera-
tion of real GDP growth is correlated to a certain extent
with the trend growth criterion (0.63). The results
obtained using the definition of expansionary consolida-
tions using the criterion of actual minus EU growth is
more correlated with the baseline scenario (0.76) than
with trend growth scenario (0.51).             
Table IV.8. reports average values and t tests for the
characteristics of the fiscal consolidations identified, dis-
tinguishing according to the expansionary status of the
consolidation and repeating the analysis for the different
definitions of expansion.
Table IV.6
Expansionary consolidations: description of episodes with alternative definitions of expansion
Growth Trend growth Actual minus EU growth
Number of consolidation episodes 49
Number of expansionary episodes 24 22 21
Number of ‘pure’ expansionary episodes 11 11 11
Description of expansionary episodes
BE 1984, 1985 1984, 1985 1984, 1993
DK 1983, 1984 1983, 1984 1983, 1984
DE 1982 1982 1982
EL 1982,1987, 1994, 1996 1986,1987, 1991, 1994, 1996 1982,1991, 1994, 1996
ES 1986 1986 1986
FR .
IE 1976, 1987, 1988 1987, 1988 1987, 1988
IT 1976, 1977, 1993 1997 1976, 1977, 1992, 1993
NL 1993 1993
AT 1984
PT 1986 1986 1986
FI 1993 1993
SE 1983, 1987, 1995, 1998 1995, 1996, 1998 1983, 1998
UK 1997 1980, 1997, 1998
NB: All fiscal consolidations are of the size-type (see note to table ?). 
A ‘pure’ expansionary fiscal consolidation is an expansionary fiscal consolidation in which the average change in real short run interest rates between t-1 and t+1 is
non-negative.
Definitions of expansionary fiscal consolidation:
Growth: average real GDP growth between t and t+2 greater than between t-1 and t-2.
Trend growth: average trend growth between t and t+2 greater than between t-1 and t-2.
Actual minus EU growth: average difference (actual real GDP growth – EU average real growth) between t and t+2 greater than between t-1 and t-2.
Source: Commission services.151
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respect to alternative definitions of expansion (based on
growth, trend growth, difference between growth and
trend growth, difference between growth and EU aver-
age growth). In general, there is support for the view that
the composition of adjustment is more significant to
identify expansionary episodes rather than the size of the
adjustment carried out. In particular, an expansionary
adjustment would be a combination of tax increases and
cuts in primary expenditure where, however, the latter
measure would be more sizeable. Consistently with the
argument proposed by Alesina et al. (2002), it is also
found that during expansionary consolidations there is a
more marked reduction in expenditure on public employ-
ees’ wage bill. However, this difference is significant
(and highly so) only when a criterion of expansion based
on trend growth is chosen. This finding is consistent with
the idea that the wage bill of public employees affects
real output through higher profits and then greater
investment. To the extent that investment affects both
demand and supply conditions, one should expect trend
output to be affected, while this is not the case if wages
would only affect output via the demand channel. 
Table IV.9. shows data illustrating the macroeconomic
environment before, during and after consolidations. It
confirms the result that, in general, expansionary consoli-
dations follow periods of low growth and negative output
gaps. Regarding the behaviour of aggregate demand com-
ponents, again, both private consumption and business
investment accelerate during expansionary consolidation
periods, with investment registering a greater acceleration.
The finding that during non-expansionary periods invest-
ment decelerates quite significantly is also confirmed and
robust with respect to the notion of expansion adopted.
Again, the level of short-term nominal interest rates falls
during both expansionary and non-expansionary consoli-
dations, irrespective of the definition of expansion used.
What seems to differ quite significantly depending on the
definition of expansion adopted is the behaviour of the
current account balance. When the expansion is measured
by trend growth the current account balance worsens dur-
ing expansionary consolidations, while the opposite is true
Table IV.7
Correlation indexes among alternative indicators 
of expansionary consolidations
Growth Trend growth Actual minus EU growth
Growth 1 . .
Trend growth 0.63 1 .
Actual minus 
EU growth
0.76 0.51 1
Source: Commission services.
Table IV.8
Size and composition of expansionary consolidations: alternative definitions of expansion
Growth Trend growth Actual minus EU growth
Non-exp. Exp. t test for 
(1) ≠ (2)
Non-exp. Exp. t test for (3) ≠ (4) Non-exp. Exp. t test for 
(7) ≠ (8)
Average values Average values Average values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8)
Primary CAB 2.9 2.8 0.6 2.9 2.8 0.2 2.9 2.7 0.7
Debt (level as a % of GDP) 65.4 75.1 – 0.9 63.9 77.7 – 1.6 61.6 81.1 – 2.2 (2)
Primary expenditure 0.0 – 1.6 3.2 (2) 0.0 – 1.8 3.6 (2) – 0.4 – 1.4 1.7 (1)
Government investment – 0.2 – 0.3 1.9 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.13 – 0.2 – 0.3 0.0
Public employees compensation 0.0 – 0.2 1.6 0.1 – 0.4 4.0 (2) 0.0 – 0.2 1.2
Total government revenues 2.3 1.0 3.9 (2) 2.2 0.9 4.1 (2) 2.0 1.1 2.8 (2)
Total cyclically-adjusted 
government revenues 
2.4 1.1 3.3 (2) 2.6 0.8 4.9 (2) 2.1 1.2 2.1 (2)
NB: t test values labelled by (1) and (2) refer, respectively, to cases in which the average value of variables during expansionary and non-expansionary consolidations are
statistically different at a 90 and 95 confidence interval.
Source: Commission services.152
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interesting result highlights that the evolution of the exter-
nal sector may be a consequence of the type of fiscal
adjustment carried out, rather than its determinant. There-
fore, a less unfavourable evolution of the current account
balance may help to identify fiscal consolidation episodes
leading to cyclical improvements (that is, when the
exchange rate tends to depreciate), but not those associ-
ated with growth improvements of a structural nature (that
is, when the exchange rate would tend to appreciate). In
the latter cases in fact the current account gives on average
a negative contribution to the evolution of growth. The
view that expansionary fiscal consolidations should be
seen as a phenomenon mainly associated with exchange
rate depreciations or devaluations and consequent current
account improvements is thus not supported.
Table IV.9
Macroeconomic scenario in expansionary consolidations: alternative definitions of expansion
Definition of expansion Growth Trend growth Actual minus EU growth
Variable Non-exp. Exp. Non-exp. Exp. Non-exp. Exp.
Growth rate of real GDP (%)
t-1 2.6 1.6 2.2 2.0 2.8 1.1
t 1.1 2.1 1.2 2.1 1.3 2.0
t+1 0.7 3.4 1.6 2.7 1.3 3.1
Output gap (% of trend output)
t-1 0.4 – 1.1 0.9 – 1.9 0.0 – 0.7
t 0.2 – 1.5 0.1 – 1.6 – 0.3 – 1.1
t+1 – 0.3 – 0.8 – 0.2 – 1.0 – 0.2 – 1.0
Trend GDP growth
t-1 2.6 2.6 3.1 2.0 2.6 2.5
t 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.2 2.6 2.5
t+1 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.3 2.6 2.6
Growth rate of real private consumption (%)
t-1 2.4 1.4 2.1 1.7 2.3 1.4
t 1.4 1.8 1.2 2.0 1.8 1.3
t+1 1.5 3.0 1.5 3.1 1.9 2.6
Growth rate of real business investment (%)
t-1 3.5 0.3 0.4 3.4 4.5 – 0.8
t – 0.6 3.7 – 0.6 4.1 1.8 1.2
t+1 – 3.3 6.7 – 2.6 6.8 – 0.7 4.9
Growth rate in real current account surplus (%)
t-1 3.0 0.1 0.3 2.6 2.2 0.3
t – 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 – 0.4 0.0 – 0.4
t+1 – 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
Growth rate in TFP (%)
t-1 0.9 1.0 0.7 1.2 1.3 0.4
t 0.2 1.6 0.5 1.4 0.2 1.7
t+1 0.2 2.1 0.8 1.5 0.4 2.0
Unemployment rate (% of labour force)
t-1 6.5 8.7 6.2 7.9 6.6 8.8
t 6.9 9.0 7.0 8.0 6.9 9.4
t+1 8.9 8.9 7.5 8.0 7.2 9.4
Short run nominal interest rates
t-1 11.3 12.5 12.4 11.4 10.3 13.2
t 10.9 11.5 12.0 10.5 9.5 12.7
t+1 9.9 10.2 10.8 9.3 8.9 11.2
Source: Commission services.153
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The analysis carried out in this chapter, relying upon alter-
native definitions of fiscal consolidation and on different
criteria to identify expansionary fiscal adjustments, leads to
a number of findings that can be summarised as follows.
• Fiscal consolidation episodes exhibiting non-Key-
nesian features can be found in Europe: growth
appears to have accelerated after about half of the
consolidation episodes identified and in roughly one
quarter of the cases this happened without a mone-
tary stimulus. Hence, there is an indication that
roughly half of the expansionary fiscal consolida-
tions are unlikely to be attributable to concomitant
monetary policy easing or devaluations.
• Expansionary fiscal consolidations are more likely
to be based on expenditure cuts than on tax increases,
irrespective of the definition of fiscal consolidation
or expansion employed. Expansionary fiscal adjust-
ment periods also appear to be associated with initial
high levels of debt, while the simple fact that there
has been an adjustment is not enough to guarantee
its positive effect on output. Consolidations based
on cuts in wage expenditure seem to be more likely
to spur potential growth (1). Consistent findings are
found in previous studies (Alesina and Ardagna,
1998, Alesina et al., 2001).
• The macroeconomic environment preceding expan-
sionary consolidation periods is characterised by
slow growth and negative output gaps compared
with that characterising non-expansionary consoli-
dations. This finding appears robust with respect to
the definition of consolidation used and the defini-
tion of expansion adopted. 
• There is evidence that the acceleration in growth
following fiscal consolidations may have either a
structural nature (trend growth is affected) or a
cyclical one, or have both a structural and a cyclical
component. During expansionary consolidations
both consumption and investment accelerate. The
behaviour of business investment seems especially
helpful in distinguishing between expansionary and
non-expansionary episodes. Irrespective of the defi-
nition of consolidation and expansion used, while in
non-expansionary cases investment falls, in expan-
sionary periods there is a strong acceleration in this
component of aggregate demand. 
• The results presented above highlight the fact that
credibility and confidence may play a role in deter-
mining the effects on output of the fiscal adjustment.
Box IV.1 provides some examples about the rela-
tionship between confidence and fiscal adjustments.
The indicators of households’ and businesses’ con-
fidence are below average before the consolidation
starts and tend to improve in those cases of budget
consolidations followed by acceleration in growth.
Before taking firm policy conclusions, however, it
should be recalled that the above results are to be inter-
preted with caution. As mentioned in Section 3.1, cross-
country empirical analysis on fiscal consolidations are
subject to a series of problems and limitations. In partic-
ular, in interpreting results referred to the short-run, it is
quite difficult to understand to what extent consolida-
tions affect growth or if it is actual and expected output
growth which affects budget balances and budget poli-
cies (2). Moreover, it is quite difficult to isolate the effect
of external factors (such as monetary and exchange-rate
policies) that shape the links between fiscal consolida-
tions and economic activity.
An ideal way to overcome the above difficulties in inter-
preting the empirical evidence would be that of creating
a policy experiment in which a fiscal shock occurs in iso-
lation from other policies and from other types of shocks
to macroeconomic variables. Though real-world policy
experiments are not feasible, the use of applied macro-
economic models helps to understand how such hypo-
thetical policy experiments would work in reality. To
this end, the next chapter presents simulations on the
effects of alternative types of fiscal consolidations from
the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs QUEST model.
¥1∂ However, this finding is quite fragile with respect to the definition of fiscal
consolidation or expansion used.
¥2∂ The possibility of a mistaken interpretation of results is somehow sup-
ported by the fact that expansionary consolidations are more likely to occur
after weak growth and when output gaps are negative. The growth pick-up
observed after expansionary consolidations may therefore be related, to
some extent, to independent cyclical developments. However, even restrict-
ing the analysis to relatively homogenous cases from the viewpoint of
cyclical conditions, the evidence still seems potentially consistent with the
hypothesis of consolidations with non-Keynesian effects. In order to avoid
extreme cases, where this independent cyclical effect is more likely to play
a relevant role, the sample could be limited to fiscal consolidations epi-
sodes (according to the benchmark definition) occurring when output is
within 2 percentage point from potential (which is the case for about 80 %
of the cases). In this case average growth is 1.7, 1.4 and 1.8, respectively in
the year before, during and after consolidation, which still shows that the
consolidation would not have recessionary effects.154
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(Continued on the next page)
The rationale for the emergence of non-Keynesian fiscal consolidations is based on the forward-looking behaviour of con-
sumers and investors. The improvement of the government budget position may lead to increased consumption or invest-
ment if the expectations of economic operators are affected positively. Consumers may raise their consumption spending
if the consolidation of public finances credibly signals reduced future taxation, thus leading to a higher perceived perma-
nent disposable income. Businesses may invest more if the fiscal consolidation leads to the perception of improved
expected future profit opportunities. A common indicator to measure the level of confidence of consumers and businesses
is the economic sentiment indicator (ESI) developed by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which sum-
marises the attitudes and judgements on the current economic situation through surveys conducted on a large number of
economic actors. For EU countries, the economic sentiment indicator is calculated on a monthly basis by the European
Commission, within the framework of the joint harmonised EU programme of business and consumer surveys (1).
Table IV.1. reports values of the economic sentiment indicator during periods of fiscal consolidations resulted to be expan-
sionary (see Table IV.3 and Table IV.4). The fiscal consolidation episodes chosen are those in Ireland in 1987 and 1988,
in Italy in 1993, in Greece in 1994 and 1996 and in Sweden in 1998. On the left-hand axis, the value of the ESI is reported
(changing on a monthly basis); on the right-hand axis, the value of the primary cyclically-adjusted CAB (annual data) is
reported.
(1) The European Commission economic sentiment indicator is the result of monthly surveys collected on a sample of 67 000 firms and 24 000 consumers
across the EU. The questions included in the surveys concern the perception of economic actors on the state of the economy in the coming months.
Answers are ranked according to their degree of ‘optimism’, with higher scores for more optimistic answers. Answers from different economic actors
are aggregated using predetermined weights (40 % for industrial firms, 20 % for households, 20 % for construction firms, 20 % for retail trade firms).
Figures are seasonally adjusted and normalised such that 1995=100.
Graph IV.1:  Economic sentiment indicators during expansionary consolidations
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(Continued on the next page)
Economic sentiment indicators during expansionary consolidations: Italy, 1993
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Economic sentiment indicators during expansionary consolidations: Greece 1994, 1996
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It is difficult to compare annual budgetary data with monthly surveys and to attribute to specific months the effect of each
budget: one should determine whether the impact on confidence materialises when the budget is announced, when it is
approved or when evidence about its implementation emerges. Nevertheless, some gross information can be obtained by
looking at the above figures. In all cases, an improvement in the economic sentiment indicator is observed in the months
during which the consolidation was taking place. In Ireland, confidence improved after the consolidation of 1987 took
place and the ESI continued to improve also after the consolidation occurred in 1988. In Italy, the consolidation of 1993
coincided with an inversion of the trend in the ESI: during 1992 confidence was falling, starting from mid-1993 confidence
began to rise. In Greece, it is worthwhile to observe that the improvement in the ESI during the consolidation of 1994 was
only temporary. The worsening of the primary cyclically-adjusted balance in 1995 coincided with a fall in confidence.
Confidence improved again during the consolidations of 1996 and 1997. Concerning Sweden, between 1997 and 1999 the
rise and fall pattern in the ESI follows quite closely that in the primary cyclically-adjusted budget balance. 
This evidence is generally consistent with the view that fiscal consolidations may have expansionary effects via improved
economic confidence of economic operators.
Economic sentiment indicators during expansionary consolidations: Sweden, 1998
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4. Assessing ex ante the effects 
of fiscal consolidations: simulation 
results from the QUEST model 
4.1. Introduction (1)
This chapter describes the macroeconomic effects of
fiscal consolidations based on simulations using the
QUEST model. QUEST is an applied macroeconomic
model whose foundations can be characterised as a mod-
ern version of the neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis.
Behavioural equations in the model are based on inter-
temporal optimisation of households and firms with for-
ward-looking expectations (2). Unemployment is gener-
ated by imperfect matching between workers and firms.
Prices adjust sluggishly and the nominal wages response
is delayed because of overlapping wage contracts. The
model has Keynesian features in the short run, but the
effectiveness of fiscal policy is more limited than in the
traditional econometric models because of the built-in
intertemporal budget constraints. However, since plan-
ning horizons are finite, there is no complete tax dis-
counting and Ricardian equivalence does not hold.
Moreover, total consumption is represented as the aggre-
gation of the responses of two groups of households, one
forward-looking group that follows the optimal con-
sumption rule given by the life cycle/permanent income
hypothesis and a liquidity-constrained group whose con-
sumption depends on current disposable income. 
Taxes are, in general, distortionary in the model and affect
long-term employment and capital formation as well as
consumption decisions by private agents. Consolidations
through tax increases have therefore long-term negative
consequences in the model. The only exception to this is
lump-sum taxes, which do not create any distortions, but
this is of limited practical relevance. 
A reduction in government expenditure in QUEST affects
consumption of the liquidity-constrained households
who see their current disposable income decline if wages
and employment are falling. However, the non-liquidity-
constrained households could increase their consump-
tion as interest rates fall and if they anticipate higher
disposable incomes in the future. The removal of distor-
tions that this entails could boost employment and output
and already affect life-time income in the short run.
Expansionary effects through the consumption channel
may occur in the medium term but, if a sizeable share of
households is liquidity-constrained, it is unlikely that in
the short run the boost to consumers’ spending that
might result from the fiscal consolidation will be strong
enough to offset the negative impact of the reduction in
government spending. Thus, the emergence of non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations through consum-
ers’ spending crucially depends on the severity of credit
constraints and on the degree of distortions associated
with public intervention (3). 
Besides the consumption channel, QUEST allows for the
working of non-Keynesian effects through the working
of the investment channel. A reduction in public expend-
iture, in particular public employment, will raise unem-
ployment and exert downward pressure on wages. This,
in turn, tends to boost profits and raise investment spend-
¥1∂ For an extended analysis see Giudice et al. (2003).
¥2∂ The model has a richer theoretical structure than most macroeconometric
models. Moreover, as in standard computable dynamic general equilibrium
models it allows for adjustment costs and nominal rigidities. For a presen-
tation of QUEST II model, see Roeger and in’t Veld (1997, 2002).
¥3∂ The fraction of liquidity-constraint households in QUEST is obtained from
available estimates.158
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instance, in Alesina et al. (2002). 
The question arises whether the non-Keynesian channels
described above could prevail over the traditional Keyne-
sian channels and lead to expansionary fiscal consolida-
tions. If this is the case, it is then relevant to understand
which type of fiscal consolidations are more likely to
induce a prevalence of non-Keynesian channels.
For comparability, all scenarios of consolidation in the
simulations are of equal ex ante size and standardised to
consolidations of 1 percentage point of GDP, that is,
permanent increases in taxation or reductions in expend-
iture of 1 % of (baseline) GDP (1). It should be noted that
an annual budgetary adjustment equivalent to 1 % of
GDP would be large relative to what Member States are
envisaging in their stability and convergence pro-
grammes in order to reach the SGP goal of budget posi-
tions which are ‘close to balance or in surplus. This
implies that two of the factors that are generally investi-
gated in analysing fiscal consolidations, that is, the size
of the adjustment and the initial state of public finances,
are not directly explored here (2). The policy experiments
are also applied to one country in isolation (Germany)
and no attention is paid to possible cross-country spill-
over effects (3). 
All scenarios assume that the fiscal consolidations are
permanent and credible, that is, private agents fully and
correctly anticipate the effects of fiscal consolidation
and do not expect the fiscal policies stance to be reverted
in the future. An exercise is carried out in Section 4.3.1
to assess the implications of fiscal consolidation which
are perceived as non-credible, since they are reversed in
the following years.
The default monetary policy assumption in the scenarios
described below is based on a forward looking Taylor-
type rule. The monetary authorities are assumed to set
short-term interest rates at a level that depends both on
the deviation of the forecast of inflation from the target
inflation rate and on the magnitude of the output gap. To
evaluate the impact of the monetary policy stance on the
effects of fiscal consolidation, an alternative monetary
policy rule, leading to a looser policy stance, is also
considered (see Section 4.3.2). 
The simulation results are presented as changes in levels
of relevant macroeconomic variables. These results are
equally interpretable as deviations from baseline steady-
state growth.
4.2. Tax increases 
With distortionary taxes, it should come as no surprise
that a fiscal consolidation through tax increases has a
negative impact on output. The purpose of this section is
merely to provide a comparison for the simulations of
expenditure reductions and contrast the potential effects
on output. Three simulations are carried out below: per-
manent tax increases of 1 % of GDP in labour income
tax, corporate profit tax and VAT, respectively. 
As expected, all these scenarios show negative GDP
effects in the short and medium run: the tax rises increase
the distortions in the economy and lower output. Labour
income tax and VAT affect consumption more than
investment, and they both reduce employment. In
contrast, the consolidation through an increase in the
corporate tax rate has the largest impact on capital for-
mation, which falls sharply on impact, while the increase
in unemployment is only of temporary nature. On the
whole, these negative output effects broadly confirm the
findings in the previous section that consolidations
through tax rises are seldom expansionary.             
4.3. Expenditure cuts
In the episode study in the previous section it was found
that fiscal adjustments based on expenditure cuts seem to
have a higher probability to be expansionary than those
based on tax increases. The set of scenarios below are fis-
cal consolidations through alternative types of expenditure
reductions: cuts in government purchases, in government
employment or in government transfers to households. 
All the policy experiments considered lead to negative
GDP effects on impact in the short run, but are reversed
in the medium to long run. Permanent cuts in govern-
¥1∂ The simulated fiscal consolidations have an impact on the size and evolu-
tion of public debt. The solution of the model requires the debt to be sus-
tainable. In the simulations the debt is stabilised at a 10 % lower level as a
percentage of GDP through reductions over time in labour income taxes.
¥2∂ The non-linearities in the model are not substantial enough to analyse the
importance of larger versus smaller fiscal consolidations, and the model
results are close to proportional for larger adjustments than the standard-
ised consolidations of 1 percentage point considered here. Nor are we
exploring here the significance of the initial state of public finances. Instead
we focus our attention on the composition of fiscal adjustments and look at
the effects for different tax and expenditure categories.
¥3∂ Note that, as the simulations are performed under an existing EMU frame-
work, there is also no role for an exchange rate channel, a potentially
important element in some of the episodes studied in the previous chapter.159
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boost consumption spending in the short run as forward-
looking households are anticipating higher disposable
income in the future (1). The simulations show that this
effect becomes relatively stronger over time, strong
enough to offset after some years the negative effect on
GDP on impact associated with reduced aggregate demand
from the public sector. When instead it is transfer pay-
ments to households to be reduced, the boost to private
spending in anticipation of lower tax liabilities in the future
appears not to be large enough to offset the negative impact
of lower transfer receipts. Consumption remains below
base, although investment spending gradually recovers.
A reduction in government employment can, from the
third year on, increase investment spending. This scenario
displays the largest potential gains in terms of higher
growth after the initial decline in the first years. The short-
term rise in unemployment in this case puts downward
pressure on real wages in the private sector and increases
profits for firms (Alesina et al., 2002). Lower real wage
costs also boost private sector employment again in the
Table IV.10
Permanent increase in labour income tax of 1 % of GDP
 % change from baseline 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 10th year
GDP – 0.36 – 0.47 – 0.6 – 0.71 – 0.80 – 1.09
Private consumption – 0.90 – 1.10 – 1.19 – 1.25 – 1.31 – 1.42
Private investment – 0.29 – 0.57 – 0.86 – 1.09 – 1.29 – 1.91
Real wage costs 0.70 0.94 0.71 0.56 0.58 0.19
Real effective exchange rate 0.14 0.08 – 0.01 – 0.10 – 0.16 – 0.42
Absolute change from baseline
Short-term interest rate – 0.08 – 0.06 – 0.05 – 0.05 – 0.05 0.01
Real short-term interest rate – 0.04 – 0.09 – 0.09 – 0.07 – 0.07 0.00
Unemployment rate 0.28 0.75 0.98 1.07 1.15 1.38
Debt (% of GDP) – 0.37 – 1.21 – 1.92 – 2.59 – 3.29 – 7.63
Deficit (% of GDP) – 1.00 – 0.83 – 0.74 – 0.73 – 0.82 – 0.86
Source: Commission services.
Table IV.11
Permanent increase in corporate tax of 1 % of GDP
% change from baseline 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 10th year
GDP – 0.34 – 0.23 – 0.23 – 0.27 – 0.31 – 0.09
Private consumption 0.85 1.38 1.37 1.30 1.25 1.47
Private investment – 4.24 – 5.29 – 5.18 – 5.01 – 4.96 – 3.96
Real wage costs – 0.13 – 0.25 – 0.25 – 0.29 – 0.40 – 1.32
Real effective exchange rate 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.03 – 0.01 0.03
Absolute change from baseline
Short-term interest rate – 0.05 – 0.04 – 0.03 – 0.03 – 0.01 0.03
Real short-term interest rate 0.01 – 0.03 – 0.04 – 0.05 – 0.04 0.05
Unemployment rate 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.01 – 0.01 – 0.81
Debt (% of GDP) – 0.44 – 1.63 – 2.80 – 3.95 – 5.11 – 9.56
Deficit (% of GDP) – 1.12 – 1.16 – 1.18 – 1.22 – 1.21 – 0.66
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ Higher future disposable income is associated with the lower future taxes
that become possible after the consolidation under the assumption that the
debt ratio is stabilised at a 10 % of GDP lower level.160
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The cross-country evidence on expansionary consolida-
tions supports this view. As found in the previous section,
reductions in the wage bill of the public sector are more
likely to be linked with expansionary consolidations when
these are defined in terms of trend growth.
4.3.1. Temporary versus permanent cuts
One of the regularities found in cross-country analyses
of fiscal consolidations is that ‘successful’ consolida-
tions, leading to a permanent reduction in debt are more
likely to produce expansionary effects than adjustments
which are reversed in the subsequent years. All the
QUEST simulations presented so far concerned fiscal
consolidations resulting from permanent tax increases or
expenditure cuts. The hypothesis of a permanent adjust-
ment is crucial. Since the QUEST model builds upon the
assumption of rational expectations, agents anticipate
the permanent reduction in government spending and the
lower tax liabilities even though these will only materi-
alise in the future.
To test the importance of the credibility of the adjust-
ment (proxied here by its permanence), and how this
feeds through the channel of agents’ expectations, the
hypothesis of permanent consolidation is relaxed: the
Table IV.12
Permanent increase in VAT of 1 % of GDP
 % change from baseline 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 10th year
GDP – 0.14 – 0.21 – 0.34 – 0.44 – 0.51 – 0.63
Private consumption – 0.68 – 0.23 – 0.29 – 0.36 – 0.44 – 0.51
Private investment – 0.15 – 0.51 – 0.80 – 0.97 – 1.12 – 1.33
Real wage costs 0.49 0.69 0.50 0.37 0.38 – 0.06
Real effective exchange rate – 0.08 – 0.18 – 0.26 – 0.31 – 0.35 – 0.43
Absolute change from baseline
Short-term interest rate – 0.06 – 0.03 – 0.02 – 0.02 – 0.02 0.03
Real short-term interest rate – 0.09 – 0.08 – 0.06 – 0.04 – 0.04 0.03
Unemployment rate 0.16 0.46 0.61 0.68 0.73 0.74
Debt (% of GDP) – 0.49 – 1.37 – 2.15 – 2.91 – 3.71 – 8.05
Deficit (% of GDP) – 0.93 – 0.87 – 0.82 – 0.83 – 0.9 – 0.81
Source: Commission services.
Table IV.13
Permanent reduction in government purchases of 1 % of GDP
% change from baseline 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 10th year
GDP – 0.33 – 0.06 – 0.04 – 0.05 – 0.04 0.41
Private consumption 1.40 2.11 2.14 2.12 2.12 2.55
Private investment – 0.63 – 0.85 – 0.86 – 0.84 – 0.81 0.15
Real wage costs – 0.07 – 0.10 – 0.05 – 0.05 – 0.10 – 0.79
Real effective exchange rate 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.37
Absolute change from baseline
Short-term interest rate 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07
Real short-term interest rate – 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.10
Unemployment rate 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.01 – 0.01 – 0.82
Debt (% of GDP) – 0.47 – 1.79 – 2.97 – 4.15 – 5.34 – 9.70
Deficit (% of GDP) – 1.13 – 1.17 – 1.2 – 1.23 – 1.22 – 0.61
Source: Commission services.161
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cuts of the same type and size as those considered previ-
ously (Tables IV.13–IV.15) but are temporary, that is,
are reversed in the subsequent year. 
Results are reported in Table IV.16 and show that when
consolidations are temporary (and perceived by economic
agents as likely to be reversed) they tend to produce larger
contractionary effects in the short run. This is due to the
fact that, since consolidations are only temporary, it will
be unlikely that future tax liabilities will be reduced. Con-
sequently, since agents will not expect any change in their
future income, no wealth effects will materialise in this
case to offset the contractionary fiscal stance. 
In all the three cases considered (reduction of govern-
ment purchases, in government transfers and in gov-
ernment employment), without any rise in permanent
income there is now a more pronounced reduction in
consumer spending as current income declines. Given
the real interest rates decline following the marked
contraction in GDP, investment is likely to increase
somewhat, but not enough to offset the negative effects
of the consolidation on output.
Table IV.14
Permanent reduction in government transfers to households of 1 % of GDP
% change from baseline 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 10th year
GDP – 0.20 – 0.15 – 0.08 – 0.06 – 0.06 0.19
Private consumption – 0.27 – 0.27 – 0.23 – 0.22 – 0.22 0.13
Private investment – 0.65 – 0.60 – 0.49 – 0.47 – 0.48 – 0.02
Real wage costs – 0.09 – 0.14 – 0.07 – 0.04 – 0.03 – 0.58
Real effective exchange rate 0.08 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.34
Absolute change from baseline
Short-term interest rate 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04
Real short-term interest rate 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07
Unemployment rate 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 – 0.46
Debt (% of GDP) – 0.47 – 1.48 – 2.52 – 3.54 – 4.58 – 9.00
Deficit (% of GDP) – 1.00 – 1.02 – 1.03 – 1.07 – 1.09 – 0.71
Source: Commission services.
Table IV.15
Permanent reduction in spending on government employment of 1 % of GDP
 % change from baseline 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 10th year
GDP – 0.93 – 0.59 – 0.2 0.02 0.16 0.63
Private consumption 0.87 1.21 1.46 1.59 1.66 2.06
Private investment – 1.00 – 0.31 0.49 0.93 1.16 1.93
Real wage costs – 1.41 – 1.97 – 1.40 – 1.04 – 0.84 – 1.12
Real effective exchange rate 0.01 0.29 0.53 0.69 0.79 1.20
Absolute change from baseline
Short-term interest rate 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07
Real short-term interest rate 0.28 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.11
Unemployment rate 1.48 0.65 0.23 0.07 0.02 – 0.50
Debt (% of GDP) 0.28 – 0.55 – 1.64 – 2.77 – 3.92 – 8.80
Deficit (% of GDP) – 0.52 – 0.81 – 1.01 – 1.10 – 1.16 – 0.76
Source: Commission services. 162
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One of the findings in the episodes analysis was that
half the expansionary fiscal consolidations appeared
to have been accompanied by a possible effective
monetary relaxation (that is, falling real interest
rates). All scenarios described above were character-
ised by a rise in real interest rates (‘pure’ expansion-
ary fiscal consolidations in terms of the episode anal-
ysis in the previous section). By contrast, the scenarios
presented in Table IV.17 assume a monetary policy rule
(monetary targeting) consistent with a small fall in real
interest rates on impact (1). 
This reduction in interest rates reduces the negative
impact of the fiscal consolidations and helps to boost
growth in all cases considered. Private consumption
registers a bigger increase in the case of cuts in govern-
ment purchases and government employment and a
smaller reduction in the case of cuts in government
transfers. Moreover, investment is boosted further by
the fact that real interest rates fall. It is to note that in
the case of cuts in government purchases or transfers,
fiscal consolidations accompanied by a supportive
monetary stance appear to have expansionary effects
already on impact.
As in previous simulations, after some negative effects
in the first years of the adjustment, the largest benefits on
output appear in the case of cuts in public employment,
given the sizeable effects on investment.
4.4. Summary of findings
The scenarios in this chapter have illustrated the real
effects of fiscal consolidations and shown under what
circumstances these effects can be expansionary on out-
put. A number of results emerge.
• The impact on output of budgetary consolidation
depends on whether it takes place on the revenue or
expenditure side. Tax increases are likely to have a
negative impact on output both in the short and
Table IV.16
Temporary expenditure cuts (1 % of GDP)
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 10th year
Reduction in government purchases
GDP – 0.75 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.01
Private consumption – 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.17
Private investment 0.58 0.33 0.08 – 0.01 – 0.01 0.23
Real short-term interest rate – 0.17 – 0.04 – 0.02 – 0.00 0.00 0.01
Reduction in government transfers
GDP – 0.21 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.12
Private consumption – 0.56 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.14
Private investment 0.13 0.06 – 0.00 – 0.02 – 0.01 0.22
Real short-term interest rate – 0.04 – 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Reduction in spending on government employment
GDP – 1.21 0.21 0.23 0.14 0.10 0.12
Private consumption – 0.36 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.13
Private investment 0.45 0.63 0.42 0.22 0.11 0.18
Real short-term interest rate 0.05 – 0.04 – 0.05 – 0.03 – 0.01 0.01
NB: Figures refer to % changes from baseline, except in the case of real short-term interest rates, where changes are reported in absolute terms.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ See Giudice, Turrini and in’t Veld (2003) for details on the monetary rule
assumed in the simulations reported in Table IV.17. Alternatively, the fall in
interest rates could be interpreted as linked to a reduction in risk premiums.
For highly indebted countries, a credible fiscal consolidation could lead to
a reassessment of the markets’ perceptions of the risks involved and lead to
an elimination or at least a reduction of a risk premium on that countries’
bonds.163
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impact on output of permanent expenditure cuts is
likely to turn positive in the medium to long run.
This may be the result of non-Keynesian features
via the anticipated effects of higher future disposa-
ble income or profitability. 
• The short-run immediate negative impact on output
will be smaller in case of permanent as opposed to
temporary expenditure reductions. 
• The consumption channel is a major offsetting
force to the standard Keynesian effects, but the
investment channel can also be of great relevance
for consolidations occurring through cuts in the
government wage bill. 
• The expansionary effects of fiscal consolidations
occurring both through the consumption or the
investment channel are likely to be reinforced
when the fiscal consolidations are associated with
a favourable monetary stance or with structural
reforms improving the efficiency of factor and
product markets (see Box IV.2). Under such cir-
cumstances, positive effects on output of the fis-
cal consolidation may emerge already in the short
run.
Overall, given the limited impact on output in the short
run, in spite of a budgetary adjustment equivalent to
1 % of GDP (which is larger than what currently
planned by Member States at this juncture), these
results are in contrast with the assertion that fiscal con-
solidation should be avoided during slowdowns, and
show that sizeable positive effects could materialise in
the medium to long run.
The QUEST simulations performed consider some, but
not all, the possible channels through which consolida-
tions could have expansionary effects. Further work may
attempt to also take into account the effects of consolida-
tions on the risk premia on countries’ public debt, that
need in this case to be determined endogenously in the
model as a function of debt levels.
Table IV.17
Permanent expenditure cuts (1 % of GDP) with accommodating monetary stance
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 10th year
Reduction in government purchases
GDP 0.26 0.40 0.25 0.16 0.09 0.32
Private consumption 1.54 2.36 2.27 2.22 2.18 2.51
Private investment 1.00 0.05 – 0.22 – 0.42 – 0.57 – 0.10
Real short-term interest rate – 0.54 – 0.04 – 0.03 – 0.02 – 0.01 0.08
Reduction in government transfers
GDP 0.35 0.30 0.21 0.17 0.11 0.17
Private consumption – 0.15 – 0.04 – 0.10 – 0.11 – 0.14 0.11
Private investment 0.84 0.26 0.17 -0.01 – 0.16 – 0.14
Real short-term interest rate – 0.37 0.01 – 0.02 -0.03 – 0.02 0.05
Reduction in government employment
GDP – 0.50 – 0.36 – 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.53
Private consumption 0.95 1.31 1.47 1.58 1.63 1.97
Private investment 0.17 0.05 0.68 1.00 1.18 1.66
Real short-term interest rate – 0.20 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.10
NB: Figures refer to % changes from baseline, except in the case of real short-term interest rates, where changes are reported in absolute terms.
Source: Commission services.164
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(Continued on the next page)
The evidence suggests that fiscal consolidations based on expenditure cuts are more likely to be expansionary than consol-
idations based on tax increases. The mechanism described in the existing literature (for example, Alesina et al., 2002)
through which expenditure-based consolidations can produce expansionary effects emphasises the role of increased profit
expectations associated with reduced wage pressure. A further reason why expenditure-based fiscal consolidations may
have non-Keynesian effects is that they accompany and quite often induce the realisation of structural reforms in labour
and product markets. The positive impact on output of fiscal consolidations may thus also be associated with expected
improved profit opportunities coming from a better functioning of markets and from productivity gains that are the result
of structural reforms. 
In order to capture the overall impact of fiscal consolidations that occur together with structural reforms, some simulations
are performed in conjunction with shocks to the parameters of the model that reproduce the effect of structural reforms.
The simulations are made using the QUEST model concerning Germany and are similar to the simulations shown in
Table IV.13 to Table IV.15 (respectively, reduction in government purchases, transfers, and employment). The shocks rep-
resenting structural reforms are based on those presented in European Commission (2002b): they concern reforms in both
the labour and product markets and reforms inducing an increase in overall efficiency. Structural reforms in the labour mar-
ket are modelled as an ‘employment-friendly’ shift of the wage-setting curve encouraging employment participation and
reducing the wage mark-ups. Reforms in the products markets are modelled instead via a fall in the price mark-ups, reflect-
ing an improvement in competitive conditions. These shocks are further combined with an increase the total factor produc-
tivity parameter capturing an improvement in the overall productive efficiency (1).
(1) The size of the shocks to model parameters is one third of that assumed in the simulations presented in the European Commission (2002 b) where
labour market reforms, product market reforms and productivity improvements were analysed separately. In the present simulations the assumed
reduction of wages along the wage-setting curve is by 1/3 of a percentage point, as it is the supposed increase in TFP. As for the reduction in mark-ups,
it is assumed to be equal to 1/6 of a percentage point.
Graph IV.2:  Expenditure-based fiscal consolidations and structural reforms: effects on GDP 
(% change from baseline)
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Graph IV.2 reports the percentage change in baseline GDP when expenditure cuts occur with and without such structural
reforms. Results show that, when expenditure cuts are accompanied by structural reforms, the effect of consolidations on
output becomes generally positive already in the short run. In all the simulations performed, after two years GDP increases
by about  percentage points compared with the baseline. In the long run (after 10 years) the effect on output of expendi-
ture-based fiscal consolidations is positive irrespective of whether they are accompanied by structural reforms. When struc-
tural reforms take place, however, the impact on output is about four times higher: instead of being about 0.5 percentage
points, it amounts to around 2 percentage points.
In sum, it seems that expenditure-based consolidations accompanied by structural reforms in labour and product markets
could have a very positive impact on output and growth not only in the medium (where it may be very large), but also in
the short run.
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Part V
Meeting the EU’s budgetary requirements:
national expenditure rules and fiscal 
relations across levels of government

Summary
The EU’s fiscal rules impose important and challenging
budgetary obligations on Member States. Countries are
required by the Treaty to avoid excessive deficit posi-
tions (defined against a reference value for deficits of
3 % of GDP), and under the Stability and Growth Pact
they are required to achieve and maintain a budget posi-
tion of ‘close to balance or in surplus’. These EU fiscal
rules focus on the budget balance, that is, the difference
between total revenues and total expenditures and not on
the level or the composition of the two. 
During the 1990s, and in particular since 1997, most EU
countries introduced expenditure rules. There is a great
deal of variety in their design as regards the types of
spending items covered by a rule, how the rule is defined
(in real or nominal terms, as a ceiling or a rate of
growth), the time frame involved and the robustness of
surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. In the major-
ity of Member States, expenditure rules feed into the
budgetary-setting process (rather than representing a
binding obligation which must be respected) and ex post
control and implementation mechanisms are rather
weak. While expenditure rules for the most part were
introduced with national policy objectives in mind, they
can also enable Member States to meet the budget bal-
ance requirements of the Treaty and SGP by helping
them to better control expenditure items that are subject
to overruns. Depending on their design, they can also
contribute to other policy objectives such as avoiding a
pro-cyclical loosening of fiscal policy in good times (via
a discretionary increase in public spending), and improv-
ing the quality of the composition of public spending. 
Preliminary empirical analysis indicates that the existing
rules have not had a significant impact on trends in pub-
lic spending. Judging compliance with expenditure
rules, however, is difficult as in many cases they cover
several years and are subject to revisions. In some coun-
tries, expenditure rules are not ambitious enough and
adherence with them is easily achieved: in other cases,
the rule has been adjusted or abandoned if perceived as
being too ambitious. Nonetheless, even a relatively weak
expenditure rule can provide useful guidance and signals
to actors involved in the budgetary process. 
The Treaty and SGP requirements are defined in terms of
the budget balance of the general government (that is,
central and local/state governments and social security),
although the specific budget targets in stability and con-
vergence programmes are set by the central government.
The challenge in meeting EU budgetary requirements is
therefore affected by the way in which Member States
allocate fiscal functions (both revenues and expendi-
tures) across different levels of government. This is
especially the case in federal countries and the Member
States where local authorities have considerable budget-
ary autonomy. The contribution of sub-central authori-
ties to the overall budget position is changing in a
number of countries in light of efforts to devolve certain
public functions to regional/local authorities. 
The direct contribution of lower levels of government to
the general government deficit is generally limited since
all Member States apply restrictions to local government
borrowing: the exception is Germany, where net borrow-
ing by local and state governments accounts for nearly
half of the general government budget deficit in 2002.
However, it should be borne in mind that de facto central
governments often have to bear the cost of financing dif-
ficulties that emerge at sub-central level. To help comply
with the EU’s fiscal rules, federal Member States and
Italy and Spain have recently introduced arrangements
that aim at coordinating the budgetary position across
levels of government (usually referred to as national sta-
bility pacts). More experience with the implementation
of these arrangements is needed before conclusions can
be drawn on their effectiveness in contributing to the
objectives of the EU fiscal framework. A priori, a strong
legal base and enforcement mechanism would be
expected to contribute to the credibility and effective-
ness of the arrangements.169
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icies raises a second issue in the context of EMU, namely
the operation of automatic stabilisers. Experience shows
that, in general, systems are designed to shield sub-
national governments from cyclical variations. However,
empirical evidence for the US and Germany suggests
some degree of procyclical behaviour at state level. Fur-
ther research would be needed, however, before policy
conclusions can be drawn on the interaction of fiscal
decentralisation and automatic stabilisation.170
1. Introduction
The EU’s fiscal rules impose important and challenging
budgetary obligations on Member States. Countries are
required by the Treaty to avoid excessive deficit posi-
tions (defined against a reference value for deficits of
3 % of GDP), and under the Stability and Growth Pact
they are required to achieve and maintain a budget posi-
tion of ‘close to balance or in surplus’. These EU fiscal
rules focus on the budget balance, i.e. the difference
between total revenues and total expenditures and not on
the level or the composition of the two. 
A further important feature of the EU’s fiscal rules is
that, notwithstanding the fact that budgetary commit-
ments are given at Community level by the central gov-
ernment, the requirements in terms of the budget balance
concern the general government: this covers central and
local (state) governments and social security, that is, it
does not distinguish between the allocation of fiscal
unbalances across different levels of government, but
only looks at the overall budgetary position. It is the
responsibility of Member States to organise their fiscal
relations across different levels and sectors of govern-
ment so as to ensure that they can meet the budgetary
requirements set down in the Treaty and SGP 
This part examines some of the challenges which Mem-
ber States face in complying with the EU’s fiscal rules,
and also analyses a number of policy instruments that are
being developed to this end. 
Section 2 considers the role and effectiveness of national
expenditure rules, which many Member States have
introduced in recent years with the purpose of establish-
ing a better control of public spending. It analyses the
design of expenditure rules across Member States and
considers how they relate to the EU framework and can
contribute to the objective of sound and sustainable pub-
lic finances. Particular attention is paid to a preliminary
evaluation of how rules worked in practice during the
first years of application. 
Section 3 considers the issue of fiscal decentralisation. It
provides a brief overview of the allocation of responsi-
bility for public expenditure and revenues items across
different levels of government, and then examines how
this interacts with the EU framework for fiscal surveil-
lance. Firstly, attention is paid to the contribution of each
level of government to the budget balance of the general
government as a whole. Consideration is given to vari-
ous institutional arrangements (such as national stability
pacts), that have been put in place by Member States to
coordinate the budgetary positions across levels of gov-
ernment, in part to comply with the provisions of the
Treaty and SGP. Secondly, the impact of fiscal decen-
tralisation on the potential for automatic stabilisation is
examined. Finally, the link between the EU fiscal sur-
veillance framework and recent institutional reforms is
examined in more detail in case studies on Spain and
Germany.171
2. Expenditure rules in EU Member States
2.1. The need for expenditure rules 
as a means to control public finances
Since the beginning of 1990s, a growing literature has
investigated the design of fiscal rules which have been
introduced in many countries as a response to growing
budgetary imbalances (1). According to Hallerberg et al
(2001) ‘a fiscal rule is a combination of a fiscal target
with a set of prescriptions of what governments are sup-
posed to do to achieve this target’. Any ex ante constraint
to budget deliberation could constitute a fiscal rule. Even
the presentation of the budget law or a budget document
with some political commitments that sets up an ex ante
targets for at least the following year could be considered
as a fiscal rule.
Kopits and Symanski (1998) define a fiscal rule as ‘a
permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms
of a summary indicator of fiscal performance, such as the
government budget deficit, borrowing, debt or a major
component thereof’. This definition is narrower because
a fiscal rule should have two specific characteristics,
namely being ‘permanent’ and defined through an ‘indi-
cator’ that can be easily monitored.
Within the wide spectrum of fiscal rules, expenditure
rules are of growing relevance in a number of Member
States (2). Growing recourse to expenditure rules can be
explained by the importance of expenditure control as
part of a successful strategy of budgetary consolida-
tion (3). Moreover, slippage from agreed budget targets
often arises on the expenditure side, that is more subject
to discretionary actions. 
The issue is how national budget processes based on
expenditure rules interact with the EU fiscal framework.
National expenditure rules can act as complementary
instruments to the EU rules-based framework for several
reasons.
• First, their respect does not prevent automatic stabi-
lisers to play, since the greatest impact of the cycle
over the budget is on the revenue side. 
• Second, appropriate recourse to expenditure rules at
national level could also help contribute to the pol-
icy objective of improving the quality of the compo-
sition of public spending, that is, help restructure the
composition of spending toward so-called produc-
tive items such as investment in infrastructures and
R & D. Expenditure rules at national level could be
designed in a way that places a stricter control on
spending on items that are considered as being less
conducive to long-term growth, and ensuring that
more productive items receive more favourable
consideration in budgetary consolidation efforts.
• Third, expenditure rules could also make an impor-
tant contribution to broader economic and budgetary
policy objectives established at EU level as part of
the BEPGs and the Lisbon strategy. For example, in
its communication on ‘Strengthening the coordina-
tion of budget policies’ (see Part II.2 of this report),
the Commission suggested that a temporary deterio-
ration in the budget balance could be envisaged if
this is due to large structural reforms. However, this
should not compromise the objective of sound and
sustainable public finances. A close monitoring of
Member States’ compliance with their own national
expenditure rule could reduce the degree of uncer-
tainty on the budget balance intertemporal profile. 
The contribution of different expenditure items to meet-
ing overall budgetary objectives is illustrated in
Graph V.1. This shows, in index form, the evolution of
¥1∂ See for a review of the main features of fiscal rules Kell (2001), Kopits and
Symansky (1998), Kopits (2001), Inman (1996).
¥2∂ See, for example, Brunila (2002), Hallerberg et al. (2001) and Mills and
Quinet (2001) for some comparison of expenditure rules across EU Mem-
ber States.
¥3∂ The 2001 and 2002 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines recommended
Member States ‘to introduce or enhance mechanisms that help assess and
control spending, including budgetary procedures’.172
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of GDP over the last 10 years for EU-15 countries as a
whole. On average, the level of primary expenditure
decreased by almost 9 % between 1992 and 2000, while
it increased by 5 % during the subsequent two years.
Whereas spending on compensation of public employ-
ees and gross fixed capital formation fell significantly
over the period, spending on intermediate consumption
(purchases of goods and services by the public adminis-
tration) and social transfers other than in kind actually
increased (1). These different trends across expenditure
items illustrate that it is more difficult to curtail spend-
ing on particular categories of expenditure.
Table V.1 examines expenditure trends for several Mem-
ber States for the 1998–2001 period. Public expenditure is
classified according to seven main ‘functions’ of the State:
several functions (such as defence, public order and
safety, general public services) refer to the core activities
of the State, for example, those functions that are at the
base of the functioning of a modern State (2). Other
expenditure programmes aim at addressing market fail-
ures. These programmes include mainly education and
healthcare but also economic services. Finally, part of
public expenditure has primary a redistribution role,
achieved through social protection programmes. 
The numbers highlighted in bold show spending items
which changed by more than total public spending (last
column of the Table V.1) (3). Clearly, it should be taken
in mind that the expenditure-to-GDP ratios differ mark-
edly across different functions: social protection repre-
sents the greatest share of expenditure (around one third
of total expenditure) while defence, public order and
safety rarely reach more than 2 % of GDP. 
With the exception of Austria, spending on healthcare in
all countries increased substantially more than total
expenditure during the last years. For instance, total
expenditure in Italy contracted by 3 % between 1998
Graph V.1:  Trends in different items of public expenditure at EU level 
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ Subsidies and ‘other current and capital expenditures’ are not presented
due to their low share of GDP.
¥2∂ The so-called COFOG classification. See European Commission (2002a)
for a detailed explanation of the functional classification.
¥3∂ The residual component (‘others’) in Table V.1 includes limited expenditures
as environmental protection, community amenities and religious expenses.173
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10.5 %. In Portugal, spending on healthcare grew at twice
the pace of total expenditure, while in Belgium, despite
the strong decrease of total expenditure (– 9.5 %), health-
care increased by 8.2 %. However, healthcare expendi-
ture is not the only item that presents such a dynamic.
Spending on education and social protection also tended
to increase faster than total expenditure, albeit by a lesser
amount and in a smaller group of countries. 
2.2. The design and implementation 
of expenditure rules
2.2.1. The design of expenditure rules
According to the standard theory of economic policy
(Tinbergen, 1956), expenditure targets should be strictly
under the control of the government since their develop-
ment represents an intermediate objective to reach the
final aim of budgetary control. Therefore, when design-
ing an expenditure rule, several choices have to be made
as follows: 
• whether the rule should target an outcome of a par-
ticular expenditure item (or an aggregate of expend-
iture items) or whether it should target the effects of
a particular policy measure;
• whether certain expenditure items should be
excluded from an aggregate expenditure target;
• whether an expenditure target should be defined in
nominal or real terms; 
• whether the target should be defined in terms of a
level of expenditure or as a rate of change; 
• the time span of the target.
Targeting an expenditure outcome or the impact of a
policy measure. A rule that targets the expenditure out-
come can be defined as follows:
[1]
where  is the targeted outcome of expenditure item E
at time t, is the projected level of expenditure in
time t forecasted at time t – 1, and is the policy
action planned in t – 1 to correct the trend and therefore
to achieve the target . 
The outcome Et is defined as:
[2]
Table V.1
Trends in public expenditure items in selected EU countries 
(variation in percentage points between 1998 and 2001)
General 
public 
services
Economic 
affairs Health Education
Social 
protection
Defence, 
public order 
and safety
Others Total
BE – 23.8 – 17.0 8.2 – 4.6 – 7.4 – 9.7 16.7 – 9.5
DK 0.0 – 12.5 3.9 10.5 – 1.6 0.0 9.1 0.3
DE – 6.0 4.9 0.0 – 4.5 – 0.5 – 6.7 4.3 – 1.0
EL – 9.0 100.0 8.3 2.7 1.2 4.8 0.0 0.8
IT – 16.7 – 2.4 10.5 2.0 – 1.1 – 6.3 – 3.7 – 3.0
NL – 11.0 18.8 2.5 2.1 – 6.0 3.3 3.1 – 1.7
AT – 3.4 7.8 – 27.5 – 3.3 2.3 – 8.0 0.0 – 3.5
PT 1.5 3.4 11.5 3.0 5.5 – 2.7 12.0 5.0
FI – 7.2 – 14.8 1.7 – 3.1 – 8.4 – 9.4 – 16.0 – 7.2
NB: Figures in the table show the cumulated change of expenditure-to-GDP ratios for each spending category and for total expenditure (last column). For instance, the
100 % increase registered in Greece for economic affairs spending-to-GDP ratio implies that expenditure doubled between 1998 and 2001.
Source: Commission services.
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the forecast error on Et, which is positive when expendi-
ture turns out higher than forecasted.
Assuming that the outcome Et equals the expected
outcome , it can be shown that:
[3]
If the trend expenditure turns out to be lower than
expected (i.e. the forecast error is negative such that
δ < 0), the ex-post policy correction  needed
to reach the target  can be smaller than what was
planned ex ante. On the contrary, if expenditure grows
faster than expected (and δ > 0), then the expenditure
target ( ) will be overshot even if the planned policy
action ( ) is implemented in full. 
The formulae show that the following steps are needed
to define an expenditure rule: first, the definition of the
expenditure item (or aggregate of expenditures) to tar-
get; second, a forecast of the trend in targeted expendi-
ture item; third, an ex-ante quantification of the policy
action necessary to achieve the target; fourth, the possi-
bility to accurately verify ex-post compliance. In partic-
ular, they highlight the central importance of defining
the appropriate target. For instance, attention should be
paid as to whether to include high volatile items in an
aggregate expenditure rule, as a high forecast error δ will
affect the outcome rendering the expenditure rule less
effective for the purpose of budgetary control (1),
An alternative approach to setting a target in terms of the
level of expenditure(s) would be to directly target the
impact a particular policy action (P) as follows:
[4]
Under this approach, the expenditure rule is respected if
the policy maker implements the announced corrective
measures irrespective of the actual outcome in
terms of expenditure. The advantage of directly targeting
the specific policy action is that it is not necessary to take
account the economic cycle or other exogenous factors
that affect the outcome. However, in practice it may be
difficult to quantify ex ante the precise budgetary impact
of the planned policy measures, rendering it difficult to
assess compliance.
Whether to exclude certain items from the aggregate
expenditure target. While the main purpose of an aggre-
gate expenditure rule is to contribute to sound public
finance positions, certain categories of expenditures
might be excluded from the target so as to ensure consist-
ency with other public policy goals. At least three cate-
gories of expenditure items warrant consideration in this
regard.
• Firstly, it may be appropriate to exclude interest
payments from the target and focus on primary
expenditure which is more under the discretionary
control of government. The inclusion of interest
payments within the expenditure target increases the
role of forecasts errors. Other things being equal, a
rule that targets an aggregate that includes interest
payments can be fulfilled with a lower policy effort
if interest payments are overestimated (2).
• Secondly, unemployment-related transfers could be
excluded from the target to prevent pro-cyclical
behaviour. For example, the rigid adherence to a
nominal expenditure target that includes unemploy-
ment transfers in periods of low growth would cete-
ris paribus result in a tightening of the fiscal stance
as de facto it would prevent part of the automatic sta-
bilisers from operating. 
• Thirdly, one may wish to exclude specific categories
of productive public spending (such as public
investment) from an expenditure target: this would
prevent corrective measures needed to achieve the
expenditure target from affecting these desirable
public expenditure items. 
¥1∂ On the importance of forecast errors in the functioning of fiscal rules see
also Auerbach (1994).
Et
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1–( ) ¥2∂ Equation [1], when interest payments are targeted, can be rewritten as:
 [1a]
where expenditure E is now the sum between interest payments I and
another primary expenditure item A. The target is the sum of the
targeted outcome on item A and the outcome on interest payments. The
outcome at time t and can be rewritten as:
[2a]
Therefore, the outcome depends on the forecasted levels for A and I, the
ex-post policy action, and the forecast error . This has two
components, one is primary expenditure and one is interest payments.
If the outcome equals the targeted expenditure level, after some passages it
results that:
 [3a]
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The difference between a real or a nominal target is rel-
evant in the case of forecast errors in inflation projec-
tions (1). In fact, price deflators differ across government
expenditures items and they also differ from GDP defla-
tors. A target defined in nominal terms has the advantage
of transparency making monitoring easier. It can also
help to keep expenditure under control, through a higher-
than-expected adjustment, if the inflation outcome is
higher than expected. However, if the rule has defined an
‘escape’ clause, so that higher-than-expected inflation
should not force a higher real adjustment in order to fulfil
the nominal target, then a nominal rule risks to produce
a bias, such that a lower-than-expected inflation allows a
lower adjustment effort while a higher-than-expected
inflation does not entail a stronger adjustment. On the
contrary, if the target is defined in real terms, compliance
is not affected by inflationary developments, but it can
result in it being more difficult to measure the compli-
ance. 
The definition of the target in terms of levels (absolute
values or as a share of GDP) or as a rate of growth.
When the target is defined as a share of GDP, the result
can depend on GDP developments and in particular on
GDP forecast errors. Thus, the rule might turn out to be
pro-cyclical, since the expenditure ceiling fluctuates in
line with GDP around its trend. This problem can be
overcome by formulating the target as a fixed rate of
growth in the expenditure item(s) or as an absolute
level. 
The time span covered (2). A multiannual rule is gener-
ally superior to a rule where the target is fixed for only
one year. This is because an annual rule can be more eas-
ily circumvented simply by postponing expenditures to
the first day of the following budget year, and is suscep-
tible to accounting practices. When the target is fixed ex
ante for several years, the possibility to postpone expen-
ditures or structural adjustment to the future becomes
more difficult. 
2.2.2. The implementation of expenditure rules
The implementation and ex-post assessment mecha-
nisms are constituent elements of an expenditure rule.
Several elements warrant consideration (Kopits and
Symanski, 1998): the availability of instruments to
monitor and if necessary correct the dynamic of budg-
etary position during budget execution; provisions to
deal with non-compliance including sanctions; escape
clauses when failures in respecting the rule are beyond
policy control. 
Implementation mechanisms can have different forms
and degrees of enforcement, from automatic contin-
gency measures once the deviation from the target
appears, to more flexible (and weak) measures such as
non-binding suggestions for discretionary corrections. 
The availability of data is essential in order to monitor
and control the budget execution. Data on budgetary
aggregates (such as budget balances or total expendi-
tures) are often easier to collect and subject to less revi-
sions than information on specific expenditure items,
where different spending units of the government are
involved. 
To avoid a pro-cyclical or perverse outcome, an expend-
iture rule should usefully define provisions for catering
for worse-than-expected economic conditions and/or
other unexpected events (such as a flood) that require
additional spending. However, while flexibility of such
a nature is essential in the case of budget balance rules,
the need for such provisions is less evident in the case of
expenditure rules as the sensitivity of most expenditure
items is very limited (apart from exceptions such as
unemployment transfers). 
Sanctions in the case of non-compliance with the target
should always be defined ex ante to make the rule cred-
ible and enforceable (Inman, 1996). These could take
different forms such as an obligation to amend the
budget law (3), automatic sequesters if there is clear
information that the target is not going to be fulfilled
during the budget year, or pecuniary sanctions imposed
by a higher level of government. While the existence of
well-defined sanctions is only a necessary condition to
¥1∂ See Brunila and Kinnunen (2002).
¥2∂ A clear example of the importance of the time span of spending rules is the
experience of the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) endorsed in 1990 in the
US. In brief, a series of annual caps on public spending were set for the
period 1990–95 and the rule specifies that ‘enacted policies cannot raise the
deficit relative to initial projected levels’ (Poterba, 1996:24). A key differ-
ence with the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) rule that has been in force
during the second half of 1980s in the US is that the latter fixed targets
year-by-year on the basis of the outcome of the previous year and therefore
it was easier to postpone expenditure to future fiscal years. Auerbach
(1994) presents evidence that, during the last years of the GRH, there was a
tendency to reduce deficits of the current year at the expense of the follow-
ing year. ¥3∂ This is the mechanism implied by the GRH rule, see Gramlich (1990).176
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fully credible, the sanctions should have a legal or con-
stitutional basis and should not be based on political
commitment alone. 
In addition, an expenditure rule is more credible if there
is an independent authority that monitors the develop-
ment of the budgetary position and that is in charge of
the enforcement measures including the application of
the sanctions. Without a clear legal basis and/or where
there are no clear defined sanctions, the penalty for non-
compliance with the rule is only reputational. 
2.2.3. A taxonomy of expenditure rules
It is possible to classify expenditure rules according to
their degree of strictness (1). Following the terminology
of Poterba (1996), expenditure rules are classified as
being either ‘narrow’ or ‘weak’, see Table V.2. 
An expenditure rule is classified as ‘weak’ if: 
• the target includes volatile expenditure items, so that
the actual level of spending is subject to a forecast
error and is only partly influenced by the application
of spending control mechanisms; 
• the target includes interest payments. In this case,
the target could be respected without the govern-
ment taking policy actions simply if interest pay-
ments develop favourably (2); 
• there is no ex-post control mechanism to verify
whether ex ante targets have been respected, and if
enforcement mechanisms are based on a political
commitment rather than legal provisions (3). 
In contrast, a rule is classified as being ‘narrow’ if: 
• it targets a less volatile expenditure item(s), and it
targets the budgetary impact of the policy action
rather than the final outcome;
• there are well-defined mechanisms for carrying out
an ex-post verification of compliance with targets; 
• enforcement mechanisms and sanctions are defined
ex ante;
• surveillance is carried out by an independent author-
ity that can enforce authorities to respect the rule. 
2.3. National expenditure rules
2.3.1. Main features of expenditure rules 
within EU Member States. 
Almost all EU countries have put in place rules to control
wide aggregates of expenditures. Table V.3 shows the
main features of expenditure rules currently in place in
¥1∂ As reported by Inman (1996), a fiscal index called an ‘ACIR stringent
index’ has been developed to measure the tightness of the state’s budget
balance rules constraint in US states, with higher values indicating a more
stringent constraint. The index is a composite measure where several fea-
tures of the fiscal rule are considered and in particular it awards points for
whether the rule: ‘requires the governor to submit a balanced budget
(1 point); requires the legislature to pass a balanced budget (2 points);
allows the state to carry a deficit into the next fiscal year (4 points); does
not allow the state to carry a deficit into the next fiscal year (6 points if a
biennium budget, 8 points if an annual budget)’ (Inman, 1996:7). In addi-
tion, additional extra points are awarded if the fiscal rule is based on a leg-
islative or constitutional instrument.
¥2∂ However, Mills and Quinet (2001) underline that, since the main goal of an
expenditure rule is to make the objectives of a decreasing debt and a lower
tax burden mutually compatible, interest payments should be kept within
the targeted aggregate.
¥3∂ See Bohn and Inman (1996) and Kopits and Symansky (1998).
Table V.2
A taxonomy of expenditure rules
Weak Narrow
Design Aggregate expenditures including interest payments Specific target on non-volatile item(s)
Specific target on volatile items Target on variation in levels
Implementation Only ex ante target Ex ante target, ex post control
Internal surveillance Surveillance by an independent authority
Statutory instrument Political commitment Constitutional or legal basis
Enforcement mechanism Reputational or economically insignificant sanctions Economically significant (but not excessive) sanctions177
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the item targeted, the definition of the target (either in
real or nominal terms, as a ceiling or as a rate of change),
the level of application (general, central or local govern-
ment), the date of introduction of the rule and the time
span. It also underlines whether there are measures spec-
ified ex ante in case of non-compliance with the rule and
possible ‘escape clauses’ in case of economic shocks.
Finally, it summarises how the rule worked in practice
during the first years of application.
Although the expenditure rules differ substantially
across Member States, some common features can be
identified (2). First, the expenditure rules of many Mem-
ber States, either as regards their timing or structure,
were influenced by the Stability and Growth Pact. Apart
from Spain (which established a ceiling on nominal
expenditure starting from 2003), and Portugal (where the
target has been introduced in 2002), all other countries
introduced expenditure rules in past years, in particular
since 1997. Such rules have been generally within
medium-term frameworks, in line with the medium-term
focus of the SGP. However, there are cases where spend-
ing rules anticipated the SGP. Germany already had
these kind of rules since the mid-1980s, while the Neth-
erlands introduced a rule in 1994.
Second, the target tends to cover a wide aggregate of
expenditure items that includes all public expenditures.
In all cases except Denmark, Ireland, Greece and Italy,
the aggregate includes interest payments. Public invest-
ment is netted out in the case of Denmark and Belgium.
Italy recently introduced an expenditure rule (the so-
called ‘expenditure freeze’ law), whereby all legislation
resulting in new or higher public expenditures should
explicitly specify the authorised amount (3). 
Third, almost all Member States apply their expenditure
rules to the central government (coupled with borrowing
and budgeting restrictions for lower levels of govern-
ment, see Section 3.2). An exception is Germany, where
expenditure rules also apply to the regional and local
governments. In Italy, within the context of a domestic
stability pact, ceilings are established for primary current
expenditure of regions. 
Fourth, most of the expenditure rules are based on politi-
cal commitments rather than legislation. This explains
why, in many cases, discretionary adjustments to expend-
iture rules have taken place when the original targets have
started to act as a constraint. In some cases this has lim-
ited the effectiveness of the rule as an instrument to con-
trol public finance developments. 
Besides these common characteristics, rules differ across
countries in terms of specific design. Targets are formu-
lated in levels or rates of growth, and both in nominal or
real terms. These four possibilities can all be found in
practice, which illustrates the diversity of arrangements
that have been put in place. Real growth targets can be
found in Belgium, Denmark and France. Nominal
growth targets are set up in Germany, Ireland, Italy and
Luxembourg. Specific ceilings on absolute values (lev-
els) have been put in place in Spain, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Finland, Sweden and the UK. Specific arrange-
ments exist in Greece and Portugal for public
employment. Here, the target is the number of employ-
ees rather than financial expenses. 
Overall, expenditure rules in EU countries belong to the
category of ‘weak’ rules as described in Section 2.2,
since, in most cases, they are based on political commit-
ment solely. The outcome depends on policy actions in
due course as well as on the development of volatile
items included in the targets, or on interest payments.
The implementation and enforcement mechanisms are
generally less developed since the rules lack a firm legal
basis. Sanctions are generally absent or economically
insignificant. In sum, many expenditure rules put in
place in EU countries lack some necessary features to be
fully credible since they allow for the option to ignore,
miss or abandon the rule when a divergence arises
between targeted variables and outcomes.
2.3.2. How have national expenditure rules 
worked in practice
This section contains a preliminary empirical assessment
on the implementation of national expenditure rules. In
¥1∂ According to information available to the Directorate-General for Eco-
nomic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission. Either as a spec-
ification of the general expenditure rule or as an additional requirement,
most Member States also have defined ceilings for individual ministries or
specific spending categories (Hallerberg et al, 2001).
¥2∂ Case studies for several countries (the Netherlands, Italy, Finland and Swe-
den) are carried out in the correspondent country sections of Part VI of this
report.
¥3∂ However, the list of expenditures that can be frozen if the spending ceiling is
breached excludes important items such as pensions, public sector wages and
unemployment benefits. See the country section on Italy in Chapter VI.8 of
this report.178
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2 0 0 3particular, it examines spending on various expenditure
items before and after the introduction of an expenditure
rule. It also examines whether there is a link between the
SGP commitments and the non-compliance with Mem-
ber States’ expenditure targets. 
The results should be interpreted with caution. Expendi-
tures are affected by many other factors outside direct
control of policy makers: since most national expendi-
ture rules target expenditure outcomes and not the
impact of specific policy actions, it is difficult to identify
the net effect of the rule on the budgetary position. 
Table V.4 shows the average rate of growth of the items
falling under an expenditure rule: when data on specific
expenditure categories covered by a rule are not availa-
ble, a close proxy is used. Averages are calculated for the
three years before the introduction of the rule, and for the
years following the introduction of the rule, up to
2002 (1). In four countries (Denmark, France, Luxem-
bourg and Belgium), the rule is defined in terms of real
rate of growth of expenditure, while in Ireland the target
is in terms of nominal rate of growth. Five countries
(Sweden, Greece, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland)
have a more composite definition that can be proxied to
a nominal ceiling. However, since the final aim is to con-
trol expenditure, to assess whether the rule worked, the
real rate of growth is used as a proxy of the target.
In five out of 10 countries, the rate of growth after the
introduction of the rule has been lower compared with
the years immediately prior to its introduction. In partic-
ular, the rate of growth of the expenditure targeted fell in
all those countries where the target has been defined as a
ceiling rather than as a rate of change: however, as
shown by t-statistics, differences in means are rarely sta-
tistically significant.
Whenever there is a correction of expenditure trends, the
effectiveness of an expenditure rule depends on its level
of ambition. In general, over-ambitious targets risk not
to be fulfilled: in some cases Member States have
changed the medium-term targets when it became clear
that these objectives would be difficult to respect. A tar-
get that is not ambitious enough, on the other hand, cre-
ates the risk of pushing expenditure up to the ceiling. A
strict adherence to a credible and realistic framework
would have probably enhanced the credibility of the
framework and contributed to the overall compliance
with the EU fiscal rules.
In many cases spending rules do not seem to be suffi-
ciently ambitious (2). In France, the 2000 updated stabil-
ity programme fixed a target of 4.9 % in real growth (on
a cumulative basis) for the three-year period 2001–03.
During the same period, real GDP growth is expected to
be at 4.1 % (3). Therefore, expenditure as a share of GDP
can increase without breaching the rule (4). In Belgium,
the rule fixes a real growth of primary expenditure of
1.5 % each year (5). Real GDP grew by 0.8 % in 2001,
0.7 % in 2002 and it is expected to grow by 1.3 % in
2003. Thus, compliance with the rule does not necessar-
ily imply a reduction of the expenditure-to-GDP ratio,
although admittedly the increase is at least in part due to
the low growth rates.
Table V.5 investigates whether there is a link between a
failure on the part of a Member State to respect its own
expenditure rule, and respect of the ‘close to balance or
in surplus’ requirement of the SGP. It compares the dif-
ference between the targeted (in the relevant stability or
convergence programme) and the actual outcome of total
expenditures as a share of GDP for cases identified
where countries missed their expenditure rule (6). The
final column shows the deterioration in the cyclically-
adjusted budget balance for the year in question com-
pared with the previous year. In all cases except Italy in
2002 and Finland in 2001 and 2002, non-compliance
with a national expenditure rule coincided with a wors-
ening cyclically-adjusted budget position. Concerning
Finland, the behaviour can be explained by the fact that
the Finnish expenditure rule stands out as a very ambi-
tious one as it aims at freezing real expenditure at the
level of 1999 (7). In Italy, cyclically-adjusted improve-
ments rely mainly on one-off measures that lowered
expenditure.        
¥1∂ 2000 for Ireland, when the rule was abandoned. Countries not included in
the Table implemented expenditure rules too recently to be assessed.
¥2∂ An exception is Ireland: it decided not to enforce its spending limits for
2001–02 which were quite tight compared with nominal GDP growth. Fin-
land also has an ambitious target, that is a frozen real central government
spending at the 1999 level. In Sweden, the norm is that the real rate of
change should be zero.
¥3∂ According to the European Commission spring 2003 forecasts.
¥4∂ Nevertheless, the target has been revised in the following updates of the
stability programme: it became 5.2 % in the updated programme 2001 and
6.5 % in the updated programme 2002.
¥5∂ The rule regards primary expenditure in entity I (Federal government and
social security).
¥6∂ Cases have been identified according to information available by the Euro-
pean Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs.
¥7∂ See also the chapter on Finland in Chapter VI.13 of this report.184
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a c r o s s  l e v e l s  o f  g o v e r n m e n tTo sum up, the overall picture signals that there are no
evident changes in the behaviour of expenditure once
spending rules are introduced. Nevertheless, the com-
pliance with the rule is difficult to judge. Targets are,
in many cases, set up over several years and there are
often revisions in due course. In some countries tar-
gets are not ambitious enough and adherence with
them is easily reached. In other cases, the rule has
been adjusted or abandoned since it was perceived to
be too ambitious. Moreover, the assessment of how
rules worked is limited by a lack of quantitative infor-
mation, so that expenditure trends are difficult to
monitor. This is particularly true in those cases where
the target concerns detailed expenditure categories
Table V.4
The impact of expenditure rules on spending trends
Item controlled Definition 
of the rule
Year 
of introduction
Real rate of growth of the measured item (1)
3 years before 
the introduction 
of the rule (A)
After 
the introduction 
of the rule (B)
T-test
for A ≠ B
DK Public consumption Real rate of growth 1999 2.4 1.6 1.0
FR Total expenditure Real rate of growth 1997 1.7 2.1 0.8
LU Total expenditure Real rate of growth 1999 3.5 6.2 1.0
BE Primary expenditure Real rate of growth 1999 2.0 2.6 1.0
SE Primary expenditure Real rate of growth 1997 0.9 3.3 1.9
IE Total expenditure Nominal rate of growth 1997 5.6 9.4 1.6
EL Compensation of employees Nominal ceiling 1997 12.3 7.1 1.1
NL Total expenditure Nominal ceiling 1994 2.2 1.0 1.1
AT Compensation of employees Nominal ceiling 2000 0.0 – 2.7 0.7
FI Total expenditure Nominal ceiling 1999 1.1 1.0 0.0
(1) Nominal rate of growth for Ireland, as defined in the expenditure rule.
Source: Commission services.
Table V.5
Total expenditure targets and spending rules
Expenditure/GDP Changes in cyclically-adjusted
budget balance (% GDP)Target Outcome Difference
BE (1999) 48.0 50.1 2.1 – 0.4
DK (1999) (1) 51.9 52.4 0.5 – 1.3
DE (2002) 48.0 48.6 0.6 – 0.3
FR (2002) 52.3 53.7 1.4 – 1.1
IT (2001) (2) 47.5 48.5 1.0 – 0.7
IT (2002) (2) 46.7 47.5 0.8 1.0
FI (2001) (3) 24.0 24.9 0.9 0.1
FI (2002) (3) 24.3 25.1 0.8 0.6
(1) Outcome before statistical revision.
(2) Targets recalculated by Commission services according to EU standards to ensure consistency with outcomes. Planned sales of real assets have been subtracted
from the expenditure targets (0.6 percentage points of GDP, only in 2002) and additional expenditure items have been included, as required under Commis-
sion Regulation (EC) No 1500/2000 (0.3 percentage points of GDP both in 2001 and 2002). Sales of real assets lowered outcomes by 0.2 percentage points of
GDP in 2001 and by 0.9 percentage points of GDP in 2002.
(3) Central government total expenditure. 
Source: Commission services on the basis of data provided by Member States in their stability or convergence programmes.185
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2 0 0 3and/or when the rule covers only part of the general
government.
2.4. Conclusions
Expenditures rules are becoming a common feature
among EU Member States as an additional tool to con-
trol budgetary development. In the majority of cases they
are ‘ex ante’ rules: they fix a target that helps to keep
expenditures under control during the process of budget-
ary formation. However, implementation mechanisms
and ‘ex post’ control are rather weak. As a consequence,
the medium-term expenditure target tends to be revised
if it becomes clear it cannot be reached. 
Thus, what counts for an effective expenditure rule is a
good design and the existence of control mechanisms
that allow to correct trends in the course of budget imple-
mentation. Control mechanisms should be accompanied
by enforcement mechanisms to render the rule fully
implemented.
In the EU context, national expenditure rules can com-
plement the fiscal framework currently in place, but can-
not be seen as a substitute. First, because they are not
subject to budgetary surveillance at EU level. Second,
their current designs and implementation mechanisms
do not ensure the achievement and maintenance of sound
public finances over the long term. 
However, even a ‘weak’ rule can be helpful as a guid-
ance of fiscal policy and to signal to the actors involved
in the budgetary process which are the components of
the budget that create more concern. Also, the redirec-
tion of public expenditure towards those items that are
more conducive to economic growth becomes easier.
Therefore, in all cases in which specific items less under
control crowd out other, perhaps more productive,
expenditures, a rule can increase the efficiency of public
expenditure.186
3. Fiscal relations across levels 
of government
3.1. Fiscal relations across different levels 
of government in EU Member States
In recent years, the management of public finances in EU
Member States has not only been affected by the process
of European integration, it has also been influenced by a
process of decentralisation whereby the budgetary auton-
omy of lower levels of government has been increased.
This reshaping of the division of budgetary competencies
between layers of government within Member States has
consequences for the budgetary requirements at the EU
level, as the Treaty and SGP obligations concern the gen-
eral government as a whole, that is, central, state and
local government plus social security. 
The process of transferring more budgetary authority to
lower levels of government is motivated in part by polit-
ical factors, namely as a way of reconciling divergence
or tension between communities with national political
cohesion or has been an expression of the citizens’ right
to participate in the conduct of public affairs (Committee
of the Regions, 2001) (1). Decentralisation may also be
justified on economic grounds: in particular, lower lev-
els of government may be able to better tailor the provi-
sion of public services to local needs and preferences,
and to establish a link with the taxes that are needed to
finance them, thereby increasing accountability at the
local level. Box V.1 provides an overview of the key
arguments of the theory of fiscal federalism.
There are large differences between EU Member States
in the way budgetary responsibilities are divided between
different levels of government. This is in part linked to
the system of government and particular whether the
country is a federal (Austria, Belgium and Germany) or
unitary State. However, the distinction is not clear cut.
Spain and Italy could be classified in both groups, since
they are unitary States with some characteristics of a fed-
eral State (2). The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland
and Sweden) also have some special characteristics, as
they are unitary States where the principle of ‘self-gov-
ernment’ is grounded in the constitution.             
A common indicator for assessing the degree of fiscal
decentralisation is to look at sub-national expenditures
and revenues, both as a percentage of GDP and of total
public expenditures. Table V.6 reports this indicator
based on the data available in the European system of
accounts (3). The figures are based on a calculation of
revenues and expenditures at different levels of govern-
ment as the sum of their components, since there are no
harmonised data ESA95 available for total revenues and
expenditures at lower levels of government (4). These
figures must be interpreted with care as they give an
approximate indication of the size of lower levels of gov-
ernment, but do not measure budgetary autonomy. 
¥1∂ See page 48 of Committee of the Regions (2001) for examples of devolu-
tion in Europe. It should be noted that decentralisation is not a uniform
trend in all Member States. It is a long-term process that has taken place
during the last few decades. See the decentralisation web site of the World
Bank (www.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization) for an overview
of the different arguments surrounding the debate on decentralisation.
¥2∂ In Spain, the constitution does not directly specify the regions (‘autono-
mous communities’), which account for a large part of public expenditure
(Table V.6). Italy also has federalist characteristics, since regional authori-
ties exercise legislative powers comparable with those of regions or states
in federal Member States (Committee of the Regions, 2001). 
¥3∂ The most common databases for cross-country comparison in this field are
the Government Finance Statistics of the IMF and the OECD Revenue Statis-
tics.
¥4∂ Total expenditure is calculated as the sum of (ESA categories are indi-
cated): D.3 subsidies, D.4 Property income, D.5 Current taxes on income
and wealth, D.62 Social benefits other than transfers in kind, D.7 Other cur-
rent transfers, P.3 Final consumption expenditure, D.9 Capital transfers, P.5
Gross capital formation, K.2; Acquisitions of non-produced non-financial
assets. Total Resources are calculated as the sum of K.1 Consumption of
fixed capital, B.2 Operating surplus, D.2 Taxes on production and imports,
D.4 property income, D.5 Current taxes on income and wealth, D.61 Social
contributions, D.7 Other current transfers, D.9 Capital transfers. 187
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2 0 0 3Table V.6 shows that, in general, the federal and the Nor-
dic countries are the most decentralised according to the
indicator. When measured in terms of sub-government
expenditure (that is, State and local) as a percentage of
total government spending, then Denmark (57 %), Ger-
many (43 %), Belgium (41 %), Sweden (40 %) and Spain
(38 %) stand out as having a highly decentralised fiscal
structure (1). A second group consists of the Netherlands
(35 %), Finland (34 %), Austria (33 %), Italy (30 %), the
UK (26 %) and France (19 %). The most centralised
Member States are Luxembourg, Portugal (both 14 %)
and Greece (4 %). With respect to the development of
lower levels of government over time, the figures gener-
ally show slow changes in the level of decentralisation
since 1995, the first year for which figures are available
for all Member States. Nevertheless, a relative increase
since 1995 is recorded in the size of the states in Austria
and Spain and the local level of government in Denmark,
Sweden and Italy. A relative decrease is recorded in the
size of the local government in the Netherlands.
Table V.7 examines the composition of public spending
by sub-central levels of government in Member States
where data was available. According to the theory of fis-
cal federalism, public spending of sub-central authorities
could be expected in policy domains where there are
large differences in preferences/needs across regions,
but less so in areas whereas economies of scale and spill-
over effects prevail.
Box V.1: Key arguments of the theory on fiscal federalism
The theory of fiscal federalism has developed criteria for the assignment of government activities to different layers of gov-
ernment. The main benefits of centralisation are the internalisation of externalities and spillovers (that is, when market fail-
ures have cross-border effects on other jurisdictions), and the exploitation of economies of scale. However, these need to
be weighed against the benefits of decentralisation which include a capacity to adjust the provision of public goods and
services to local preferences and needs, the avoidance of diseconomies of scale, more competition and innovation in the
provision of public goods and services, and improved accountability and transparency of policy makers by establishing a
more direct link between the benefits of public expenditures and the taxes levied to finance them. 
Fiscal federalism yields no clear-cut policy conclusions on the assignment of public functions whose main objective is to
ensure an efficient allocation of resources. A cost/benefit assessment is needed on a case by case basis. Some public goods/
services may need to be centralised where there are large spillover effects covering the entire country (national transport
infrastructure), whereas others may be more efficiently provided at local level (local transport infrastructures).
In contrast, stronger policy conclusions are drawn as regards the benefits of centralising the public function that aim at
redistribution (either across regions or individuals) for several reasons. Firstly, the demand for redistribution policies may
cover an entire country, in that citizens may be concerned about the living standards of the entire population and not just
in their own locality or State. Secondly, it may be very difficult to operate redistribution policies efficiently at sub-central
level: labour mobility may result in the migration of low-income persons to regions providing the most generous benefits
whereas high-skilled persons may move to regions with the lowest taxes. 
Fiscal federalism in general reaches strong policy conclusions on centralising the stabilisation function. This is because
lower levels of government might not have the right incentives to provide an optimal level of stabilisation, since a consid-
erable part of their stabilisation efforts would leak away to other jurisdictions. Furthermore, the possibilities of local gov-
ernments to run counter-cyclical policies (for example, by means of letting the automatic stabilisers work) are often limited,
given the existence of borrowing restrictions.
In general, the theory of fiscal federalism provides stronger arguments in favour of centralised revenue collection compared
with expenditures. Centralised revenue collection could lower the costs of collection and compliance due to economics of
scale, it could prevent tax evasion induced by mobile tax basis and prevent excessive tax competition. This can give rise
to a ’vertical fiscal imbalance’ whereby central sub-national governments have to rely on the central government to provide
them with revenues to finance decentralised public expenditures.
¥1∂ One should keep in mind that this figure does not measure local autonomy
in deciding on expenditure.188
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presence of spillover effects, economies of scale and polit-
ical considerations. A considerable percentage of the
resources of sub-central authorities are devoted to items
such as education, housing, recreation and culture: decen-
tralised provision of these items may be justified on the
ground of tailoring public goods and services to local
needs and preferences. The largest differences between
Member States can be found in the categories of health
and social security and welfare, where sub-central author-
ities in several countries have an important role to play. 
It should be noted, however, that the scale and composi-
tion of public spending by sub-central authorities does
not coincide with the actual degree of budgetary auton-
omy of sub-national authorities. This is because the cen-
tral government can influence, to a large degree, the
expenditure choices of sub-central authorities, for exam-
ple by mandating standards of public goods and services
that sub-central authorities must provide. Local or state
government expenditures, for example, include expendi-
tures that are part of national programmes. In the Nordic
Member States, central control is generally confined to
setting a broad policy framework, leaving them a high
degree of independence in areas like primary education,
social and health services. Their counterparts in the
Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Italy have a role too
in providing the major welfare services, though with
more detailed steering by higher tiers of government
(Committee of the Regions, 2001).
Sub-central authorities can be financed through taxes,
grants, service charges and fees (1). Table V.8 shows the
main categories as according to the ESA95 classifica-
tions. Taxes that are collected by the central government
and automatically transferred to the local and state gov-
Table V.6
Expenditure and revenues at State and local government level
MS Structure
Total expenditures Total revenues
% of GDP % of total % of GDP % of total
1995 2000 2001 1995 2000 2001 1995 2000 2001 1995 2000 2001
BE Federal State 14 13 14 26 27 27 13 14 14 27 27 28
Local 7 7 7 12 14 13 7 7 7 14 13 13
DK Unitary; local self-government Local 32 31 31 53 56 57 33 31 31 56 53 54
DE Federal State 13 14 14 27 29 28 12 13 12 26 28 27
Local 8 7 7 15 15 14 8 7 7 16 15 16
EL Unitary Local 2 2 2 3 4 4 2 2 2 5 4 4
ES Unitary; federal features State 7 9 9 15 22 23 6 8 8 16 21 21
Local 6 6 6 13 15 15 6 6 6 15 16 16
FR Unitary Local 10 10 10 18 19 19 10 10 10 20 19 19
IT Unitary; federal features Local 13 14 14 24 30 30 13 14 15 28 30 32
LU Unitary Local 7 6 15 14 7 6 15 13
NL Unitary Local 23 16 16 45 35 35 23 16 16 49 34 35
AT Federal State 8 10 10 14 18 18 9 10 10 16 20 19
Local 9 8 8 16 15 15 8 8 8 16 16 15
PT (1) Unitary Local 5 7 12 14 5 5 14 12
FI Unitary; local self-government Local 19 16 17 31 33 34 20 16 16 36 29 30
SE Unitary; local self-government Local 23 22 23 34 39 40 23 23 23 37 38 38
UK Unitary, four constituent nations Local 12 10 11 26 28 26 11 10 11 29 25 26
EUR-12 16 16 31 33 16 15 33 32
EU-15 16 15 31 33 16 15 33 32
(1) Figures for PT concern 1999.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ That is, in the absence of borrowing. See Graph V.3 on the contribution of
lower levels of government to general government borrowing.189
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2 0 0 3ernments (for example, as part of a tax-sharing agree-
ment) are registered as if they were collected directly by
the local or state government. According to ESA95, the
category of transfers within the general government
mainly shows block transfers to the local and state gov-
ernments that do not correspond to any specific category
of taxes. 
There are large differences in the way Member States
finance their expenditure at lower levels of government.
In Belgium, the states rely mostly on transfers from the
central government. For the states in Austria and Spain,
transfers also account for a large part of their revenues,
although to a lesser extent than in Belgium. In Austria,
tax sharing represents another important part of income,
while the states in Spain have increased their tax auton-
omy in the second half of the 1990s. For the German
states, the transfers from the central government are
much smaller and tax income is the most important
source of revenue. This reflects the importance of tax
sharing of national taxes with the central government. 
Transfers to local governments are relatively high in
the UK and the Netherlands, which indicates their rela-
tively centralised system of financing local govern-
ments. This contrasts with Italy and France, where the
autonomy of lower levels of government in raising
taxes is higher. In Italy in particular, reforms in the
1990s have strongly decreased local governments’
dependence on transfers from the centre and extended
their autonomy in raising taxes. Finally, the data for the
category of taxes on income and wealth show very
large differences between Denmark, Finland and Swe-
den, where figures range from 10 to 15 % of GDP, and
other Member States, where this figure is usually below
2 % of GDP, in line with the fact that income taxes are
the most important source of income at local level for
the Nordic countries.
3.2. Fiscal decentralisation and its 
interaction with the EU’s fiscal rules
3.2.1. Fiscal decentralisation and the goal of sound 
and sustainable public finances
The data in Section 3.1 clearly illustrate the importance
of public finances at sub-central level when considering
the overall budgetary situation of a Member State. A
question arises whether there is a link between the
degree of fiscal decentralisation and the budgetary per-
formance, in particular the capacity of Member States to
meet the budget balance and debt requirements for the
general government set down in the Treaty and SGP. 
Graph V.2 compares an indicator for fiscal decentrali-
sation with indicators for budget balance and debt. It
shows that, at first glance, there is no apparent link
between the degree of fiscal decentralisation and budg-
etary performance.
However, a possible link between fiscal decentralisation
and budgetary performance may exist, depending upon
whether or not a sub-central authority faces a hard
budget constraint (for example, Rodden, 2000). The
argument is that lower levels of government may not
take adequate account of the spillover effects of their
budget policies and may face incentives to shift the costs
of their expenditure decisions to the central level of gov-
ernment. The extent to which they might be able to act
according to these incentives depends on the institutional
set-up of the system of financing of lower levels of gov-
ernment (Eichengreen and von Hagen, 1996, Rodden,
2002, Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997).                    
There may be a tendency for higher levels of public
spending and deficits if there is a vertical fiscal imbal-
ance, that is, when sub-central authorities have important
responsibilities for public expenditures but limited own
resources and are thus reliant on transfers and grants
from central authorities. These transfers may create the
perception that local public spending is funded by non-
residents. As a consequence, expenditure discipline and
cost-awareness might deteriorate: the costs of grants
may not be fully internalised at the local level, causing to
demand above-optimal levels of public expenditures on
items that are financed by grants for central authorities
(for example, Rodden and Wibbels, 2002). This pressure
for increased transfers to sub-central authorities could
translate into higher deficits and debt of the general gov-
ernment. On a related point, sub-central authorities may
engage in excessive levels of borrowing if they consider
that, in the event of default, they will be bailed out by a
higher level. Pressures to bail out sub-central authorities
may rise with the degree of vertical imbalance, since the
smaller the tax base and the control over it at sub-
national level, the smaller are the possibilities at that
level to raise taxes in the event of financial problems.
In response to these pressures, governments in recent
years have paid close attention to the incentives embed-
ded in the design of grants and revenue sharing arrange-
ments with sub-central authorities. Many countries have190
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2 0 0 3also introduced borrowing restrictions for lower levels of
government (for an overview see Ter-Minasian and
Craig, 1997), and empirical studies indicate that higher
degrees of vertical imbalance and sub-national borrow-
ing restrictions are indeed associated (Eichengreen and
Von Hagen, 1996). 
Borrowing restrictions are usually found to be effective
in restraining fiscal policies at lower levels of govern-
ment (for example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1995).
All EU countries apply restrictions to local government
spending and borrowing, but in various forms and
degrees (Dafflon, 2002). Their impact within the EU is
examined on Graph V.3 which contrasts the general gov-
Graph V.2:  Fiscal decentralisation and budgetary situation         
Source: Commission services.
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Local and state governments usually balance their budg-
ets or run small deficits or surpluses. The only notable
exception is Germany, where net lending by local and
state government accounts for almost half of the general
government deficit in 2002.
Clearly this does not provide for an adequate picture of
the overall contribution of lower levels of government to
the general government budget balance. For example, a
sub-national government that is facing a borrowing
restriction might obtain a higher amount of grants or per-
centage of shared taxes from the central government,
increasing the deficit at that level. 
3.2.2. Recent measures in several Member States 
to coordinate budgetary positions across levels 
of government in light of EU requirements
In recent years, a number of Member States have re-
considered the fiscal relations across different levels of
government which take into account the need to comply
with EU budgetary requirements. These initiatives also
sought to correct a form of vertical institutional imbal-
ance, whereby the Treaty and SGP obligations concern
the general government as a whole (i.e. central, state and
local government plus social security) but commitments
given at European level (notably in the annual updates to
stability and convergence programmes) are made by the
central government. Compliance with budgetary com-
mitments given at EU levels is dependent upon the budg-
etary performance of all levels of government, whereas
the costs of non-compliance (either the reputational cost
or ultimately in the form of a pecuniary sanction) are
borne by central government. 
Apart from borrowing and budgeting restrictions for
sub-national authorities (as discussed in the previous
section), the federal Member States and Italy and Spain
have also introduced institutional arrangements at
national level, usually referred to as national stability
pacts. These arrangements can be summarised according
to the formulation and scope of their targets, the meas-
urement of the targets, their legal status, the process of
surveillance and the enforcement including possible
sanctions. The usual hypothesis is that a complete design
across all these dimensions will contribute to the effec-
tiveness of the arrangements. 
Graph V.3:  The contribution of lower levels of government to general government, 
net lending (+) or borrowing (–) in 2002 
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2 0 0 3In January 1999, a domestic stability pact was enacted in
Austria. In October 2000, it was amended by an agree-
ment between the federal government, provinces and the
local authorities that covers the period until 2004. The
agreement covered the joint achievement of a balanced
budget by 2002 as well as financial burden sharing
arrangements. The provinces undertook to contribute to
an average budget surplus over the whole period of not
less than 0.75 % of GDP up to 2004. Temporary under-
runs of – 0.15 % of GDP are allowed if, over the whole
financial burden-sharing period, the averaged value of
0.75 % GDP is maintained. The local authorities under-
took to balance their budget up to 2004. Temporary
overruns of 0.1 % of GDP are allowed if, over the whole
period, the average position of a balanced budget is
attained. The system of monitoring and enforcement
includes possible fines, subject to unanimous decision
from all interested parties. The flood disaster in 2002 led
to a temporary suspension of the rule, that is, not taking
account of flood-related expenditure in the years 2002
and 2003.
In Belgium the coordination of the budget balance posi-
tion of various levels of government is ensured by the
agreement concluded initially in 2000, and renewed in
2002, between the federal government, the communities
and regions to adhere to the budgetary targets as recom-
mended each year by the High Council of Finance (1).
The communities and regions draw up internal medium-
term stability programmes each year, at least equal in
duration to the Belgian stability programme, which are
evaluated by the High Council of Finance. The agree-
ment covers the period of 2001–05. The cooperation
agreement does not include formal sanctioning proce-
dures in case of deviation from the permissible deficits.
However, the federal government can restrict the bor-
rowing capacity of communities and regions for a period
of up to two years upon recommendation of the High
Council of Finance and after the regions involved have
been consulted (IMF, 2001).
On 21 March 2002, the federal government and the
Länder in Germany agreed on a kind of National Sta-
bility Pact for the implementation of the SGP (for a
more detailed description, see the case study on Ger-
many in Section 3.4.2). The federal government and the
Länder (including the local governments falling within
their competence) commit to comply with the budget-
ary rules of EMU and ‘shall strive towards a reduction
in net borrowing with the aim of achieving balanced
budgets’. The Financial Planning Council, to which the
Federal Minister for Finance, the Federal Minister for
Commerce and Labour, the Finance Ministers of the
Länder as well as representatives of local authorities
and local authority associations belong, discusses the
compatibility of the budgetary developments of territo-
rial authorities with the provisions of the SGP. The
Financial Planning Council will issue recommenda-
tions on budgetary policies — and in particular on a
common expenditure line — taking into account the
economic and fiscal factors. Regarding enforcement,
the Financial Planning Council will discuss the reasons
of non-respect of the rules and give recommendations
in order to restore budgetary discipline. 
In Italy, a domestic stability pact came into force through
legislation adopted in connection with the budget law for
1999. It aims at improving the budget balances of local
governments by fixing targets for the reduction of their
deficits. Healthcare expenditure, which accounts for over
two thirds of regional expenditure, is subject to a separate
agreement. The Treasury is to monitor cash flows during
the year and report on a quarterly basis to the conference
for relations between regions and State and the confer-
ence for state-municipalities, which are expected to indi-
cate measures to achieve the targets in case of divergence.
Possible fines under the budgetary rules of the Treaty and
the SGP are to be levied on the local authorities that have
failed to meet their targets, in proportion to the overshoot
for which they are responsible. 
In Spain the General Law of Budgetary Stability enacted
in 2001 has taken effect from 2003 (for a more detailed
description, see the case study on Spain in Section 3.4.1).
The central feature is that all general government sub-
sectors should show a surplus or a balanced budget.
Temporary deficits are allowed only in exceptional situ-
ations, where two-to-three year plans will be discussed
in Parliament to return to a surplus or a balanced budget.
The central government monitors budgetary execution
and assesses the degree of fulfilment of the objectives.
As a part of enforcement, the central government will be
able to condition any recourse to debt by sub-national
governments. Possible fines under the budgetary rules of
the Treaty and the SGP will be shared by those public
entities responsible for the deficits. 
¥1∂ Advisory board on fiscal policy of the government and communities and
regions.194
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the way Member States address the challenge of coordi-
nating the overall budgetary position across levels of
government. The differences reflect historical circum-
stances, variation in political structure and diversity in
budgetary processes. Some Member States have chosen
to replicate the medium-term objective of the SGP of
‘close to balance or in surplus’ at the local or regional
level, while others have chosen to define specific budget-
ary targets on a yearly basis. In some cases, the arrange-
ments are laid down in national law, while in others they
are formulated as an agreement between levels of govern-
ment. There are also institutional differences with respect
to the way the arrangements are implemented and moni-
tored. Finally, some arrangements specify the specific
actions to be taken in case of non-compliance, such as
imposing sanctions, while others do not.
More experience with the implementation of the
arrangements is needed before firm conclusions can be
drawn on their effectiveness in contributing to the over-
all fiscal objectives of the SGP. A crucial issue is how
the mechanisms are implemented when a divergence
arises between targets and expected outcomes that can-
not be attributed to exceptional circumstances. In this
respect, a strong legal base and enforcement mechanism
would be expected to contribute to the credibility and
effectiveness of the arrangements. 
3.3. Fiscal decentralisation 
and automatic stabilisation
Apart from the issue of how fiscal decentralisation
affects the capacity of Member State to achieve sound
and sustainable public finances, it may also be relevant
as regards the effects of fiscal policy on the stabilisation
of economic activity, and in particular the operation of
automatic stabilisers. Stabilisation could be beneficial
both to smooth taxes and consumption over time and to
avoid excessive output and employment variability and
boom-bust fluctuations. 
EMU raises particular concerns as regards the role of
national fiscal policies for stabilisation purposes (see
European Commission 2001a): it is widely argued that
given the loss of national monetary policy in EMU,
budgetary policy may need to play a more significant
role in smoothening the impact of country-specific
shocks on real output. The philosophy underlying the
Treaty and the SGP reflects widespread scepticism on
the use of discretionary fiscal policies for stabilisation
purposes (European Commission 2002a), and the norm
for budgetary behaviour in EMU should be to let auto-
matic stabilisers operate freely over the economic
cycle. Adhering to budgetary positions of ‘close to bal-
ance or in surplus’ will provide for an adequate safety
margin to prevent nominal budget deficits from breach-
ing the 3 % of GDP reference value while letting auto-
matic stabilisers play fully. 
The traditional literature on fiscal federalism provides
arguments in favour of centralising the stabilisation
function. Lower levels of government might not have the
right incentives to provide an optimal level of stabilisa-
tion, since a large part of their stabilisation effort would
leak away to other jurisdictions. Likewise, local govern-
ments could try to free ride on the effort of others. Fur-
thermore, the possibilities of local governments to run
counter-cyclical policies (for example, by means of let-
ting automatic stabilisers work) are, in many cases, lim-
ited given the existence of borrowing and budgeting
restrictions. As a result, it is widely believed that there
may be good reason to shield the income of lower levels
of government to some extent from cyclical fluctuations.
Ter-Minassian (1997) summarises the broad consensus
in the literature that the central government should be
assigned taxes that, among other things, have a higher
income elasticity, ‘that is, to provide the central govern-
ment with stabilisation instruments, and also to shelter to
the extent possible the budgets of sub-national govern-
ments from cyclical fluctuations’ (1). This kind of shelter
can be achieved either by only assigning tax bases to
lower levels of government that are sufficiently stable
over the cycle, or by devising a system of shared taxes or
grants that correct for cyclical variability in own taxes at
lower levels of government. 
The empirical literature on fiscal federalism and auto-
matic stabilisation focuses mainly on the US, and
sometimes on other large federalist States as well (such
as Canada and Germany), where state budgets are large
enough to potentially influence overall automatic stabi-
lisation. The results indicate agreement that more strin-
gent borrowing controls are associated with less cycli-
cal response of the budget balance at the level of the
states within federations (Sørensen et al (2001),
Alesina and Bayoumi (1996), Bayoumi and Eichen-
green (1995)). Moreover, Alesina and Bayoumi (1996)
¥1∂ Ter-Minassian (1997) also provides an overview of which taxes would be
more suitable for assignment to the central government or to lower levels of
government. 195
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does not affect output variability at state level within
the US, indicating that balanced budget rules for the US
states are effective in enforcing fiscal discipline, but
have no costs in terms of increased output variability.
Lastly, Sørensen et al (2001) specifically investigate
the cyclical variability of different components of the
budget for the US states, indicating that state revenues
and expenditure are both pro-cyclical, but the pro-
cyclicality of revenue dominates so that the overall
budget balances improve during upturns and worsen
during downturns. These results indicate — at least for
the US — a gap between practice and the recommenda-
tion of shielding sub-national revenues and expenditure
from cyclical variations. No firm conclusions are
reached, however, on the desirability of automatic sta-
bilisation at lower levels of government. 
From the point of view of the EU, a relevant question is
whether the trend of fiscal decentralisation might impact
on the extent to which budgets of sub-national govern-
ments are shielded from cyclical variations. Greater tax
autonomy at lower levels of government might increase
the cyclical variability of revenue at local level and lead
to a degree of procyclical behaviour if borrowing
requirements are in place. For example, if tax revenues
at lower levels of government decrease in a recession
then expenditure would have to be cut as a result. 
To investigate the issue, it is necessary to examine the
variability of budget balances at the state/regional levels
of government and the cyclical variability of revenues
and expenditure at state levels of government. Table V.9
presents figures for aggregate net lending (–) and bor-
rowing (+) at the state-level government for the federal-
ist Member States (including Spain) and the local level
for the Nordic countries. It also shows the development
of the output gaps over time. The aggregate budget bal-
ances at state or local level generally show little cyclical
variation over time. For Belgium and especially Ger-
many, the aggregate budget balances of the states could
indicate a small degree of cyclical sensitivity. Neverthe-
less, the limited period for which data are available does
not allow for a firm conclusion in this respect. 
The crucial question is whether a low degree of cyclical
response of the budget balance at state or local level is
due a low cyclical variability of revenues and expendi-
ture. According to the proposition that lower levels of
government should be shielded from cyclical variations
in their revenues and expenditures, one would expect a
steady growth in real revenues and expenditures of lower
levels of government at the rate of trend GDP (in absence
of any change in the size of lower levels of government).
If, on the contrary, revenue and expenditure at lower lev-
els of government would be responsive to the cycle, then
a lack of cyclical movement of state budget balances
could indicate a degree of pro-cyclical behaviour, possi-
Table V.9
Aggregate budget balances at state level (AT, BE, ES, DE), local level (DK, FI, SE) and output gaps.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
AT B. balance 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2
Output gap – 0.8 – 0.9 – 1.5 0.2 0.7 1.9 0.5
BE B. balance – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.8
Output gap – 0.7 – 1.5 – 0.1 0.0 1.0 2.2 1.0
ES B. balance – 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.5
Output gap – 3.0 – 3.1 – 1.8 – 0.3 0.7 1.6 0.9
DE B. balance – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.2 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 1.3
Output gap 0.2 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.2 1.1 0.4
DK B. balance 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.4 0.1 0.0 – 0.1
Output gap 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.4 0.6
FI B. balance 1.4 0.9 – 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.2 – 0.3
Output gap – 2.5 – 1.1 1.7 2.8 2.3 4.3 1.4
SE B. balance 0.0 – 0.2 – 4.9 – 0.2 – 5.4 0.3 – 0.2
Output gap – 0.4 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 0.2 1.5 3.0 1.3
Source: Commission services.196
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the typical pattern would be that revenues show a degree
of cyclical variability and that expenditures are adjusted
in a pro-cyclical manner as a result. 
The following figures therefore plot the yearly changes
in the level of real revenues and expenditures at the state/
regional level of government as well as the output gaps.
Graph V.4 shows the results for Germany from 1991
onwards. Changes in the level of revenues and spending
show a strong correlation and seem to move to some
degree at least in line with the economic cycle. The last
year shows a stronger drop in revenues than expenditure,
which is in line with the recent increase of the budget
deficit for the states. In sum, the figures suggest a degree
of cyclical variation in revenues followed by a smaller
degree of pro-cyclicality on the spending side (and hence
some degree of cyclical variation of the deficit ratio at
the level of the states). 
Graph V.5 shows the available results for the Spanish
regions. The growth rates of expenditure and revenue
well above at the trend rate of GDP are in line with the
increase in fiscal responsibilities of the Spanish regions
as reported elsewhere (for example, Committee of the
Regions, 2001) The figures seem to provide little or no
indication of pro-cyclicality in spending. A relevant
question, however, is whether the recent budgetary
reform in Spain, which combines a higher degree of tax
autonomy for lower levels of government and balanced
budget requirements could lead to a greater degree of
pro-cyclicality in the future (see case study on Spain in
Section 3.4.1).               
Graph V.6 shows the results for Denmark, a unitary State
with a high degree of decentralisation and local auton-
omy. A relevant feature of the Danish system is that
block grants to lower levels of government are adjusted
for changes in the burden of tasks that the central govern-
ment assigns to local governments and the effects of
business-cycle fluctuations (OECD, 2003b). These
cyclical variations are covered by the ‘budget guaran-
¥1∂ Rodden (2002) presents an index of borrowing autonomy for lower levels
of government, where a score of 1 implies no borrowing autonomy and a
score of 5 a high degree of borrowing autonomy. The scores for the Mem-
ber States as shown here are States Austria: 1.85; States Spain: 2.8; States
Germany: 2.7.
Graph V.4:  Germany: output gap and changes in the level of real revenues and expenditure at State level 
 
Source: Commission services.
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Source: Commission services.
Graph V.6:  Denmark: output gap and changes in the level of real revenues and expenditure at local level  
Source: Commission services.
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changes in expenditure (such as unemployment benefits)
that are caused by cyclical variations. As expected, since
local governments are not allowed to run deficits (except
in short periods), changes in revenues and expenditures
show a large correlation over time. In principle, the
counter-cyclical adjustments of the block grant need not
imply that total expenditures at local level are counter-
cyclical. Nevertheless, a marked difference with the
cases described above is that revenues and expenditures
at local level show a rise in 2001 against a background of
lower growth, which may indicate a degree of counter-
cyclicality, in line with the philosophy of the SGP.
In interpreting the results of the examples above, one
should be careful to recognise the preliminary nature of
the analysis. The analysis is a partial one, as it only
investigates the cyclical pattern of government finances
at the state and local level, and is based on aggregate data
for a limited period of time. A follow-up study could
investigate the total degree of cyclical variability of
budgets of Member States and investigate the contribu-
tion of all levels of government (that is, central, state,
local and social security) as well as its actual effects on
output.
3.4. Case studies
3.4.1. Spain
Introduction
Spain’s budget deficit was gradually reduced during the
second half of the 1990s in line with EMU fiscal rules.
More recently, attention has focused on how to ensure
budgetary stability in a context of increasing fiscal decen-
tralisation. At present, territorial governments represent
more than 30 % of total general government expenditure
and nearly 70 % of general government investment.
The General Law of Budgetary Stability (GLBS) came
into force in 2003. Its adoption follows the new financing
system for regional governments implemented in 2002,
which implies considerably greater taxation powers for
regional authorities and widens joint fiscal responsibility.
The GLBS aims at ensuring that increased decentralisa-
tion of public finances should not put at risk overall budg-
etary stability. It does so by requiring that all the general
government sub-sectors should show a surplus or bal-
anced budget and by introducing new budgetary proce-
dures and norms. These institutional changes are seen as
more important in ensuring budgetary stability than the
mere setting of quantitative targets.
The principle of budgetary stability implying a surplus
or a balanced budget will be applied to all public entities.
Thus, apart from the central government (State, social
security and autonomous entities) and regional and local
governments, public bodies (even if they are not
included in the general government definition on a
national accounts basis) are covered by this new legal
framework. Therefore, the scope of the GLBS is wider
than the general government definition on ESA95 basis.
Main principles of the GLBS 
The GLBS is based on four basic principles: 
• each entity of the public sector must fulfil the crite-
rion of budgetary stability, which is defined in the
law as ‘a situation of balance or in surplus in terms
of financing capacity according to ESA95 method-
ology’. As far as public entities and enterprises are
concerned, the definition of budgetary stability is
more vague. For these entities budgetary stability
means ‘a balanced financial situation, which might
imply, if necessary, the adoption of restructuring
strategies to avoid or lower economic losses and
provide adequate profits for the fulfilment of their
institutional purposes’; 
• multiannual framework for budgetary setting, which
implies that each public entity must prepare the
budget on the basis of medium-term projections
(three years). This framework is in line with the time
horizon of the stability programme; 
• transparency, meaning that each public entity must
provide enough information to allow the assessment
of its budgetary situation and the fulfilment of the
budgetary stability criterion; 
• efficiency in the use of public funds in order to
accomplish the budgetary stability criterion for each
public agent. To give practical implementation to
these principles, the GLBS introduces new budget-
ary procedures, both for the public sector as a whole
and for each sub-sector.199
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 3Budgetary procedure innovations 
concerning the whole of the public sector
All public sector entities are required to modify their
specific budgetary procedures to ensure compliance with
the budgetary stability criterion. The central government
is responsible for the assessment of budgetary stability in
the public sector as a whole (1). In particular, all public
entities will have to consider the following:
• budgetary deficits have to be justified by the public
sector entity concerned and will require the formula-
tion of a medium-term (three years) plan to restore a
balanced budget situation;
• in the first quarter of each year, the central govern-
ment will release the budgetary objectives for the
next three years for the whole general government
sector and for each sub-sector. These objectives are
to be discussed in the Parliament together with the
macroeconomic scenario for the same period set out
in the stability programme;
• before 1 September of each year the General Inter-
vention of the State (IGAE henceforth) will submit
a report on the degree of fulfilment of the stability
objectives in the previous year. The report will be
sent to the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (the
official body responsible for coordinating fiscal pol-
icy between central and regional governments).
Imbalances will have to be justified and will require
the formulation of a plan to correct them;
• the financial penalties due to the non-fulfilment of
the commitments assumed by Spain within SGP will
be shared by those public entities responsible for the
deficits.
Budgetary procedures innovations 
for central government and social security 
The following rules apply to the central government and
social security system, taking into account that the budg-
etary stability objectives for these two sub-sectors will
be considered jointly until the process of separation of
social security financing is completed in 2012. 
• Before releasing the Budget Law, the Ministry of
the Economy prepares a multiannual programme of
expenditure and revenues for each year specifying
the spending commitments for ‘every budgetary
policy’.
• Along with the budgetary stability objectives
announced in the first quarter of each year for the
next three years, the government sets a maximum
expenditure limit for the State on an annual basis for
the same period.
• Based on the maximum limit set for the non-financial
expenditure for the State, a contingency fund is cre-
ated up to a maximum of 2 % of the such limit. This
fund is to be used for changes in spending commit-
ments to meet unforeseen circumstances. The Minis-
try of Public Finances has to inform parliament about
the use of such funds on a quarterly basis. Thus, new
spending commitments have to be financed through
this fund or by reducing other expenditures. It is not
possible to carry over unspent amounts in the fund
from one year to the following one. 
• Surpluses recorded by the State are allocated to debt
reduction while those registered by the social security
are allocated with priority to the pension reserve fund.
• Public entities and enterprises not included in the gen-
eral government sector on a national accounts basis
but dependent on the central government have to con-
tribute to budgetary stability. Thus, in case of losses
affecting negatively the central government budget-
ary objective, a medium-term plan containing appro-
priate measures to remedy this situation has to be
adopted. The legal procedures, contents and deadlines
for these plans will be set out in a specific regulation.
Budgetary procedure innovations 
concerning regional governments
In addition to the rules that apply to the whole of the pub-
lic sector, regional governments are required to respect
the following criteria.
• The budgetary stability objective for the whole
regional government sub-sector released by the cen-
tral government in the first quarter of each year will
have to take into account a previous report by the
Fiscal and Financial Policy Council. Once the budg-
etary stability objective for the whole regional gov-
¥1∂ This responsibility will be, to some extent, shared when assessing the
budgetary stability for regional and local governments. The so-called ‘Fis-
cal and Financial Policy Council’, made up of central and regional author-
ity representatives, will carry out the assessment for regional governments.
In turn, the ‘National Committee for Local Entities’ co-assesses the finan-
cial situation of local governments.200
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government, the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council
has one month to translate it into budgetary objec-
tives for each regional government. If, in this period,
the Council does not reach an agreement, each
regional government has to prepare its budget
respecting, at least, a balanced budget objective.
• If a regional government approves its budget fore-
seeing a deficit or fails to achieve the budgetary
stability objective set in the previous budget, a
medium-term plan aiming at rectifying this situation
is required. This plan must include all the necessary
revenue and expenditure measures to restore budg-
etary stability within three years, and requires the
approval by the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council.
The Ministry of Public Finances is responsible for
the monitoring of this plan.
• The State can condition the issuance of new debt and
the recourse to bank credit by the regional govern-
ments to the fulfilment of their budgetary stability
objectives. In addition, the Ministry of Public
Finances is allowed to request information from
regional governments and to set up a public informa-
tion agency for loan operations, debt issuance and
assumption of risks by regional authorities. 
• Regional governments are able to take measures so
as to reach budgetary stability in relation to public
entities and enterprises not included in the general
government sector on a national accounts basis but
dependent on regional authorities.
Budgetary procedure innovations 
concerning local governments
The procedures that apply to local governments are
broadly the same as to those addressed to regional
authorities. In this case, the National Committee for
Local Entities plays a role analogous to that of the Fiscal
Financial Policy Council. 
A tentative assessment
The GLBS can be seen as a means to keep public
finances on a sound basis so as to respect the fiscal com-
mitments undertaken at European level while allowing
to share fiscal responsibility among all general govern-
ment tiers. It redresses the potential asymmetry regard-
ing budgetary stability between the central government,
which is the only responsible for fiscal commitments
vis-à-vis EU authorities, and territorial governments
with an increasing role in public expenditure.
The law aims at entrenching the dynamics of fiscal con-
solidation based on the expenditure side through the
annual limit on expenditure at the State level and the so-
called contingency fund. An additional positive feature
of the GLBS is the multiannual stability objectives
announced by the government for budgetary setting. In
order to keep credibility, the budgetary target set in the
first quarter of each year should be only subject to lim-
ited changes in the Budget Law and the USP.
However, despite the validity of the central goal of
ensuring that fiscal decentralisation remains compatible
with the budgetary stability as defined by EMU fiscal
rules, some questions arise as to the means foreseen to
achieve it. A principal criticism is that the objective of
budgetary stability, defined in nominal terms, might
hamper the stabilisation function of fiscal policy since
the effect of the cycle on the budget is not taken into
account. Nevertheless, the difficulty of estimating cycli-
cally-adjusted balances at sub-national level can explain
the choice of applying objectives in nominal terms. 
The adoption of the GLBS complements that of the new
system for financing of regional governments. By mak-
ing regions finances increasingly dependent on own tax
revenues, the new system of financing increases the sen-
sitivity of regional budgets to the economic cycle, aggra-
vating the risk of pro-cyclical policies. Should deficits
occur, the responsible public entities have three years to
restore the balanced budget. In case of a severe reces-
sion, this period might prove to be insufficient. Some
margin of flexibility, however, can be expected in the
implementation of the three-year plans to restore a bal-
anced budget situation. The issue raised by GLBS con-
cerning its compatibility with a proper functioning of
automatic stabilisers will need some time to be assessed. 
It is also claimed that the GLBS could reduce public
investment, causing serious problems for a catching-up
country such as Spain. The objective of a balanced
budget or a surplus would mean that public investment
could only be financed through current revenues. How-
ever, recent research suggests that public investment is
not constrained by a ban on deficits, as no significant
direction of causality has been detected between public
investment and deficits. 201
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aspects. The joint objective of budgetary stability for the
State and social security system (up to 2010) will allow
the State to record deficits without having to present
consolidation plans at all. A stricter formulation could
have required that the social security surpluses be
entirely allocated to the reserve fund together with
requirements for the State balances.
The transparency at each level of government is essential
for the effectiveness of the GLBS. The law includes
advances in this direction, particularly concerning sub-
national governments for which budgetary information
has traditionally been poor. The GLBS may pave the
way for additional information requirements, recognis-
ing that stability and transparency are complementary.
Finally, this law will only produce the awaited results in
terms of long-term sustainability only if the General
Budgetary Law, which contains the main budgetary pro-
cedures, and the social security system are properly
reformed. The latter is especial relevant for Spain, given
the expected budgetary impact due to ageing, which can-
not be tackled by the simple implementation of the GLBS.
3.4.2. Germany 
The constitutional framework
In constitutional terms, the Federal Republic of Germany
was actually founded by the Länder (see Präambel). As a
consequence, Article 70 (1) of the German constitution
clearly states that ‘the Länder have the right to legislation
as long as this constitution does not defer this right to the
federal level.’ The following articles then define which
are the responsibilities of the federation and in which areas
both government levels may intervene. In line with these
regulations, Article 104a states that ‘the federation and the
Länder are — in clear separation — in charge of the
expenditures, which result from the responsibilities which
this Constitution confers upon them’.
Article 106 then specifies which taxes are collected by
which level of government. Article 105 (3) states that
federal laws on taxation, which regard taxes at least par-
tially collected by lower level of government, are subject
to approval by the Bundesrat (Upper chamber of Parlia-
ment composed of Länder representatives) (1). Further-
more Article 106 (3) states that the uniformity of living
conditions on the federal territory has to be guaranteed.
Expenditure and revenue by levels of government
On the basis of these constitutional provisions, the
regional and local governments play a substantial role
for the development of public finances in Germany, as
indicated already in Table V.7. 
On average, expenditure by regional governments is of a
similar magnitude as federal spending. If one incorpo-
rates spending by local entities, federal expenditure
accounts for only 40 % of total expenditure by all levels
of government (that is, excluding social security sys-
tems). As shown in Graph V.3, the share of lower levels
of government account for almost half of the general
government budget deficit.
Given the importance of lower levels of government for
public spending and revenue collection, the coordination
of budgetary policies is obviously very relevant for the
respect of the SGP. Furthermore, given that only the fed-
eral government is at the European level responsible for
the respect of the deficit and debt criteria, the Federal
Minister has a strong interest in having his policies sup-
ported by the other levels of government. In the run-up
to EMU, however, attempts to agree upon a national sta-
bility pact failed, due to constitutional problems and
political considerations. Recently, however, the respon-
sibilities of the Finanzplanungsrat (Financial Planning
Council) have been clearly reinforced.
The role of the Financial Planning Council 
The Finanzplanungsrat itself consists of the Federal
Minister for Finance, the Länder Ministers of Finance,
the Federal Minister for Economics and representa-
tive(s) of local authorities. It meets twice a year (nor-
mally in June and November), following the presenta-
tion of the economic forecast and the respective meeting
of the working group Steuerschätzung (‘tax revenues
estimate’) (2). Given that the April economic forecast
has a medium-term time horizon (that is, normally the
following three years), the June meeting of the Finanzpla-
¥1∂ Following regional elections in the Länder of Lower Saxony and Hesse,
Christian Democratic-led Länder governments currently ‘control’ 41 votes
out of a total of 69 votes, conferring on the opposition parties an important
role in economic policy-making. 
¥2∂ At the end of January, the Federal Government normally presents its
Jahreswirtschaftsbericht (annual economic review), which also contains its
economic projections; for the spring meeting of the Finanzplanungsrat,
these projections can be revised. The projection of the Federal Government
serves as a basis for discussion in the Finanzplanungsrat; however, current
projections of economic research institutes and of international organisa-
tions including the EU are also presented. The medium-term projections of
the federal government are only published once a year, in April. 202
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tions, while the November meeting — based on the
short-term forecast published in October — will only
discuss prospects for the current and the following year. 
Automatic stabilisation
When the Finanzplanungsrat met for the first time in
March 1968, it was to contribute to the fine-tuning of the
business cycle, in line with Article 109 (2) of the German
constitution, whereby the federal government and the
Länder, in their budgetary management, have to respect
the requirements of the overall macroeconomic equilib-
rium (1). Since the early 1980s, the focus has shifted to
fiscal consolidation; in the mid-1990s, it was decided
that the rise in (nominal) expenditure of all levels of gov-
ernment should not exceed 2 % per year. Regarding the
issue of automatic stabilisation, past experience shows
that lower levels of government tend to follow a pro-
cyclical pattern; if in one year tax revenues turn out to be
higher than originally budgeted, nominal deficits first
tend to decline. In the following year, the growth rate of
expenditure would clearly accelerate (see Graph V.4). 
The Law on Budgetary Principles
Following the adoption of the SGP and the introduction
of the euro, the Ecofin Council, in its opinion on the
updated German stability programme, had repeatedly
recommended to the German authorities to agree upon a
kind of ‘national stability pact’ in order to make the
attainment of the budgetary targets of the updated pro-
grammes more credible and in order to avoid pro-cyclical
policies. In line with this recommendation, a modifica-
tion to Article 51a Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz (‘Law on
Budgetary Principles’) was decided upon on 20 Decem-
ber 2001. 
Article 51a (1) of the new law now contains a clear ref-
erence to the responsibilities of all levels of government
to respect Article 104 of the EU Treaty and proclaims
the overall aim of bringing the deficit down in order
to reach a balanced budget. Article 51a (2) states that
‘the Finanzplanungsrat will issue recommendations on
budgetary policies, in particular on a common expendi-
ture line., taking into account the economic and fiscal
factors. The Finanzplanungsrat… shall discuss the con-
sistency of budgetary developments, in particular of the
development of expenditures and deficits by the federa-
tion and by the Länder (including the local authorities),
with the regulations of Article 104 of the EU Treaty and
with the European Stability and Growth Pact.’ Finally,
Article 51a (3) now stipulates that in case of non-respect
of the principles described in Article 51a (1) and (2), the
Finanzplanungsrat will discuss the reasons thereof and
‘give recommendation in order to restore budgetary dis-
cipline’.
Following the Commission recommendation to the Coun-
cil of 30 January 2002 to give an early warning to Ger-
many, the date of implementation of the new Article 51a
Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz was carried forward from
1 January 2005 to 1 July 2002. 
Furthermore, in its special meeting of March 2002, the
Finanzplanungsrat agreed upon ambitious expenditure
targets for 2003 and 2004. Federal expenditure was pro-
jected to decrease by 0.5 % per year and Länder expend-
iture was to rise by 1 % per year in nominal terms only.
In the November 2002 meeting, it was decided that the
expenditure line for 2005 and 2006 should be discussed
in the first meeting in 2003. Furthermore, not least due to
the costs implied by reconstruction from the floods of
summer 2002, the expenditure pattern was changed, but
the targeted overall rise in expenditure remained almost
unchanged.
In its opinion on the updated stability programme
adopted in January 2003, the Council urged the German
authorities to respect the agreed expenditure targets for
2003 and 2004 and to reach an agreement on ambitious
expenditure targets for 2005 and 2006. 
While recent legal developments clearly constitute an
improvement compared with the preceding rules, it
remains to be seen how effective the new law turns out
to be in practice: The lack of threat of sanctions going
above recommendations could imply less compliance
with mutually agreed targets.
¥1∂ ‘Bund und Länder haben bei ihrer Haushaltsführung des Erfordernissen des
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichts Rechnung zu tragen’.203

Part VI
Member State developments

1. Belgium
Recent developments
Despite an unfavourable macroeconomic context, a 0.1 %
of GDP general government surplus was achieved in
2002. Initially, a government surplus of 0.3 % of GDP
was planned in the 2002 budget under a 1.3 % real GDP
growth assumption; however, in the course of the year,
activity proved to be more subdued than expected and
real GDP growth reached 0.7 % only. 
In March and July 2002, budgetary control exercises
were organised associating all levels of government.
Expenditures were contained, particularly at federal
level of government; applying the ‘anchor principle’,
which consists in holding the utilisation rate of credits
under or at the rate of 2001 in part of the year, was instru-
mental in controlling spending. In the social security
sector, health spending was better controlled. Thus, the
government primary surplus in 2002 was maintained at a
high level, 6.1 % of GDP.
The government debt ratio, which reached 108.5 % of
GDP in 2001, was lowered to 105.3 % of GDP in 2002.
During the period 2000–02, the pace of debt reduction
slowed primarily due to low GDP growth in real and
nominal terms. Moreover, in 2001 and to a lesser extent
in 2002, financial operations included in the stock-flow
adjustment decelerated the reduction process; these
operations consisted of the assumption by the State of
debt in a number of public entities.
Table VI.1
Composition and balances of general government, Belgium (1) 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (2) 0.1 0.4 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1
— Total revenue 49.5 49.8 50.2 49.5 49.2
Of which: — current taxes 30.4 30.2 30.4 30.2 29.8
— social contributions 16.1 16.4 16.5 16.4 16.4
— Total expenditure (2) 49.4 49.4 50.1 49.7 49.3
Of which: — collective consumption 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.1 8.1
— social transfers (3) 28.7 29.3 30.0 30.5 30.5
— interest expenditure 6.8 6.5 6.0 5.5 4.9
— gross fixed capital formation 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5
Primary balance (2) 6.9 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.8
Pm Tax burden 45.9 46.0 46.3 45.9 45.5
Government debt 109.6 108.5 105.3 102.7 98.9
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance – 1.2 – 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 5.6 6.2 6.1 5.7 4.9
(1) Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
(2) Data for 2001 (except cyclically-adjusted) include UMTS receipts of 0.2 % of GDP.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.207
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accounts to be in balance on the basis of a 2.1 % real
GDP growth assumption. Attaining a government sur-
plus of this order of magnitude was also recommended
in the 2002 BEPGs. The balanced budget objective is
expected to be reached while implementing further tax
cuts that are to be compensated by equal decline in inter-
est payments. 
The federal government real primary expenditure is pro-
jected to increase by 1.3 % in 2003. The general govern-
ment primary surplus was expected to decline somewhat
in 2003 as a result of a reduction in the primary surplus
of Entity I (Federal government and social security). The
government debt ratio was projected to be lowered to an
estimated 102.3 % of GDP and no ad hoc financial oper-
ations are planned for 2003.
However, due to further deterioration in the external
environment, the real GDP growth assumption underly-
ing the budget estimates was revised downwards to
1.4 % in February 2003, while the government balance
objective was maintained. Such an adjustment is possi-
ble by further containment of federal expenditure apply-
ing the ‘anchor principle’, higher-than-expected tax
revenues registered at the end of 2002 and a more
favourable projection for interest payments (made possi-
ble by interest rate developments).
In the 2003 Commission spring forecasts, real GDP
growth is further adjusted downward to 1.2 % in 2003;
consequently under the assumption of no further adjust-
ment measures, a government deficit of 0.2 % of GDP is
forecasted. At the same time the government debt is
expected to decline to 102.7 % of GDP in 2003.
Reducing the debt ratio 
within a global budgetary strategy
In recent years, Belgium has succeeded in reducing its
government debt ratio by means of achieving high
government primary surpluses. The 2002 update of the
stability programme projects a reduction in the govern-
ment debt ratio to 94 % of GDP in 2005: this is to be
achieved by sustaining primary surpluses in the order of
5.5 % of GDP. The programme also states that no finan-
cial operations are foreseen in the time period covered by
the stability programme (2002–05), although a decision
to assume a part of the debt of the national railway com-
pany (SNCB) may have an impact in coming years.
The need to run down debt levels is motivated in part by
concerns about the projected budgetary impact of ageing
populations (see Part I.3) of this report. The strategy of
the Belgian authorities to meet the budgetary costs of
ageing populations is based on achieving a steady
decline in the government debt ratio by sustaining high
primary surpluses even beyond the time horizon of the
stability programme. However, sustaining a high pri-
mary surplus over the very long run poses a substantial
budgetary challenge, especially if, at the same time,
other budgetary objectives such as a reduction in the tax
ratio are being pursued in parallel.
The Belgian authorities are currently making a much
needed effort to alleviate the tax burden weighing partic-
ularly on labour. Since 1999, social security
contributions paid by employers have been lowered and
a programme of tax cuts is currently being implemented
covering the period 2002–05. In order to foster labour
market participation, which is low in Belgium by inter-
national standards, particularly among older workers,
both demand and supply of labour are to be encouraged.
Fiscal measures have been decided aiming at a phased
reduction in personal income taxes over the period
2002–05, also reducing the ‘marriage penalty’, better
providing for children charges and sustaining ‘green’
initiatives. The global impact of the reform is estimated
in the 2002 update of the stability programme at 1.3 % of
GDP in 2006.
In 2003, personal income taxes have been cut by 0.4 %
of GDP including, in particular, lowering the top rate,
implementing the final stage of phasing out of the crisis
contribution and introducing an income tax credit for
low-wage earners. At the same time, as from April 2002,
further reductions in social security contributions have
been introduced, concerning both contributions paid by
employees, in order to improve low-paid categories’ dis-
posable income and contributions paid by employers
particularly for older workers. Moreover, in 2003, rates
for enterprises income taxes have been lowered from
40.17 to 33.99 % while the more favourable fiscal regime
for SME has been maintained, the tax rates applied to
them being reduced from 28.84 to 24.98 %. These meas-
ures in favour of the enterprises are meant to be budget-
ary neutral, being compensated by offsetting measures.
As far as pensions reform is concerned, draft legislation
has been tabled to Parliament, providing a regulatory
framework for the ‘second pillar’ of supplementary pen-
sions. This covers about one third of the employees in208
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an objective of the government. 
A measure specific to Belgium is the creation of a
Silver Fund (September 2001) financed by budgetary
surplus, social security surpluses and non-tax rev-
enues. In 2003, EUR 625 million should be allocated
to the Fund from non-tax revenues. At the end of the
year, the capital of the Fund is expected to reach about
0.7 % of GDP (excluding interests on investments).
Use of the reserves of the Fund will be allowed from
2010 only, under the condition that the level reached
by the government debt ratio would be below 60 %
of GDP.
Table VI.2
Key figures of the Belgian stability programme (1) (2003–05)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 0.8 0.7 2.1 2.5 2.5
General government budget balance (% of GDP) 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5
Primary surplus (% of GDP) 6.9 6.1 5.5 5.6 5.6
Government debt (% of GDP) 108.6 106.1 102.3 97.9 93.6
(1) UMTS receipts excluded (0.2 % of GDP in 2001).
Source: 2002 update of the stability programme of Belgium.209
2. Denmark
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
In 2002, a surplus of 2.0 % of GDP was recorded, the
sixth consecutive year with a surplus. Swaps amounted
to 0.13 % of GDP leaving the surplus in national
accounts definition at 1.9 % of GDP (1). This compares
with a target surplus of 1.6 % of GDP in the most recent
update of the convergence programme, and the differ-
ence is mainly due to higher-than-expected tax revenues.
Compared to 2001, the surplus fell by 0.8 percentage
points of GDP. In addition to the effects of slower
growth, this resulted from the disappearance of the
one-off effect of the UMTS-sale in 2001 amounting to
0.2 percentage points of GDP (2), and secondly the
impact of ‘the special pension contribution’ being
changed from a public pension scheme to a private one
(as a result of the redistributive element being removed
from the scheme) which has led to a permanent reduc-
tion of the budget balance of  percentage point.
Revenues are still affected by the volatile pension fund
yield tax. The taxation on pension fund yields was
changed in 2000 (3). The change has resulted in revenues
being far more volatile. It is estimated that revenues can
fluctuate by slightly more than 1 % of GDP on average,
leading to increased volatility of the surplus on public
finances of the same amount, and changes are very diffi-
cult to predict. Furthermore, the prolonged downturn in
the stock market has resulted in this tax generating
hardly any revenues in 2001 or 2002 and only small
revenues are expected in 2003 as well. In a year with
‘normal’ stock market developments, the tax is expected
to generate revenues of around 1 % of GDP.
The tax burden fell markedly in 2002 due to the afore-
mentioned changes to ‘the special pension contribution’.
In the forecast period, the tax burden is set to decline
only marginally despite the inclusion of an announced
tax reform in 2004 amounting to 0.4 % of GDP. This is
a result of the revenue lost by the tax reform being more
than outweighed by the positive effects of increased
GDP growth on public finances and by the fact that the
pension fund yield tax as mentioned should begin to gen-
erate revenues again.
The ratio of primary expenditure to GDP was largely
unchanged in 2002. Over the forecast horizon, a fall of
around 1 % of GDP in total government expenditure is pro-
jected, mostly as a result of declining interest payments. 
Government consumption rose in real terms by 1 % in
2002. This is in line with the multiannual target of 1 %
increase in consumption growth, but slightly lower than
the target actually set for the year. The target for the year
was set at 1.3 % with a subsequent reduction of the target
in 2003 to 0.7 %, averaging 1 % over the two years.
Over the forecast horizon, continued surpluses on gen-
eral government finances are expected at around 2 % of
GDP every year. This should result in the debt-to-GDP
ratio being reduced from the current level of 45 to 40 %
by the end of 2004. In cyclically-adjusted terms, the pri-
mary balance remains largely unchanged over the fore-
cast horizon, thereby indicating that the fiscal policies
are neutral with respect to the cycle.
The government’s medium-term public finance strategy
continues to be focused on reducing the debt by keeping
surpluses of 1 –2  % of GDP on average every year
towards 2010 and adherence to the tax freeze. The debt-
¥1∂ Compared to the figures used in the autumn forecast, Statistics Denmark
has implemented methodological changes to the public finance statistics
amounting to a downward revision of the surplus of 0.13 % of GDP.
¥2∂ It should still be noted that Statistics Denmark has decided to treat the
UMTS proceeds as an annuity over the next 20 years, which is not in line
with Eurostat’s recommendation. 
¥3∂ The tax rate on yields on equities was increased and the tax rate on yields
on bonds was reduced to ensure the same tax rate on yields from the two
types of assets. As the development in prices on equities is far more volatile
than on bonds, the volatility of the revenues from this tax has increased
markedly. Given the poor performance of the stock market in 2001, this
resulted in lower revenues. 210
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to prepare public finances for the budgetary impact of an
ageing population. Sustainability calculations show that
the public finances are in a good position to handle the
impact of rising expenditure due to the ageing popula-
tion. However, in order to make room for the targeted
 % average annual growth in real public consump-
tion (1), increases in labour force participation rates are
needed to ensure the continued high surpluses.
Tax freeze and tax reform
When the current government took office late in Novem-
ber 2001, a novelty was introduced into Danish public
finances as a tax freeze was implemented. This section
deals with the implications of the tax freeze for expend-
iture control and tax reforms.
The tax freeze means that no direct or indirect tax —
whether legislated in kroner or as a percentage — can be
increased. Furthermore, a nominal ceiling has been put
on the property value tax. However, if there are compel-
ling reasons for introducing or raising a tax rate, another
tax rate has to be reduced by an amount which leaves
total tax revenues unchanged (2). 
The introduction of the tax freeze has several implica-
tions. First, the wording of the tax freeze is actually
slightly misleading, as the implication of the tax freeze is
a trend-wise reduction of the tax burden. The reduction
of the tax burden stems from the fact that excise duties
expressed in kroner and the tax base for property value
tax are no longer adjusted in parallel with price
increases, thereby eroding the effective value of rev-
enues from these sources. The erosion is estimated to be
around  % of GDP between 2002 and 2010.
Second, given the overall target for public finances of
a surplus of 1 –2  % of GDP every year, the tax
freeze also has implications for the need for expenditure
control. If the tax freeze is strictly implemented, it
implies that the marginal budget improvement in order
to secure the surplus will have to be taken on the expend-
iture side, as the tax side has to be taken as given. This
would mark a break compared to the historic tradition,
Table VI.3
Composition and balances of general government, Denmark 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (1) 2.6 2.8 2.0 1.8 2.1
— Total Revenue 57.3 58.1 57.0 56.2 56.1
Of which: — current taxes 46.8 47.2 47.2 46.9 46.9
— social contributions 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.6
— Total expenditure (2) 54.7 55.0 54.9 54.4 54.0
Of which: — collective consumption 7.7 7.7 8.0 8.0 8.0
— social transfers (2) 34.9 35.4 35.6 35.7 35.4
— interest expenditure 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.3 3.2
— gross fixed capital formation 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7
Primary balance (2) 6.8 7.0 5.6 5.1 5.3
Pm Tax burden 49.6 49.9 49.3 49.0 49.0
Government debt 47.4 45.4 45.2 42.7 39.9
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance 1.5 2.3 1.9 2.0 2.2
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 5.7 6.3 5.5 5.3 5.4
(1) Data exclude UMTS receipts amounting to 0.2 % of GDP in 2001.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts. 
¥1∂ The multiannual target for public consumption growth has been 1 % for the
years up to 2004, in 2004 and 2005 the target is  % and from 2006 the tar-
get is reduced to  %.
¥2∂ The definition of the tax freeze also covers user charges and fees, thereby
covering all sources of income for the public sector.211
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found by increasing taxes.
A very tentative assessment might suggest that the tax
freeze actually has acted as a mechanism of discipline of
expenditure control for 2003, and thereby supported the
achievement of a growth rate of real public consumption
lower than 1 %.
The strict implementation of the tax freeze is, however,
not given, as it implies adherence by all levels of govern-
ment. In Denmark, counties and municipalities have
completely autonomous taxing powers and they govern
around two thirds of public consumption. Each year an
agreement is made between central government and the
associations of counties and municipalities concerning
expenditures in counties and municipalities and the
block grant from the State to these. These agreements
are, however, not legally binding for individual counties
and municipalities. 
In order to ensure the implementation of the tax freeze,
the government therefore announced that any breach of
the tax freeze would be penalised by the central govern-
ment. This penalising mechanism consists of central
government recuperating the extra revenues earned from
tax increases and using it for reducing State taxes, leav-
ing the counties and municipalities with a higher tax bur-
den, but no extra revenues.
Despite the announcement of a sanction mechanism,
breaches of the tax freeze did occur in late 2002 when
counties and municipalities made their budgets for 2003.
This could perhaps be viewed as a test by counties and
municipalities of whether the government would be will-
ing and able to implement sanctions. However, counties
and municipalities have so far only agreed to respect the
tax freeze for 2003. No agreements have been made for
subsequent years, and a risk therefore exists that the gov-
ernment might find it more and more difficult to enforce
the tax freeze.
As mentioned previously, the tax freeze in itself implies a
reduced tax burden over time. The reduction is achieved via
reducing the tax burden on property and goods submitted to
excise duties. It is not as a result of an explicit political pri-
oritisation that the reduction in taxes falls on these items,
but only a result of the fact that these tax rates happened to
be expressed in terms of kroner and not in percentage terms,
when the tax freeze was implemented. 
Increasing the labour supply is considered to be one of
the main challenges for the Danish economy, but the cur-
rent prioritisation of where tax reductions are taking
place as a result of the tax freeze does not seem to
address this problem to any large degree.
Judging by comments made by leading ministers, a very
strict interpretation has been chosen for the interpreta-
tion of when ‘compelling reasons arrive’ for changing a
tax rate (1), thereby effectively blocking for revenue-
neutral tax reforms which might reduce further the taxes
on earned income while increasing other tax rates.
The government has announced a tax reform from 2004
to 2007, especially intended to help increase the labour
supply. The proposal includes an increase in the thresh-
old for the intermediate bracket of the State tax and the
introduction of an earned income tax credit. When fully
implemented the tax reductions are estimated to be  %
of GDP by 2007. 
The main objective of the reform is stated to be an
increase in the labour supply by reducing marginal taxes.
Table VI.4
Key figures of the Danish convergence programme (2001–06)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 1.0 1.5 2.2 1.8 1.7 n.a.
General government budget balance 
(% of GDP)
2.8 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.4 n.a.
Primary surplus (% of GDP) 4.3 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.3 n.a.
Government debt (% of GDP) 44.7 43.9 42.1 39.2 36.7 n.a.
Source: 2002 update of the convergence programme of Denmark.
¥1∂ An example given of a reason for changing a tax rate is tax changes
imposed by a decision within the EU.212
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one of the more expensive ways to increase the labour
supply, so if this was the only target, more could have
been achieved for the same costs by reducing the top
State tax or further reductions to the intermediate State
tax. It therefore appears that also there has been a strong
eye to distributional effects in the proposal for the tax
reform. This focus does not seem to be an obvious policy
choice at the expense of increasing labour supply further,
given the very equal income distribution in Denmark.
The overall reduction of  % of GDP is larger than what
had been announced as tax cuts within the governments
medium-term projection. However, if the induced labour
supply effect is too small to achieve the targets set in the
public finance strategy and further additional fiscal lee-
way cannot be found, consideration could be given to
implementing a less rigid interpretation of when ‘com-
pelling reasons arrive’ for changing a tax rate, in order to
increase the scope for reducing taxes on earned income
by a reprioritisation within the current tax framework.
This would also be in line with the Council opinion on
the Danish convergence programme 2001 in which the
tax freeze was first presented, where it was noted that the
tax freeze should not be an impediment to reductions of
marginal taxes on labour.213
3. Germany
Recent developments
Following a revised 2001 outcome of 2.8 % of GDP, the
general government deficit is currently estimated to have
reached 3.6 % of GDP in 2002. This rise in the deficit is
mostly due to a marked shortfall in tax revenues com-
pared with the official May 2002 tax estimate and
another widening of the deficit in social security sectors.
Not surprisingly, the debt ratio has breached the respec-
tive Treaty criterion by rising to close to 61 % of GDP by
end-2002. With the 2002 general government deficit
clearly above the respective reference value of the
Treaty, the Council on 21 January 2003 decided that an
excessive deficit existed in Germany. The Council inter
alia recommended to the German government to imple-
ment up to 21 May 2003 the measures announced in the
budget for 2003 amounting to 1 % of GDP and to bring
the deficit below the 3 % of GDP reference value of the
Treaty by 2004 at the latest.
The ‘annual economic report’ by the federal government
implies — in line with the updated German stability pro-
gramme of December 2002 — a decline in the nominal
deficit to 2.8 % of GDP in the current year. However, the
Commission’s spring forecast for the 2003 deficit is
clearly more pessimistic (3.4 % of GDP): this is mostly
due to the Commission forecast for nominal GDP growth
in 2003 being more than 1 percentage point of GDP lower
than projected by the federal government in its annual
economic report of January 2003. Furthermore, the gov-
ernment’s deficit projection still incorporates a consider-
able rise in tax revenues from the tax amnesty and the
Steuervergünstigungsabbaugesetz, which was, however,
rejected by the Bundesrat on 14 March (1). Finally, the
Commission forecast does not incorporate all of the
expenditure savings projected at the level of the Federal
Labour Office by the federal government. According to
information available in early May 2003, the cyclically-
adjusted balance would improve in 2003 by around
0.8 percentage points of GDP.
In 2004, accelerating growth conducive to employment
creation should result in a more important fall in the
nominal deficit, in spite of the implementation of the
next step of income tax reform with a volume of 0.3 per-
centage points of GDP. The debt ratio, however, is pro-
jected to rise further to 63 % of GDP. Based on the
standard no-policy-change assumption (2) and due not
least to the planned tax cuts, the improvement in the
cyclically-adjusted deficit in 2004 would be minor. 
A low nominal rise in expenditures and strict expendi-
ture control are indispensable to create the margin for the
tax cuts planned for 2004 (0.3 % of GDP) and for 2005
(around 1 % of GDP). To make the achievement of the
ambitious expenditure targets of the December 2002
update of the German stability programme more proba-
ble, a profound reform of social security systems is an
absolute necessity.
Budgetary impact of current reforms
Following the general elections in September 2002, the
reconfirmed federal government has embarked on a
more ambitious course in economic policy matters:
More courageous structural reforms are to be imple-
mented with the overall objective of increasing the
growth potential of the German economy and reducing
unemployment. At the same time, the federal govern-
ment claims that budgetary consolidation will 
¥1∂ In early April, this law was still under discussion in the ‘Mediation Com-
mittee’ (Vermittlungsaus-schuss) between the Bundestag and Bundesrat.
¥2∂ The spring 2003 deficit forecast for 2004 is based on the assumption of
unchanged social security contribution rates. Furthermore, none of the
measures announced by the Chancellor on 14 March could be taken into
account, as some of them are not yet outlined in detail or have not yet been
introduced into the legislative procedure. 214
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announced in the meantime (for example, the investment
programme for local public investment and the pro-
gramme for the promotion of private construction — both
announced by Chancellor Schröder on 14 March 2003).
Regarding the labour market, the first proposals pre-
sented in August 2002 by the Hartz Commission have
already been implemented in January and in April 2003
(incentive schemes for older workers; creation of per-
sonal service agencies; gradual benefit phase-out for low
income earners). Furthermore, the government has
announced that further proposals in line with those
advanced by the Hartz Commission would enter into
force in 2004. In addition to the more structural meas-
ures, the rules for entitlement to Arbeitslosenhilf (assist-
ance for the long-term unemployed) have been tight-
ened, as the income of the unemployed person’s partner
is now being taken into account.
For public finances, the overall impact of these measures
is clearly positive, but in general difficult to quantify.
The projections of the federal government in this regard
appear very optimistic: Based on a real GDP growth
forecast for 2003 of 1 %, the average number of unem-
ployed is projected to reach 4.21 million, a rise by
150 000 on the preceding year. At the same time, the fed-
eral budget assumes that the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit
(Federal Labour Office) — in stark contrast to 2002 —
will need no federal transfers in the current year. In spite
of a projected rise by 150 000 in the overall number of
unemployed in 2003, the number of unemployed people
entitled to Arbeitslosengeld is to decrease by 203 000, to
a large part due to the implementation of the above-men-
tioned measures. 
On 14 March, Chancellor Schröder in an official ‘decla-
ration of the government’ to the Bundestag announced
additional reform measures: regarding Arbeitslosenhilfe,
the maximum period of entitlement shall be reduced to
12 to 18 months, from presently up to 32 months. The
current benefit withdrawal for long-term unemployed
taking up work will be reduced and the sanctions for
those who refuse a job offer will be tightened. Finally,
Arbeitslosenhilfe and Sozialhilf (social assistance) are to
be merged, with the benefit level of Arbeitslosenhilfe
going down to the level of Sozialhilfe. 
Without any doubt, these measures will increase incen-
tives to take up a job instead of relying on social benefit
payments which in the past often discouraged unem-
ployed from accepting a job offer. Furthermore, they are
Table VI.5
Composition and balances of general government, Germany (1) 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (2) 1.1 – 2.8 – 3.6 – 3.4 – 2.9
— Total revenue 47.0 45.5 45.0 45.4 45.5
Of which: — current taxes 24.6 23.0 22.6 23.0 23.2
— social contributions 18.6 18.5 18.4 18.6 18.5
— Total expenditure 45.9 48.3 48.6 48.9 48.4
Of which: — collective consumption 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.9 7.8
— social transfers (3) 29.9 30.0 30.7 31.0 30.7
— interest expenditure 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.3
— gross fixed capital formation 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6
Primary balance 4.5 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.3
Pm Tax burden 43.2 41.5 40.7 41.3 41.4
Government debt 60.2 59.5 60.8 62.7 63.0
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance – 2.1 – 3.0 – 3.3 – 2.6 – 2.4
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 1.3 0.3 – 0.1 0.6 0.8
(1) Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
(2) Data for 2000 (except cyclically-adjusted) include UMTS receipts of 2.5 % of GDP.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.215
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programme submitted by Germany in December 2002,
which projected a clear decrease of the share of ‘social
transfers other than in kind’ from a (rounded) 19  % of
GDP in 2002 to 18  in 2004 — the year when most of
these measures are to be implemented.
Regarding healthcare, the government declaration of
14 March announced a whole catalogue of different
measures: insurers are to gain stronger bargaining power
and shall be allowed to negotiate costs directly with doc-
tors and the cost sharing by patients shall be increased to
raise their cost awareness. The Chancellor also proposed
that in the future employees should seek a private insur-
ance for the continued salary payment in case of sick-
ness, which is currently paid by the public health system.
According to the Chancellor, the overall aim of the
reform of the public healthcare system is to bring the
contribution rate down below 13 % of gross income
(from a currently estimated 14.4 %). While this target is
highly welcome given the negative effect of current
contribution rates on employment, the tax financing of
the so-called versicherungsfremden Leistungen (1) also
announced by the Chancellor may constitute a risk to the
very ambitious consolidation programme laid out in the
most recent update of the German stability programme
of December 2002. Furthermore, Mr Schröder remained
elusive on some aspects, indicating only that parts of the
necessary measures were being prepared by the respec-
tive ministries, while important questions regarding the
financing part should be presented by the Rürup Com-
mission in May.
Regarding the pension system, the government declara-
tion conceded that the projections underlying the recent
reform (Riester-Rente) have already proved too optimis-
tic and underlined that he expected detailed proposals
from the Rürup Commission on how to further adopt the
pension system.
In his speech of 14 March, the Chancellor also announced
measures aimed at liberalising regulations for crafts and
at reducing bureaucracy, especially for small and
medium-sized companies. As had been frequently
pointed out by the Commission in the past, the implemen-
tation of such measures appears very important to raise
the currently very low growth potential of the German
economy. However, their impact on public finances will,
in the short term, probably be negligible. In the medium
term, however, stronger average growth appears as the
best way to put public finances on a sustainable basis. 
All in all, the reform measures already implemented or
currently discussed go into the right direction. However,
at the current juncture, many proposals are not yet
elaborated in such a way as to allow a final judgement
on whether their implementation would allow the
achievement of the very ambitious budgetary targets of
the updated German stability programme of December
2002. In particular, it remains to be seen how courageous
the proposals for the health and pension system turn out
and whether the currently discussed reforms will actu-
ally be implemented.
In this regard, a reform of the social security systems,
aimed at cutting expenditures and at bringing contribu-
tion rates down to acceptable levels appears as the best
means to raise the growth potential of the German econ-
omy and to put public finances again on a sustainable
basis. 
Table VI.6
Key figures of the German stability programme (2002–06)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP growth (annual %change) 0.5 1.5 2.3 2.3 2.3
General government budget balance (% of GDP) – 3.8 – 2.8 – 1.5 – 1.0 0.0
Primary surplus (% of GDP) – 0.5 0.5 2.0 2.0 3.0
Government debt (% of GDP) 61.0 61.5 60.5 59.5 57.5
Source: 2002 update of the stability programme of Germany.
¥1∂ Benefits currently paid by health insurance systems, deemed not to be cov-
ered by contributions.216
4. Greece
Recent developments
Despite strong economic growth in 2002, the general
government deficit was only slightly reduced to 1.2 % of
GDP from 1.4 % in 2001. The government gross debt
fell after two consecutive years of increase but remained
at a high level equal to 104.9 % of GDP in 2002.
The favourable domestic economic conditions in com-
bination with measures of further containment of tax
evasion and enhancement of the tax base contributed to
an increase in total revenues at the targeted rate. How-
ever, the general government surplus of 0.8 % of GDP
anticipated in the 2002 State budget and in the 2001 sta-
bility programme did not materialise, mainly due to the
disappearance of the one-off effects of the UMTS-sale
in 2001 and the reclassification of a number of opera-
tions which primarily affected the expenditure side and
to a lesser extent government revenues. In addition,
overruns in almost all categories of primary expendi-
tures increased the deficit of the State budget to 3.5 %
of GDP compared to the estimated 2.9 %. The primary
surplus in 2002 declined to 4.3 % of GDP from 4.9 %
achieved in 2001.
The 2003 State budget projects a central government def-
icit of 4.3 % of GDP corresponding to a general govern-
ment deficit of 0.9 % of GDP. Notwithstanding the signif-
icant increase in the deficit of ordinary budget as well as
in the deficit of public investment programme, the State
budget deficit in percent of GDP is estimated to be the
same as in 2002 as a result of the projected high GDP
growth. On the other hand, the surplus of social security
funds and local authorities which is estimated to slightly
increase in 2003, appears to be the main factor shaping the
foreseen reduction in the general government deficit (1).
According to the Commission forecasts, the general gov-
ernment deficit for 2003 is projected to stand at 1.1 % of
GDP compared to an estimated 1.2 % of GDP in 2002.
The deceleration in government consumption expendi-
tures projected in the State budget could be considered
rather optimistic (2). In fact, the uncertainty characteris-
ing some categories of expenditures, mainly wages, may
result in an overshooting of the projected primary expen-
ditures. The general government consolidated gross
debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to stand at 101 % at the
end of 2003, compared to 100.2 % estimated in the State
budget and in the 2002 stability programme.
In the 2002 stability programme, a further improvement
in the budgetary position is projected throughout the
period covered by the programme. The central govern-
ment deficit is expected to stand at 3.7 % in 2004 and to
decline to 2.3 % in 2006. The general government deficit
is projected to turn into a surplus from 2005 onwards and
the government debt ratio is expected to decline by
12.3 percentage points in the period 2004–06, reaching
87.9 % of GDP at the end of 2006. 
The projected progressive deceleration in primary spend-
ing, is subject to the risks mentioned above. Considering
the foreseen slowdown in budget revenues, an overshoot-
ing of the projected spending would lead to a rather
slower than the expected reduction in the general govern-
ment debt-to-GDP ratio.
Revisions of budgetary data 
and their impact on the general 
government deficit and debt 
In 2002, the bilateral discussions between Eurostat and
the Greek statistical authorities led to a significant revi-
¥1∂ According to the last notification (March 2003), the surplus of social secu-
rity funds and local government amounted to 2.7 % of GDP in 2001 and is
estimated to have been equal to 3.5 % of GDP in 2002. 
¥2∂ In the 2002 update of the stability programme government final consump-
tion expenditure is estimated to increase by 2.5 % in 2003 compared to
6.7 % in 2002. However, according to revised data, in 2002 the general
government consumption expenditure appears to have been increased by
11.5 % in nominal terms. 217
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fact, the agreed changes resulted in an upward revision
of the government debt ratio while the anticipated gov-
ernment surpluses for 2001 and 2002 turned into deficits.
The slow decline in the debt ratio from 1997 onwards,
has been reversed and in fact, the debt ratio increased
both in 2000 and 2001. 
The reclassifications required by Eurostat, were related
to large debt management financial operations that have
been reflected in the unusually high stock-flow adjust-
ments as well as to government expenditures previously
excluded from the budget (1). Specifically, the increase
in general government deficit for the years 2000 and
2001 resulted from treating debt assumptions as well as
capital injections to public enterprises as capital trans-
fers. Moreover, before the adjustments, the debt man-
agement related financial operations were either not
included or incorrectly treated in government books cre-
ating a picture of government balances not correspond-
ing to the actual evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Thus, the treatment of debt creating financial operations
according to generally accepted practices is expected to
improve the transparency and credibility of the Greek
budgetary accounts. 
The reclassified operations can be grouped into the fol-
lowing categories:
• Capital injections. The treatment of capital injections
(that is of increases in the share capital of public
enterprises) in the ESA government accounts is not
straightforward. These transactions are recorded as
financial transactions, without any direct impact on
the government deficit, when the national account-
ants consider that the government is acting as a share-
holder, which provides funds and expects to receive
property income in future. However, when the capital
injections are no more than a grant that is paid to
cover losses or to compensate the company for public
services, the transaction should be recorded as gov-
ernment expenditure and included in the government
deficit. In the case of Greece, Eurostat considered that
the distinction between these two cases was not strict
enough and asked the Greek statistical service to
record capital injections to a group of enterprises in
the deficit. 
Table VI.7
Composition and balances of general government, Greece (1) 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (2) – 1.9 – 1.4 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.0
— Total revenue 47.0 45.6 46.5 46.0 45.2
Of which: — current taxes 10.8 9.6 9.4 9.3 9.0
— social contributions 14.0 13.9 14.0 13.9 13.9
— Total expenditure (2) 48.9 47.0 47.7 47.1 46.2
Of which: — collective consumption 9.7 9.3 9.7 9.5 9.4
— social transfers (3) 22.6 22.2 22.5 22.4 22.2
— interest expenditure 7.0 6.3 5.5 5.2 4.9
— gross fixed capital formation 4.0 3.9 3.8 4.0 3.9
Primary balance (2) 5.1 4.9 4.3 4.1 3.9
Pm Tax burden 38.8 36.6 36.4 36.2 35.7
Government debt 106.2 107.0 104.9 101.0 97.0
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance – 1.9 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 1.9
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 5.1 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.0
(1) Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
(2) Data include UMTS receipts amounting to 0.5 % of GDP in 2001.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ The large financial operations which affected the evolution of the debt ratio
were mirrored in the stock-flow adjustments which reached 7.1 % of GDP
in 2001 and stood at 3.7 % of GDP in 2002. 218
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the assumption of State guaranteed debt of public or
private companies, is recorded as capital transfer,
that is a government expenditure. However, Greece
used to register debt assumptions as financial trans-
actions and not as government expenditure.
• Coinage. In Greece, as in most EU Member States,
coins are issued by the Treasury and are a compo-
nent of government debt. This implies that the pro-
ceeds collected by government at the issuance of
coins have a financial nature and therefore do not
have any direct favorable effect into the deficit (1).
However, in Greece, the coinage proceeds used to be
recorded as government revenue and improved the
deficit. The correction of this accounting inconsist-
ency had a negligible impact on the years before
2002, since the regular issuance of coins is very
small. However, for 2002, the impact was quite
considerable since it was the year that the whole
stock of coins in circulation was replaced because of
the euro cash changeover.
• Securitisation. The Greek government has been rel-
atively active in securitising expected future reve-
nue. The Greek statistical authorities used to record
the securitisation proceeds outside the government
deficit and therefore the Eurostat decision of July
2002 did not have any impact on the Greek govern-
ment deficit. However, Eurostat also decided that
the proceeds collected through securitisation should
be treated as loans and therefore included in the gov-
ernment debt. 
• Finally Eurostat considered that, according to the
ESA95 rules, share exchangeable and share convert-
ible bonds should be treated as the normal govern-
ment bonds and should be included in the stock of
government debt.
The agreed total revisions of budgetary accounts
amounted to 1.3 % of GDP in 2001 and 1.9 % of GDP
in 2002. Correspondingly, the debt ratio was revised by
7.3 percentage points in 2001 and 8.0 percentage points
in 2002. 
Specifically, in 2001 more than half of the revision of the
general government deficit was accounted for by the
capital injections to public enterprises. The rest of the
adjustments resulted almost entirely from debt assump-
tions, whereas the impact on interest payments was less
than 0.1 % of GDP. 
Overall, the estimated surplus of 0.1 % of GDP reported
in the September 2002 notification was turned into a def-
icit equal to 1.2 % of GDP in the revised notification
submitted in November 2002, whereas in the March 2003
notification the general government deficit for 2001 was
further raised to 1.4 % of GDP due mainly to an increase
in public investment and interest payments. 
Concerning government debt, an amount equal to 5.4 %
of GDP related to proceeds from securitisation of future
revenues and share convertible bonds was already
included in the debt in the September 2002 notification.
However, the proceeds from share exchangeable bonds,
added an amount equal to 1.9 % of GDP raising the gov-
ernment debt to 107 % of GDP from 105.1 % of GDP
reported in the September 2002 notification.
In 2002, the reclassification of capital injections to pub-
lic enterprises raised government deficit by 0.7 % of
GDP while debt assumptions added another 0.2 % of
GDP to the deficit. In the same year an amount equal to
0.4 % of GDP, representing proceeds from coinage, was
Table VI.8
Key figures of the Greek stability programme (2001–06)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 4.1 3.8 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.6
General government budget balance (% of GDP) – 1.2 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.4 0.2 0.6
Primary surplus (% of GDP) 5.1 4.4 4.4 4.6 5.0 5.2
Government debt (% of GDP) 107.0 105.3 100.2 96.1 92.1 87.9
Source: 2002 update of the stability programme of Greece.
¥1∂ In fact, there is even a small detrimental impact into the government deficit
as the cost of minting the coins is recorded as government expenditure.219
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general government deficit for 2002 was further
increased by 0.6 % of GDP due mostly to the budgetary
outcome of the year, reaching 1.9 % of GDP. Thus, the
estimated surplus of 0.8 % of GDP reported in the 2001
update of the stability programme turned into a deficit of
1.1 % of GDP. The same deficit is reported in the 2002
update while the March 2003 notification reports a
higher deficit equal to 1.2 % of GDP due to higher public
investment spending.
Government debt was similarly revised upwards by 8 %
of GDP in 2002, the main contributors to this increase
being the same as in 2001. Thus, the estimated govern-
ment debt of 97.3 % of GDP reported in the 2001 update
of the stability programme was revised up to 105.3 % of
GDP in the 2002 update. However, the March 2003 noti-
fication reports a slightly lower debt ratio equal to
104.9 % of GDP due to a higher than the previously esti-
mated increase in GDP. 
The correction of budgetary data while improving the
credibility of the Greek public accounts points at the
same time to the imperative need for further and more
decisive consolidation of the Greek public finances. All
the adjustments in the budgetary data were linked to cur-
rent expenditures indicating the persisting pressures for
increases in public spending even under the favourable
conditions of strong growth. Additional measures are
therefore required to limit current spending and bring
down the debt ratio at a faster pace in view of the
expected budgetary costs from an ageing population. 220
5. Spain
Recent developments
Since the mid-1990s, Spain’s fiscal strategy, based on
expenditure restraint, has been successful in reducing the
general government deficit from 6.6 % of GDP in 1995
to 0.1 % in 2002. In the same period, the debt-to-GDP
ratio declined from 63.9 % in 1995 to 54.0 % in 2002.
While fiscal consolidation was supported by the strong
expansion of the economy until mid-2001, the reduction
of the deficit continued in 2001–02. The balanced budget
in 2002 was obtained thanks to revenue buoyancy,
supported by relatively strong domestic demand and
employment creation, coupled with savings on public
consumption and interest payments. In particular, the
corporate income tax posted a record increase (24 % on
a cash basis) due to a surge in declared capital gains
following the introduction of a favourable regime for
their reinvestment. Additionally, civil service pay was
increased below the CPI inflation rate, helping to moder-
ate public consumption. Finally, the interest payments
fall reflected both the decreasing debt burden and lower
interest rates. In cyclically-adjusted terms, the fiscal
stance in 2002 can be regarded as slightly restrictive. 
As a result, the GDP share of current resources rose to
39.5 % in 2002 (39.0 % in 2001) while total current
expenditure remained broadly stable at 35.3 % of GDP
(35.1 % in 2001). The slight increase in public saving as
a percentage of GDP was accompanied by the marginal
increase in the share of gross capital formation, reaching
3.3 % of GDP in 2002.
In the baseline scenario of the 2002–06 updated stability
programme, a target of a general government balanced
budget is envisaged for 2003 and 2004 (maintaining the
target for 2003 and revising only marginally the target
for 2004 with respect to the previous update). Targets for
2005 and 2006 are small surpluses of 0.1 % and 0.2 % of
GDP respectively. The primary surplus is set to remain
broadly unchanged at close to 2.7 % of GDP throughout
the programme period.    
The debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to continue to decline
by around 2 percentage points every year throughout the
programme period, falling below 47 % of GDP by 2006.
These objectives assume the economy grows at a rate
close to potential (3 %) between 2003 and 2006 with
higher inflation compared with the previous update
(average annual growth of the GDP deflator of 2.8 % and
2.5 % respectively). The fiscal strategy continues to rely
on restraint of primary current expenditure, supported by
lower interest payments, while allowing for a strength-
ening of public investment. The programme incorporates
the effects of the recently implemented reform of per-
sonal income tax, with an estimated direct cost of 0.4 %
of GDP in 2003 and 2004 (see next section for details). 
Finally, the programme incorporates the full effect of
the new financial system for regional governments,
which has involved further decentralisation of tax and
spending powers. The parallel implementation of the
General Law of Budgetary Stability, which prescribes
that all public entities have to present their accounts in
balance or in surplus (1), is meant to provide further
support to the consolidation strategy in a context of
higher fiscal decentralisation.
For 2003, the target of a general government balanced
budget is being tested given the worsening in the macr-
oeconomic scenario and the implementation of the per-
sonal income tax reform. By comparison, the Commis-
sion forecasts a deficit of 0.4 % of GDP based on GDP
growth of 2.0 %, reflecting also a less optimistic assess-
ment of the effects of the tax reform on domestic
demand. However, for the rest of the projection period
fiscal objectives appear to be based on cautious growth
assumptions and seem attainable (for comparison, the
Commission services forecast a GDP growth of 3 % and
a slight deficit of 0.1 % in 2004 on an unchanged policy
¥1∂ Deficit budgets can be presented in certain circumstances if justified and
returning to balance or surplus within the three-year planning period (see the
case study on Spain’s General Law of Budgetary Stability in Chapter V.5).221
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 3basis). All in all, the underlying budgetary position
improves by over a  percentage point over the pro-
gramme period, to a surplus of 0.3 % of GDP in 2006.
The new income tax reform in Spain: 
main features and implications
Main features of the new tax reform
The new personal income tax was approved at the end of
2002. The 2003 income tax declaration on incomes
earned in 2002 will still be based on the previous system
and the first tax declaration according to the new tax
rules will be submitted in June 2004. However, the
effects of this reform are already evident in 2003 as the
new tax rates are currently being applied to income sub-
ject to withdrawal at the source. 
The reform introduces fewer and smaller changes than
the previous reform adopted in 1998 of which the new
reform is considered to be a continuation. Accordingly,
the measures aim at simplifying further the tax system,
by lowering the number of tax brackets, and increasing
the income threshold below which an individual is no
longer required to file a tax return. The major changes
can be summed up as follows:
Minimum and maximum marginal rates are lowered
from 18 and 48 % to 15 and 45 % respectively (20 and
56 % in the income tax prevailing up to 1998). In turn,
Table VI.9
Composition and balances of general government, Spain
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (1) – 0.9 – 0.1 – 0.1   – 0.4 – 0.1
— Total revenue 39.0 39.2 39.6 39.3 39.5
Of which: — current taxes 22.2 21.8 22.6 22.3 22.4
— social contributions 13.3 13.6 13.5 13.5 13.5
— Total expenditure (2) 39.9 39.3 39.7 39.8 39.6
Of which: — collective consumption 7.5 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.6
— social transfers (2) 22.4 22.3 22.6 22.8 22.7
— interest expenditure 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5
— gross fixed capital formation 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4
Primary balance (2) 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.2 2.4
Pm Tax burden 35.7 35.6 36.1 35.9 35.8
Government debt 60.5 56.9 54.0 52.5 50.5
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance (1) – 1.6 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.1
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (1) 1.7 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.4
(1) Data exclude UMTS receipts amounting to 0.1 % of GDP in 2000.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
Table VI.10
Key figures of the Spanish stability programme (2001–06)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 2.7 2.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
General government budget balance (% of GDP) – 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Primary surplus (% of GDP) 3.0 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7
Government debt (% of GDP) 57.1 55.2 53.1 51.0 49.0 46.9
Source: 2002 update of the stability programme of Spain.222
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(see Table 1). 
The minimum level of earned income which implies
the obligation of filling a tax return is increased to
EUR 22 000 when this income stems from a single
wage earner compared to EUR 21 035 in the previous
system (1). The new tax keeps the concept of taxable
income introduced in the 1998 reform: taxable income
is obtained after deducting a tax-free allowance, the
so-called ‘exempted minimum living standard’, which
replaced a vast set of tax reliefs. As in the previous
scheme, this tax-exempt minimum living standard
varies depending on personal and family circum-
stances. However, these thresholds have now been
raised. For instance, the basic individual exempted
income increases by 2.8 % to EUR 3 400.
The reform introduces a more favourable fiscal treat-
ment for some disadvantaged groups to promote their
insertion in the labour market and raise employment.
Specifically, tax reliefs for working women with chil-
dren (EUR 1 200 for every child aged below three);
higher tax reliefs for unemployed workers accepting a
job implying geographical mobility; tax advantages for
disabled workers and workers aged above 65.
With a view to remedying low geographic mobility of
workers, partially attributable to the poor functioning of
the housing market, the new income tax establishes
fiscal advantages for letting of accommodation. This
includes a relief of 25 % of net rental income an addi-
tional relief of 25 % for five years for housing at present
unoccupied and let before the end of 2004. 
A more favourable fiscal treatment of income from cap-
ital in the reform is targeted at promoting saving. In par-
ticular, realised capital gains (net worth gains) on assets
held for more than one year are now taxed at 15 % (18 %
previously), while tax relief for capital incomes from
assets held for more than two years is raised to 40 from
30 %. In addition, capital gains obtained from invest-
ment funds will not be taxable as long as they are rein-
vested in other funds. 
Private pension plans are promoted by raising the thresh-
olds to be deducted in the tax base. In addition, pension
insurance contracts are to have a similar fiscal treatment
as pension funds when the main purpose of the insurance
policy is long-term saving for retirement.
Finally, the withholding tax rate applied to interest from
deposits, capital gains stemming from share sales and
other non-labour incomes is lowered from 18 to 15 % in
line with the minimum marginal income tax.
A tentative assessment of the new income tax
The new income tax regime does not change dramati-
cally the existing structure put in place by the 1998 tax
reform. However, the reform is likely to reinforce the
reduction in the share of taxation directly paid by house-
holds observed since the mid-1990s. According to offi-
cial estimates, the current reform will involve a reduc-
tion of the effective average income tax rate of 11 %,
while by level of income the impact is officially esti-
mated as being progressive. However, estimates carried
out by independent researchers highlight an uneven
impact of the reform with a significant reduction in the
effective average tax rate occurs only for the lowest and
the highest income brackets (2); marginal tax rates for
middle-range incomes are broadly unchanged.
The reform can be expected to boost the labour supply
given the reduction in the marginal tax rate at the bottom
of the income scale. The tax relief introduced for work-
ing women with children aims at increasing the female
employment rate, which at present is very low. It might
also have some positive impact on the fertility rate which
is one of the lowest among developed countries. The fis-
cal rebates on labour incomes for workers aged above
65 could also have positive effects on the labour partici-
pation of older workers.
The more favourable taxation of unemployed workers
accepting a job offer implying a move to another place
of residence is a positive measure, given the low labour
mobility in Spain and the wide disparities in unemploy-
ment between regions. Nevertheless, mobility is unlikely
to increase significantly in the absence of a reform of the
current benefit system and a better functioning of the
housing market. In this respect, the new fiscal treatment
of letting of accommodation might imply an increase in
the current rather limited supply of this kind in Spain.
However, some doubts arise on the final effect of this
measure, given the absence of reduction in the current
¥1∂ According to the Spanish Statistical Institute, the average gross wage
(including non-labour costs) in annual terms is estimated at approximately
EUR 23 450. ¥2∂ See, for example, Pampillon and Raymond (2002).223
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able than that envisaged for letting.
In general, the new income tax contains positive meas-
ures to encourage labour participation and improve the
functioning of labour market. However, a fuller assess-
ment will only be possible after a certain period of time.
As for the fiscal treatment of saving, a positive aspect of
the new income tax refers to long-term savings related to
retirement. The rise in the annual thresholds to qualify
for tax relief for private pension contributions is a posi-
tive measure in the light of the future financial pressures
on the public pension system stemming from ageing.
Likewise, the tax exemption for capital gains realised on
an investment fund and reinvested in another fund
should promote saving. Additionally, this measure is
expected to increase competition not only among differ-
ent types of funds but also among financial institutions.
Regarding the macroeconomic and budgetary impact,
according to government estimates the income tax
reform will add 0.5 percentage points to GDP growth
(although whether this impact takes place over one or
two years is not specified). The estimated loss of reve-
nues is set at 0.3 % of GDP in 2003, including the sec-
ond-round effects caused by the reform. This estimate
might prove optimistic: given the average tax reduction
of 11 %, the cost of the reform excluding second-round
effects could be roughly estimated at around 0.6 % of
GDP. As to the effects on growth, both in terms of
immediate impact and second-round effects, an econo-
metric simulation performed with the Commission
QUEST model suggests that the impact of the reform
on GDP growth is an increase by 0.1 % in 2003. In the
medium term, this impact is estimated as adding around
0.2 percentage points per year to GDP between 2004
and 2006. 
Table VI.11
Main features of recent tax reforms
1998 income tax 2002 income tax
Net tax base up 
to EUR 
Taxable 
income
Rest up 
to EUR 
Marginal 
tax rate
Net tax base up 
to EUR 
Taxable 
income
Rest up 
to EUR 
Marginal 
tax rate
0.00 0.00 3 678.19 18.0 0.00 0 4 000 15.0
3 678.19 662.07 9 195.48 24.0 4 000.00 600 9 800 24.0
12 873.70 2 868.99 12 260.64 28.3 13 800.00 2 952 12 000 28.0
25 134.32 6 338.75 15 325.80 37.2 25 800.00 6 312 19 200 37.0
40 460.30 12 039.95 26 973.42 45.0 45 000.00 13 416 — 45.0
67 433.55 24 177.99 — 48.0 — — — —224
6. France
Recent developments
In 2002, the situation of French public finances deterio-
rated markedly. The general government deficit reached
3.1 % of GDP, thus breaching the 3 % of GDP reference
value of the Treaty. This outcome is to be compared with
a general government deficit of 1.4 % of GDP planned
by the French authorities in the Finance Law for 2002.
For the first time since 1998, the general government
debt ratio increased in 2002, reaching 59.1 % of GDP, up
from 56.8 % of GDP in 2001. The larger part of the slip-
page in the 2002 general government deficit is due to a
deterioration in the cyclically-adjusted budget position:
according to Commission calculations, the cyclically-
adjusted balance worsened by 1.1 percentage points of
GDP in 2002, to reach 3.3 % of GDP. This results from
(1) an overrun in expenditures, (2) the implementation of
tax cuts worth  percentage point of GDP, and (3) a rel-
atively low tax-to-GDP elasticity. The remaining reflects
a base effect due to the incorporation in the deficit of a
capital injection in the firm RFF (Réseau Ferré de
France), worth 0.1 percentage point of GDP, and the
impact of adverse cyclical developments. Indeed, real
GDP grew by 1.2 % last year, as against 2.5 % projected
in the budget for 2002. According to Commission calcu-
lations, the cyclical component of the deficit worsened
by 0.5 percentage points of GDP in 2002.
The developments in public finances in 2002 provide
evidence of the existence of an excessive deficit position
in France. The Commission has therefore decided in
March 2003 to initiate an excessive deficit procedure
(EDP) in the case of France. This procedure follows the
early warning issued by the Council in January 2003,
and recommending that France ‘ensures that the 3 % of
GDP reference value for the general government deficit
will not be breached in 2003’. A recommendation to the
Council to recommend to France measures to correct the
excessive deficit has been adopted by the Commission
on 7 May 2003 and is expected to be endorsed by the
Ecofin Council on 3 June.
However, under current policies, French public finances
are expected to deteriorate further in 2003: the budget for
2003 does not contain measures reducing sizeably the
underlying deficit and unfavourable cyclical develop-
ments will continue weighing on fiscal revenues. The gen-
eral government deficit is projected by the French author-
ities to reach 3.4 % of GDP, and by the Commission to
reach 3.7 % of GDP. In the same year, the gross govern-
ment debt is projected by the Commission and the French
authorities to breach the 60 % Treaty reference value.
These projections are subject to downside risks. In par-
ticular, after a year of freeze in real wages, wage claims
by unions in the central government sector could trigger
stronger than projected current expenditures. This effect
could overlap with the financing of the priorities of the
new government in the field of national security. On the
other side, the French authorities decided to cancel
expenditures worth 0.1 % of GDP, and to freeze credits
for an amount of 0.15 % of GDP. However, as long as
they are not cancelled, the credits frozen can still be
spent in the current budgetary exercise.
In 2004, despite the acceleration in economic activity to
a close to potential rate, the general government deficit
is projected by the Commission, under a no policy
change assumption, to decrease only marginally to 3.5 %
of GDP. The decline in the deficit in 2004 will be bur-
dened by the lagged impact of the low 2003 GDP growth
on fiscal revenues. The French authorities expect a
stronger decline in the government deficit in 2004 to
2.9 %. This forecast is based on the assumption that
measures ensuring an improvement in the cyclically-
adjusted balance by 0.5 percentage point of GDP in 2004
will be implemented in the budget for that year.          
The urgency of reforming the French 
pension system 
As in many other European countries, public finances in
France will face problems arising from ageing popula-225
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that the old-age dependency ratio will increase rapidly,
to almost double between 2000 and 2050. In the absence
of further reforms, the share of pension expenditures to
GDP will increase by around 4 percentage points of GDP
over the next 40 years. The pension system, today
broadly balanced, could then post a deficit as high as
3.8 % of GDP in 2040. 
While the magnitude of ageing comparable in France to
that expected in the other EU countries, the timing will
be somewhat different, as the larger part of the demo-
graphic change will occur earlier in France than in most
other EU countries. Pension expenditures will start
increasing faster than GDP as from 2005, and the growth
differential will widen markedly as from 2010. Pension
expenditures are projected to increase by 3 percentage
points of GDP in France between 2000 and 2020, and by
only 1 percentage point of GDP on average in the EU. 
Therefore, reforming the pension system in view to
ensure its financial sustainability is urgent. The French
authorities committed themselves to implement a com-
prehensive reform of the pension system before the
summer 2003. This commitment follows a long period of
broad consultations with the social partners. Since the
Table VI.12
Composition and balances of general government, France (1) 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (2) – 1.4 – 1.5 – 3.1 – 3.7 – 3.5
— Total revenue 51.2 51.0 50.5 50.3 50.3
Of which: — current taxes (3) 27.7 27.5 25.5 25.5 25.5
— social contributions 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3
— Total expenditure (4) 52.6 52.5 53.7 54.1 53.8
Of which: — collective consumption 9.3 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.2
— social transfers (4) 31.7 31.7 32.8 33.2 33.2
— interest expenditure 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.3
— gross fixed capital formation 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0
Primary balance (4) 1.7 1.6 0.0 – 0.5 – 0.2
Pm Tax burden 45.0 44.7 44.0 43.8 43.9
Government debt 57.2 56.8 59.1 61.8 63.1
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance – 2.3 – 2.2 – 3.3 – 3.5 – 3.3
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 0.9 0.9 – 0.3 – 0.3 0.1
(1) Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
(2) Data include UMTS receipts amounting to 0.1 % of GDP in 2001.
(3) Taxes on production and imports and current taxes on income and wealth.
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.
Table VI.13
Key figures of the French stability programme (2002–06)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 1.8 1.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
General government budget balance (% of GDP) – 1.4 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 1.6 – 1.0
Primary balance (% of GDP) 1.7 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.5 2.0
Government debt (% of GDP) 56.8 58.7 59.1 58.9 58.3 57.0
Source: 2002 update of the stability programme of France. The figures presented from 2004 are those of the ‘cautious’ scenario of the stability programme, which projects 
real GDP growth at 2.5 % as from 2004 and was considered by the Commission as the most plausible one.226
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increased the number of contribution years giving right
to a full pension, the main new measure has been the
creation of a Pension Reserve Fund in 1999. This Fund
is projected to have accumulated assets for a total
amount of 10 % of GDP in 2020 and is only intended to
smooth the financial shock during the retirement of the
early baby boom cohorts. Indeed, the assets of the fund
will be largely insufficient to cover increased spending
on pensions.
Limited information has been released up to now on the
main lines along which the reform will be based (see
Box VI.I). However it appears likely that a driving prin-
ciple is to safeguard the compulsory schemes financed
on a pay-as-you-go basis, which the national strategy
report regards as an essential condition for inter- and
intra-generational solidarity. The reinforcement of the
third pillar, based on encouraging private saving, seems
also to be among the intentions of the current govern-
ment, as well as the willingness of putting on a more
equal footing conditions for retirement in the public and
in the private sectors.
In this context, any possible reform of the pension system
will necessarily be organised around the modification of
the three essential parameters of the system: (1) the
replacement ratio, (2) the rate of social contributions,
and (3) the retirement age. The reform will probably rely
on a change of all these parameters. Indeed, according to
the estimates presented by the French authorities in the
national strategy report on pensions, achieving the sus-
tainability of the pension system changing only one of
these parameters would require too large an effort. Cur-
rent estimates show that solving the problem via a reduc-
tion in the replacement ratio alone requires a reduction of
this parameter by more than 30 percentage points. In the
same vein, changing only the average retirement age
would necessitate an increase by at least six years of the
contribution period, and relying only on increasing
social contributions would imply an increase in the
labour cost by more than 6 %. 
If this latter option was to be followed, the resulting
increase in the labour cost would be huge and could
have strong negative effects on labour demand. It is
indeed generally accepted that a rise in the labour cost
by 1 percentage point reduces the demand for labour by
0.3–0.5 percentage points. This option would not be
fully compatible with the Lisbon strategy, neither sat-
isfy the objective of fairness across generations.
Finally, in France still exists a large scope for increasing
the effective retirement age by encouraging labour sup-
ply of older people as the employment rate of older
workers is among the lowest in the EU. This could be
achieved notably by strengthening the link between
contribution and benefits in order to increase the incen-
tives to remain at work when entering in more mature
cohorts. 
Box VI.1: Main features of the French pension system
The French pension system is based on compulsory pay-as-you-go schemes, which cover 98 % of total pension expenditure
and are financed by social security contributions and taxes. The larger scheme is the general scheme which covers the
majority of workers of the private sector. Civil servants and State enterprise employees are covered by a variety of special
schemes, which are generally more generous than those for private sector employees. The basic schemes contain solidarity
elements and give pension on the basis of the number of contribution years. Alongside the basic schemes, compulsory
complementary schemes exist, which cover workers by category (AGIRC for managers and for ARRCO other employers).
The benefit formula of these supplementary schemes is based on a point system and ensures a close link between contri-
butions and benefits.
On its current form, the system is relatively generous compared to other countries. Indeed, the legal retirement age, set at
60, and the effective average retirement age, currently at 58.7 years according to Eurostat, are among the lowest in the EU.
The replacement ratio is relatively high in France compared to other EU countries, and retired households are at no higher
risk of poverty than other households, as a minimum level is guaranteed. The current system provides weak incentives to
contribute beyond the age at which a full pension entitlement is acquired.227
7. Ireland
Recent developments
After five years of surpluses, with a peak of 4.3 % of
GDP in 2000, the out-turn for the general government
balance in 2002 is estimated to have been a negligible
deficit of 0.1 % of GDP (or 0.2 % of GDP excluding
UMTS receipts), around  percentage point below tar-
get (1). As in 2001, the deviation from target is due to a
large tax undershoot and some expenditure overruns (on
a general government basis). While cyclical develop-
ments are undoubtedly in part to blame for the large rev-
enue shortfalls of the past two years, difficulties seem to
have arisen in accurately costing tax packages and fore-
casting revenues. Regarding expenditure in 2002, sav-
ings on interest payments and public investment partly
compensated for overruns on current primary spending.
Given high nominal growth, the debt-to-GDP ratio,
which has been the second-lowest in the EU since 2000,
fell by three percentage points to one third of GDP at the
end of 2002.
The cyclically-adjusted balance is estimated to have
deteriorated by almost 1 percentage point of GDP in
2002. Although calculations of the output gap are subject
to a particularly large margin of error in Ireland, this
points to a discretionary easing of budgetary policy in
2002 rather than broadly neutral as planned in the previ-
ous update of the stability programme 2002–04 and as
recommended by the broad economic policy guidelines
for 2002. By the same measure, fiscal policy was loos-
ened by more than 3 percentage points of GDP over the
period 2000–02.
By contrast, the budget plans for 2003, unveiled on
4 December 2002 together with the new stability pro-
gramme 2003–05, implement a tightening of fiscal
policy by some  % of GDP. The budget for 2003 (2)
increases the tax take by 0.9 % of GDP compared to a
no-policy change scenario, two thirds of which comes
from increases in indirect taxes and stamp duties. On the
expenditure side, a 1 % cut in nominal capital spending
(which translates into a very significant real cut in view of
high construction inflation) makes room for increased cur-
rent spending. Even so, the budget plans a marked reduc-
tion in the growth rate of current discretionary expendi-
ture (3), to 8 % for 2003 from 15 % in 2002 and 22 % in
2001. The main measures regarding current spending are
a relatively modest social welfare package and a rise in the
public sector pay and pensions bill by 11 % (4).     
The original budget-day target for the general govern-
ment balance in 2003, a deficit of 0.7 % of GDP, was
revised to 0.8 % in March (5). The Commission spring
2003 economic forecasts project a slightly better out-
come, with a deficit of 0.6 % of GDP for 2003, corre-
sponding to a restrictive fiscal stance. In 2004, the deficit
is expected to widen further to 0.9 % of GDP (on a no-
policy change basis).
According to the updated stability programme, the gen-
eral government deficit is projected to reach 1.2 % of
GDP in 2004 and to remain at that level in 2005. These
targets incorporate technical provisions for unspecified
future budget measures with a full-year cost of 0.7 % of
GDP in each year, which is subject to review ‘in light of
emerging economic conditions’. They also include
¥1∂ For this assessment, the original budget-day target (+ 0.7 % of GDP)
has been adjusted to (i) include UMTS receipts of 0.2 % of GDP and
(ii) exclude a transfer from the Central Bank of 0.5 % of GDP which had to
be reclassified below the line.
¥2∂ The rest of this parafigure is based on the budget plans in terms of the
Exchequer cash accounts. 
¥3∂ This refers to the concept of ‘voted’ current spending, for which annual
approval by Parliament is needed and which excludes, inter alia, the serv-
ice of the national debt and the contribution to the EU budget.
¥4∂ This includes a provision of 0.4 % of GDP for payment of the first quarter
of the ‘benchmarking’ awards (backdated to December 2001). The bench-
marking process was initiated in mid-2000 to adjust pay rates in the public
sector by reference to rates in the private sector for comparable jobs. The
benchmarking body’s report of mid-2002 recommended pay increases dif-
ferentiated by grade, leading to an 8.9 % rise in public sector pay costs
with an estimated full-year cost of 0.8 % of GDP.
¥5∂ From the March 2003 reporting of government deficits and debt levels in
accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93, as amended by
Council Regulation (EC) No 475/2000.228
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ments) of 0.4 % of GDP in 2004 and 0.8 % in 2005. In
cyclically-adjusted terms, the targets for 2004–05 imply
a broadly neutral stance, but, excluding the contingency
provisions, would have a tightening bias. The debt ratio
is projected to rise by less than 1 percentage point over
the programme period, to just below 35 % by 2005. With-
out the build-up of non-general government assets in the
National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF) (1), however,
the (gross) debt ratio would continue to fall to 2005.
Recent initiatives 
on expenditure management
Driven by the need to improve infrastructure and public
services, discretionary spending almost doubled between
1997 and 2002 (2). The occurrence of overruns and
concerns about securing ‘value for money’ raise the
issue of whether control and management systems are
adequate. This section reviews progress on implement-
ing the recommendations on expenditure management in
Table VI.14
Composition and balances of general government, Ireland 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (1) 4.3 1.1 – 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.9
— Total revenue 36.4 35.2 33.7 33.5 32.8
Of which: — current taxes 26.8 25.2 23.9 23.9 23.4
— social contributions 5.6 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.6
— Total expenditure (1) 32.0 34.1 33.9 34.1 33.7
Of which: — collective consumption 5.2 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.8
— social transfers (2) 16.7 17.8 18.2 18.7 18.4
— interest expenditure 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5
— gross fixed capital formation 3.7 4.6 4.4 3.9 3.8
Primary balance (1) 6.5 2.7 1.1 0.9 0.6
Pm Tax burden 32.1 30.7 29.3 29.2 28.7
Government debt 39.3 36.8 33.3 33.4 33.3
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance (1) 2.6 0.0 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.1
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (1) 4.6 1.5 0.4 1.2 1.6
(1) Data exclude UMTS receipts amounting to 0.2 % of GDP in 2002.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
Table VI.15
Key figures of the Irish stability programme (2003–05)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 5.7 4.5 3.5 4.1 5.0
General government budget balance (% of GDP) (1) 1.6 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 1.2 – 1.2
Primary surplus (% of GDP) (1) 3.1 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.4
Government debt (% of GDP) 36.7 34.1 34.0 34.5 34.9
(1) Data exclude UMTS receipts amounting to 0.2 % of GDP in 2002 and include contingency provisions (against unforeseen developments) of 0.4 % of GDP in 2004
and 0.8 % of GDP in 2005.
Source: 2002 update of the stability programme of Ireland.
¥1∂ The NPRF receives 1 % of GNP annually from general government
resources. At the end of 2002, it was worth over 7 % of GNP. ¥2∂ Total ‘voted’ spending (see above) rose by 92.4 %.229
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thereby putting the range of measures taken or announced
since 2002 in context (1).
In 1994, the strategic management initiative (SMI) was
launched to enhance the quality of public services. As a
follow-up, the DBG report proposed to change manage-
ment structures, human resource management and finan-
cial management systems (2). Concerning the latter, it
made the following recommendations.
Firstly, DBG favoured moving to multiannual budgeting.
The budget for 1997 marked a first step in this direction,
producing aggregate budgetary projections on a no-pol-
icy change basis for 1998 and 1999. Subsequent budgets
have provided more detailed projections over a three-year
horizon, thus covering the same period as the stability
programmes that have accompanied each budget. In 2000
it was decided to defer the original plan to introduce
three-year financial envelopes for each department,
because existing multi-year programmes (such as the
three-year social partnership agreements (3) and the
seven-year investment programme) were considered to
provide sufficient medium-term guidance. In November
2002, however, the Minister for Finance announced that
he was considering extending working with five-year
financial envelopes (as is currently done for public trans-
port) to other large capital spending areas (4).
Secondly, DBG sought to delegate financial authority to
the maximum extent possible. This would be accompa-
nied by the requirements that each department report at
year-end on outcome versus plan — not only financially,
but also in output terms — and that regular expenditure
reviews be carried out (see next point) (5).
Thirdly, the government launched the expenditure
review initiative (ERI) in May 1997, which was origi-
nally intended to review all expenditure from a results
perspective over a three-year period. This turned out to
be over-ambitious and, by end-2000, only 62 reviews
had been completed with 21 more underway, together
representing at most 37 % of government spending.
Drawing on an assessment of the ERI by the Comptroller
and Auditor General (6), the government decided in mid-
2001 to adopt somewhat revised arrangements: (i) the
selection of topics for review should ensure that the ERI
focuses on significant areas of expenditure and critical
areas of government policy; (ii) the Department of
Finance is to enhance its provision of central support;
and (iii) departments are encouraged to publish the
reviews they carry out. The topics for review in the
second round (2002–04) were approved in May 2002
and include two pilot cross-departmental reviews.
Related to this, the government set up an Independent
Estimates Review Committee (IERC) in the course of
2002 to help prepare the spending plans for 2003 (7). The
objective of this group of three former civil servants was
to find EUR 900 million (0.7 % of GDP) worth of sav-
ings on the estimated cost of maintaining the ‘existing
level of service’ in 2003 (8). This was to be achieved by
identifying programmes (i) which were no longer justi-
fied because of changed circumstances or (ii) which
could be deferred or spread over a longer period; and by
suggesting new delivery or user-charging mechanisms.
The ensuing budget was based on a reduction of the
existing level of service cost in 2003 by 0.6 % of GDP.
A similar review is to be carried out in 2003 regarding
the spending targets for 2004–05.
Fourthly, DBG recommended to strengthen the admin-
istrative budget system introduced in 1991. Adminis-
trative budgets cover the administrative (or running)
costs of departments, of which pay constitutes by far
the largest part. Each department has to agree with the
Department of Finance on a level of administrative
spending for three years and can manage these funds
rather flexibly (rights to switch, to carry-over and to
appoint staff, all subject to certain limits). The system
has been enhanced and extended to other departments
and offices. The IERC’s report recommended to intro-
duce an efficiency dividend of 2 %.
¥1∂ See also National Economic and Social Council (2002).
¥2∂ See Coordinating Group of Secretaries (1996). A working group, set up to
oversee implementation of DBG’s financial management recommenda-
tions, produced detailed proposals in July 1999.
¥3∂ These agreements not only contain a wage clause, but also cover tax and
spending measures.
¥4∂ In addition, revised arrangements for capital spending are being put in
place, providing detailed information of the size and time-scale of spending
commitments.
¥5∂ In this context, DBG recommended that departments be rewarded for sug-
gesting savings. In November 2002, the Minister for Finance announced
that savings would be earmarked to the same department for use in high-
priority areas.
¥6∂ See Comptroller and Auditor General, (2001).
¥7∂ The IERC’s report to the Minister for Finance is available at www.
budget.gov.ie.
¥8∂ This concept has recently replaced the no-policy change basis and allows a
clearer distinction between technical and policy adjustments.230
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information system is to be implemented by the end of
2005. In addition to cash data, it will provide data on an
accruals basis. In addition to financial data, it will provide
non-financial information. By focusing on outputs, it will
enable measurement of performance, thus providing valu-
able information for value for money studies and expend-
iture reviews. The development of performance measure-
ment systems has received much attention under the social
partnership process because recent national agreements
have included a conditionality clause for public sector pay
rises. The final pay rise under the Programme for prosper-
ity and fairness (expiring mid-2003) was conditional on
developing and agreeing performance indicators and mak-
ing sufficient progress towards modernisation targets. All
pay rises in the proposed new agreement, Sustaining
progress, are similarly dependent on verifiable progress
on modernisation and flexibility (1).
Apart from reforms prompted by DBG, several measures
have recently been taken to address the need to remain
within spending allocations, which has become more
pressing in view of the tighter budgetary situation. In
November 2002, the Minister for Finance announced
that the assessment of expenditure overrun risks would
be improved and that contingencies to cater for unfore-
seen pressures would be introduced. Special attention
would be given to demand-led schemes. In January
2003, a report on accountability was endorsed contain-
ing recommendations to strengthen internal financial
control and audit systems and to adopt formal risk man-
agement strategies.
An area of particular concern regarding budgetary
control and value for money is the health sector (2). In
2002, an Independent Commission on Financial Man-
agement and Control Systems was set up to make recom-
mendations on how to enhance the timeliness and quality
of the available financial information in the health serv-
ice. While not yet published, its report is expected to
highlight serious deficiencies in existing financial man-
agement procedures and to recommend the establish-
ment of a new national health services executive as well
as the urgent implementation of new budgetary and
accountability systems and performance management
programmes (3).
Finally, two recent measures are worth mentioning even
though they are not directly concerned with improving
the management of expenditure. In November 2002, the
government decided to publish intra-year spending pro-
files by department, which can be compared with the
evolution of expenditure as published in the monthly
cash Exchequer accounts. The profiles for 2003 (also for
tax revenues) were published at the end of January. In a
further move to enhance the transparency of spending
developments, the Department of Transport decided to
issue monthly progress reports on major transport and
infrastructure projects. The first such fiche was pub-
lished in early March for the Luas (Dublin light-rail)
project; it provides the original and updated estimates of
(i) total cost and (ii) completion dates.
In conclusion, the 1996 DBG report constituted an ambi-
tious programme to improve public expenditure man-
agement. While progress has been made on several
fronts, implementation of the recommendations remains
incomplete. The measures announced during 2002 will
further improve expenditure management, but some
issues require ongoing attention, such as the roll-out of
the management information system — and its contribu-
tion to securing value for money — as well as the
medium-term planning of spending.
¥1∂ The new agreement not only awards general pay rises (a cumulative 7 %)
but also allows for a gradual and full implementation of the benchmarking
awards (8.9 % on average — see footnote above). The first tranche of
benchmarking (25 %) is unconditional and is to be paid in 2003, backdated
to December 2001.
¥2∂ The involvement of the private sector in the provision of healthcare, as in the
delivery of public investment, falls outside the scope of this contribution. ¥3∂ Irish Times, 30 and 31 January 2003.231
8. Italy
Recent developments
The general government accounts recorded a deficit of
2.3 % of GDP in 2002, against an initial target of 0.5 %
of GDP. The considerable shortfall with respect to plans
is in part explained by economic growth assumptions,
which from the outset did not sufficiently reflect the
observed deterioration in the global economic out-
look (1). It is also due to the emergence of stronger than
initially assessed expenditure trends, also as a result of
the marked revision of the 2001 budgetary out-turn (2).
Almost half of this revision (around 0.5 percentage
points of GDP), was due to an underestimation of
expenditure of the central and the decentralised adminis-
trations. In the course of 2002, the government took
steps to address the serious deficiencies that had
appeared in the budgetary process, by passing a law
tightening expenditure controls (reviewed in the next
section) and adopting provisions aimed at improving the
information base on disbursements of the central govern-
ment and the decentralised administrations. 
The 2002 budgetary out-turn benefited from a lower debt
servicing costs than projected for that year in the
November 2001 stability programme update (3). Legisla-
tion enforced in the second half of the year, blocking
additional tax credits for employment creation and
investment, increasing tax receipts, curbing healthcare
expenditure and, as recalled above, improving expendi-
ture controls, played a role in keeping the government def-
icit in check. In addition, measures of a temporary nature
contributed over 1 percentage point of GDP to the 2002
result: sales of public real assets, largely through securiti-
sation, amounted to 0.9 % of GDP and receipts from a tax
amnesty on assets held abroad were 0.1 % of GDP. 
According to Commission calculations, after the deteri-
oration recorded in 2001, the cyclically-adjusted budget
balance improved markedly in 2002, although the cycli-
cally-adjusted primary balance posted a much smaller
recovery. If the impact of sales of real estate is netted out
in both years, however, the cyclically-adjusted overall
budget balance shows only very slender improvement
between 2001 and 2002, while the cyclically-adjusted
primary balance deteriorates by 0.4 percentage points.    
The general government debt ratio decreased by almost
3 percentage points of GDP to 106.7 % in 2002, well below
the government’s own revised estimate of 109.4 %,
mainly thanks to operations carried out in the final months
of the year, most notably a debt conversion which
reduced the face value of government debt by 1.9 % of
GDP (4). 
The update of the stability programme, covering the
period 2002–06, targets a reduction in the actual deficit
ratio to 1.5 % of GDP in 2003, with the budget approach-
ing a balance in 2005, the year in which the debt ratio is
to fall below 100 % of GDP. The budgetary target for
2003 relies heavily, as in 2002, on one-off measures,
including the sale of publicly-owned real estate assets
through securitisation operations, an accelerated tax liti-
¥1∂ Moreover, since 2001, official projections of tax receipts have tended to be
consistently higher than would be warranted by already overoptimistic
growth forecasts. 
¥2∂ In March 2002, the Italian statistical office reported a deficit of 1.4 % of
GDP for 2001. The 2001 deficit estimate was then revised upwards three
times: to 1.6 % in June 2002, mainly because of a higher estimate for
healthcare expenditure; to 2.2 % in July 2002, as a result of Eurostat’s deci-
sion on the treatment of securitisation in national accounts; and to 2.6 % in
February 2003, following a further correction of healthcare expenditure
and State sector expenditure (chiefly purchases of goods and services) and
revenue (tax receipts). After the latest revision, the discrepancy between
deficit reported in the government accounts in cash terms and the
Maastricht deficit (in accrual terms) is significantly reduced in 2001.
¥3∂ The sensitivity of Italian government debt to changes in interest rates is still
relatively high, given that over a third of it consists of short-term or variable
rate instruments. In 2002, interest expenditure was also reduced by
EUR 1.9 billion through swap operations.
¥4∂ Other factors influencing the result were financial operations which
reduced the cash deficit, including the disposal of loans and other financial
assets by the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (the public savings and loans bank)
in December 2002, the effect of the re-evaluation of the euro on debt
denominated in foreign currencies and a reduction compared to end-2001
in the assets held by the Treasury with the Bank of Italy at end-2002.232
P a r t  V I
M e m b e r  S t a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t sgation settlement scheme and new tax amnesties. The
2004 budgetary objective depends on replacing the main
one-off measures implemented in 2003 and on an addi-
tional significant budgetary correction. 
The Commission’s spring forecasts show a deficit in
nominal terms of 2.3 % of GDP in 2003, on the back of
one-off measures amounting to 1.2 % of GDP. In 2004,
the ‘no policy change’ projection of 3.1 %, principally a
result of the expiry of one-off measures, implies that a
very substantial fiscal correction would have to be car-
ried out that year. The debt ratio also remains distant
from the targeted values, although it decreases over the
forecast period. The difference between the Commis-
sion’s forecasts and the targets in the stability pro-
gramme are in part due to a markedly lower assumption
for real GDP growth in 2003, in part to a more cautious
evaluation of the fiscal policy measures (although the
evaluation of the temporary measures — programmed
sales of public real assets and tax amnesties — is aligned
with the official estimates). Interest rates at historically
low levels are expected to continue to exert a dampening
effect on the interest burden. The cyclically-adjusted
deficit would improve in 2003 by 0.3 percentage points
of GDP over the previous year, while the cyclically-
adjusted primary balance would remain largely stable.
On 18 April 2003, the Ministry for the Economy and
Finance released a new projection for the general gov-
ernment deficit in 2003, which now stands at 2.3 % of
Table VI.16
Composition and balances of general government, Italy 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (1) – 1.8 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 3.1
— Total revenue 46.2 45.8 45.2 45.1 44.3
Of which: — current taxes 29.8 29.6 28.8 28.2 28.0
— social contributions 12.7 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.8
— Total expenditure (1) 48.0 48.5 47.5 47.4 47.5
Of which: — collective consumption 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.2 7.2
— social transfers (2) 27.9 28.3 28.9 28.9 28.8
— interest expenditure 6.5 6.4 5.7 5.3 5.1
— gross fixed capital formation 2.4 2.5 1.8 2.1 2.6
Primary balance (1) 4.6 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.0
Pm Tax burden 42.7 42.5 41.8 41.7 41.1
Government debt 110.6 109.5 106.7 106.0 104.7
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance (1) – 2.4 – 3.1 – 2.1 – 1.8 – 2.7
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (1) 4.1 3.3 3.6 3.5 2.4
(1) Data exclude UMTS receipts amounting to 1.2 % of GDP in 2000.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
Table VI.17
Key figures of the Italian stability programme (2002–06)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 1.8 0.6 2.3 2.9 3.0 3.0
General government budget balance (% of GDP) – 2.2 – 2.1 – 1.5 – 0.6 – 0.2 0.1
Primary surplus (% of GDP) 4.4 3.8 4.5 5.0 5.3 5.5
Government debt (% of GDP) 109.9 109.4 105.0 100.4 98.4 96.4
Source: 2002 update of the stability programme of Italy.233
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2 0 0 3GDP, based on an economic growth forecast of 1.1 % (as
against 2.3 % in the November 2002 stability pro-
gramme update). This is likely to have negative reper-
cussions on the planned medium-term adjustment path,
making the policy dilemma concerning the necessary
adjustment in 2004 more acute.
Monitoring and controlling public 
expenditure: the ‘expenditure freeze’ law
Amongst the provisions adopted in 2002 to correct fiscal
imbalances, Law No 246/2002 (the so-called legge
blocca spese, ‘expenditure freeze’ law) represents, in the
intentions of the Italian authorities, an important instru-
ment to improve the control of expenditure and to allow
timely correction of any deviation from the public
finance objectives established in government’s medium-
term economic and financial plan (DPEF). The law is an
example of how the need to fulfil obligations under the
Stability and Growth Pact provides an incentive to
change national rules and procedures, emphasising
budgetary discipline and fiscal sustainability.
The overriding principle of ensuring the consistency of
fiscal trends with budgetary objectives is contained in arti-
cle 81 of the Italian Constitution, which states that ‘With
the adoption of the budget no new taxes and no new
expenditures can be established’ (indent 3) and ‘Any other
law [beyond the budget] that establishes new expenditures
must indicate the means through which they will be
financed’ (indent 4). The implementation of the constitu-
tional principle has proved problematic. In 1978, a series
of instruments (including the Financial Law) were intro-
duced in order to rationalise the budgetary process and
control public finances (1). Since the late 1980s, legisla-
tion introducing new/higher current or capital expendi-
tures or lower revenues, above and beyond the financing
means provided by the Financial Law in the special capital
and current account funds, can be financed only within the
limits of new/higher receipts and/or reductions of other
current expenditure, with an additional constraint that cap-
ital revenues cannot be used to finance current expendi-
ture (2). All legislation introducing higher expenditure or
lowering revenues and any amendment to existing legisla-
tion must be complemented by a technical report
quantifying the budgetary impact of each provision and
supplying indications on means of financing. 
Inevitably, there is a risk of underestimating the budget-
ary impact of proposed policy measures or overestimat-
ing the impact of provisions ensuring their financing.
This would not represent an insurmountable problem in
the presence of effective expenditure control mecha-
nisms. However, the experience is that budgetary moni-
toring and control have suffered from the complexity
and opaqueness of budgetary procedures, delays in
availability of information, loose practices and institu-
tional weaknesses. 
The ‘expenditure freeze’ law aims at making existing
control mechanisms more effective. To do so, it intro-
duces new stringent procedures, on the one hand facili-
tating the monitoring and control of the implementation
of legislation, and on the other hand allowing emergency
action to deal with significant slippages from the overall
public finance objectives of the government’s medium-
term economic and financial plan (DPEF) (3). 
In practice, all legislation introducing new or higher
expenditure must indicate for every year and for every
provision the ‘authorised expenditure’, that is, depending
on the type of law, either the maximum ceiling of dis-
bursements or the expenditure forecast attached to the pro-
vision. In the first case, the General Accounting Office
(Ragioneria Generale dello Stato, RGS), which is the arm
of the Ministry for the Economy and Finance entrusted
with surveillance and control powers, determines whether
the ceilings are reached and in this event blocks further
expenditure appropriations (4). The Minister for Economy
and Finance reports to Parliament and the application of
legislation is suspended unless additional financing can be
provided through a new legislative provision. In the sec-
ond case, legislation must define a ‘specific safeguard
clause’ to compensate for expenditure in excess of fore-
cast. Surveillance is entrusted to the RGS.
The provisions for ‘emergency action’ empower the
Minister for the Economy and Finance to intervene in the
general case in which the RGS detects a ‘significant
divergence’ from the overall budgetary objectives of the
DPEF (5). In this case, the Minister for the Economy and
¥1∂ Law No 468/1978.
¥2∂ Law No 362/1988. 
¥3∂ This may be considered the more structural aspect of the law, as suggested
by Grilli (2003). 
¥4∂ An appropriation is a legal obligation to carry out a payment and as such it
is distinct from a disbursement, which is the moment in which the payment
is effectively carried out. 
¥5∂ The size of the budgetary slippage which gives rise to a ‘significant diver-
gence’ is not defined in the law. An estimated divergence of 0.3–0.5 per-
centage points from the revised budgetary objective of 2.1 % of GDP was
considered grounds in late 2002 for applying the law (Grilli, 2003).234
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the Council of Ministers. The government decides on the
measures and the Prime Minister adopts a decree (atto di
indirizzo), containing the general guidelines for the
government action to secure more effective expenditure
monitoring and control. The relevant Parliamentary
Committees have 15 days to express an opinion, after
which the Minister for the Economy and Finance can in
any case adopt the necessary measures by decree. Cru-
cially, the Minister for the Economy and Finance can
limit State budget appropriations, by fixing proportional
across-the-board cuts on State expenditure, excluding
wages of public sector employees, pensions, and other
fixed or obligatory expenditure (1).
Finally, the new law also bars the widespread practice of
administrations charging new expenditure appropriations
to a financial year after it has ended (that is, 31 Decem-
ber). In addition, it reduces the number of years during
which capital expenditure arrears can be carried over in
the budget. Both these measures are likely to exert a
dampening effect on expenditures.
Given the short period elapsed since the adoption of
‘expenditure freeze’ law, a full evaluation of its impact
must necessarily be left for future discussion (2). At this
stage it is only possible to examine some of its features,
which may shed light on its potential to ensure an effec-
tive control of expenditures. 
In some respects, the law is less innovative than it might
appear: budget appropriations for some non-obligatory
expenditures (for example, purchases of goods and serv-
ices) already constituted absolute expenditure ceilings.
Yet in view of the prevailing practices, the reinstating of
procedures should not be underrated. Moreover, the mon-
itoring of expenditures is now carried out more stringently
on each single provision, instead of in terms of balance-
sheet items, as in the past.
A shortcoming of the law is the limited field of applica-
tion in case of detection of a significant budgetary slip-
page: de facto the expenditure cuts concern essentially
expenditures for goods and services and some capital
expenditures. Moreover, while the ‘significant diver-
gence’ is identified for the general government, the
domain of application of the law is restricted to expend-
iture of the central government and of non-territorial
public institutions and organisations, such as universities
or social security funds (3), leaving out expenditure of
the local administrations (4). This represents a clear lim-
itation in the light of past experience (the significant
overruns due to regional expenditure for healthcare in
2000 and 2001) and of the budgetary control challenges
generated by the decentralisation process. Another
weakness of the law could be the fact that, since expend-
iture cuts in case of significant divergence are uniformly
applied, in principle this does not allow selective action.
Finally, the ‘emergency’ instrument of the law has
intrinsically temporary effects: in the absence of more
fundamental action, in the following fiscal year, past
expenditure levels can again be reinstated.
The innovative features of the ‘expenditure freeze’ law
are undoubtedly the wide-ranging powers granted to the
Ministry for Economy and Finance, in particular the
obligation for the RGS to suspend expenditure appropri-
ations when the ceilings are reached and the possibility
(not the obligation) for the minister to act in the event of
significant divergences (even, if necessary, by supersed-
ing the role of parliament). The effective implementation
of the emergency procedures depends to a great extent
on the relative powers of the Ministry for Economy vis-
à-vis the rest of the government. In any case, the power
to impose across the board expenditure limitations is jus-
tified by the seriousness of the event, a significant diver-
gence. This confers to the instrument an exceptional
nature, whose effectiveness may well depend on its
implicit threat content. The threat of ex post action may
enhance ex ante the role of the Ministry for Economy in
the phase in which the budget is drawn, giving added
substance to the pivotal role it has long been assigned in
the budgetary process. Moreover, the credibility of a
more stringent application of surveillance procedures,
together with the risk of across the board expenditure¥1∂ Interest on public debt, accrued liabilities for loan reimbursements, obliga-
tions ensuing from Community law and international agreements, obliga-
tions ensuing from contracts, etc. The law does not contain an exhaustive
list of expenditures. In practical terms, the RGS has chosen to identify as
‘obligatory expenditure’ also ‘juridically complete obligations vis-à-vis
third parties’ (Grilli, 2003).
¥2∂ The ministerial decree of end-November 2002 established a cut in budget-
ary appropriations of 15 %. The RGS estimates this resulted in a reduction
of EUR 1.8 billion (0.2 % of GDP) in the State sector borrowing require-
ment and EUR 2.1 billion (0.2 % of GDP) in the general government deficit
(Maastricht definition).
¥3∂ The Minister for Economy can reduce working expenses of non-territorial
public institutions. Surveillance is carried out by the internal audit bodies.
¥4∂ In 2002 the law was applied also to the local health institutions (aziende
sanitarie locali, ASL). However, the action spurred strong reaction from the
regions and the ASL. As a result, the Minister for the Economy has ruled
that in future the law will not be applied to regional funding for healthcare.235
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expenditure projections.
The law should increase reliability of budgetary forecast
and transparency, enhance surveillance, strengthen con-
trols on expenditures and avoid overruns and its applica-
tion should allow quick action to address budgetary
imbalances. However, it remains to be seen whether its
provisions, in particular the freezing of laws reaching
their authorised expenditure limits and the across the
board limitations on all State non-obligatory expendi-
ture, leads to an effective control of expenditures. 236
9. Luxembourg
Recent developments
Luxembourg has enjoyed many consecutive years of high
growth and substantial fiscal surpluses. In 2000 and
2001, the general government surplus even increased to
the unprecedented levels of 6.1 and 6.4 % of GDP respec-
tively. In 2001, the general government balance increased
by an estimated 2 percentage points of GDP due to a
transaction concerning the satellite company ASTRA.
This was recorded as the sale of a non-produced non-
financial asset, that is, as a negative capital expenditure.
In 2002, the fiscal accounts remained in surplus: net lend-
ing of general government amounted to 2.6 % of GDP.
The outcome for 2002 was more favourable than previ-
ously expected in the light of the economic slowdown,
largely owing to strong corporate tax revenues and lower-
than-expected expenditure from special funds. 
In 2002, tax revenues remained strong in spite of the
sharp economic slowdown. This is to a large extent due
to high corporate tax revenues, partly reflecting the
lagged impact of strong earnings in previous years with
high economic growth. Some acceleration in the collec-
tion of corporate tax arrears played a decisive role as
well, while income tax receipts also remained relatively
favourable. In 2002, taxes on income and wealth
increased by 7.5 %, while the receipts of indirect taxes
rose by a modest 2.2 %. By contrast, the rate of growth
of social security premium revenue slowed down to
6.6 %, compared to an increase of around 13 % in 2001.
Total current resources of general government increased
by around 5 %. However, total current expenditure rose
much faster, at around 10 % which is higher than the
increase by around 9 % in 2001. Strong increases in the
public wage bill (by approximately 10 %) and in social
transfers other than in kind (by some 14 %) were mainly
responsible for the acceleration in expenditure. The lat-
ter largely reflect the substantial increases in pension and
social security payments agreed among social partners at
the so-called Rentendësch. In addition, total public
investment also increased rapidly in 2002, by 11.6 %,
compared to close to 10 % in 2001. As a consequence,
the ratio of total harmonised government expenditure to
GDP (disregarding the satellite transaction mentioned
above) rose by some 1  percentage points to more than
45 %, the highest level since the mid-1990s. 
Relatively strong revenue from corporate taxes can be
expected to continue into 2003 and possibly 2004,
despite adverse developments in corporate profits over
the last few years. This is the case because the receipts
can be levied up to five years back. Hence, payment of a
considerable part of claims accrued in the favourable
years before 2001 is still due, while the advances to be
paid are still relatively high as they are being computed
on the basis of the still-favourable company accounts of
a few years back. As regards the development of taxable
personal income, the effect of decelerating employment
and compensation on revenue will be mainly felt from
2003 onwards only.
According to the Commission spring 2003 forecasts, the
general government balance is expected to deteriorate in
2003 and 2004, to a deficit of 0.2 and 1.2 % of GDP
respectively. This reflects the lagged impact of the
economic slowdown on tax revenue and social security
contributions, in combination with continued high rates
of growth of public current and investment expenditure.
As regards tax revenues, inevitably the impact of the
collection of tax arrears will fade after some years. This
will also influence revenues of local government that are
directly linked to corporate taxes. Adverse developments
in the central government accounts would account for
most of the deterioration of the general government bal-
ance in 2003 and 2004, while local government revenues
would be affected negatively by the effects of the earlier
tax reforms from 2004 onwards. By contrast, the balance
of social security funds would still be positive, albeit to
a lesser extent than in recent years. The already low
gross government debt ratio is forecast to decline some-
what further to 3.4 % of GDP in 2004.            237
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of weaker growth
Luxembourg is a very open economy sensitive to cycli-
cal swings, which have a sizeable impact on public
finances. The sensitivity of government finances to the
business cycle is accentuated by the large cross-border
flows of workers (which affect the payment of social
security contributions) and the large exposure to the
highly volatile financial sector. However, reliable esti-
mates of the impact of the current economic slowdown
on government finances in Luxembourg are very diffi-
cult to make for a number of reasons. 
First, the higher volatility of key macroeconomic aggre-
gates and the importance of cross-border labour flows
leads to a higher margin of uncertainty for fiscal projec-
tions compared to larger EU economies (the net pay-
ments of excise taxes from the customs union with Bel-
gium is a notably difficult item). Second, the structure of
the tax system is such that a sizeable part of taxes are col-
lected with substantial and variable lags. This also makes
it harder to assess the impact of the tax reforms of 2000
and 2001 on revenue. Finally, the impact of operations of
special funds that accumulated from the fiscal surpluses
achieved in past years may cloud forecasts of changes in
the government balance based on past trends. 
Table VI.18
Composition and balances of general government, Luxembourg (1) 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (2) 6.1 6.4 2.6 – 0.2 – 1.2
— Total revenue 45.7 46.6 48.1 46.0 45.1
Of which: — current taxes 30.2 29.7 30.6 30.0 29.1
— social contributions 11.4 12.4 12.9 12.9 12.6
— Total expenditure (2) 39.6 40.2 45.5 46.3 46.4
Of which: — collective consumption 6.7 7.1 7.7 8.0 8.2
— social transfers (3) 23.3 24.9 27.3 28.9 29.7
— interest expenditure 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2
— gross fixed capital formation 4.1 4.3 4.7 5.2 5.5
Primary balance (2) 6.4 6.7 3.0 0.0 – 1.1
Pm Tax burden 41.5 41.8 43.2 42.6 41.3
Government debt 5.6 5.6 5.3 4.1 3.4
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(1) Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
(2) UMTS receipts excluded
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.
Table VI.19
Key figures of the Luxembourg stability programme (1) (2001–05)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 1.0 0.5 1.2 2.4 3.1
General government budget balance (% of GDP) 6.1 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.1
Primary balance (% of GDP) 6.4 0.2 0.0 – 0.5 0.1
Government debt (% of GDP) 5.3 5.1 4.1 3.8 2.9
(1) UMTS receipts excluded.
Source: 2002 update of the stability programme of Luxembourg.238
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Luxembourg is very favourable, given the healthy surplus
reached before the current economic slowdown started, the
very low level of government debt (which stood at 5.3 %
of GDP in 2002) and the sizeable net asset position stem-
ming from cumulated surpluses. However, some potential
risk factors should not be underestimated. Most impor-
tantly, the rise in government expenditure in Luxembourg
has been very strong in the recent years. Total government
expenditure increased by a cumulative 40 % between 1998
and 2002; the average yearly increase during that period
was around 8 %. Public investment also increased very
rapidly in the past few years, by close to 10 % on average
in nominal terms between 1998 and 2002. 
Luxembourg has accumulated some reserves that are
available to cushion the negative budgetary impact of a
transitory economic slowdown. However, such reserves
could not cater for the long-term impact on the budget
position of a prolonged slowdown in economic growth. 
Existing reserves should be used to fund the budgetary
costs of ageing that will increase markedly in the longer
term. Thus, the existence of substantial reserves in the
social security system (estimated at around 22 % of GDP
in 2001) is fully justified by the budgetary costs of age-
ing and is necessary to guarantee the payment of pension
claims also for non-resident workers in the event of
reduced employment growth. In addition, the existence
of substantial surpluses in social security funds is not a
feature that can be for certain in the medium term, as
they depend on continuing rapid growth of employment
of both residents and cross-border workers.
While it is clearly important to address the budgetary
consequences stemming from a cyclical slowdown, a
perhaps even more daunting challenge for fiscal policy
in the period ahead stems from the possibility that eco-
nomic growth may slow down for a prolonged period to
rates well below the ones enjoyed for many years in the
past decades. At the present juncture, estimates of the
rate of potential real GDP growth of the Luxembourg
economy are surrounded by large margins of uncer-
tainty. However, it seems likely that in the years ahead,
Luxembourg will experience growth rates that on aver-
age will be lower than in the decade up to and including
2000. Hence, policy measures might be needed to adjust
the growth of public expenditure to a rate consistent with
the revenue base. This would help ensure that a budget-
ary position close to balance or in surplus would be
achieved and maintained in the medium term.239
10.  The Netherlands
Recent developments
The fiscal accounts in the Netherlands deteriorated mark-
edly in 2002 against the background of a sharp economic
slowdown. After having reached a surplus of 0.1 % of
GDP in 2001, the general government balance turned into
a deficit of 1.1 % of GDP in 2002 (a worse outcome than
the 0.5 % of GDP deficit expected in the 2003 budget).
This deterioration mainly reflects the impact of the eco-
nomic slowdown, as well as the lagged impact of tax
reforms. Revenue shortfalls related mainly to corporate
taxes and increases in tax-exempt pension premiums paid
into private schemes. According to Commission calcula-
tions, the cyclically-adjusted general government deficit
remained broadly constant in 2002, at around 1 % of GDP. 
The fiscal outlook is highly uncertain at the time of writ-
ing due to the political situation. Following elections in
May 2002, a new cabinet was formed in July. The coali-
tion parties formulated their policy proposals in a coalition
agreement known as the ‘strategic accord’, which set out
the fiscal policy objectives for the whole 2003–06 cabinet
term of office. However, the cabinet fell on 16 Octo-
ber 2002, which led to general elections on 22 January
2003. At the time of writing of this report, negotiations to
form a new coalition government following the elections
are still ongoing. The 2003 budget was approved by Par-
liament with some relatively minor changes, despite the
fall of the government, and contains a package consisting
of reallocations, expenditure increases in some areas, and
tax revenue raising measures. The net combined impact of
these measures on the government balance is an estimated
improvement of around EUR 5 billion or approximately
1 percentage point of GDP in 2003. According to the 2003
budget, this would result in a stabilisation of the deficit at
0.5 % of GDP in 2003, with real GDP growth of 1  %.
However, in the absence of additional measures, the deficit
in 2003 will increase further than forecast in the budget, due
to the less favourable starting position of public finances in
2002 according to the latest data available and the worsened
economic outlook. Under the technical assumption of no
policy changes and assuming real GDP growth of 0.5 %,
the Commission spring 2003 forecasts expect the general
government balance to deteriorate in 2003 to a deficit of
1.6 % of GDP as unfavourable cyclical developments will
continue weighing on fiscal revenues. The deficit would
increase further to 2.4 % of GDP in 2004 under the no pol-
icy change assumption, reflecting the weakness of the
expected upturn as well as the lagged impact of slow
growth in 2003. According to the estimates in the spring
forecast, the cyclically-adjusted general government bal-
ance would improve slightly in 2003 and deteriorate again
to a deficit of around 1 % of GDP in 2004 (1). As a result of
projected deficits and low economic growth the gross gov-
ernment debt ratio would fall only slightly in 2003 and
increase again somewhat in 2004, to 52.8 % of GDP.
An incoming government will most likely announce con-
solidation measures even though a full assessment can
only be given on the basis of a coalition agreement. Hence,
for 2004 the current projected deficit may be interpreted as
an upper bound to expected deficits. An important chal-
lenge for the incoming government is to leave some scope
for automatic stabilisers to work, while achieving the nec-
essary improvement of the underlying balance.
The sensitivity of public finances 
to the business cycle and the importance 
of expenditure rules
As in other open EU economies, Dutch government
finances are sensitive to cyclical swings in activity. The
very marked deterioration of government finances, to a
large extent due to the impact of the economic slowdown
¥1∂ Note that the forecast horizon here covers the period up to 2004. Owing
to the characteristics of the estimation method, the outcome for the cycli-
cally-adjusted balance in any year will change when the forecast horizon
is altered. Thus, forecasts covering a longer time horizon, such as, for
instance, used in stability programmes, will typically yield a somewhat
different result even if the same input data would be used for the period
up to and including 2004. 240
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mission calculations based on the spring 2003 forecasts,
the cyclically-adjusted general government balance
remained stable in 2002 (showing an estimated deficit of
1.0 % of GDP). Thus, the deterioration of the nominal
general government balance by 1.2 percentage points in
2002 seems to be wholly accounted for by cyclical factors,
with a shortfall in revenues being the main determinant. 
The precise impact of cyclical conditions on public
finances of course also depends on the composition of
GDP growth. Typically, a change in the growth rate of
domestic demand will have a more profound impact on
the fiscal accounts than a shock to external demand. In
addition, the structure of revenue and expenditure also
determines the sensitivity of public finances to the busi-
ness cycle. For instance, the share of corporate taxes,
which are highly sensitive to cyclical conditions, in total
tax receipts has increased markedly in the Netherlands in
the past decade or two. In 1987, this share was approxi-
mately 13 % of total tax revenue. It increased to more than
17 % in 1997 and 1998 and stood at around 16 % in 2001. 
This mainly reflects three factors. First, an increase in
corporate tax receipts as a percentage of GDP, from
3.6 % in 1987 to 4.1 % in 2001. Second, the fact that the
substantial reduction in the overall tax burden since the
late 1980s was largely achieved through a reduction in
income taxes, thus raising the relative share of corporate
taxes as a source of revenue. Third, the economic boom
of the second half of the 1990s, which strongly boosted
corporate tax receipts. The latter effect is likely to be at
least partially reversed as the impact on tax revenue of
lower corporate profits in the wake of the cyclical down-
turn feeds through. Thus, seen from a longer-term per-
spective the increasing share of corporate taxes as a
source of revenue has arguably increased the sensitivity
of Dutch government finances to cyclical fluctuations.
Expenditure restraint is important in the current situation
to avoid a further deterioration of the general govern-
ment balance in response to prolonged weak economic
activity. A continuation of the basic tenets of the current
budgetary framework, which uses expenditure rules as a
cornerstone for fiscal policy, may be a useful instrument
to help maintain stable government finances in the
medium term and contain the growth of public expendi-
ture. In this respect the Dutch experience may be instruc-
tive (see part V of this report for an analysis of the role
of expenditure rules in the EU context). 
It suggests that it helped reduce the incidence of ad-hoc
measures in response to unexpected changes in the vola-
tile nominal government balance. Note, however, that
Table VI.20
Composition and balances of general government, the Netherlands (1) 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (2) 2.2 0.1 – 1.1 – 1.6 – 2.4
— Total revenue 47.4 46.5 46.1 45.9 45.3
Of which: — current taxes 24.2 24.5 24.4 23.9 23.5
— social contributions 17.1 15.3 14.8 15.6 15.3
— Total expenditure (2) 45.3 46.4 47.2 47.5 47.7
Of which: — collective consumption 10.6 10.9 11.3 11.2 11.3
— social transfers (3) 23.8 23.9 24.8 25.2 25.4
— interest expenditure 3.9 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.9
— gross fixed capital formation 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.5
Primary balance (2) 6.1 3.6 2.1 1.5 0.5
Pm Tax burden 41.6 40.0 39.4 39.6 38.9
Government debt 55.8 52.8 52.6 52.4 52.8
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance – 0.6 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.1
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 3.3 2.5 2.2 2.6 1.8
(1) Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
(2) Data for 2000 and 2001 (except cyclically-adjusted) include UMTS receipts of 0.7 % and 0.2 % of GDP respectively.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.241
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ciple facilitate the working of automatic stabilisers, it
effectively mitigates somewhat their working on the
expenditure side. That said, this need not be a major
drawback since, in the Netherlands, automatic stabilisers
mainly work via the income side.
Rules to limit the increase of a large part of total public
expenditure under pre-determined ceilings defined in real
terms were introduced in the Netherlands by the first pur-
ple cabinet in 1994, to be applied from 1995 onwards.
Since then relevant government expenditure was success-
fully kept below these ceilings (see Table VI.21 for the
outcome during the second purple cabinet), although this
was facilitated by strong economic growth and conse-
quent lower expenditure (mainly on interest payments
and unemployment benefits) for most of the period 1996–
2002 covered. This enabled a redistribution of windfalls
to sub-sectors of general government with higher-than-
projected expenditure growth as well as additional
expenditure increases in areas such as healthcare, educa-
tion, infrastructure investment and public safety. 
The overall experience with the expenditure rule since
the mid-1990s has been positive, as it is widely believed
that it helped contain expenditure growth. Furthermore,
clearly defining fixed expenditure margins for the whole
cabinet period helped anchor expectations of economic
actors. However, the fact that the budgetary framework
was respected was not enough to prevent public finances
from deteriorating in the wake of the economic slow-
down. This was partly because higher revenue and lower
expenditure during the years of higher-than-expected
economic growth had been used to intensify spending,
rather than to use it as an additional buffer. But more
importantly, one has to bear in mind that the parameters
of any budgetary rule need to be adjusted to changing
economic prospects, in order to ensure that fiscal policy
remains consistent with a budgetary position close to
balance or in surplus in the medium term. 
In the strategic accord the outgoing government retained
many of the basic characteristics of the previous budget-
ary expenditure rule, with some modifications (see
Box VI.2). It should be noted that the future of the budg-
etary framework is uncertain at the present juncture with
negotiations to form a new government still ongoing. In
any case, the budgetary rules put in place by an incoming
government will be put to a genuine test, given the sever-
ity of the economic slowdown.
Table VI.21
Expenditure in the Netherlands — relevant 
ceilings and outcome
1999 2000 2001 2002
Targeted (bn EUR ) 150.7 157.3 166.6 174.0
Outcome 149.2 156.3 166.6 173.8
Overrun (+)/ underachievement (–) – 1.5 – 1.0 0.0 – 0.2
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Box VI.2: The Dutch framework for expenditure ceilings
The budgetary framework adopted by the outgoing government resembles the one embedded in the coalition agreement of
the two previous governments The use of expenditure ceilings in real terms for a large part of total expenditure is the pivotal
mechanism of the framework (1). In particular, each of the three main sectors of the general government (central govern-
ment, social security and healthcare) will have to respect separate expenditure ceilings for the relevant expenditure items
identified (irrespective of revenues). In case overruns occur, they should be compensated within each sector.
• Fiscal projections are based on cautious macro-economic assumptions. 
• The automatic stabilisers will be allowed to work freely on the revenue side as long as the government balance will be
between 0 % of GDP and a surplus of 2.5 % of GDP. There are also provisions in case a (nominal) surplus of more than
1 % of GDP would emerge — a scenario that, at present, appears to be not very relevant.
¥1∂ A technical change to the framework adopted by the previous government is that in the deflator for gross domestic expenditure will be used to calculate
expenditure ceilings in nominal terms. The previous budgets used the GDP deflator, which is more sensitive to shocks to the terms of trade.242
11.  Austria
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
In 2002, general government finances in Austria weak-
ened markedly. From a surplus of 0.3 % of GDP in 2001,
the budgetary position deteriorated by almost 1 percent-
age point to a deficit of 0.6 % of GDP despite the fact
that output growth accelerated slightly to 1.0 % from
0.7 % in 2001. This outcome compares with an initial
objective of a balanced budgetary position set in the
November 2001 stability programme based on a real
growth assumption of 1.3 % and also exceeds the deficit
target of – 0.2 % of GDP retained in the low-growth sce-
nario assuming a real GDP expansion of 0.9 %. 
While in 2001 a strong rise in tax revenues helped to
improve the cyclically-adjusted position despite low out-
put growth, the decline in domestic demand in 2002
depressed tax revenues. The gross tax intake, accounting
for 97 % of the revenues in the budget 2002, fell short of
the budgeted amounts by 3.2 % or 0.8 % of GDP. How-
ever, the marginal item ‘other revenues’, increased to the
extent that total revenues came in only slightly below the
budget (by – 0.1 % or 0.03 % of GDP).
Although expenditure exceeded the budgeted figure by
2.3 % or 0.6 % of GDP, this increase was lower than
anticipated against the background of rising unemploy-
ment and almost stagnating employment, entailing
lower pension contributions and thus higher federal out-
lays for public pensions. In addition, the flood disaster
in summer 2002 and the emergency package adopted in
its aftermath was expected to increase spending but had,
contrary to expectation, virtually no budgetary impact
in 2002. 
These factors had led the Austrian fiscal authorities to a
preliminary deficit estimate of 1.0 % of GDP in 2002.
Due to statistical reasons and data revisions, the actual
deficit of 0.6 % of GDP turned out clearly lower, despite
a decline in the surplus at the Länder level. 
The March 2003 update of the stability programme
projects that in the near term the general government
financial position will deteriorate markedly, both in
nominal and in cyclically-adjusted terms, before improv-
ing again as late as in 2007. The deficit will remain on
average at 1 % of GDP until 2007, which is in sharp
contrast to the objective of the previous programme aim-
ing at a balanced budget position in 2003, and a small
surplus in 2004 and 2005. 
Specifically, according to the stability programmes the
deficit is forecast to deteriorate from 0.6 % in 2002 to
1.3 % of GDP in 2003 despite higher output growth. While
a temporary improvement is expected in 2004, the planned
income tax reform will take its toll as of 2005, when the
deficit is estimated to increase to 1.5 % of GDP and to
remain above 1 % of GDP in 2006. A sizeable improve-
ment to a deficit of 0.4 % of GDP is forecast only for 2007.
The budgetary strategy has changed significantly com-
pared with the previous programme. The highlights of
the new strategy are twofold: a fundamental reform of
the public pension system, tackling many of its key prob-
lems, and a sizeable income tax reform. 
On the revenue side, the tax reform is intended to reduce
the tax burden to 43 % of GDP by the year 2006. It is esti-
mated to cost EUR 3 billion or 1.3 % of GDP and to take
effect in two steps, a smaller one in 2004 (EUR  billion)
and a more substantial one of EUR 1  billion or almost
1 % of GDP in 2005. The reform aims at lowering taxes
for low and middle incomes as well as on retained profits,
strengthening work incentives for lower incomes, reduc-
ing non-wage labour costs and rendering the tax system
more environment-friendly. Conversely, an increase in
energy taxes effective as of 2004 should entail additional
revenues of EUR 450 million or some 0.3 % of GDP. 
On the expenditure side, a comprehensive pension
reform, which is announced to start in 2004 and will be
phased in until 2009, is without doubt the most remark-
able feature of the updated stability programme.        243
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structural upward pressure on spending and could prove
central to ensuring the long-term sustainability of gov-
ernment finances. Further cuts in government personnel,
measures to raise efficiency in the healthcare sector, and
restructuring the federal railways complement expendi-
ture side measures. 
As regards the regional authorities, the national stability
pact between the federal and lower levels of government
is temporarily suspended owing to the flood disaster in
summer 2002. Although the regional authorities had
committed themselves to achieve on average annual sur-
pluses of 0.7 % of GDP over the medium term, this obli-
gation is not binding in 2002 and 2003 as far as flood-
related spending is concerned.
Mainly due to a substantial upward revision of public
debt by 6.6 percentage points of GDP (details see
below), the debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 68.7 % at the end
of 2002, which was 9.1 percentage points above the
59.6 % objective set in the November 2001 stability pro-
gramme. As a consequence, the projected decline in the
debt-to-GDP ratio is delayed compared with the previ-
ous version of the programme. The debt ratio is planned
to drop below the 60 % benchmark with a delay of five
years, by 2007, decreasing by more than 8 percentage
points from its peak in 2002, helped by further privatisa-
Table VI.22
Composition and balances of general government, Austria (1) 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (2) – 1.5 0.3 – 0.6 – 1.1 – 0.4
— Total revenue 50.8 52.3 51.4 51.0 50.7
Of which: — current taxes 27.9 29.8 29.4 30.0 30.7
— social contributions 16.9 17.0 16.9 17.1 17.0
— Total expenditure (2) 52.2 52.0 52.0 52.1 51.1
Of which: — collective consumption 7.5 7.6 7.4 7.5 7.4
— social transfers (3) 30.2 30.2 30.7 31.6 31.8
— interest expenditure 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4
— gross fixed capital formation 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
Primary balance (2) 2.2 3.8 3.0 2.4 3.0
Pm Tax burden 43.5 45.6 45.1 45.8 46.4
Government debt 66.8 67.3 68.7 68.5 66.8
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance – 2.5 – 0.0 – 0.6 – 1.0 – 0.4
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 1.2 3.5 2.9 2.5 3.0
(1) Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
(2) Data for 2000 (except cyclically-adjusted) include UMTS receipts of 0.4 % of GDP.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.
Table VI.23
Key figures of the Austrian stability programme (2002–06)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.5 2.5
General government budget balance (% of GDP) – 0.6 – 1.3 – 0.6 – 0.3 0.2
Primary surplus (% of GDP) 3.2 2.3 2.7 1.9 2.2
Government debt (% of GDP) 67.8 67.0 65.1 63.8 62.1
Source: 2002 update of the stability programme of Austria.244
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financing scheme for State-owned enterprises (details
see section below). 
Sharp increase in debt for statistical reasons 
The debt-to-GDP-ratio was significantly revised upwards
following a Eurostat decision (1) on securitisation opera-
tions and also due to the inclusion of debt issued for pub-
lic enterprises which had been erroneously omitted.
First, Eurostat’s decision on securitisation operations
entailed a reclassification of debt within the government
sector and resulted in an increase of public debt by
EUR 2 593 million or 1.2 % of GDP in 2001. The sec-
ond reclassification concerned bonds issued by the Aus-
trian government in order to finance certain public enter-
prises (Rechtsträgerfinanzierung), which had not been
included in gross debt. At the end of 2002, these opera-
tions amounted to EUR 11.7 billion or 5.4 % of GDP.
Thus, the total effect of these two revisions is an increase
in the debt-to-GDP ratio by 6.6 percentage points in
2002. 
Securitisation operations — The case 
of the Blue Danube Loan Funding GmbH
In the case of Austria, Eurostat’s decision on securitisa-
tion operations concerns debt issued by a ‘special pur-
pose vehicle’, set up by the Land Niederösterreich (prov-
ince of Lower Austria). In an effort to comply with the
national stability pact, which obliges lower levels of
government to attain an annual surplus of 0.75 % of
GDP, some provinces sold their mortgage loan portfo-
lios, that is, accounts receivable relating to State-subsi-
dised housing. Economically this makes sense, as pro-
ceeds are re-invested to bear interest on the financial
market and, thus, increase revenues. 
To this end, the Land Niederösterreich set up a company,
the ‘Blue Danube Loan Funding GmbH’ (BDLF), to
which it sold its mortgage loan portfolio, consisting of
accounts receivable relating to some 150 000 State-sub-
sidised housing loans. The buyer purchased the right to
collect principal and interest from this portfolio. 
The BDLF financed this purchase by issuing bonds for
an amount of EUR 2 593 million in 2001. The final
maturity date of these bonds is May 2049. From May
2012 onwards, the issuer will have the right to redeem
the bonds (first every five years, that is, in May 2017,
May 2022 and May 2027, and at any date thereafter). 
Yet, despite the sale, Niederösterreich keeps guarantee-
ing payment of the principal and interest, as well as any
other amount due, should the issuer, for any reason, fail
to meet its obligation. 
Eurostat considers that guarantees by the State government
imply an insufficient transfer of risk. Therefore, the debt of
this ‘special purpose vehicle’ was reclassified within the
government sector, entailing an increase of public debt by
EUR 2 593 million or 1.2 % of GDP in 2001. 
Financing public undertakings — 
Rechtsträgerfinanzierung
In Austria, a favourable financing scheme for State-
owned enterprises was put in place in 1998 with the aim
of minimising their financing costs. Under this scheme
(Rechtsträgerfinanzierung) the federal government issues
bonds in its own name and forwards the amounts raised
as loans to the respective enterprise, mainly Asfinag,
ÖBB, SCHIG, ÖIAG (2), all owned to 100 % by the
government. 
For the bondholder, the government remains debtor of
principal and interest, that is, bondholders have a direct
claim on the government, which is committed to make
the corresponding payments. An internal agreement
between the government and the State-owned enter-
prises, however, specifies that the respective enterprise
redeems all payments, principal and interest, i.e. the gov-
ernment is also creditor.
According to the Treaty and successive regulations (3),
public debt — for the purpose of the EDP notification —
is a gross concept and therefore all debt issued by gen-
eral government without exception has to be included (4).
Due to a misinterpretation of the reporting rules, the
Austrian authorities had netted out accounts receivable
and payable resulting from the government’s double role
¥1∂ Decision of Eurostat on deficit and debt, No 80/2002 of 3 July 2002, ‘Secu-
ritisation operations undertaken by general government’.
¥2∂ Asfinag — road infrastructure, ÖBB — federal railways, SCHIG — rail-
way infrastructure, ÖIAG holding of public enterprises. 
¥3∂ Regulation (EC) No 3605/93. 
¥4∂ This is further specified in the Council minutes of 22 November 1993,
when Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 was adopted, where a statement reads:
‘The Council and the Commission agree that the amounts outstanding in
the government debt from the financing of public undertakings will be the
subject of a separate presentation which will reveal the institutional charac-
teristics in force on the subject in the Member States’. 245
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quence, bonds issued in order to finance public undertak-
ings had not been included in the compilation of public
debt until 2002. As of the spring 2003 notification, the
reporting practice was corrected and the gross concept
applied, entailing an upward revision of government
debt by EUR 11.7 billion or 5.4 % of GDP in 2002
Economically, the Rechtsträgerfinanzierung enables
State-owned enterprises to borrow money at very favour-
able interest rates, benefiting from both bigger emission
volumes and Austria’s AAA credit rating. As a conse-
quence, issuance of these debt instruments has progres-
sively increased since 1998. Government bonds passed
on as loans to State-owned companies represented only
11.6 % of these enterprises’ long-term liabilities in 1998,
increased to 47.2 % in the year 2001 and are estimated to
have represented almost 54 % in 2002. The interest rate
spread between government bonds and bonds issued in
the companies’ own name, although being 100 % gov-
ernment owned, ranged from 42 to 63 basis points. As a
result, cumulated interest savings since 1998 are esti-
mated to total EUR 73.3 million or 0.3 % of GDP. 
As liabilities relating to financing State-owned companies
need to be reported as government debt, this instrument is
now being abandoned, entailing two consequences. First,
financing costs for State-owned companies will increase,
since their emission volumes are fairly small, even if bun-
dled for several enterprises. Moreover, in order to raise
funds on the capital market, each of these firms needs a
credit rating, hinging among other factors on the enter-
prise’s relative independence of the government. In most
cases, these firms are not autonomous in their decision
making, such as setting prices, which impacts negatively
on the credit rating (road tolls, for example, are set by the
transport ministry and not by Asfinag). Second, the
decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio after peaking in 2002
should be fairly pronounced, since by 2012 all claims
relating to the Rechtsträgerfinanzierung will be settled.246
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Recent developments
According to the March 2003 notification as revised by
Eurostat (1), the general government deficit in 2002 is
estimated at 2.7 % of GDP and the debt ratio at 58.1 %.
Implementation in 2002 of the 2001 stability programme
update was severely hampered by the significant budget-
ary slippage registered in 2001, which led the Council on
5 November 2002 to decide that an excessive deficit
exists in Portugal. The extent of the budgetary slippage
registered in 2001 has had considerable knock-on effects
in 2002, not least because it was recognised only with a
considerable delay. 
However, even in a situation of incomplete information,
the Portuguese authorities realised in April 2002 that the
budgetary situation was developing less favourably than
foreseen in the stability programme update of December
2001, requiring corrective measures. Therefore, a recti-
fying budget was approved in June 2002, including
saving measures worth about 0.6 % of GDP, notably a
rise in the normal VAT rate from 17 to 19 %, and a
reduction in investment expenditure (2). Following the
approval of the rectifying budget, the new deficit target
for 2002 was raised by 1 percentage point to 2.8 % of
GDP. Therefore, the preliminary deficit estimate com-
plies with the target as set in the rectifying budget. 
During 2002, budgetary execution at the central govern-
ment level developed less favourably than projected in
the rectifying budget, basically because of weaker activ-
ity than expected (GDP growth is estimated at  % as
against an initial forecast of 1  %), faltering domestic
demand which depressed tax revenue, particularly in the
second half of the year, and disappointing revenues from
sales of government property. Therefore, in order to
comply with the deficit target set in the rectifying budget
and given uncertainties regarding the outcome for the
healthcare sector and local authorities, the Portuguese
authorities adopted a number of one-off measures at the
end of the year, notably a tax amnesty, which in total are
estimated to have yielded additional revenue of about
1  % of GDP (3). 
The reduction in the general government deficit from
4.2 % of GDP in 2001 to 2.7 % in 2002 resulted basically
from a strong increase in total revenue of about 1.3 per-
centage points of GDP, while total expenditure remained
relatively stable at about 46.3 %, virtually unchanged
from 2001. On the one hand, the increase in total reve-
nue, despite the current unfavourable cyclical condi-
tions, is due to the rise in indirect taxes by about 10.2 %
caused by the discretionary rise in the standard VAT rate
in June, together with the favourable impact of the tax
amnesty decided at the end of the year on direct taxes
and social security contributions (more 4.1 and 7.9 %,
respectively).                     
On the other hand, the virtual stabilisation in the total
expenditure-to-GDP ratio conceals a sharp rise in current
primary expenditure, which was offset by an equivalent
decline in capital expenditure. It is important to recall that
in the period that led to the budgetary slippage of 2001,
current primary expenditure grew consistently above
nominal GDP. As regards current primary expenditure,
¥1∂ Eurostat news release 30/2002 of 17 March 2003. The Portuguese govern-
ment deficit was revised upwards by Eurostat to exclude revenue received
by the Portuguese government at the occasion of the liquidation of the
EFTA industrial development fund for Portugal, which had been set up in
1976. The revision is worth EUR 139.5 million (or 0.1 % of GDP). Accord-
ing to Eurostat, the ESA95 rules imply that this kind of liquidation pro-
ceeds have no impact on the deficit. As a consequence, the government
deficit for 2002 has been revised from 2.6 % of GDP (the figure notified by
the Portuguese authorities) to 2.7 %. 
¥2∂ The rectifying budget included other measure, notably the freezing of hir-
ing by the government, the closure and merger of public institutes, and the
end of new interest rate subsidies to mortgage loans. The rectifying budget
also provided for the sale of government property. 
¥3∂ In mid-November 2002, the government declared an amnesty for interest
surcharges on the payment of arrears on tax and social security contribu-
tions if paid before the end of 2002. The tax amnesty was a huge success,
the extent of which was largely unanticipated, having brought in an addi-
tional EUR 1 367 million in revenue (or about 1 % of GDP).247
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37.9 % of GDP, which increased by 1.1 percentage points
in 2002.
The growth rate of current primary expenditure has
stabilised at around 8 % per year in the 2001–02
period that is more than 2 percentage points above the
average growth rate of nominal GDP. The growth rate
of collective consumption, which decelerated only
from 7.9 % in 2001 to 7.4 %, together with an increase
in the GDP ratio of total social transfers by 0.8 percent-
age points to 25.6 %, resulting in part from the dynam-
ics of pension expenditure at unchanged policies, and
in part from the first step in the intended convergence
of minimum pensions towards the minimum net wage,
which is due to be completed by 2006. The rise in cur-
rent primary expenditure in 2002 was offset by the
reduction in government investment, which fell by
about 7.4 % in comparison with 2001. This raises ques-
tions about the quality of overall expenditure. 
In the meantime, the government adopted a number of
measures that are likely to yield over time significant
benefits: the freezing of hiring in the central government,
a policy of wage moderation in the general government,
and a comprehensive set of measures to curb healthcare
spending. 
Table VI.24
Composition and balances of general government, Portugal (1) 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (2) – 2.8 – 4.2 – 2.7 – 3.5 – 3.2
— Total revenue 42.3 42.1 43.5 43.5 43.6
Of which: — current taxes 24.8 24.2 24.8 24.8 25.0
— social contributions 11.8 11.9 12.2 12.1 12.0
— Total expenditure (2) 45.1 46.3 46.3 47.0 46.9
Of which: — collective consumption 8.4 8.5 8.7 8.7 8.6
— social transfers (3) 24.5 24.8 25.6 25.8 25.8
— interest expenditure 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.0
— gross fixed capital formation 3.8 4.1 3.6 3.6 3.6
Primary balance (2) 0.4 – 1.1 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.2
Pm Tax burden 36.7 36.2 37.1 37.0 37.0
Government debt 53.3 55.6 58.1 59.4 60.2
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance – 4.0 – 4.6 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.1
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance – 0.8 – 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.9
(1) Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
(2) Data include UMTS receipts amounting to 0.3 % of GDP in 2000.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.
Table VI.25
Key figures of the Portuguese stability programme (2003–06)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 0.7 1.3 2.7 3.1 3.5
General government budget balance (% of GDP) – 2.8 – 2.4 – 1.9 – 1.1 – 0.5
Primary balance (% of GDP) 0.2 0.8 1.2 1.9 2.5
Government debt (% of GDP) 58.8 58.7 57.5 55.3 52.7
Source: 2002 update of the stability programme of Portugal.248
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for 2003 is a major challenge on the road 
to sound public finances 
The achievement of the Portuguese authorities in 2002
deserves due credit, in particular given the difficult condi-
tions under which it was obtained, but the budgetary
adjustment must be confirmed in 2003. In this respect, the
Council opinion of 7 March on the 2002 stability pro-
gramme update emphasised the need to ensure that the
government deficit in 2003 be further reduced well below
3 % of GDP and that the debt ratio be kept below the 60 %
of GDP reference value. Failure to comply with the deficit
target for 2003 would constitute a severe set-back for eco-
nomic policy for three reasons: first, it would undermine
policy credibility; second, it would not support the correc-
tion of a number of imbalances affecting the economy,
notably the external balance; and thirdly, in order to
secure government accounts close to balance by 2006 as
envisaged in the current stability programme update,
steady progress has to be achieved on fiscal consolidation.
Therefore, it is paramount to secure both a timely and
determined implementation of structural reforms. 
In the last update of the stability programme, the Portu-
guese authorities have outlined an ambitious programme
of structural reforms, which is in line with the broader
strategy defined in the 2002 broad economic policy
guidelines. The twin aims of these reforms are: first, the
pursuit of the process of budgetary consolidation on a
sustainable basis, and second, to enhance the growth
potential of the economy. Reforms in key areas, notably
in public administration, education, healthcare, and
social security, are likely to have a direct impact on
budgetary consolidation. Other reforms (for instance in
the labour market) are likely to have an indirect impact
on fiscal consolidation, either by fostering a more effi-
cient use of resources, or by broadening the tax bases as
a result of successful supply-side policies. 
However, the medium-term budgetary consolidation
strategy foresees only limited progress on expenditure
reduction in 2003 because structural reforms take time to
yield benefits. In fact, only from 2004 onwards, budget-
ary consolidation is to be achieved through a sustained
and significant reduction in the primary expenditure-to-
GDP ratio. In the meantime, given the weakness of eco-
nomic activity, the likely shortfall in tax revenue, com-
bined with the wearing-off of the significant amount of
one-off measures adopted in 2002, it is difficult to imag-
ine how the Portuguese authorities will be able to meet
the government deficit target of 2.4 % of GDP for 2003
without recourse to additional one-off measures, which
have yet to be announced. 249
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Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
Owing to an equally strong boost from domestic and for-
eign demand, real GDP growth recovered somewhat to
1.6 % in 2002, and was held back by a strong inventory run-
down in the manufacturing and shipping industries. On the
back of substantial deceleration in economic activity since
2000 when GDP rose by 5.5 %, the general government
financial surplus fell slightly to 4.7 % (1) of GDP in 2002,
although exceeding the estimate of the stability programme
update of November 2002 by 0.9 percentage points.
The change in public finances since 2000 results from a
normalisation of exceptionally high capital and corpo-
rate tax revenue from 2000–01. The better-than-
expected outcome in 2002 owes mainly to certain one-
off timing factors in corporate, capital gains and option
tax income. Overall, these factors are estimated to have
amounted to about  % of GDP. In addition, a decline
in taxation on used cars together with a rise in corporate
and energy tax intake increased tax revenue more than
was expected. In spite of these exceptional revenues, the
surplus of central government finances fell by 0.3 per-
centage points to 1.7 % of GDP. Local government
finances continued to post a small deficit of 0.3 % of
GDP although the finalisation of taxation of the tax year
2001 increased municipal revenue by some 0.3 % of
GDP at the end of 2002. Social security institutions
largely maintained their position, thanks also to the
ongoing preparation for age-related future expenditure
pressures, with a surplus of 3.3 % of GDP.
In spite of good indirect tax accrual, the general government
revenue ratio slid marginally by 0.2 percentage points to
just below 54 % in 2002. This was mainly the result of rev-
enue shortfalls due to discretionary income tax cuts of the
order of 0.5 % of GDP as well as the normalisation of cor-
porate and capital tax revenue. On the other hand, govern-
ment income from sales of property rose markedly. 
On the expenditure side, a repeated slippage in central
government spending and higher social benefits follow-
ing a marked rise of pensioners contributed to a rise of
general government expenditure by 0.2 percentage
points to 49.2 % of GDP, in spite of a significant fall in
interest payments. Central government real expenditure
was about 1  % higher in real terms in 1999–2001 com-
pared with the target of freezing the spending at 1999
levels. In 2002, the cumulative overrun was more
pronounced, about 3 %. This owes to discretionary
increases in permanent expenditure in many areas of the
budget. According to the budget for 2003, the deviation
from the spending guidelines is expected to continue
with the anticipated cumulative overrun of the central
government expenditure target reaching 3  % in real
terms (2). Consequently, the central government’s aim of
achieving a structural surplus of 1  to 2 % of GDP in the
medium term seems all the more challenging in the
future.                
Due to a still strong primary surplus of 7 % of GDP and
substantial privatisation proceeds of about 1.9 % of
GDP, the general government debt ratio fell to 42.7 % in
2002 from 43.8 % in the previous year, i.e. close to the
estimate of the updated stability programme. The stock-
flow adjustment decelerated the fall of government debt
as the pension funds continued to restructure their assets
by shifting large parts of their Finnish government bonds
to bonds issued in other countries of the euro area.
Although the government’s aim of pushing the central
government debt ratio to below 50 % of GDP (3) by 2003
¥1∂ It should be noted that Statistics Finland revised the national accounts data
at the beginning of 2003 by changing the base year of price data to 2000
from 1995. Along with other small changes in classification, this revised
upwards net lending of general government for earlier years by about 0.1–
0.2 percentage points.
¥2∂ In fact, in budgets for 2002 and 2003, direct VAT-income distribution to the
social insurance institution was increased, implying a cumulative overrun
of about 4  %.250
P a r t  V I
M e m b e r  S t a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t s(42.4 % of GDP in 2002) has been reached, the need to
create a safety margin against age-related expenditure
pressures warrants a further reduction in the debt ratio. 
The November 2002 update of the stability programme
foresees a general government surplus of 2.7 % of GDP
in 2003. Recently, this estimate was revised to 2.6 %,
which deviates markedly from the Commission services
estimate of 3  %. The difference is due mainly to a more
pessimistic national estimate of the costs in 2003 of low-
ered car taxation and on a less optimistic view of domes-
tic demand. Also, the normalisation effect of 2000–01
corporate and capital tax revenues in 2003 are estimated
to be larger in the national forecast. 
In view of expected cuts of excise duties on tobacco and
alcohol owing to the end of EU exemption, the stability
programme of November 2002 foresees the general gov-
ernment surplus to continue moderating to just over 2 %
of GDP in 2004 which further deviates from the Com-
mission estimate of 3 %. This follows largely from the
Table VI.26
Composition and balances of general government, Finland (1) 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (2) 6.9 5.1 4.7 3.3 3.0
— Total revenue 55.9 54.2 53.9 52.8 52.0
Of which: — current taxes 35.0 32.7 32.9 32.2 31.6
— social contributions 12.2 12.5 12.3 12.1 12.0
— Total expenditure 48.9 49.0 49.2 49.5 49.0
Of which: — collective consumption 7.6 7.3 7.6 7.7 7.7
— social transfers (3) 29.6 29.9 30.5 30.9 30.7
— interest expenditure 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.1
— gross fixed capital formation 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.7
Primary balance 9.8 7.9 7.0 5.4 5.0
Pm Tax burden Inclusive social contribution 48.0 46.0 45.9 45.0 44.4
Government debt 44.5 43.8 42.7 42.3 41.4
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance 4.1 4.2 4.8 3.7 3.3
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 6.9 7.0 7.0 5.8 5.4
(1) Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
(2) No UMTS receipts included.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.
Table VI.27
Key figures of the Finnish stability programme (1) (2002–06)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 0.7 1.6 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.4
General government budget balance 
(% of GDP)
4.9 3.8 2.7 2.1 2.6 2.8
Primary surplus (% of GDP) 5.6 4.2 2.9 2.3 2.6 2.7
Government debt (% of GDP) 43.4 42.5 41.9 41.9 41.4 40.7
(1) No UMTS receipts included.
Source: 2002 update of the stability programme of Finland.
¥3∂ Excluding income from sales of government property.251
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cast. In the light of mounting tax competition on corpo-
rate income and the experience of expenditure slippage
in the recent past, renewed efforts to control central
government spending seem to be warranted if the
government is to secure a sustainable path of public
finances.
Experiences with the expenditure rule
At the beginning of the 1990s, following one of the most
severe economic depression in Finland, the government
added a new tool into the budget process to achieve con-
solidation in public finances (see Part V of this report for
an analysis on expenditure rules in the EU context).
Annual expenditure limits (so-called ‘frames’) were
introduced for central government spending to help
budgetary planning in the medium term. In particular,
the government sought to terminate the chronic accumu-
lation of central government deficits caused by hiking
social security spending and reducing overall revenues.
During the first half of the 1990s, the frames also
included targets for the central government personnel,
but this feature was eradicated by 1995 whereas plans on
interest payments for the State debt have always been
included in the frames. 
Expenditure rule
Expenditure frames turned into spending ceilings when
the current/stepping aside government took office in
1999, and defined as one of its fiscal policy targets to
freeze central government real expenditure at the level of
the 1999 original budget (EUR 32 billion) for its term of
office until 2003. According to the government pro-
gramme of 1999, all spending needs would be financed
within the spending ceilings, implying savings measures
should any new expenditure items arise. The 2000 update
of the stability programme further stipulated: ‘the parlia-
mentary factions of the ruling parties have agreed to
refrain from using any automatic savings generated by a
decrease in unemployment and reduced debt servicing to
cover new spending items or levels, should the economic
cycle so require’. In view of the government’s other fiscal
policy targets of reducing central government debt to
below 50 % of GDP and cutting labour taxes by EUR
1.7–1.9 billion over the election period, adhering to strict
spending control was therefore essential. 
Annually in February/March, the government agrees on
expenditure frames by the ministries for the next four-
year period taking into account existing legislation, all
relevant coming spending items (inter alia wage rises)
and large specific development plans. Thus, on the
one hand, indexation-induced ‘automatic’ spending
increases are included in the frames and, on the other
hand, any major developing process can be agreed and
included upon the spending plans already in advance. On
the other hand, as the government drafts new frames
every year, there is a customary tendency of overrunning
the previous frames instead of using the previously
agreed frame as a basis for next year’s budget, thereby
effectively undermining the genuine purpose of the
expenditure frames. Expenditure frames lack the status
of being legally binding, nor is there any requirement of
covering the possible overruns. Individual ministries are
obligated to draft their budget proposal for the next year
according, to the frames agreed by the government in
spring although the ministries can include developing
projects into the budget proposals thus deviating from
the initial expenditure frame.
Assessment of accomplishment
Budgetary consolidation during the past decade has been
successful and the on-budget (1) expenditure fell by well
over 10 percentage points (2) of GDP between 1995 and
2001 (see Table 13.3; from 36.4 % of GDP in 1995 to
24.9 % in 2001). Particularly for the early years, much of
this owed to expenditure frames while part of the fall in
expenditure ratio in later years is also due to robust
growth of nominal GDP (3) and sturdy privatisation pro-
ceeds (4). Owing to the revenue from sales of govern-
ment property, interest payments on government debt
have decreased faster than was targeted in the govern-
ment programme of achieving the level of central gov-
ernment debt of below 50 % of GDP (5) by the end of the
term of the government. 
¥1∂ Central government finances also include extra-budgetary funds, such as
the National Housing Fund of Finland, the State Pension Fund, the Devel-
opment Fund of Agriculture and Forestry, and the Intervention Fund of
Agriculture.
¥2∂ Budgetary outcomes of different years are not strictly comparable over the
period owing to some of the functions having been transferred to net budg-
eting and some others to State-owned companies.
¥3∂ Of about 6 % per year on average.
¥4∂ Totalling to EUR 6.7 billion or 5 % of GDP during 1999–2002.
¥5∂ Estimated at 42.2 % of GDP in 2002. The target was later complemented to
exclude privatisation proceeds. The debt-to-GDP ratio is estimated at about
47 % in 2002 if all the income from property sales had been excluded from
the use of reducing the central government debt.252
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Difference of budgetary outcomes and expenditure ceilings (excluding interest payment), million EUR 
Source: Commission services.
In spite of clearly successful budgetary consolidation
during the second half of the 1990s, the current expend-
iture rule has not been fully adhered to. Central govern-
ment real expenditure, including falling interest
payments on government debt, is estimated to exceed the
target of the 1999 budget level by somewhat over
EUR 1 billion in 2003. Central government nominal
spending by ministries increased by EUR 5.5 billion
whereas interest payments decreased by EUR 1.3 billion,
about 1  percentage point of GDP, between 1999 and
2003. The over-shooting was mild in 2000, but acceler-
ated sharply in 2001 making for a overrun in 1999–2001
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Table VI.29
Central government expenditure frames 1994–2003, million EUR in nominal terms
Year Expenditure ceiling(as defined in t-1) Budgetary outcome
Difference btw target 
and outcome, %
Outcome, 
 % of GDP
1994 28 056 31 780 13.3 36.2
1995 31 352 34 626 10.4 36.4
1996 33 583 34 042 1.4 34.5
1997 33 411 31 817 – 4.8 29.7
1998 31 928 32 424 1.6 27.9
1999 32 060 32 120 0.2 26.8
2000 32 460 32 953 1.5 25.3
2001 32 595 33 765 3.6 24.9
2002 (1) 34 195 35 249 3.1 25.1
2003 (1) 35 625 35 755 0.4 24.5
(1) Latest budget proposal for the year in question.
Source: Commission services.253
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was more pronounced, about 3  %. Part of the overrun
results from a deceleration in the growth of social secu-
rity contributions which has increased transfers from the
central government budget to social security funds. To a
large extent, however, the increased central government
spending is due to increasing transfer payments to local
government, whilst consumption expenditure also grew
markedly, in particular in 2002. 
Source of overrun
The expenditure ceilings are expressed by administrative
branches, that is, ministries, not by functions. Conse-
quently, the ceilings bring a certain lack of flexibility
and coordination as every ministry strives for the opti-
mal budgetary funding for itself. Furthermore, the min-
istries have a tendency to overrun the expenditure ceiling
of spring when they present their budget proposal to the
Ministry of Finance in July, after only five to six months
of agreement of the ceilings. The general shortcoming is
that the expenditure ceilings are changed annually
instead of adhering to them for their whole four-year
period. Furthermore, as the government complements
the annual budget with two to three supplementary budg-
ets in the course of the budget year, only modest effort is
given to adhere to spending ceilings, or the original
budget, for the year in question. The current expenditure
rule applies only over the government’s term of office. In
addition, the last word in compiling the budget rests with
parliament which has often taken a softer approach on
adhering to the spending ceilings agreed by the govern-
ment. 
Latest expenditure ceilings
On 27 February 2003, the government reached an agree-
ment on the expenditure frames for the next four-year
period up to 2007 (1) (see Table 13.4.). According to the
latest ceilings, central government total expenditure in
2004–07 is estimated to exceed the level of the 2003
budget expenditure by about 1 % in real terms. The fall
of interest expenditure on government debt is expected
to discontinue (2) owing to a rise of nominal debt.
Consequently, nominal expenditure seems to grow by
about EUR 2  billion between 2003 and 2007. The deci-
sion on ceilings include all currently decided future
spending items and expected social transfers on, inter
alia, unemployment. Furthermore, guidelines take into
account the expenditure pressure arising from rising
healthcare costs and they further assume a 75 % cost
indexation on local government state grants instead of
the current 50 %. 
Overall, spending ceilings for 2004–07 assume a virtual
freeze on real expenditure, which, in view of fixed inter-
est expenses, imply that central government is expected
to spend more money merely on price rises and wage
increases over the coming four-year period. Further-
more, falling interest outlays no longer seem to offer lee-
way for extra spending.
Improving the expenditure rule
Implied by the expenditure overruns and the current
obscure structure of the expenditure rule, it appears that
expenditure ceilings should be made operationally more
simple. To this end, the authorities should consider
reformulating the real expenditure target so as to avoid
transparency problems. That could be achieved, for
example, by explicitly agreeing how nominal govern-
ment expenditure will be adjusted for inflation. On the
other hand, nominal targets are more transparent and
therefore easier to monitor. Additionally, nominal tar-
gets require correctional measures in case of faster-than-
expected inflation. 
Additional improvement could be gained from applying
the four-year ceilings in full, that is, using them as the true
medium-term targets instead of changing the ceilings
every year. An overall priority plan for the total central
government spending would be helpful in that regard. In
addition, the current supplementary budget procedure
should be reformulated to take better account of the exist-
ing spending limit and budget for each year. It seems that
stricter enforcement of the limits should be implemented.
To this end, spending decisions which overrun the ceil-
ings should be offset by spending cuts.
It would pay off to consider whether interest payments
on public debt should be excluded from the ceilings,
thereby avoiding a loosening of the spending targets in
case of falling interest expenses (see also Part V of this
report). Additionally, this implies also considering the
possibility to exclude other cyclical expenses, such as
unemployment benefits, too. Taking this analysis fur-
ther, one-off-type income measures could also be
excluded from the budgetary planning.
¥1∂ These guidelines are only indicative as the new government, to be elected
on 16 March 2003, will renegotiate the final spending ceilings for 2004–07
to be used when preparing the budget proposal for 2004 in autumn 2003.
¥2∂ The government expects interest payments to fall by another EUR 300 mil-
lion in 2004 from 2003, but to resume a rising trend between 2005 and
2007.254
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Central government expenditure frames for 2004–07 by ministries, million EUR at 2004 prices and costs
Administrative branch 2004 2005 2006 2007
Council of State 45 45 51 42
Foreign Affairs (1) 747 783 823 864
Justice 663 651 671 665
Interior 1 435 1 447 1 431 1 418
Defence 2 049 2 116 2 121 2 124
Finance 5 441 5 560 5 680 5 765
Education 6 017 6 003 6 005 6 000
Agriculture and Forestry 2 636 2 659 2 682 2 626
Transport and Communications 1 768 1 629 1 485 1 426
Trade and Industry 948 943 948 959
Social Affairs and Health 8 727 8 775 8 826 8 837
Labour 2 101 2 044 2 009 1 970
Environment 657 647 640 635
Primary expenditure 33 337 33 405 33 473 33 433
Interest payments on State debt (1) 3 127 3 068 3 076 3 088
Total 36 464 36 473 36 549 36 521
(1) Interest and Development Cooperation expenses at current prices.
Source: Commission services.255
14. Sweden
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
The Swedish government finances have been in surplus
each year since 1998. The overriding goal of fiscal pol-
icy is to maintain sound public finances. To achieve this,
Sweden’s medium-term budgetary strategy is three-fold
and consists of: (i) nominal ceilings on central govern-
ment expenditure set annually for three years ahead, (ii)
a medium-term balanced budget constraint for local gov-
ernments and (iii) a 2 % of GDP surplus target for gen-
eral government finances on average over the business-
cycle. The latter forms an integral part of Sweden’s strat-
egy to cope with the budgetary consequences of ageing
populations. 
In 2002, the surplus was 1.3 % of GDP (1.7 %
expected in the latest convergence programme), down
markedly from 4.5 % of GDP in 2001. Higher expend-
iture and in particular lower revenue contributed to the
lower surplus recorded in 2002. Higher public con-
sumption and transfer payments to households contrib-
uted to the rise in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio. Lower
tax receipts from both households and companies con-
tributed to the fall in the revenue-to-GDP ratio. This
reflects in part the tax cuts on labour income imple-
mented in 2002. 
Central government expenditure covered by the ceiling
(cash basis) in 2002 came out just below the ceiling
previously set. The use of expenditure ceilings on cen-
tral government as a means for medium-term budgetary
planning is covered in more detail in the following
section. 
The cyclically-adjusted balance fell to 0.9 % of GDP in
2002 from 3.6 % of GDP in 2001, and the cyclically-
adjusted primary balance fell to 3.8 % of GDP from
6.8 % of GDP. This indicates a considerable easing of
the fiscal stance in 2002 (1).
The general government debt ratio was 52.4 % of GDP
in 2002, down by 2 percentage points compared with
2001. The debt reduction was lower than the surplus in
general government finances, mainly due to the net
acquisition of financial assets in 2002. 
In 2003, the surplus in government finances is expected
by the Commission services to fall somewhat to 0.8 % of
GDP as economic activity is forecast to be weaker. GDP
growth of 1.4 % is expected compared with 1.9 % in
2002. The expenditure-to-GDP ratio is expected to rise
in 2003 as a result of the weaker economic activity fore-
seen. Higher transfer payments to households are pro-
jected, in part as unemployment is forecast to rise and in
part as sickness insurance payments should be higher
than in the previous year. This suggests that the ceilings
on central government expenditure will be breached on
the basis of the budget for 2003, presented in October
2002. Indeed, the Swedish authorities announced, in the
Spring Fiscal Policy Bill released on 15 April, measures
to cut expenditure, in line with the Budget Law. 
The revenue-to-GDP ratio is expected to rise in spite of
the weaker economic activity foreseen. This is in part
due to higher tax rates levied by several local govern-
ments in 2003, resulting in higher tax revenues for the
general government sector as a whole. The cyclically-
adjusted surplus is expected to rise by 0.2 percentage
points of GDP and the cyclically-adjusted primary sur-
¥1∂ In the 2002 updated convergence programme an adjustment for the timing
of recording of taxes is made, which reduces the balance in particular in
2001 but also in 2002. The Swedish approach of adjusting the periodisation
of taxes gives considerable effects for some years. This means that the
budget balance for 2000 is strengthened by 1 percentage point and weak-
ened by 2.5 and 0.5 percentage points in 2001 and 2002, respectively.
Smaller effects are projected for 2003 and 2004. On the basis of such an
additional adjustment, the fiscal stance is still expansionary in 2002, but to
a lesser degree.256
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ing a slightly restrictive stance in 2003. 
In the latest update of the Swedish convergence pro-
gramme, the general government finances were projected
to show surpluses of 1.5 % of GDP in 2003 and 1.6 % of
GDP in 2004. These budgetary projections were based on
real GDP growth of 2.5 % in 2003 and in 2004. The
social security sector was projected to continue to show
considerable surpluses in the years to 2004. For the local
government sector, slight surpluses in 2003 and 2004
were projected, whereas for the central government defi-
cits of around 1 % of GDP were projected. Overall, both
the revenue and expenditure-to-GDP ratios were pro-
jected to decline in 2003 and 2004. The government gross
debt-to-GDP ratio fell below 60 % in 2000 and is
expected to fall further, to 49.3 % by 2004. The targets set
for public finances were considered to be in accordance
with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact by
the Council, as evident from their latest opinion on the
updated Swedish convergence programme (1).
The overall thrust of the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill is
restrictive and the outlook for the economy and the pub-
lic finances were revised downwards compared with the
2002 convergence programme (and the budget for
2003). The surplus in the public finances were revised
downwards to 0.4 % of GDP in 2003 (from 1.5 %) and
to 1.0 % of GDP in 2004 (from 1.6 %). In 2005 and
2006, surpluses of 1.4 and 2.1 % of GDP, respectively,
were projected. These budgetary projections were based
on real GDP growth of 1.4 % in 2003 (down from
2.5 %), 2.4 % in 2004 (down from 2.5 %), 2.6 % in 2005
and 2.5 % in 2006.
The Commission’s spring forecasts suggest that the sur-
plus in the public finances will reach a low in 2003 and
a surplus of 0.8 % of GDP is projected at the back of
lower GDP growth compared with 2002. In 2004, a
higher surplus of 1.2 % of GDP is projected, in line with
higher GDP growth. The difference between the Com-
mission’s spring forecasts and the projections in the
Spring Fiscal Policy Bill regarding the budget balance in
particular in 2003 can mainly be attributed to the revenue
side. In particular, the Swedish authorities project a
smaller rise in current tax receipts, compared with the
Commission. This smaller rise can be explained by an
assumption rather than a forecast of wage increases
(hourly earnings) of 3.5 %, which may well be on the
low side. The budget also projects a larger fall in corpo-
rate direct taxes, compared with the Commission. In
addition, the main new measure in the Bill — of reduc-
ing sickness insurance — results in lower taxable
income and therefore lower tax receipts, as benefits are
taxed. Moreover, a decline in the debt ratio is expected
and the debt ratio is projected by the Commission to fall
below 50 % of GDP in 2004.
Sustaining sound public finances — the first 
real test for the procedure of ceilings 
on central government expenditure
The Swedish Government introduced with the 1996
Budget Law a procedure of expenditure ceilings on cen-
tral government to be set three years ahead. This proce-
dure has proven useful in that it limits the risk for slip-
page in the budget, as it imposes institutional restrictions
on increased spending. It has also been successful in the
sense that these ceilings have been adhered to each year
since 1997, and expenditure also came out below the
ceilings in 2002 (see Table VI.33 below). At the same
time, general government expenditure in relation to GDP
has been on a declining trend. It can therefore be said that
the fiscal policy framework has been instrumental in
strengthening the Swedish public finances. It has
allowed Sweden to introduce substantial tax cuts in
2000–02 while keeping the public finances in surplus.
Sweden experienced remarkable economic growth
between 1998 and 2000, averaging 4.2 %, accompanied
by strong employment growth and a reduction of the
unemployment rate, from 8.2 % in 1998 to 5.6 % in 2000
(and further to 4.9 % in 2001). This has acted in the
direction of limiting the demand and need for expendi-
ture increases beyond projections. 
However, Swedish economic growth, as in most other
economies, was more subdued in 2001 and 2002, aver-
aging 1.5 %, and is set to be slightly below that in 2003.
Moreover, employment growth was virtually flat in 2002
and is expected to be slightly negative in 2003. This is
expected to result in a rise in the unemployment rate,
widely regarded as being near the NAIRU. In the budget
for 2003, the contingency reserves (the buffers within
the ceilings) were narrowed for 2003 and 2004. More-
over, it is likely that there will be overruns in some
expenditure areas if economic growth comes out below
the government’s expectations. Indeed, in the 2003
Spring Fiscal Policy Bill GDP growth was revised¥1∂ OJ C 26, 4.2.2003.257
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contingency reserves (the buffers within the ceilings)
were narrowed further for 2003 and 2004. 
The Budget Law states that the government should twice
a year report to Parliament (this has been done when pre-
senting the Fiscal Policy Bill in the spring and the
Budget Bill in the autumn in the past). If signs of over-
runs should emerge, the government should propose
measures to correct these if the overall ceiling is threat-
ened. However, Parliament may decide on changing the
ceilings, which illustrates that the procedure has some
flexibility. The government has declared on several
occasions that it stands ready to take restraining meas-
ures on expenditure, in order to ensure adherence to the
ceilings set overall, in line with the Budget Law. In the
Spring Fiscal Policy Bill, proposals to contain expendi-
ture in 2003 and 2004 were included.
The fact that expenditure cuts were proposed in the
Spring Bill suggests that the Swedish authorities do take
the procedure of expenditure ceilings seriously. This
lends support to the continuation of the hitherto success-
ful strategy of maintaining expenditure control.        
Table VI.31
Composition and balances of general government, Sweden (1) 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance 3.4 4.5 1.3 0.8 1.2
— Total revenue 60.9 61.7 59.5 59.9 59.7
Of which: — current taxes 37.5 38.6 36.4 37.2 37.3
— social contributions 14.9 15.5 15.6 15.4 15.2
— Total expenditure 57.4 57.2 58.2 59.1 58.5
Of which: — collective consumption 8.6 8.7 9.0 9.1 9.0
— social transfers (2) 36.0 36.2 36.9 37.9 37.7
— interest expenditure 4.0 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.6
— gross fixed capital formation 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.3
Primary balance 7.5 7.7 4.2 3.5 3.9
Pm Tax burden Inclusive social contribution 52.5 54.2 51.9 52.6 52.5
Government debt 52.8 54.4 52.4 50.9 49.5
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance 1.4 3.6 0.9 1.1 1.5
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 5.5 6.8 3.8 3.9 4.2
(1) Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.
Table VI.32
Key figures of the Swedish convergence programme (2001–04)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 1.2(°) 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.3 :
General government budget balance (% of GDP) 4.8 1.7 1.5 1.6 2.0 :
Primary surplus (% of GDP) 6.0 2.3 2.0 2.1 : :
Government debt (% of GDP) 56.6 53.6 50.9 49.3 48.0 :
NB: In the 2003 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill released on 15 April, the following projections were made: GDP growth: 1.4 % in 2003, 2.4 % in 2004, 2.6 % in 2005 and
2.5 % in 2006. General government budget balance (% of GDP): 0.4 % in 2003; 1.0 % in 2004; 1.4 % in 2005 and 2.1 % in 2006. Government debt (% of GDP):
51 % in 2003, 50 % in 2004, 48.4 % in 2005, and 46.4 % in 2006.
Source: 2002 update of the convergence programme of Sweden.258
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of a rule-based framework for public finances and a pro-
cedure for ensuring expenditure control has been instru-
mental in strengthening Swedish public finances and has
added to the achievement of macroeconomic stability.
Indeed, Mr. Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Swedish
Riksbank recently said (1) that ‘if there is a short-term
room for manoeuvre and if it is possible to achieve
higher growth and employment without the inflation tar-
get being threatened, this opportunity should be taken by
lowering the repo-rate. To let the rule-based fiscal policy
framework go when it, for the first time, is being tested
thoroughly, would send a very negative signal to all who
assesses the Swedish economic situation’.
To this end, the proposed increase in the levels of sick-
ness and family insurance (2) was postponed in the
Spring Bill. Moreover, cuts in the sickness insurance
benefit levels and a prolongation of the period the
employer pays ‘sickness wage’ from 14 to 21 days were
proposed. This, together with other expenditure cuts and
postponements amounted to SEK 5.3 billion (0.2 % of
GDP) in 2003 and SEK 10.8 billion (0.4 % of GDP) in
2004. Even so, the budgetary margins for 2003 and 2004
are very narrow at SEK 0.4 billion and 1.1 billion respec-
tively. With the proposed expenditure cuts, the fiscal
stance is restrictive, in particular in 2003 and to a lesser
extent in 2004–06. Tax increases in the local government
sector this year contribute to this. The Spring Bill notes
that the restrictive fiscal stance ‘lessens the need for a
tightening of monetary policy in the recovery phase’.
In order to strengthen the chances of respecting the
expenditure ceiling for 2003, some expenditure compo-
nents were advanced from 2003 to 2002, suggesting a
slightly better starting position in 2003. However, this type
of operation may adversely affect the credibility of the
expenditure ceiling procedure as a mean to avoid slippage.
In addition, it does jeopardise the very idea of containing
expenditure. This is evident from the national accounts
definition, where tax expenditures are booked, properly, as
expenditures. Indeed, in the report published on 12 March
2002 by the government-appointed Committee on Stabili-
sation Policy for Full Employment if Sweden joins the
Monetary Union, the use of the expenditure ceilings in
Sweden is being addressed in the context of ensuring main-
tained expenditure control in ‘good times’. The report
notes that ‘[…] the so-called budget margin — the differ-
ence between the government expenditure ceiling and esti-
mated expenditure — has come to be viewed more as a
“room for new expenditure increases” than as a safety mar-
gin for dealing with uncertainty in expenditure forecasts’.
Hence, in order to ensure a successful use of expenditure
ceilings on central government as a means to contain
expenditure in the medium term, Sweden would gain
from a stricter implementation of the so-called budget
margin to reflect an adequate margin for forecast errors.
In the short-term (in 2003–04), the discretionary cuts in
spending introduced with the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill
strengthens the chances of adhering to the ceilings set
when they are being tested thoroughly for the first time
since the procedure was introduced. It lends support to
the continuation of the hitherto successful strategy of
maintaining expenditure control. This should put Swe-
den in a better position to continue the strategy of sus-
taining surpluses in public finances over the cycle and
would also make room for the continuation of the strat-
egy of lowering taxes.
¥1∂ On 18 March at a hearing in the Parliament’s sub-committee on finance. On
the same day, the Riksbank announced that the Executive Board had
decided to cut the repo-rate by 25 basis points, to 3.5 %.
¥2∂ Proposal in the budget for 2003 to raise the level from 7.5 to 10 times the
basic amount.
Table VI.33
Central government expenditure in % of GDP
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Expenditure, central government 36.5 36.4 36.2 34.6 34.7 34.7 : :
Expenditure ceiling, central government in t-1 38.3 36.5 36.2 34.8 34.8 34.7 33.8 33.5
NB: the figures for central government are on a cash basis (national definition). For 2003 and 2004, the Commission services spring 2003 forecast
for nominal GDP is used. The expenditure ceiling for 2004 as given in t-2. A technical adjustment to the ceilings in 2003 and 2004 in the
Spring Fiscal Policy Bill results in a ceiling (in % of GDP) of 33.9 % in 2003 and 33.7 % in 2004. In addition, new expenditure ceilings for 2005
and 2006 were not proposed in the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill, contrary to the information in the 2002 updated convergence programme. The
Bill states that ceilings for these years will be presented with the budget for 2004. However, the Spring Bill includes indicative expenditure
ceilings. These were (in % of the Bill’s GDP) 33.6 % in 2005 and 33.4 % in 2006.
Sources: Swedish Budget Bills for 1997–2003, The 2003 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill, Commission services.259
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Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects 
The government finances in 2002 moved into deficit,
following four years of surpluses. The estimated out-turn
for the general government balance was a deficit of
1.3 % of GDP following a surplus of 0.8 % in 2001. In
the financial year 2002–03, the out-turn is now estimated
to be a deficit of 2.3 % compared to 1.8 % in the conver-
gence programme. Part of the rise from the convergence
programme is due to an allocation for the war with Iraq.
A reason for the move into deficit in 2002, was the result
of planned rises in government expenditure in excess of
GDP growth, but also receipts were lower than expected
due to the effects of the global economic slowdown on
financial markets and companies. The tax burden is esti-
mated to have decreased from 38 % of GDP in 2001 to a
little under 37 % in 2002. In particular, taxes on income
actually fell, in part, to the aforementioned effect on the
financial sector. A rise in current consumption and capi-
tal expenditure as a percentage of GDP, was partly offset
by a fall in interest payments as UK gross debt relative
to GDP continued to fall. The cyclically-adjusted pri-
mary surplus, as a percentage of GDP, fell in 2002 as
planned expenditure rose as a percentage of GDP. The
general government debt fell to 38.4 % of GDP at the
end of 2002 from 38.9 % at the end of 2001.
The public finances are expected to weaken again in
2003 and the general government finances are expected
to show a deficit of 2.5 % of GDP in that year. The
authorities, in the budget announced in April, expect a
similar deficit of 2.4 % of GDP in 2003–04 compared to
2.2 % in the convergence programme. This weakening
in the government finances is due to planned expenditure
rises over the period to financial year 2003–04 which are
only partially offset by rises in national insurance contri-
butions. Further, government expenditure is expected to
be temporarily inflated, in 2003, as a result of the costs
of the war with Iraq. In addition, the public finances will
continue to be affected, albeit temporarily, by a continu-
ation of lower than expected tax receipts resulting from
the weakness in financial markets. In sum, the rise in
the cyclically-adjusted balance is around 1 % of GDP
between 2002 and 2003 on the Commission services
projections, as the cyclically-adjusted deficit rises to 2 %
of GDP in 2003 and 2004 from 1 % in 2002. This expan-
sionary stance is not expected to present problems in the
UK where inflation is amongst the lowest in the EU and,
indeed, rises in general government expenditure, espe-
cially capital expenditure, should help maintain respect-
able GDP growth of 2  % in 2003.
The Commission services are projecting a deficit of
2.5 % of GDP in 2004; the same as in 2003. The latest
budget projections show the public finances moving into
deficit of 2.4 % of GDP in 2003–04, as stated above, and
a deficit of 2.1 % of GDP in 2004–05 falling to 1.9 % in
2005–06. The slightly lower deficits of the authorities, as
compared to the Commission services, can be largely
explained by a more optimistic growth forecast for 2004.
However, in the short term, these projected deficits of
the authorities are a little higher than those in the conver-
gence programme due to a more negative output gap, but
in 2006–07 and subsequently, the deficit is projected at
1.7 % of GDP a little above that of the convergence pro-
gramme and it is also 1.7 % in cyclically-adjusted terms.
This deficit persists as the result of addressing the low
level of government investment.
Gross debt as a percentage of GDP is expected to be
around 40 % in 2007–08 in the budget projections. This
is relatively low. On current policies and assumptions,
the UK is well placed to meet the budgetary costs asso-
ciated with an ageing population.             
The UK approach to public investment
The government has introduced a number of reforms to
fiscal policy making and public expenditure planning
and control to ensure that public investment is main-260
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goals (1). 
These reforms reflect the view that, in recent years, pub-
lic investment had fallen to very low levels as a propor-
tion of GDP (only 0.5 % in net terms in 1999–2000).
Among the EU economies, the ratio of public sector net
investment to GDP in the UK was around the lowest over
the period 1970–2004. The reforms also reflect the
importance the government attaches to public invest-
ment, in its own right, as an important ingredient in
advancing two of its five long-term goals, namely:
• raising the sustainable rate of UK productivity to
deliver, rising national prosperity (by improving the
nation’s infrastructure);
• establishing world-class public services with signif-
icant extra investment tied to reform and results.
The following describes the UK approach to public
investment in four important areas, namely the role of
public investment in the macroeconomic framework,
the broad planning approach to public investment in the
Table VI.34
Composition and balances of general government, United Kingdom (1) 
(as % of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government balance (2) 1.6 0.8 – 1.3 – 2.5 – 2.5
— Total revenue 40.6 40.7 39.5 39.5 39.7
Of which: — current taxes 30.4 30.3 29.2 29.0 29.0
— social contributions 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.9 8.1
— Total expenditure (3) 36.7 39.9 40.7 41.9 42.2
Of which: — collective consumption 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.8 7.8
— social transfers (3) 24.6 25.4 25.9 26.2 26.2
— interest expenditure 2.8 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.1
— gross fixed capital formation 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.8
Primary balance (3) 6.7 3.2 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.4
Pm Tax burden 38.2 38.0 36.7 36.9 37.1
Government debt 42.1 38.9 38.4 39.0 39.8
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance 1.2 0.7 – 1.0 – 2.0 – 2.0
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 3.9 3.1 1.1 0.0 0.0
(1) Commission spring 2003 economic forecasts.
(2) Data include UMTS receipts amounting to 2.4 % of GDP in 2000.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.
Table VI.35
Key figures of the United Kingdom’s convergence programme (2001–02 to 2006–07)
2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07
Real GDP growth (annual % change) 1.5 2.0 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.5
General government budget balance (% of GDP) – 0.2 – 1.8 – 2.2 – 1.7 – 1.6 – 1.6
Primary balance (% of GDP) 1.0 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 0.6 n.a.
Government debt (% of GDP) 38.2 37.9 38.8 38.9 38.9 39.1
Source: 2002 update of the convergence programme of United Kingdom.
¥1∂ Most recently, these were described in the Treasury publication, ‘2002 Spend-
ing review departmental investment strategies: a summary’. (December 2002).261
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assessment of investment by results and the role of pri-
vate/public partnerships in delivering investment.
The macroeconomic framework
The UK’s own fiscal rules, introduced in 1997, are now
well known:
• the golden rule: over the economic cycle, the gov-
ernment will borrow only to invest and not to fund
current spending; and
• the sustainable investment rule: public sector net
debt as a proportion of GDP will be held over the
economic cycle at a stable and prudent level.
Thus, the intent can be seen to promote (public sector)
capital investment while ensuring sustainable public
finances over the long term as borrowing for investment
is conducted in a responsible way.
The chart reveals the low level to which investment had
fallen in recent years and also shows the pick-up since
the rules were established, though investment still
remains at low levels. Of course, part of the historical fall
is explained by the decisions of governments to move
out of activities previously delivered by the public sec-
tor, but the fall is not fully explained by these changes.
The broad planning approach
Public investment allocations play an important role in
the four key themes of the 2002 spending review
namely, raising productivity, extending opportunity,
strong and secure communities, and Britain in the world.
Within the increased level of resources devoted to
investment, the government has focused on four priority
areas — education, transport, health and housing.
Public sector investment falls within the budgeting
regime which is intended to secure compliance with the
fiscal rules. The main ingredients of this, as far as invest-
ment is concerned, are:
• firm and fixed three-year departmental expenditure
limits (DEL) to help departments plan and manage
resources with greater certainty over the medium
term (so extending planning horizons from the his-
toric levels of one year, to fixed three-year spending
plans, and with longer-term plans for key pro-
grammes such as transport and health);
• separate resource (current) and capital budgets, con-
sistent with the distinction in the fiscal rules. Depart-
ments can only spend capital allocations on capital
programmes. This helps to ensure that investment is
not sacrificed to meet short-term current pressures;
• full end-year flexibility which allows departments to
carry forward under-spends from one year to the
next;
• coherent investment strategy to deliver assets neces-
sary to support public services.
The recent spending review established department
spending plans for the three years — 2003–04 to 2005–
06. Net investment is planned to rise from 1.2 % of GDP
in 2002–03 to 2.1 % in 2005–06 and is projected to rise
further to 2.2 % of GDP by 2007–08 which, if achieved
as planned, would bring investment up to rates last seen
at the end of the 1970s (see Graph VI.1).
While spending has risen significantly, especially
recently, it would be fair to say that there has been some
slippage from previously announced plans. In the first
spending review of 1998 (covering the years from 1998–
99 to 2000–01) net investment was planned to rise to
1.2 % of GDP in 2000–01. In the event the out-turn in
that year was 0.5 % of GDP. A reason for the undershoot
is that departments have taken time to respond to the step
change in capacity to manage investment programmes. 
Departmental allocations and assessment of results
Overall totals for public investment are established
consistent with meeting the fiscal rules and achieving the
government’s broad objectives. Departments each have
what are called public service agreements (PSAs). These
set out the outcomes that departments are aiming to
achieve and the targets that underpin them. Overall
capital budgets for departments are then agreed in the
spending review appropriate to the established PSAs.
Departments then prioritise within these allocations.
Departmental investment strategies (DISs) explain how
investment will contribute to the achievement of these
objectives. The strategies are also backward looking
such that progress on previous strategies can be evalu-
ated. However, since the PSAs are, in some cases, to be
achieved over a longer time frame than three years, the
contribution so far is critical to achieving the overall tar-
get. Departments strive to achieve best practice for
project appraisal based on guiding principles in the
Treasury’s ‘Green Book’.262
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Investment secured through public–private partnerships
(PPPs) and the private finance initiative is not included
in the totals for public sector investment. The way these
work is that the public sector buys services from a pri-
vate sector partner. The private sector partner undertakes
the capital investment, and its ability to manage risks
allocated to it can result in the provision of a service at a
price that represents value for money. Approval of a PFI
scheme depends on an assessment of the lifetime costs of
providing and maintaining the underlying asset (a school
say) and the running costs of delivering the required
service.
The government stresses that PPPs must be seen in con-
text and that PFI contracts make up 10–15 % of total
investment in any one year but do not replace the ‘signif-
icant’ investment committed by the government itself.
They are pursued only when they represent better value
than the public service alternative.
Assessment
The UK approach establishes a comprehensive frame-
work for the determination of public investment from its
role in the macroeconomic fiscal rules to its role in meet-
ing specific objectives of government policy. While
investment is rising rapidly now, it has often come in
under projections since the new framework was set up in
1997. The challenge for the authorities will be to ensure
that investment rises as planned and to ensure, and dem-
onstrate, that public investment has played its intended
role in securing the policy outcomes desired.
Graph VI.1:  Public sector net investment, % of GDP 
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Part VII
Resources

1. Code of best practice on the compilation 
and reporting of data in the context 
of the excessive deficit procedure 
This code of best practice (1) aims at clarifying and
streamlining procedures, both at the Member State and
the Commission levels, when compiling and reporting
government accounts, in particular data for government
deficit and debt, covering the previous four years (actual
data) and the current year (planned data) in the context
of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). The code
respects the definitions, deadlines or obligations estab-
lished by the legal acts in force. The reporting procedure
is governed by Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 (2). The
Protocol on the EDP annexed to the Treaty stipulates in
Article 4 that ‘The statistical data to be used for the
application of this Protocol shall be provided by the
Commission’. Therefore, the Commission fulfils the role
of statistical authority. However, it does not directly
compile government data in the Member States but
depends on data compiled and reported by the national
authorities. For that reason, the accurate and speedy
compilation of budgetary data and their prompt reporting
to the Commission is of utmost importance.
The Commission’s role as statistical authority in the con-
text of the EDP is exercised by Eurostat, on behalf of the
Commission.
1.1. Compilation of budgetary data 
by Member States
Actual data: The actual data of the ESA95 government
accounts shall be compiled by the national statistical
institutes (NSIs), and where applicable by the national
central banks (NCBs). In certain Member States, in view
of current national institutional arrangements, actual
data can be compiled by the ministries of finance (MOF).
The NSIs act in full scientific independence, in strict
respect of the accounting rules as defined in Regulation
(EC) No 3605/93, Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 (3) (the
ESA95 regulation), and in the ESA95 manual on govern-
ment deficit and debt. Central, regional and local gov-
ernment and the social security funds shall ensure that
the accurate basic data and other information needed for
compiling reliable ESA95 accounts is made available to
the compiling authorities in time and with sufficient
detail.
Planned data: The planned data are, in general, provided
by the ministries of finance on the basis of the ESA95
government accounts. They shall be the most recent offi-
cial forecasts, taking into account the most recent budget-
ary decisions and economic developments and prospects,
and should be produced shortly before the reporting
deadline where possible. The planned data together with
the actual data must form a consistent time series.
1.2. Reporting of budgetary data 
by Member States to the Commission
Reporting deadlines: Member States shall strictly
comply with the reporting deadlines before 1 March
and before 1 September as laid down by Regulation
¥1∂ Endorsed by the Ecofin Council of 18 February 2003.
¥2∂ OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 7, as amended by Council Regulation (EC)
No 475/2000 (OJ L 58, 3.3.2000, p. 1), and Commission Regulation (EC)
No 351/2002 (OJ L 55, 26.2.2002, p. 23).
¥3∂ OJ L 310, 30.11.1996, p. 1, as amended. The amendments most relevant for
general government data are Regulation (EC) No 1500/2000, OJ L 172,
12.7.2000, p. 3, Regulation (EC) No 2516/2000, OJ L 290, 17.11.2000,
p. 1, Regulation (EC) No 995/2001, OJ L 139, 23.5.2001, p. 3, and Regula-
tion (EC) No 2558/2001, OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 1.267
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actual data in general the NSI (in cooperation with the
NCB, where applicable) or in certain cases the MOF, and
for planned data in general the ministry of finance —
take responsibility for the content, timeliness and trans-
mission of their respective part of the report. 
Reporting tables: The Commission shall, in cooperation
with the Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance
of Payments Statistics (CMFB), as soon as possible put
forward a more detailed set of reporting tables and
required supplementary information, on the basis of the
legal acts in force (2). This shall be implemented by the
March 2004 notification.
Revisions: Member States shall inform the Commission,
as soon as they become available, of revisions of the
actual accounts and of major revisions of the planned
data. Major revisions should be properly documented
including a breakdown of the revisions. In any case, revi-
sions have to be reported and properly documented if the
reference values as specified in the relevant Treaty Pro-
tocol are being surpassed.
1.3. Securing the quality 
of the actual budgetary data
Statistical inventory: For the purpose of data quality
assessment by the Commission, the NSIs (in cooperation
with the NCBs and the MOFs, where applicable) shall,
following a proposal by Eurostat and after consultation
of the CMFB, during 2004 provide a detailed inventory
of the methods, procedures and sources used for the
compilation of actual government deficit and debt
data (3). This inventory shall be updated regularly.
Resolving methodological issues: When there are doubts
on the correct accounting treatment of a specific govern-
ment measure, without prejudice to the authority exer-
cised by Eurostat on behalf of the Commission, Member
States are strongly advised to at the earliest stage organ-
ise consultations at national level between the finance
ministry, the NSI, and where applicable the NCB. In
cases where the doubts prevail, the NSI shall formally
ask Eurostat to rule on the matter. Eurostat shall liaise
with other Commission departments, and if necessary
with the ECB, and give prompt advice about the record-
ing of the government transaction in question in the
ESA95 accounts (4). In cases which are not covered ade-
quately by ESA95, or are particularly complex or of gen-
eral interest, Eurostat shall consult the CMFB before tak-
ing a decision (5). The Member States shall provide
Eurostat and the CMFB with the information necessary
to decide on any accounting issue. Eurostat as a general
rule shall publish its decision, together with the CMFB
opinion, within the timetable laid down in the CMFB
rules of procedure for consultations on EDP statistics.
The decisions of Eurostat shall be systematically pre-
sented in the ESA95 Manual on Government Deficit and
Debt, which is regularly updated and which may lead to
amendments of ESA95 in case of substantial clarifica-
tions. In case amendments are required, the Commission
shall initiate secondary legislation in conformity with the
rules on competence and procedure laid down in the
Treaty and Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 (the ESA95
regulation). Eurostat can also take decisions on the
accounting of government transactions on its own initia-
tive. The CMFB may also provide opinions on its own
initiative. 
Monitoring of data: Eurostat assesses the compliance of
the reported data with the accounting rules, including the
completeness, plausibility and consistency of the data.
The Member States shall promptly provide the Commis-
sion access to the information required for the purpose of
this assessment. Eurostat may when necessary examine
in depth the ESA95 government accounts of each Mem-
ber State. Eurostat may request the assistance of other
parties represented in the CMFB, and may publish the
results, taking due account of the confidentiality of sta-
tistical data.
¥1∂ Should a Member State because of unexpected and unforeseen reasons be
unable to comply with the deadlines, it will promptly inform the Commis-
sion of the reasons for the delay and inform them of the expected reporting
date. In case such unexpected and unforeseen reasons concern planned
data, the Member State could report planned and actual data separately.
The Member States shall inform the Commission which national institu-
tions are responsible for the EDP reporting.
¥2∂ More detailed information at the level of government sub-sectors (central,
regional and local government and social security funds) is needed on
actual data. 
¥3∂ Such an inventory already exists for the compilation of GNP/GNI and GDP
in the context of the Communities’ fourth resource (Council Directive
89/130/EC of 13 February 1989 on the harmonisation of the compilation of
GNP at market prices, OJ L 49, 21.2.1989, p. 26). 
¥4∂ The formal request, including the necessary information for a Eurostat rul-
ing, should be made in due time to ensure that no accounting issue is left
pending at the time of the notifications.
¥5∂ The CMFB is a consultative body and its opinion is therefore not binding
for Eurostat. However, Eurostat takes the utmost account of the opinions
expressed by the CMFB.268
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by the Commission
Actual data: Eurostat shall assess and publish for each
Member State the actual government deficit and debt
figures, within two weeks after the reporting deadline.
Delays in the reporting by any Member State do not con-
stitute a motive for Eurostat to delay its publication. Any
reservation expressed when publishing the actual data,
including if necessary and possible amendments by
Eurostat and a reference to the objected figures, shall be
communicated no later than two working days before
this publication, to the Member State concerned and to
the EFC President. When the issue is subsequently
resolved, the withdrawal of the reservation is also pub-
lished. Following revisions, the Commission (Eurostat),
recording the results of the debate with the Member
State, shall within two weeks publish on their web site
the updated government accounts and the effects on gov-
ernment deficit and debt. 
Planned data: The Commission does not publish the
reported planned data. However, the planned data are
communicated by the Commission to the EFC. These
data do not preclude the Commission (Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs) to publish
their own forecasts. 
Reporting to the EFC: In a report on the main reporting
results to the EFC within one month after the reporting
deadline, the Commission shall summarise major issues
or problems in the reporting tables submitted by the
Member States, with a view to find solutions and to con-
stantly improve the quality and timeliness of data. The
EFC may request further information or a follow-up to
the report.269
2. Glossary
Accession countries Countries that will become mem-
bers of the EU in May 2004 and include Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Automatic stabilisers Various features of the tax and
spending regime which react automatically to the eco-
nomic cycle and reduce its fluctuations. As a result, the
budget balance tends to improve in years of high growth,
and deteriorate during economic slowdowns. 
Broad economic policy guidelines (BEPGs) Annual
guidelines for the economic and budgetary policies of
the Member States. They are prepared by the Commis-
sion and adopted by the Council of Ministers responsible
for Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin). 
Budget balance The balance between total public
expenditure and revenue in a specific year, with a posi-
tive balance indicating a surplus and a negative balance
indicating a deficit. For the monitoring of Member State
budgetary positions, the EU uses general government
aggregates. See also structural budget balance, primary
budget balance, and primary structural balance. 
Budgetary rules Rules and procedures through which
policy-makers decide on the size and the allocation of
public expenditure as well as on its financing through
taxation and borrowing.
Budgetary sensitivity The variation in the budget bal-
ance in percentage of GDP brought about by a change in
the output gap. In the EU, it is estimated to be 0.5 on
average.
Candidate countries Countries that wish to accede to
the EU. Besides the accession countries, they include
Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.
Close-to-balance requirement A requirement con-
tained in the Stability and Growth Pact, according to
which Member States should, over the medium term,
achieve an overall budget balance close to balance or in
surplus.
Code of conduct on the format and content of the sta-
bility and convergence programmes Policy document
endorsed by the Ecofin Council in July 2001 setting
down the information requirements and key definitions
to be followed by Member States in preparing their sta-
bility or convergence programmes.
Convergence programmes Medium-term budgetary
and monetary strategies presented by each of those
Member States that have not yet adopted the euro. They
are updated annually, according to the provisions of the
Stability and Growth Pact. Prior to the third phase of
EMU, convergence programmes were issued on a volun-
tary basis and used by the Commission in its assessment
of the progress made in preparing for the euro. See also
stability programmes.
Crowding-out effects Offsetting effects on output due
to changes in interest rates and exchange rates triggered
by a loosening or tightening of fiscal policy.
Cyclical component of budget balance That part of the
change in the budget balance that follows automatically
from the cyclical conditions of the economy, due to the
reaction of public revenue and expenditure to changes in
the output gap. See automatic stabilisers, tax smoothing
and structural budget balance. 
Cyclically-adjusted budget balance See structural
budget balance.
Demand and supply shocks Disturbances that affect the
economy on the demand side (for example, changes in
private consumption or exports) or on the supply side
(for example, changes in commodity prices or techno-
logical innovations). They can impact on the economy
either on a temporary or permanent basis.270
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receive government transfers, especially pensions, rela-
tive to those who are available to provide the revenue to
pay for those transfers. 
Direct taxes Taxes that are levied directly on personal or
corporate incomes and property.
Discretionary fiscal policy Change in the budget bal-
ance and in its components under the control of govern-
ment aiming at stabilising the economy. It is usually
measured as the residual of the change in the balance
after the exclusion of the budgetary impact of automatic
stabilisers. See also fiscal stance. 
Early-warning mechanism is part of the preventive ele-
ments of the SGP, and is activated when there is signifi-
cant divergence from the budgetary targets set down in a
stability or convergence programme. 
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) Formerly
the Monetary Committee, renamed the Economic and
Financial Committee as of January 1999. Its main task is
to prepare and discuss (Ecofin) Council decisions with
regard to economic and financial matters. 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) Group of senior
officials whose main task is to prepare discussions of the
(Ecofin) Council on structural policies. It plays a large
role in the preparation of the BEPGs, and it is active on
policies related to labour markets, methods to calculate
cyclically-adjusted budget balances and ageing popula-
tions. 
Effective tax rate The ratio of broad categories of tax
revenue (labour income, capital income, consumption)
to their respective tax bases.
ESA95/ESA79 European accounting standards for the
reporting of economic data by the Member States to the
EU. As of 2000, ESA95 has replaced the earlier ESA79
standard with regard to the comparison and analysis of
national public finance data. 
Excessive deficit procedure (EDP) A procedure accord-
ing to which the Commission and the Council monitor the
development of national budget balances and public debt
in order to assess the risk of an excessive deficit in each
Member State. Its application has been further clarified in
the Stability and Growth Pact. See also stability pro-
grammes and Stability and Growth Pact. 
Expenditure rules A subset of fiscal rules that target (a
subset of) public expenditure.
Fiscal consolidation A continuous improvement in the
budget balance, either specified by the amount of the
improvement or the period over which the improvement
continues.
Fiscal decentralisation The transfer of authority and
responsibility for public functions from the central gov-
ernment to intermediate and local governments or to the
market. 
Fiscal federalism A subfield of public finance that
investigates the fiscal relations across levels of govern-
ment.
Fiscal impulse The estimated effect of fiscal policy on
GDP. It is not a model-free measure and it is usually cal-
culated by simulating an econometric model. The esti-
mates presented in the present report are obtained by
using the Commission services’ model QUEST.
Fiscal rule A permanent constraint on fiscal policy,
expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal per-
formance, such as the government budget deficit, bor-
rowing, debt, or a major component thereof. See also
budgetary rule, expenditure rules.
Fiscal stance A measure of the discretionary fiscal pol-
icy component. In this report, it is defined as the change
in the primary structural budget balance relative to the
preceding period. When the change is positive (negative)
the fiscal stance is said to be expansionary (restrictive). 
General government As used by the EU in its process
of budgetary surveillance under the Stability and Growth
Pact and the excessive deficit procedure, the general
government sector covers national government, regional
and local government, as well as social security funds.
Public enterprises are excluded, as are transfers to and
from the EU budget. 
Government budget constraint A basic condition apply-
ing to the public finances, according to which total public
expenditure in any one year must be financed by taxation,
government borrowing, or changes in the monetary base.
In the context of EMU, the ability of governments to
finance spending through money issuance is prohibited.
See also stock-flow adjustment, sustainability.271
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used to calculate trend GDP and output gaps by filtering
actual GDP.
Indirect taxation Taxes that are levied during the pro-
duction stage, and not on the income and property aris-
ing from economic production processes. Prominent
examples of indirect taxation are value added tax (VAT),
excise duties, import levies, energy and other environ-
mental taxes. 
Interest burden General government interest payments
on public debt as a share of GDP. 
Maastricht reference values for public debt and defi-
cits Respectively, a 60 % general government debt/GDP
ratio and a 3 % general government deficit/GDP ratio.
These thresholds are defined in a protocol to the Maas-
tricht Treaty on European Union. See also Excessive def-
icit procedure.
Maturity structure of public debt The profile of total
debt in terms of when it is due to be paid back. Interest
rate changes affect the budget balance directly to the
extent that the general government sector has debt with
a relatively short maturity structure. Long maturities
reduce the sensitivity of the budget balance to changes
in the prevailing interest rate. See also public debt.
Minimal benchmarks Values indicating a budgetary
position that would provide a cyclical safety margin for
the automatic stabilisers to operate freely during eco-
nomic slowdowns without leading to excessive deficits.
The minimal benchmarks are estimated by the European
Commission. They do not cater for other risks such as
unexpected budgetary developments and interest rate
shocks and should not be confused with the close to bal-
ance or in surplus medium-term requirement of the Pact.
Monetary conditions index (MCI) An indicator com-
bining the change in real short-term interest rate and in
the real effective exchange rate to gauge the degree of
easing or tightening of monetary policy.
Mundell-Fleming model Macroeconomic model of an
open economy which embodies the main Keynesian
hypotheses (price rigidity, liquidity preference). In spite
of its shortcomings, it remains useful in short-term eco-
nomic policy analysis.
NAIRU Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemploy-
ment.
Non-Keynesian effects Supply-side and expectations
effects which reverse the sign of traditional Keynesian
multipliers. Hence, if non-Keynesian effects dominate,
fiscal consolidation would be expansionary.
Old age dependency ratio Population aged over 65 as a
percentage of working age population (usually defined
as persons aged between 15 and 64).
Output gap The difference between actual output and
estimated potential output at any particular point in time.
See also cyclical component of budget balance.
Pay-as-you-go pension system (PAYG) Pension sys-
tem in which current pension expenditures are financed
by the contributions of current employees.
Pre-accession economic programmes (PEPs) Annual
programmes submitted by candidate countries which set
the framework for economic policies The PEPs consist
of a review of recent economic developments, a detailed
macroeconomic framework, a discussion of public
finance issues and an outline of the structural reform
agenda.
Pre-accession fiscal surveillance framework (PFSF)
provides the framework for budgetary surveillance of
candidate countries in the run up to accession. It closely
approximates the policy coordination and surveillance
mechanisms at EU level.
Policy-mix The overall stance of fiscal and monetary
policy. The policy-mix may consist of various combina-
tions of expansionary and restrictive policies, with a
given fiscal stance being either supported or offset by
monetary policy. 
Primary budget balance The budget balance net of
interest payments on general government debt.
Primary structural budget balance The structural (or
cyclically-adjusted) budget balance net of interest pay-
ments.
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy A fiscal stance which ampli-
fies the economic cycle by increasing the structural
primary deficit during an economic upturn, or by
decreasing it in a downturn. It can be contrasted with272
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opposite effects. A neutral fiscal policy keeps the cycli-
cally-adjusted budget balance unchanged over the eco-
nomic cycle but lets the automatic stabilisers work. See
also tax-smoothing.
Production function approach A means to estimate the
potential level of output of an economy on taking inputs
on labour and capital as well as trend factor productivity
into account. This is used to estimate the output gap that
is a key input in the estimation of cyclical budget compo-
nent.
Public debt Consolidated gross debt for the general
government sector. It includes the total nominal value of
all debt owed by public institutions in the Member State,
except that part of the debt which is owed to other public
institutions in the same Member State.
Public goods Those goods and services that are con-
sumed jointly by several economic agents and for which
there is no effective pricing mechanism that would allow
private provision through the market.
Public investment The component of total public
expenditure through which governments increase and
improve the stock of capital employed in the production
of the goods and services they provide.
Public–private partnerships (PPP) Agreements that
transfer to the private sector investment projects that tra-
ditionally have been executed or financed by the public
sector. To qualify as a PPP, the project should concern a
public function, involve the general government as the
principal purchaser, be financed from non-public
sources and engage a corporation outside the general
government as the principal operator that provides sig-
nificant inputs in the design and conception of the
project and bears a relevant amount of the risk.
Quasi-fiscal activities Activities promoting public pol-
icy goals carried out by non-government units. 
QUEST The Directorate-General’s macroeconomic
model of the EU Member States plus the US and Japan.
Ricardian equivalence Under fairly restrictive theoret-
ical assumptions on the consumer’s behaviour (inter alia
infinite horizon for decision making), the impact of fis-
cal policy does not depend on whether it is financed by
tax increases or by a widening deficit. The basic reason-
ing behind this statement dates back to Ricardo and was
revisited by Robert Barro in the 1970s.
Securitisation Borrowing (issuing of bonds) with the
intention of paying interest and capital out of the pro-
ceeds derived from assets (use or sale of) or from future
revenue flows.
Sensitivity analysis An econometric or statistical simu-
lation designed to test the robustness of an estimated
economic relationship or projection, given various
changes in the underlying assumptions. 
Significant divergence A sizeable excess of budget balance
over the targets in the stability or convergence programmes,
that triggers the early warning procedure of the SGP.
‘Snowball’ effect The self-reinforcing effect of public
debt accumulation or decumulation arising from a posi-
tive or negative differential between the interest rate paid
on public debt and the growth rate of the national econ-
omy. See also government budget constraint.
Social security contributions (SSC) Mandatory contri-
butions paid by employers and employees to a social
insurance scheme to cover for pension, healthcare and
other welfare provisions. 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) Approved in 1997, the
SGP clarifies the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty
regarding the surveillance of Member State budgetary
policies and the monitoring of budget deficits during the
third phase of EMU. The SGP consists of two Council
regulations setting out legally binding provisions to be fol-
lowed by the European institutions and the Member States
and two resolutions of the European Council in Amster-
dam (June 1997). See also excessive deficit procedure. 
Stability programmes Medium-term budgetary strate-
gies presented by those Member States that have already
adopted the euro. They are updated annually, according
to the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. See
also convergence programmes.
Stock-flow adjustment The stock-flow adjustment
(also known as the debt-deficit adjustment) ensures con-
sistency between the net borrowing (flow) and the vari-
ation in the stock of gross debt. It includes the accumu-
lation of financial assets, changes in the value of debt
denominated in foreign currency, and remaining statisti-
cal adjustments.273
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adjusted for its cyclical component. The structural bal-
ance gives a measure of the underlying trend in the
budget balance, when taking into account the automatic
effect on the budget of the economic cycle. It is referred
to also as the cyclically-adjusted budget balance. See
also primary structural budget balance.
Sustainability A combination of budget deficits and
debt that ensure that the latter does not grow without
bound. While conceptually intuitive, an agreed opera-
tional definition of sustainability has proven difficult to
achieve.
Tax gaps Measure used in the assessment of the sustain-
ability of public finances. They measure the difference
between the current tax ratio and the constant tax ratio
over a given projection period to achieve a predeter-
mined level of debt at the end of that projection period. 
Tax smoothing The idea that tax rates should be kept
stable in order to minimise the distortionary effects of
taxation, while leaving it for the automatic stabilisers to
smooth the economic cycle. It is also referred to as neu-
tral discretionary fiscal policy. See also cyclical compo-
nent of fiscal policy.
UMTS Third generation of technical support for mobile
phone communications. Sale of UMTS licences gave
rise to sizeable one-off receipts in 2001.
Wagner’s law Theory according to which public spend-
ing — since it comprises ‘luxury goods’ with high elas-
ticity to income — would tend to rise as a share of GDP
as per-capita income increases.
Welfare state Range of policies designed to provide
insurance against unemployment, sickness and risks
associated with old age.274
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Estonia www.eestipank.info Eesti Pank
Hungary www.mnb.hu National Bank of Hungary
Latvia www.bank.lv Bank of Latvia
Lithuania www.lb.lt Lietuvos Bankas
Malta www.centralbankmalta.com Central Bank of Malta
Poland www.nbp.pl Narodowy Bank Polski
Romania www.bnro.ro National Bank of Romania
Slovak Republic www.nbs.sk National Bank of Slovakia
Slovenia www.bsi.si Bank of Slovenia
Turkey www.tcmb.gov.tr Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
Japan www.boj.or.jp Bank of Japan
United States 
of America www.federalreserve.gov Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Statistical offices
European Union europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat Eurostat
Belgium www.bnb.be National Bank of Belgium
Denmark www.dst.dk Danmarks Statistik
Germany www.statistik-bund.de Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland283
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2 0 0 3Greece www.statistics.gr National Statistical Service of Greece
Spain www.ine.es Instituto Nacional de Estadística
France www.insee.fr Institut National de la Statistique 
et des Etudes Economiques
Ireland www.cso.ie Central Statistics Office
Italy petra.istat.it Istituto nazionale di statistica
Luxembourg statec.gouvernement.lu Service Central de la Statistique 
et des Etudes Economiques
Netherlands www.cbs.nl Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek
Austria www.oestat.gv.at Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt
Portugal www.ine.pt Instituto Nacional de Estatística
Finland www.stat.fi Tilastokeskus / Statistics Finland
Sweden www.scb.se Statistiska Centralbyrån / Statistics Sweden
United Kingdom www.statistics.gov.uk Office for National Statistics
Bulgaria www.nsi.bg National Statistical Institute
Cyprus www.pio.gov.cy/dsr Statistical Service
Czech Republic www.czso.cz Czech Statistical Office
Estonia www.stat.ee Statistical Office
Hungary www.ksh.hu Central Statistical Office
Latvia www.csb.lv Central Statistical Bureau
Lithuania www.std.lt Statistics Lithuania
Malta www.nso.gov.mt National Statistics Office
Poland www.stat.gov.pl Polish Official Statistics
Romania www.insse.ro National Institute of Statistics
Slovak Republic www.statistics.sk Statistical Office
Slovenia www.sigov.si/zrs Statistical Office 
Turkey www.die.gov.tr State Institute of Statistics
Japan www.stat.go.jp/english/index.htm Statistics Bureau/Statistics Centre
United States 
of America www.fedstats.gov/  Federal Statistical Agencies
International organisations
Bank for International Settlements www.bis.org
EBRD www.ebrd.com
IMF www.imf.org
OECD www.oecd.org
United Nations www.un.org
World Bank www.worldbank.org
World Trade Organisation www.wto.org284
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XTable A.1.1
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Belgium
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.2 12.0 12.2 12.1 12.1 12.3
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 18.0 19.1 16.7 16.3 16.2 16.2
3. Social contributions 14.9 17.1 16.9 17.5 17.8 18.1
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : :  :  : 
5. Other current resources 2.6 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8
6. Total current resources 47.6 50.4 47.5 47.7 47.8 48.3
7. Government consumption expenditure 17.3 16.7 13.9 14.3 14.2 14.6
8. Of which compensation of employees 13.4 13.0 11.2 11.5 11.6 12.0
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 23.6 24.8 23.1 24.0 24.4 24.6
12. Interest payments 5.9 10.3 10.4 10.0 10.6 10.6
13. Subsidies 3.6 3.7 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.6
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 51.3 56.2 51.1 52.2 52.9 53.4
16. Gross savings – 3.7 – 5.8 – 3.6 – 4.5 – 5.0 – 5.1
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 47.6 50.4 47.5 47.7 47.8 48.3
19. Gross fixed capital formation 4.4 2.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 56.1 59.3 52.9 53.9 54.8 55.5
22. Tax burden 45.7 49.2 46.6 46.8 46.9 47.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 8.6 – 8.9 – 5.4 – 6.2 – 6.9 – 7.2
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.288
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XTable A.1.1
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
12.6 12.2 12.2 12.7 12.9 12.9 13.2 13.1 12.6 13.0 13.0 13.0
17.4 17.8 16.7 16.6 17.1 17.6 17.1 17.3 17.6 17.6 17.3 16.9
17.5 17.4 16.8 16.7 16.5 16.6 16.4 16.1 16.4 16.6 16.5 16.4
: : 14.8 14.6 14.5 14.5 14.4 14.2 14.4 14.6 14.4 14.3
1.5 1.5 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8
48.9 48.9 48.8 49.3 49.4 50.0 49.5 49.4 49.5 50.1 49.5 49.1
14.5 14.5 21.4 21.7 21.2 21.1 21.2 21.2 21.7 22.1 22.5 22.5
12.0 12.1 11.9 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.6 11.4 11.6 12.0 12.0 12.0
: : 7.9 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.2
: : 13.5 13.9 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.8 14.0 14.4 14.4
24.0 24.2 16.6 16.6 16.3 16.1 15.6 15.3 15.5 16.0 16.2 16.3
9.9 8.8 9.3 8.9 8.0 7.6 7.0 6.8 6.6 6.1 5.6 5.0
2.4 2.4 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5
: : 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.9
51.9 50.9 50.7 50.8 48.9 48.3 47.4 46.8 47.3 47.9 47.8 47.2
– 3.0 – 2.0 – 2.0 – 1.5 0.5 1.7 2.1 2.7 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.9
: : 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
48.9 48.9 48.5 49.1 49.5 50.0 49.6 49.6 49.8 50.4 49.7 49.4
1.6 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.5
: : 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1
53.7 52.7 52.8 52.9 51.4 50.7 50.1 49.5 49.4 50.4 50.0 49.6
48.4 48.5 46.8 47.0 47.5 48.0 47.6 47.5 47.6 48.1 47.7 47.3
– 4.8 – 3.9 – 4.3 – 3.8 – 2.0 – 0.8 – 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.2
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.289
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XTable A.1.2
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Denmark
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 18.0 17.8 17.0 16.7 16.6 16.9
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 25.1 27.8 28.3 28.5 29.0 30.1
3. Social contributions 1.6 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 6.1 7.1 7.5 7.2 8.0 8.4
6. Total current resources 50.8 55.3 55.1 54.7 56.0 57.9
7. Government consumption expenditure 27.0 25.6 25.6 25.7 25.8 26.8
8. Of which compensation of employees 18.0 17.4 17.7 17.7 17.8 18.1
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 16.3 15.9 18.0 18.7 19.2 20.3
12. Interest payments 3.7 9.3 7.3 7.3 6.7 7.3
13. Subsidies 3.0 2.8 3.3 3.2 3.8 3.9
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 50.0 54.4 54.9 55.7 56.3 58.9
16. Gross savings 0.7 0.9 0.2 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.0
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 50.8 55.3 55.1 54.7 56.0 57.9
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.3 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.8
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 53.1 56.4 56.1 57.1 58.2 60.7
22. Tax burden 44.7 48.0 47.6 47.5 48.0 49.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 3.2 – 2.0 – 1.0 – 2.4 – 2.2 – 2.8
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.290
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XTable A.1.2
resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
17.3 17.2 16.9 17.3 17.5 18.2 18.1 17.2 17.3 17.5 17.5 17.4
30.6 30.3 30.4 30.6 30.3 29.9 30.8 29.6 29.9 29.7 29.5 29.6
2.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.2 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.6
: : 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.2 2.4 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.7
7.5 6.8 6.8 7.1 6.7 6.6 6.0 5.8 6.1 5.7 5.4 5.3
58.1 57.0 56.8 57.7 57.1 57.4 58.1 55.8 56.5 55.6 55.0 54.9
25.9 25.7 25.8 25.9 25.5 26.0 25.8 25.3 25.9 26.1 26.1 26.0
17.5 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.1 17.5 17.4 17.0 17.2 17.5 17.5 17.6
: : 8.4 8.5 8.2 8.2 8.0 7.7 7.7 8.0 8.0 8.0
: : 17.4 17.4 17.3 17.8 17.9 17.6 18.1 18.2 18.1 18.1
21.7 20.8 20.4 19.8 18.8 18.3 17.8 17.3 17.3 17.6 17.6 17.5
6.7 6.4 6.4 6.1 5.7 5.3 4.8 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.3
3.7 3.6 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0
: : 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6
58.8 57.4 57.3 56.8 54.9 54.6 53.2 51.6 52.0 52.2 51.8 51.4
– 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.5 0.9 2.2 2.8 4.9 4.2 4.5 3.3 3.2 3.5
: : 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5
58.1 57.0 58.0 58.8 58.3 58.7 59.5 57.2 58.0 57.3 56.3 56.2
1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7
: : 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4
60.7 59.2 60.3 59.8 58.0 57.6 56.3 54.7 55.0 55.4 54.7 54.2
50.7 50.1 50.2 50.7 50.7 51.0 52.3 50.2 50.6 50.1 49.8 49.8
– 2.6 – 2.2 – 2.3 – 1.0 0.4 1.1 3.2 2.5 3.0 1.9 1.6 2.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.291
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XTable A.1.3
Resources and expenditure of general government
(% of GDP)
Germany (1)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.9 12.3 12.1 12.2 12.4 12.7
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 12.5 12.3 10.9 11.3 11.6 11.2
3. Social contributions 16.6 17.1 16.5 17.5 17.8 18.4
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 2.3 3.1 2.6 2.6 3.1 3.0
6. Total current resources 44.3 44.9 42.1 43.5 44.9 45.3
7. Government consumption expenditure 19.9 19.6 17.8 19.0 19.5 19.6
8. Of which compensation of employees 10.8 10.4 9.5 10.1 10.4 10.6
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 16.9 16.4 15.4 16.7 17.3 18.4
12. Interest payments 1.9 3.0 2.5 2.6 3.2 3.2
13. Subsidies 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.1 2.1
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 41.9 42.4 40.8 42.3 43.4 44.8
16. Gross savings 2.4 2.5 1.3 1.2 1.4 0.5
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 44.3 44.9 42.1 43.5 44.9 45.3
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.5 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.7
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 47.1 46.0 44.1 46.8 47.6 48.8
22. Tax burden 41.7 41.4 39.2 40.8 41.5 42.0
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 2.9 – 1.1 – 2.0 – 3.2 – 2.8 – 3.5
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany
(2) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.292
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XTable A.1.3
Resources and expenditure of general government
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (2)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
13.1 12.7 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.6 12.2 12.0 11.9 11.8 12.0 12.0
10.8 11.1 11.1 11.5 11.2 11.5 12.0 12.5 11.1 10.8 11.0 11.2
18.9 19.1 18.8 19.4 19.7 19.3 19.0 18.7 18.5 18.4 18.6 18.5
: : 17.7 18.3 18.6 18.2 17.9 17.6 17.5 17.4 17.6 17.5
3.0 2.7 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.8 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8
45.9 45.6 44.8 45.7 45.5 45.5 46.2 46.0 44.6 44.1 44.5 44.5
19.4 19.5 19.8 20.0 19.5 19.2 19.1 19.1 19.0 19.1 19.1 18.9
10.3 10.2 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.9 7.8
: : 8.4 8.4 8.1 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.8
: : 11.4 11.6 11.3 11.2 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.3 11.2 11.1
18.6 19.0 18.1 19.3 19.3 19.0 18.9 18.8 18.9 19.4 19.8 19.6
3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.3
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
: : 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7
44.9 45.6 44.9 46.2 45.6 45.0 45.0 44.6 44.4 44.9 45.2 44.7
1.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.1 0.5 1.2 1.4 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.2
: : 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
45.9 45.6 46.1 46.9 46.6 46.6 47.3 47.0 45.5 45.0 45.4 45.5
2.6 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6
: : 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 – 1.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6
48.4 49.0 49.6 50.3 49.4 48.8 48.8 45.9 48.3 48.6 48.9 48.4
42.5 42.5 42.3 43.1 43.1 43.1 43.8 43.9 42.1 41.5 42.0 42.1
– 2.6 – 3.4 – 3.5 – 3.4 – 2.7 – 2.2 – 1.5 1.1 – 2.8 – 3.6 – 3.4 – 2.9
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany
(2) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.293
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XTable A.1.4: 
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Greece
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 10.5 12.5 13.9 14.6 15.3 14.7
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 4.6 4.6 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.7
3. Social contributions 9.4 11.6 11.5 11.1 11.0 11.9
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 1.9 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.5 3.1
6. Total current resources 26.3 30.3 32.5 33.3 34.1 35.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 13.5 16.1 15.1 14.2 13.7 14.3
8. Of which compensation of employees 9.4 11.4 12.5 11.5 10.9 10.9
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 9.4 14.2 15.0 14.9 14.8 15.1
12. Interest payments 2.0 4.9 10.0 9.3 11.5 12.6
13. Subsidies 2.2 5.2 4.0 3.5 3.6 3.9
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 26.4 37.7 41.9 39.7 41.1 43.3
16. Gross savings – 0.1 – 7.4 – 9.4 – 6.4 – 7.0 – 7.9
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 26.3 30.3 32.5 33.3 34.1 35.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.1 3.7 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.3
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 29.0 41.9 48.4 44.7 46.8 49.0
22. Tax burden 24.6 28.9 31.0 31.4 31.9 32.6
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 2.6 – 11.6 – 15.9 – 11.4 – 12.6 – 13.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.294
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XTable A.1.4: 
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
14.3 14.2 13.6 14.0 14.3 14.4 15.1 15.2 14.8 14.4 14.3 14.1
6.8 7.2 7.4 7.1 7.8 9.5 9.9 10.8 9.6 9.4 9.3 9.0
12.1 12.4 12.6 12.9 13.3 13.6 13.6 14.0 13.9 14.0 14.0 13.9
: : 10.5 10.8 11.1 11.5 11.4 11.8 11.7 11.8 11.9 11.8
3.8 4.2 2.9 2.9 3.4 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.4
36.9 38.1 36.5 36.9 38.8 40.3 41.5 43.2 41.9 41.4 41.1 40.4
13.8 15.3 15.3 14.5 15.1 15.3 15.4 15.7 15.3 15.8 15.5 15.2
10.6 11.3 11.3 10.7 11.6 11.6 11.7 11.7 11.6 12.2 12.1 11.9
: : 9.5 8.5 8.8 9.3 9.4 9.7 9.3 9.7 9.5 9.4
: : 5.9 6.0 6.3 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.0 5.9
15.2 15.5 15.1 15.4 15.6 15.8 15.8 16.6 16.3 16.4 16.4 16.3
13.9 12.8 11.2 10.5 8.2 7.8 7.2 7.0 6.3 5.5 5.2 4.9
3.6 3.3 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
: : 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.7
44.0 45.1 43.3 42.2 40.2 40.2 39.8 40.5 39.2 38.7 38.0 37.3
– 7.1 – 7.1 – 6.8 – 5.3 – 1.5 0.1 1.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0
: : 1.6 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.0 : : : : :
36.9 38.1 39.3 40.3 42.4 44.1 44.7 47.0 45.6 45.1 46.0 45.2
3.1 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.5 4.1 3.9 3.8 4.0 3.9
: : 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.6 2.0 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4
46.8 48.5 49.4 47.7 46.4 46.6 46.5 48.9 47.0 46.3 47.1 46.2
33.4 34.0 34.4 34.8 36.0 38.1 39.3 40.6 38.9 38.3 38.0 37.5
– 9.9 – 10.5 – 10.2 – 7.4 – 4.0 – 2.5 – 1.8 – 1.9 – 1.5 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.1
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.295
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Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Spain
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 6.3 9.1 10.3 10.3 10.9 10.1
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 6.7 8.2 11.6 11.6 12.0 11.5
3. Social contributions 12.7 12.7 12.9 13.2 14.0 14.3
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 3.9 4.2 3.7 4.1 4.0 5.0
6. Total current resources 29.6 34.2 38.4 39.2 40.9 40.9
7. Government consumption expenditure 12.9 14.2 15.0 15.6 16.4 16.9
8. Of which compensation of employees 9.4 10.2 10.7 11.1 11.8 11.8
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 11.8 13.8 13.9 14.7 15.5 16.2
12. Interest payments 0.4 1.9 3.9 3.7 4.3 5.0
13. Subsidies 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.5 3.1
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 27.7 33.9 36.8 38.0 40.2 42.6
16. Gross savings 0.6 0.3 1.7 1.2 0.7 – 1.7
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 29.6 34.2 38.4 39.2 40.9 40.9
19. Gross fixed capital formation 1.8 3.6 4.9 4.8 4.0 4.1
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 31.7 40.4 42.6 43.5 44.9 47.6
22. Tax burden 26.1 30.6 35.4 35.7 37.5 36.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 2.5 – 6.2 – 4.2 – 4.3 – 4.0 – 6.7
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.296
A
N
N
E
XTable A.1.5
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
10.6 10.3 10.2 10.2 10.5 11.1 11.7 11.7 11.4 11.7 11.8 11.9
11.0 11.0 10.1 10.3 10.5 10.2 10.2 10.5 10.5 10.9 10.6 10.6
14.0 13.1 13.0 13.2 13.1 13.0 13.1 13.3 13.6 13.5 13.5 13.5
: : 12.0 12.2 12.2 12.1 12.2 12.5 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7
4.2 3.6 4.1 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.5
39.8 38.0 37.4 37.8 38.0 38.0 38.6 38.9 39.0 39.5 39.3 39.4
16.2 16.0 18.1 18.0 17.5 17.5 17.4 17.6 17.5 17.6 17.8 17.7
11.3 11.2 11.3 11.3 10.9 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.2 10.3 10.3
: : 8.0 7.8 7.7 7.5 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.6
: : 10.1 10.1 9.9 9.9 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.2 10.1
15.8 15.1 13.9 13.8 13.3 12.8 12.4 12.3 12.2 12.5 12.6 12.6
4.7 5.3 5.2 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5
2.9 3.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
: : 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2
41.3 40.3 39.2 39.1 37.6 36.8 35.8 35.6 35.1 35.3 35.3 35.1
– 1.5 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.3 0.4 1.2 2.9 3.2 3.9 4.2 3.9 4.3
: : 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5
39.8 38.0 38.4 38.8 38.6 38.3 39.0 39.0 39.2 39.6 39.3 39.5
3.9 3.7 3.7 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4
: : 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
45.9 45.0 45.0 43.7 41.8 41.4 40.2 39.8 39.3 39.7 39.8 39.6
36.1 35.0 34.0 34.4 34.8 35.0 35.6 36.1 36.0 36.6 36.4 36.3
– 6.1 – 7.0 – 6.6 – 5.0 – 3.2 – 3.0 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.1
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.297
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XTable A.1.6
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
France
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 14.9 15.6 14.9 14.5 14.3 14.3
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 8.2 8.9 8.7 9.2 8.8 9.0
3. Social contributions 19.1 20.8 20.6 20.7 20.9 21.1
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 3.2 3.8 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.1
6. Total current resources 45.3 49.1 48.2 48.2 48.0 48.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 17.7 19.1 17.7 17.9 18.5 19.4
8. Of which compensation of employees 13.4 14.4 13.0 13.1 13.4 14.0
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 18.6 21.7 20.9 21.4 22.0 23.2
12. Interest payments 1.4 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.3
13. Subsidies 2.5 3.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.5
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 41.7 48.6 45.7 46.7 48.4 50.7
16. Gross savings 3.7 0.5 2.4 1.4 – 0.4 – 2.2
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 45.3 49.1 48.2 48.2 48.0 48.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.3 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.2
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 45.4 52.0 49.7 50.2 51.8 54.1
22. Tax burden 42.9 46.3 45.1 45.4 45.0 45.6
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) 0.0 – 2.8 – 1.5 – 2.0 – 3.9 – 5.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.298
A
N
N
E
XTable A.1.6
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
14.7 14.9 15.4 16.1 16.0 16.0 15.9 15.5 15.0 15.1 15.0 15.2
9.2 9.4 8.5 8.9 9.5 11.7 12.2 12.2 12.5 11.6 11.4 11.3
20.7 21.0 20.5 20.7 20.3 18.1 18.3 18.2 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.3
: : 18.7 18.9 18.4 16.3 16.5 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.5 16.4
3.7 3.8 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.5
48.3 49.0 47.9 49.6 49.6 49.3 49.9 49.4 49.3 48.5 48.2 48.2
19.2 19.0 23.9 24.2 24.2 23.4 23.3 23.2 23.2 23.9 24.0 23.9
14.0 14.1 13.7 13.9 13.8 13.7 13.7 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.8 13.6
: : 9.8 9.9 10.0 9.4 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.4 9.3 9.2
: : 14.1 14.3 14.2 14.1 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.5 14.7 14.7
22.9 23.0 18.5 18.7 18.8 18.4 18.2 17.8 17.8 18.1 18.4 18.4
3.5 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3
2.3 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
: : 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.7
50.4 50.4 49.1 49.9 49.6 48.3 47.8 47.0 47.1 48.1 48.6 48.5
– 2.1 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 0.3 – 0.1 1.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.3
: : 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6
48.3 49.0 49.6 51.3 51.8 51.1 51.7 51.2 51.0 50.3 50.2 50.2
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0
: : 1.5 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8
54.0 53.8 55.1 55.4 54.9 53.7 53.5 52.6 52.5 53.5 54.0 53.7
46.0 46.6 45.2 46.4 46.5 46.4 47.0 46.5 46.2 45.5 45.2 45.2
– 5.7 – 4.8 – 5.5 – 4.1 – 3.0 – 2.7 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 3.1 – 3.7 – 3.5
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.299
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XTable A.1.7
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Ireland
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 15.3 16.8 15.6 15.2 15.2 14.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 11.5 13.1 13.1 13.7 14.1 14.9
3. Social contributions 4.4 5.1 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.3
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 3.3 3.9 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.4
6. Total current resources 34.6 38.8 35.9 36.7 37.0 37.0
7. Government consumption expenditure 18.2 16.9 14.2 15.1 15.4 15.3
8. Of which compensation of employees 11.8 11.5 9.9 10.5 10.7 10.8
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 11.6 15.2 13.4 14.1 14.6 14.5
12. Interest payments 6.0 9.4 7.4 7.2 6.7 6.3
13. Subsidies 7.2 7.5 5.6 5.6 4.7 5.0
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 39.5 45.1 36.7 37.9 38.2 38.0
16. Gross savings – 4.9 – 6.3 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 1.2 – 1.0
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 34.6 38.8 35.9 36.7 37.0 37.0
19. Gross fixed capital formation 5.4 3.7 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.2
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 46.2 49.1 38.1 38.9 39.4 39.3
22. Tax burden 31.2 34.9 33.6 34.0 34.4 34.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 11.6 – 10.2 – 2.2 – 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.3
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.300
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XTable A.1.7
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
15.3 14.6 13.5 13.7 13.5 13.1 13.1 13.2 12.1 12.2 12.4 12.3
15.2 13.5 13.6 14.1 14.0 13.8 13.7 13.6 13.0 11.8 11.5 11.2
5.2 4.7 6.8 6.3 5.9 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.6
: : 5.0 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4
2.1 1.8 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3
37.7 34.6 36.7 37.0 36.1 35.0 34.5 34.6 33.5 32.1 31.9 31.3
15.2 14.2 16.5 15.8 15.2 14.5 13.9 13.8 14.8 15.2 15.4 15.4
10.5 9.6 10.2 9.7 9.2 8.5 8.0 7.8 8.2 8.3 8.6 8.5
: : 6.5 6.3 6.0 5.8 5.4 5.2 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.8
: : 10.0 9.5 9.2 8.7 8.5 8.6 9.2 9.5 9.7 9.6
14.4 13.7 11.8 11.4 10.6 9.7 8.7 8.0 8.5 8.8 9.0 8.8
5.6 5.0 5.4 4.6 3.8 3.5 2.5 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.5
4.5 4.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7
: : 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2
37.1 34.8 36.7 35.1 32.8 30.7 28.0 26.6 28.0 28.2 28.9 28.5
0.6 – 0.2 0.0 1.8 3.3 4.3 6.5 7.9 5.5 3.9 3.0 2.8
: : 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1
37.7 34.6 39.4 39.4 38.6 37.2 36.7 36.4 35.2 33.7 33.5 32.8
2.3 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.7 4.6 4.4 3.9 3.9
: : 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.9 2.9 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.9
39.2 36.7 41.5 39.6 37.1 35.0 34.7 31.9 34.1 33.7 34.1 33.7
35.5 32.9 35.1 35.0 34.2 33.4 33.0 33.1 31.7 30.4 30.3 29.7
– 1.6 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 0.1 1.4 2.3 2.0 4.5 1.2 0.0 – 0.6 – 0.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.301
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XTable A.1.8
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Italy
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 9.3 9.5 11.3 11.8 11.8 12.7
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 9.7 13.0 14.3 14.4 14.6 16.1
3. Social contributions 12.9 13.5 14.3 14.6 14.9 15.4
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 2.4 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.6
6. Total current resources 34.4 39.0 42.8 43.8 44.5 47.7
7. Government consumption expenditure 15.0 16.6 17.4 17.4 17.5 17.5
8. Of which compensation of employees 11.1 11.8 12.7 12.6 12.5 12.4
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 14.5 17.3 18.3 18.4 19.5 19.7
12. Interest payments 5.5 8.0 9.4 10.1 11.4 12.0
13. Subsidies 3.5 3.4 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.7
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 39.0 45.9 48.5 49.5 51.6 53.1
16. Gross savings – 4.6 – 6.9 – 5.7 – 5.7 – 7.1 – 5.4
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 34.4 39.0 42.8 43.8 44.5 47.7
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 3.7 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.6
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 43.0 51.5 53.8 53.8 54.0 57.1
22. Tax burden 31.7 36.1 40.0 40.9 41.5 44.2
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 8.7 – 12.5 – 11.0 – 10.0 – 9.5 – 9.4
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.302
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XTable A.1.8
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
12.4 12.4 12.1 11.8 12.4 15.3 15.1 15.0 14.5 14.6 14.5 14.5
14.8 14.5 14.8 15.4 16.2 14.5 15.2 14.7 15.1 14.2 13.7 13.6
14.8 14.7 14.8 15.0 15.3 12.8 12.7 12.7 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.8
: : 13.0 14.6 14.9 12.5 12.4 12.4 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.5
3.6 3.7 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0
45.5 45.3 44.8 45.5 47.2 45.9 46.3 45.5 45.3 44.6 44.0 43.8
17.0 15.9 17.9 18.1 18.2 17.9 18.0 18.3 18.8 18.8 18.9 18.7
11.9 11.3 11.2 11.5 11.6 10.7 10.7 10.6 10.7 10.7 10.8 10.7
: : 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.2 7.2
: : 10.6 10.8 11.0 10.8 10.8 11.2 11.7 11.8 11.6 11.5
19.7 19.1 16.7 16.9 17.3 17.0 17.2 16.8 16.6 17.1 17.3 17.4
10.9 11.3 11.5 11.5 9.4 8.3 6.8 6.5 6.4 5.8 5.3 5.1
2.4 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9
: : 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
51.0 49.1 48.6 49.2 47.4 45.8 44.6 44.1 44.4 44.1 43.8 43.4
– 5.4 – 3.9 – 3.8 – 3.7 – 0.2 0.1 1.7 1.4 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.4
: : 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 : : : :
45.5 45.3 45.8 46.1 48.4 46.8 47.1 46.2 45.8 45.2 45.1 44.3
2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 1.8 2.1 2.6
: : 2.5 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.6 0.2 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.3
54.6 52.9 53.4 53.2 51.1 49.9 48.9 46.9 48.5 47.7 47.5 47.5
42.1 41.9 42.3 42.9 44.4 43.2 43.5 43.0 42.7 41.9 41.4 41.2
– 9.1 – 7.6 – 7.6 – 7.1 – 2.7 – 3.1 – 1.8 – 0.7 – 2.7 – 2.5 – 2.3 – 3.1
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.303
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XTable A.1.9
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Luxembourg
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.5 14.9 14.9 14.7 15.3 15.9
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 15.7 17.6 : : : : 
3. Social contributions 13.4 12.4 : : : : 
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 6.3 5.7 : : : : 
6. Total current resources 48.0 50.6 : : : : 
7. Government consumption expenditure 14.5 13.7 12.5 12.1 12.3 12.0
8. Of which compensation of employees 10.2 9.8 : : : : 
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 21.7 20.8 : : : : 
12. Interest payments 1.2 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
13. Subsidies 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 40.8 39.5 : : : : 
16. Gross savings 7.2 11.2 : : : : 
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 48.0 50.6 : : : : 
19. Gross fixed capital formation 6.5 4.0 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.0
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 48.4 44.4 : : : : 
22. Tax burden 39.2 42.1 : : : : 
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 0.4 6.3 4.7 1.8 0.7 1.5
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.304
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XTable A.1.9
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
16.1 16.2 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 13.5 14.1 13.4 13.5 13.3 12.9
: : 17.5 17.9 17.4 16.4 15.6 15.4 15.5 16.5 16.2 15.7
: : 12.5 12.1 11.5 11.2 11.1 11.1 12.1 12.7 12.7 12.4
: : 11.2 11.0 10.5 10.2 10.2 10.3 11.2 11.8 11.7 11.5
: : 5.7 5.4 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.9 4.9 4.5 4.4
: : 48.2 48.1 47.0 45.6 45.0 45.2 45.9 47.6 46.7 45.4
11.9 12.6 18.5 18.9 17.9 16.8 16.7 15.7 16.8 18.3 19.2 19.6
: : 9.7 9.7 9.3 8.8 8.3 7.8 : : : :
: : 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.1 6.9 6.5 6.9 7.6 7.9 8.0
: : 10.5 10.9 10.3 9.7 9.8 9.2 9.9 10.7 11.3 11.6
: : 16.5 16.2 15.5 14.8 14.4 13.6 14.4 16.2 17.1 17.6
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2
2.8 2.1 1.8 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6
: : 3.1 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.8
: : 40.2 40.3 38.6 37.0 36.3 34.3 36.1 39.3 41.1 41.8
: : 8.0 7.8 8.4 8.6 8.7 10.9 9.9 8.3 5.6 3.6
: : 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
: : 47.6 47.5 46.6 45.1 44.5 44.6 45.4 47.2 45.2 44.3
4.2 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.6 5.1 5.4
: : 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.1 – 0.5 1.4 0.9 – 0.5
: : 45.5 45.5 43.3 42.1 41.0 38.7 39.1 44.7 45.5 45.6
: : 42.5 42.6 41.7 40.4 40.3 40.6 41.0 42.7 42.2 41.0
2.7 1.8 2.1 2.0 3.2 3.1 3.5 6.0 6.3 2.5 – 0.2 – 1.2
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.305
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XTable A.1.10
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
The Netherlands
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 11.7 11.7 11.9 11.9 12.3 12.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 15.2 12.3 15.0 16.3 15.3 16.1
3. Social contributions 17.5 19.8 16.4 17.3 17.8 17.8
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 6.4 8.8 4.9 5.2 4.8 4.6
6. Total current resources 50.7 52.5 48.1 50.6 50.2 51.0
7. Government consumption expenditure 16.8 15.2 14.0 13.9 14.1 14.3
8. Of which compensation of employees 12.4 10.6 9.3 9.2 9.4 9.6
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 25.4 26.4 26.2 26.3 26.8 26.9
12. Interest payments 3.7 6.2 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.0
13. Subsidies 3.0 3.5 2.9 3.1 3.1 2.9
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 49.4 51.7 49.7 50.3 51.1 51.3
16. Gross savings 1.3 0.9 – 1.6 0.3 – 0.9 – 0.3
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 50.7 52.5 48.1 50.6 50.2 51.0
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.0
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 54.8 56.1 53.0 53.4 54.0 54.1
22. Tax burden 43.9 43.4 42.9 45.2 44.8 46.2
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 4.1 – 3.5 – 4.9 – 2.8 – 3.8 – 3.1
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.306
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XTable A.1.10
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
12.4 12.3 10.7 11.2 11.4 11.6 12.2 12.1 12.6 12.7 12.6 12.5
13.6 12.5 12.4 12.9 12.4 12.2 12.2 12.1 11.9 12.0 11.3 11.1
18.4 18.2 17.2 16.6 16.6 16.4 17.1 17.1 15.3 15.0 15.6 15.3
: : 16.0 15.5 15.5 15.3 16.0 16.0 14.2 14.0 14.6 14.3
4.1 3.7 6.0 5.8 5.5 5.0 4.7 4.8 5.2 5.2 4.9 4.6
48.4 46.6 46.3 46.5 45.9 45.2 46.2 46.1 45.1 44.9 44.4 43.5
13.9 13.8 24.0 23.1 22.9 22.7 22.9 22.7 23.2 24.3 24.2 24.4
9.3 9.3 10.8 10.4 10.2 10.1 10.2 10.0 10.1 10.4 10.6 10.6
: : 11.6 11.3 11.0 10.8 10.9 10.6 10.9 11.3 11.2 11.3
: : 12.5 11.9 11.9 11.9 12.0 12.0 12.3 13.0 13.0 13.1
26.0 25.1 15.3 14.8 13.9 13.0 12.5 11.8 11.6 11.8 12.2 12.4
5.7 5.7 5.9 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.9
2.5 1.8 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.2
: : 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.6
49.4 47.7 47.4 45.9 44.7 43.4 42.8 41.5 41.4 42.6 42.5 42.5
– 1.0 – 1.1 – 1.1 0.6 1.3 1.8 3.4 4.6 3.7 2.3 2.0 1.0
: : 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
48.4 46.6 47.3 47.8 47.1 46.5 47.6 47.4 46.5 46.3 45.9 45.3
2.0 1.9 3.0 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.5
: : 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 0.2 – 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
52.1 50.5 51.4 49.6 48.2 47.2 46.9 45.3 46.4 47.5 47.5 47.7
43.8 42.5 41.5 41.7 41.5 41.1 42.4 42.2 40.7 40.3 40.4 39.7
– 3.6 – 3.8 – 4.2 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 0.8 0.7 2.2 0.1 – 1.2 – 1.6 – 2.4
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.307
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XTable A.1.11
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Austria
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 15.8 16.3 15.7 15.5 15.6 15.7
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 12.5 14.0 11.6 12.2 12.7 12.8
3. Social contributions 14.4 14.6 15.5 15.6 16.2 16.8
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 2.8 2.9 4.4 4.4 4.8 4.6
6. Total current resources 45.6 47.8 47.1 47.7 49.2 49.9
7. Government consumption expenditure 17.4 18.4 18.4 18.7 19.1 19.9
8. Of which compensation of employees 11.6 12.4 11.7 11.8 12.0 12.5
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 18.4 19.8 19.5 19.7 19.9 21.5
12. Interest payments 2.4 3.5 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.3
13. Subsidies 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.0 3.1
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 41.3 44.7 44.9 45.9 46.5 49.1
16. Gross savings 4.2 3.1 2.2 1.8 2.7 0.8
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 45.6 47.8 47.1 47.7 49.2 49.9
19. Gross fixed capital formation 4.3 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 47.2 50.2 49.6 50.6 51.2 54.1
22. Tax burden 42.7 44.8 42.6 43.2 44.4 45.3
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 1.7 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 3.0 – 2.0 – 4.2
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.308
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XTable A.1.11
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
15.7 15.5 14.3 14.5 14.9 14.9 15.0 14.6 14.7 15.0 14.6 14.9
11.3 11.9 12.0 13.1 13.5 13.6 13.4 13.3 15.1 14.1 15.1 15.3
17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.4 17.2 17.2 16.9 16.9 16.8 16.9 16.8
: : 15.2 15.3 15.3 15.2 15.2 14.9 15.0 14.9 14.8 14.7
4.4 4.5 5.7 5.2 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.5 4.5 4.1 4.1 4.0
48.6 49.2 49.4 50.3 49.5 49.2 49.1 48.2 51.1 50.0 50.6 50.9
20.0 19.8 20.4 20.3 19.7 19.5 19.8 19.2 19.1 18.7 19.3 19.2
12.4 12.4 12.6 12.4 11.5 11.3 11.4 11.0 10.1 9.9 10.0 9.9
: : 8.1 8.1 7.8 7.8 7.9 7.5 7.4 7.0 7.4 7.3
: : 12.4 12.2 11.9 11.7 11.9 11.7 11.7 11.6 11.9 11.9
21.7 21.6 19.5 19.5 18.9 18.5 18.7 18.5 18.8 18.8 19.3 19.3
4.0 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.6
2.5 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.7
: : 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.6 3.3 4.0 3.1 3.1
48.6 49.6 49.8 49.4 47.7 47.4 47.5 46.5 47.5 47.7 48.3 47.9
0.0 – 0.4 – 0.4 0.9 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7 3.7 2.4 2.3 3.0
: : 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
48.6 49.2 52.0 52.8 52.1 51.7 51.8 50.7 52.2 51.5 51.0 50.7
3.3 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
: : 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.6 2.2 2.7 2.7
53.5 54.2 57.3 56.8 54.1 54.2 54.2 52.4 52.1 52.2 52.3 51.3
44.0 44.7 44.9 45.9 46.7 46.4 46.3 45.5 47.4 46.2 47.3 47.7
– 4.9 – 5.0 – 5.3 – 4.0 – 2.0 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.6 0.1 – 0.8 – 1.3 – 0.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.309
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XTable A.1.12
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Portugal
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.2 13.7 13.0 12.9 13.7 12.9
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 5.6 7.8 7.9 8.8 9.8 9.0
3. Social contributions 8.0 8.6 10.1 10.5 11.1 11.7
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 2.0 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.6 3.1
6. Total current resources 27.8 32.7 33.9 35.2 38.1 36.8
7. Government consumption expenditure 13.3 14.0 15.0 16.7 16.8 17.4
8. Of which compensation of employees 10.2 10.2 11.8 12.8 13.8 14.2
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 9.3 10.4 11.4 12.5 13.4 15.0
12. Interest payments 2.6 7.4 7.8 7.6 7.0 6.0
13. Subsidies 6.0 6.8 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 31.3 38.7 35.3 37.7 37.3 38.8
16. Gross savings – 3.5 – 6.0 – 1.4 – 2.5 0.8 – 2.0
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 27.8 32.7 33.9 35.2 38.1 36.8
19. Gross fixed capital formation 4.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.9
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 36.2 42.8 38.8 41.0 41.0 42.7
22. Tax burden 24.6 28.3 31.3 32.6 35.0 34.1
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 8.4 – 10.1 – 4.9 – 5.8 – 2.9 – 5.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.310
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XTable A.1.12
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
13.4 13.6 13.6 14.0 13.8 14.3 14.8 14.5 14.4 15.1 15.2 15.5
8.8 9.1 8.9 9.5 9.6 9.3 9.8 10.4 9.8 9.7 9.6 9.5
11.5 11.7 11.0 10.9 11.2 11.2 11.4 11.8 11.9 12.2 12.2 12.0
: : 10.1 10.2 10.5 10.5 10.6 10.9 11.0 11.3 11.3 11.2
2.6 2.8 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9
36.3 37.1 37.6 38.7 38.6 39.0 40.0 40.3 39.8 40.9 40.7 40.9
17.1 17.3 18.6 18.9 19.0 18.9 19.7 20.5 20.8 21.3 21.3 21.0
13.7 13.7 13.6 13.7 13.8 14.0 14.4 15.0 15.2 15.4 15.0 14.5
: : 7.6 7.3 7.8 7.6 7.9 8.4 8.5 8.7 8.7 8.6
: : 11.0 11.7 11.3 11.3 11.8 12.1 12.3 12.6 12.6 12.4
14.8 15.1 11.8 11.9 11.7 11.7 11.9 12.4 12.5 13.0 13.2 13.4
6.1 6.2 6.3 5.4 4.2 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.0
1.2 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4
: : 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3
39.1 39.5 39.6 39.6 38.2 37.7 38.7 39.6 40.0 41.0 41.4 41.3
– 2.8 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 0.9 0.4 1.2 1.3 0.7 – 0.2 0.0 – 0.7 – 0.4
: : 1.9 2.1 2.3 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.3
36.3 37.1 39.6 41.0 41.2 41.0 42.4 42.3 42.1 43.5 43.5 43.7
3.5 3.6 3.7 4.2 4.4 4.0 4.2 3.9 4.1 3.6 3.7 3.6
: : 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.2 1.9 1.3 1.6 1.6
42.1 42.7 45.0 45.8 44.8 44.1 45.3 45.2 46.4 46.2 47.1 46.9
34.4 34.7 33.8 34.5 34.8 34.9 36.1 36.7 36.1 37.0 36.9 37.0
– 5.9 – 5.6 – 5.5 – 4.8 – 3.6 – 3.2 – 2.9 – 2.9 – 4.3 – 2.7 – 3.6 – 3.3
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.311
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XTable A.1.13
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Finland
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.1 14.1 14.9 15.0 14.7 14.5
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 14.2 16.5 17.7 17.6 16.9 15.2
3. Social contributions 10.9 11.4 12.9 13.6 14.6 15.0
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 3.8 5.1 5.9 6.8 7.6 8.0
6. Total current resources 42.0 47.0 51.4 53.1 53.7 52.7
7. Government consumption expenditure 17.6 19.8 20.8 23.8 24.3 22.8
8. Of which compensation of employees 12.1 13.9 14.4 16.8 17.3 16.2
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 12.5 15.3 15.5 19.3 23.2 24.7
12. Interest payments 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.9 2.6 4.5
13. Subsidies 3.2 3.1 2.8 3.4 3.5 3.3
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 34.6 40.5 42.2 50.5 55.8 57.7
16. Gross savings 7.4 6.5 9.2 2.6 – 2.1 – 5.0
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 42.0 47.0 51.4 53.1 53.7 52.7
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.5 2.8
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 38.6 44.2 46.1 54.5 59.5 60.6
22. Tax burden 38.3 42.3 45.8 46.6 46.5 44.9
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) 3.3 2.9 5.3 – 1.5 – 5.7 – 7.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.312
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XTable A.1.13
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
14.2 13.5 13.4 13.5 14.2 14.0 14.2 13.6 13.2 13.5 13.5 13.2
16.8 16.7 17.4 19.0 18.5 18.9 18.9 21.4 19.5 19.4 18.7 18.4
15.8 14.7 14.8 14.2 13.4 13.0 13.1 12.2 12.5 12.3 12.1 12.0
: : 14.6 14.0 13.2 12.9 13.1 12.2 12.5 12.3 12.1 12.0
6.7 6.9 7.3 6.8 6.2 6.0 5.4 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.1 6.0
53.5 51.9 52.8 53.6 52.3 51.8 51.6 53.4 51.6 51.5 50.4 49.7
21.8 21.2 22.7 23.1 22.3 21.6 21.6 20.7 20.8 21.6 21.9 21.8
15.3 14.8 15.2 15.5 14.5 13.8 13.8 13.2 13.2 13.4 13.6 13.6
: : 8.5 8.6 8.5 8.1 8.0 7.6 7.3 7.6 7.7 7.7
: : 14.3 14.5 13.8 13.5 13.6 13.2 13.5 13.9 14.1 14.1
24.5 22.8 22.1 21.4 19.8 18.3 18.1 16.5 16.4 16.5 16.8 16.6
5.0 5.2 4.0 4.3 4.3 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.1
3.0 3.2 2.8 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
: : 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4
56.4 54.1 53.6 53.0 50.5 47.4 46.8 44.0 43.7 44.1 44.6 44.3
– 2.9 – 2.2 – 0.7 0.6 1.8 4.4 4.8 9.4 7.9 7.3 5.8 5.4
: : 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
53.5 51.9 55.5 56.5 55.1 54.3 54.1 55.9 54.2 54.0 52.8 52.0
2.9 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7
: : 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
59.5 56.9 59.4 59.5 56.4 52.8 52.1 48.9 49.0 49.2 49.5 49.0
47.2 45.5 46.3 47.4 46.7 46.4 46.8 47.8 45.7 45.6 44.6 44.0
– 6.1 – 5.0 – 3.9 – 3.0 – 1.3 1.5 2.0 6.9 5.2 4.7 3.3 3.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.313
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XTable A.1.14
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Sweden
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.1 16.0 16.5 17.2 15.8 14.6
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 20.9 20.3 22.6 19.2 19.9 19.5
3. Social contributions 14.8 13.6 15.0 15.0 14.4 13.4
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 7.3 9.3 8.4 8.2 9.1 8.9
6. Total current resources 56.1 59.2 62.6 59.6 59.1 56.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 28.5 27.1 26.4 26.4 27.1 26.3
8. Of which compensation of employees 20.2 18.3 18.1 18.3 18.8 18.0
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 17.6 18.2 19.2 20.6 22.9 23.6
12. Interest payments 4.0 8.1 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.8
13. Subsidies 4.2 4.9 4.6 4.9 5.4 5.5
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 55.4 59.3 56.3 58.1 62.4 63.1
16. Gross savings 0.7 – 0.1 6.3 1.4 – 3.3 – 6.6
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 56.1 59.2 62.6 59.6 59.1 56.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 4.1 3.0 2.3 2.2 2.6 1.0
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 60.0 63.0 58.5 60.7 66.6 67.9
22. Tax burden 51.0 52.6 57.0 54.3 52.7 50.0
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 3.9 – 3.7 4.0 – 1.1 – 7.5 – 11.5
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.314
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XTable A.1.14
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
13.9 13.4 15.7 16.1 16.3 17.2 18.4 16.3 16.4 17.1 17.5 17.5
19.7 20.1 19.5 20.9 20.9 21.7 21.2 21.2 22.2 19.3 19.7 19.8
13.4 13.7 13.7 14.7 14.5 14.5 13.2 14.9 15.5 15.6 15.4 15.2
: : 13.1 14.2 14.0 14.0 12.7 14.3 14.9 15.0 14.8 14.6
8.3 7.9 8.2 7.8 6.9 6.9 6.1 5.9 5.0 5.0 7.1 7.1
55.3 55.0 57.1 59.5 58.6 60.3 58.9 58.3 59.1 56.9 59.7 59.6
25.3 24.0 27.3 27.9 27.3 27.5 27.5 26.8 27.2 28.0 28.3 28.1
17.0 16.1 16.7 17.2 16.8 16.2 15.8 15.7 16.0 16.3 16.0 15.9
: : 8.4 8.6 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.7 8.8 8.8
: : 18.9 19.2 18.9 19.2 19.1 18.5 18.8 19.3 19.5 19.4
23.3 21.8 20.6 19.6 18.9 18.7 18.2 17.5 17.4 17.6 18.5 18.3
6.4 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.1 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.7
4.9 4.7 3.7 3.2 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5
: : 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.3 4.6 4.5
61.7 59.4 60.2 59.0 56.9 55.8 54.3 52.1 51.6 52.7 55.7 55.1
– 6.4 – 4.3 – 3.1 0.5 1.8 4.5 4.6 6.2 7.5 4.2 4.0 4.5
: : 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
55.3 55.0 60.4 62.4 61.5 63.1 61.7 60.9 61.8 59.6 59.9 59.7
2.8 2.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.2 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3
: : 0.6 0.1 0.6 – 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
64.9 62.3 67.8 65.4 63.2 60.8 60.4 57.5 57.2 58.5 59.1 58.5
49.4 50.1 49.6 52.4 52.4 54.1 53.4 53.0 54.7 52.4 53.1 53.0
– 9.6 – 7.3 – 7.4 – 2.9 – 1.7 2.3 1.3 3.5 4.6 1.1 0.8 1.2
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.315
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XTable A.1.15
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
United Kingdom
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 15.8 16.0 15.6 16.0 15.6 15.3
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 13.4 14.5 13.8 12.8 12.1 11.4
3. Social contributions 6.0 6.8 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.1
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 4.5 4.1 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2
6. Total current resources 39.8 41.4 38.3 37.4 36.1 35.1
7. Government consumption expenditure 21.7 21.2 20.3 21.2 21.6 21.5
8. Of which compensation of employees 12.8 12.2 11.5 11.7 11.8 10.7
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 10.6 12.8 10.6 11.8 13.1 13.8
12. Interest payments 4.7 5.0 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.8
13. Subsidies 2.5 2.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 40.3 42.0 35.8 36.9 39.3 40.0
16. Gross savings – 0.5 – 0.5 2.4 0.5 – 3.2 – 4.9
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 39.8 41.4 38.3 37.4 36.1 35.1
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 43.2 44.3 39.2 39.7 42.2 42.8
22. Tax burden 33.5 35.4 33.3 33.1 32.2 31.3
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 3.4 – 2.9 – 0.9 – 2.3 – 6.1 – 7.7
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.316
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XTable A.1.15
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (1)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
15.4 15.7 13.1 13.2 13.5 13.4 13.8 13.8 13.6 13.7 13.6 13.5
11.8 12.6 14.9 14.7 15.0 16.2 16.1 16.6 16.7 15.5 15.4 15.5
6.2 6.2 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.3 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.9 8.1
: : 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.6 6.9 7.0 6.8 7.2 7.4
2.2 2.2 2.9 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.2
35.6 36.7 38.4 38.2 38.6 39.8 39.9 40.4 40.5 39.0 39.0 39.3
21.2 20.9 19.6 19.3 18.4 18.0 18.5 18.7 19.3 20.0 20.7 20.7
9.1 8.4 8.3 7.9 7.5 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.4 7.6 8.0 8.0
: : 8.3 8.1 7.6 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.6 7.7 7.9 7.9
: : 11.3 11.2 10.8 10.7 11.2 11.4 11.7 12.4 12.8 12.8
13.6 13.4 15.4 14.8 14.4 13.7 13.4 13.3 13.7 13.5 13.5 13.4
3.2 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 2.9 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.1
1.1 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
: : 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.6
39.8 39.7 41.3 40.6 39.2 38.0 37.3 37.6 38.2 38.6 39.2 39.3
– 4.2 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 2.3 – 0.6 1.8 2.6 2.9 2.4 0.4 – 0.2 0.0
: : 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
35.6 36.7 38.9 38.6 38.9 40.1 40.3 40.9 41.0 39.4 39.5 39.7
1.8 1.7 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.9
: : 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 – 1.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9
42.3 42.1 44.6 43.0 41.1 39.8 39.1 36.9 40.2 40.6 41.9 42.2
31.9 32.9 36.5 36.1 36.6 37.8 37.9 38.6 38.4 37.1 37.4 37.6
– 6.7 – 5.4 – 5.8 – 4.4 – 2.2 0.2 1.1 4.0 0.8 – 1.3 – 2.5 – 2.5
1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.317
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XTable A.1.16
Resources and expenditure of general government
(% of GDP)
Euro area (1)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.2 12.5 12.6 12.6 12.7 13.0
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 10.7 11.5 11.7 12.0 12.0 12.1
3. Social contributions 15.8 16.6 16.3 16.7 17.1 17.7
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 3.0 3.7 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.7
6. Total current resources 41.7 44.3 43.9 44.7 45.4 46.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 17.3 17.9 17.1 17.6 18.0 18.4
8. Of which compensation of employees 11.7 11.9 11.4 11.6 11.8 11.9
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 17.1 18.6 18.0 18.6 19.4 20.3
12. Interest payments 2.6 4.4 4.9 5.0 5.5 5.6
13. Subsidies 2.7 3.0 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.5
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 40.5 44.9 44.1 45.2 46.7 48.2
16. Gross savings 1.0 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 1.2 – 1.8
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 41.7 44.3 43.9 44.7 45.4 46.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.9
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 45.0 49.2 48.2 49.3 50.2 52.0
22. Tax burden 38.8 40.8 40.8 41.6 42.1 43.0
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 3.4 – 4.9 – 4.3 – 4.6 – 4.8 – 5.6
(1) Due to problems with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included; 
from 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) System is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.318
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XTable A.1.16
Resources and expenditure of general government
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (2)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
13.2 13.1 12.5 12.7 12.9 13.5 13.8 13.6 13.3 13.4 13.4 13.4
11.6 11.7 11.4 11.9 12.1 12.4 12.8 13.0 12.6 12.2 12.0 12.0
17.7 17.7 17.4 17.6 17.5 16.5 16.4 16.2 16.0 16.0 16.1 16.0
: : 16.0 16.4 16.3 15.3 15.2 15.1 14.9 14.9 15.0 14.9
3.5 3.3 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3
46.0 45.7 45.1 45.9 46.1 45.8 46.3 46.0 45.4 44.9 44.8 44.6
18.1 17.9 20.5 20.5 20.3 19.9 19.9 19.9 20.0 20.3 20.4 20.2
11.7 11.6 11.1 11.2 11.1 10.7 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.6
: : 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2
: : 11.9 12.0 11.8 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.9 12.1 12.1 12.0
20.2 20.1 17.3 17.7 17.6 17.1 17.0 16.7 16.6 17.0 17.2 17.2
5.4 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.1 4.8 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.6
2.4 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2
: : 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6
47.5 47.2 46.4 47.0 45.9 44.9 44.3 43.7 43.6 44.0 44.2 43.8
– 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.1 0.2 0.9 2.0 2.3 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.8
: : 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 : : : :
46.0 45.7 46.4 47.2 47.6 47.1 47.6 47.2 46.5 46.1 46.0 45.8
2.7 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5
: : 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3 0.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
51.0 50.7 51.5 51.5 50.2 49.4 48.9 47.1 48.1 48.4 48.5 48.2
42.8 42.7 42.2 42.9 43.2 43.0 43.5 43.4 42.5 42.0 41.9 41.8
– 5.1 – 4.9 – 5.1 – 4.3 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 1.4 0.1 – 1.6 – 2.3 – 2.5 – 2.4
(1) Due to problems with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included; 
from 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.319
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XTable A.1.17
Resources and expenditure of general government
(% of GDP)
EU-15 (1)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.9 13.3 13.3 13.4 13.3 13.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 11.8 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.6 12.5
3. Social contributions 14.0 14.6 14.5 14.8 15.2 15.7
4. Of which actual social contributions : : : : : : 
5. Other current resources 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.7
6. Total current resources 42.1 44.6 43.9 44.3 44.8 45.3
7. Government consumption expenditure 18.6 18.9 18.0 18.6 19.0 19.2
8. Of which compensation of employees 12.3 12.3 11.8 12.0 12.2 12.1
9. Collective consumption : : : : : : 
10. Social benefits in kind : : : : : : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind 16.1 17.6 17.0 17.7 18.6 19.5
12. Interest payments 3.0 4.8 4.7 4.7 5.2 5.3
13. Subsidies 2.7 2.9 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.4
14. Other current expenditure : : : : : : 
15. Total current expenditure 41.2 45.2 43.5 44.7 46.3 47.7
16. Gross savings 0.8 – 0.6 0.4 – 0.3 – 1.6 – 2.4
17. Capital transfers received : : : : : : 
18. Total resources 42.1 44.6 43.9 44.3 44.8 45.3
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.7
20. Other capital expenditure : : : : : : 
21. Total expenditure 45.5 49.1 47.4 48.5 49.8 51.4
22. Tax burden 38.5 40.5 40.4 40.9 41.2 41.7
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 3.4 – 4.5 – 3.5 – 4.1 – 5.0 – 6.0
(1) Due to problems with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included; 
from 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) System is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Source: Commission services.320
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XTable A.1.17
Resources and expenditure of general government
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions (2)
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
13.6 13.5 12.8 12.9 13.2 13.7 14.0 13.8 13.5 13.6 13.6 13.6
12.3 12.4 12.5 12.9 13.2 13.7 14.0 14.2 14.0 13.3 13.2 13.2
15.7 15.7 15.7 15.8 15.5 14.6 14.5 14.3 14.2 14.2 14.4 14.4
: : 14.4 14.7 14.4 13.6 13.4 13.3 13.2 13.2 13.4 13.3
3.5 3.4 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.2
45.0 45.0 44.8 45.6 45.5 45.4 45.8 45.6 45.2 44.4 44.4 44.4
18.9 18.6 20.7 20.7 20.3 19.9 20.0 20.0 20.2 20.6 20.8 20.7
11.6 11.4 11.1 11.1 10.8 10.4 10.4 10.2 10.2 10.3 10.5 10.4
: : 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.1 8.1 8.0 8.1 8.1 8.2 8.2
: : 12.1 12.2 12.0 11.9 11.9 12.0 12.2 12.5 12.6 12.5
19.4 19.3 17.2 17.4 17.1 16.6 16.4 16.1 16.1 16.4 16.6 16.6
5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 4.9 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.3
2.3 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
: : 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9
47.1 46.8 46.4 46.7 45.4 44.3 43.6 43.0 43.0 43.5 43.8 43.5
– 2.0 – 1.7 – 1.6 – 1.2 0.1 1.2 2.2 2.6 2.1 1.0 0.7 0.9
: : 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5
45.0 45.0 46.1 46.8 46.8 46.6 47.0 46.7 46.2 45.5 45.5 45.4
2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.4
: : 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 – 0.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
50.4 50.0 51.3 51.0 49.3 48.3 47.7 45.7 47.1 47.4 47.8 47.6
41.6 41.8 41.8 42.5 42.6 42.6 43.0 42.9 42.3 41.5 41.6 41.6
– 5.4 – 5.0 – 5.2 – 4.2 – 2.5 – 1.7 – 0.8 0.9 – 0.9 – 1.9 – 2.3 – 2.2
(1) Due to problems with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included; 
from 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with the former definitions: The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21
Commission services.321
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XTable A.2.1
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Former definitions
Belgium 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Net borrowing (1) 8.6 8.9 5.4 6.2 6.9 7.2
2. Interest payments 5.9 10.3 10.4 10.0 10.6 10.6
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 9.2 9.5 8.7 8.2 8.8 8.5
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 8.8 6.4 6.0 4.8 5.0 3.0
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 8.6 8.9 5.4 6.2 6.9 7.2
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 5.6 – 6.9 – 7.3 – 5.8 – 6.1 – 3.7
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 5.2 2.9 1.9 – 0.8 0.8 2.0
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 2.7 – 1.4 – 5.0 – 3.8 – 3.7 – 3.5
9. Snowball effect (5) 0.3 3.4 3.2 4.2 4.6 6.9
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 5.2 2.9 1.9 – 0.8 0.8 2.0
11. Change in gross debt (6) 8.3 4.9 0.1 2.1 1.4 6.8
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 78.3 121.8 127.7 129.8 131.2 138.0
Denmark
1. Net borrowing (1) 3.2 2.0 1.0 2.4 2.2 2.8
2. Interest payments 3.7 9.3 7.3 7.3 6.7 7.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 13.7 13.9 13.2 13.1 11.0 11.1
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 8.0 8.7 4.7 3.9 3.5 1.4
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 3.2 2.0 1.0 2.4 2.2 2.8
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 2.2 – 5.8 – 2.6 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 0.9
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 6.0 0.9 1.4 4.4 3.9 9.8
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 0.7 – 7.6 – 6.3 – 4.9 – 4.4 – 4.5
9. Snowball effect (5) 1.6 3.5 4.7 5.1 4.5 6.4
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 6.0 0.9 1.4 4.4 3.9 9.8
11. Change in gross debt (6) 7.0 – 2.9 – 0.2 4.6 4.0 11.7
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 36.4 69.8 57.7 62.3 66.4 78.0
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services. Source322
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XTable A.1.1
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
4.8 3.9 3.8 2.0 0.8 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2
9.9 8.8 8.9 8.0 7.6 7.0 6.8 6.6 6.1 5.6 5.0
7.8 7.0 6.8 6.4 6.3 6.1 6.2 6.2 5.7 5.5 5.0
5.4 3.7 2.4 4.9 3.7 4.6 5.0 2.8 2.5 3.0 4.0
4.8 3.9 3.8 2.0 0.8 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2
– 6.9 – 4.6 – 3.1 – 6.1 – 4.5 – 5.3 – 5.5 – 2.9 – 3.1 – 3.1 – 4.0
– 0.6 – 1.3 – 4.6 – 1.2 – 1.6 0.1 0.3 2.3 – 0.1 0.3 0.0
– 5.1 – 4.9 – 5.0 – 6.0 – 6.8 – 6.5 – 6.9 – 7.0 – 6.1 – 5.3 – 4.8
3.0 4.2 5.7 1.9 3.1 1.7 1.3 3.7 3.0 2.5 1.0
– 0.6 – 1.3 – 4.6 – 1.2 – 1.6 0.1 0.3 2.3 – 0.1 0.3 0.0
– 1.6 – 3.1 – 3.9 – 5.4 – 5.3 – 4.7 – 5.3 – 1.1 – 2.8 – 2.5 – 3.9
136.4 133.4 130.2 124.8 119.6 114.9 109.6 108.5 105.8 103.2 99.4
2.6 2.2 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.1 – 3.2 – 2.5 – 3.0 – 1.9 – 1.6 – 2.0
6.7 6.4 6.1 5.7 5.3 4.8 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.3
9.2 9.1 9.3 9.3 9.0 8.9 8.6 8.8 8.4 7.9 8.2
7.3 4.6 5.1 5.2 3.5 4.5 6.1 3.5 2.5 3.8 4.1
2.6 2.2 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.1 – 3.2 – 2.5 – 3.0 – 1.9 – 1.6 – 2.0
– 5.3 – 3.2 – 3.3 – 3.2 – 2.1 – 2.4 – 3.0 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 1.7 – 1.7
– 1.8 – 3.2 – 1.9 – 0.4 – 1.7 2.4 – 0.1 2.6 2.9 0.8 0.9
– 4.1 – 4.2 – 5.1 – 6.1 – 6.5 – 8.0 – 6.8 – 7.0 – 5.6 – 5.1 – 5.3
1.4 3.2 2.8 2.5 3.3 2.3 1.3 2.4 2.6 1.8 1.7
– 1.8 – 3.2 – 1.9 – 0.4 – 1.7 2.4 – 0.1 2.6 2.9 0.8 0.9
– 4.6 – 4.2 – 4.2 – 3.9 – 4.9 – 3.3 – 5.6 – 2.0 – 0.1 – 2.5 – 2.8
73.5 69.3 65.1 61.2 56.2 53.0 47.3 45.4 45.3 42.7 40.0
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as percentage of gross debt at end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excl. interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
SourceCommission services.323
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XTable A.2.2
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Germany (1)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Net borrowing (2) 1.9 2.1 2.0 3.2 2.8 3.5
2. Interest payments 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.6 3.2 3.2
3. Implicit interest rate (3) 7.2 7.1 6.8 7.1 8.5 7.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 3.3 5.3 9.1 8.8 7.4 2.5
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (2) 1.9 2.1 2.0 3.2 2.8 3.5
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 1.4 – 2.2 – 3.5 – 3.6 – 2.8 – 1.1
7. Stock-flow adjustment (4) 0.5 0.4 3.0 1.1 2.7 1.5
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (5) – 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.6 0.6 – 0.4 0.2
9. Snowball effect (6)      :       :       :  – 0.9 0.4 2.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (4) 0.5 0.4 3.0 1.1 2.7 1.5
11. Change in gross debt (7) 1.0 0.5 1.7 0.9 2.7 4.0
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 42.6 43.1 43.5 40.4 43.2 47.2
Greece
1. Net borrowing (2) 2.6 11.6 15.9 11.4 12.6 13.6
2. Interest payments 2.0 4.9 10.0 9.3 11.5 12.6
3. Implicit interest rate (3) 9.4 12.9 16.6 14.3 16.2 16.2
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 20.1 22.0 20.7 23.5 15.6 12.6
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (2) 2.6 11.6 15.9 11.4 12.6 13.6
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 4.3 – 8.4 – 12.5 – 15.3 – 11.1 – 9.8
7. Stock-flow adjustment (4) 1.4 4.6 4.3 5.8 4.1 18.6
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (5) 0.7 6.7 5.9 2.1 1.1 1.0
9. Snowball effect (6) – 2.3 – 3.5 – 2.5 – 6.0 0.4 2.8
10. Stock-flow adjustment (4) 1.4 4.6 4.3 5.8 4.1 18.6
11. Change in gross debt (7) – 0.2 8.7 8.6 2.2 6.4 12.7
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 27.9 59.9 89.0 91.1 97.5 110.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany
(2) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(3) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t – 1.
(4) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(5) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(6) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(7) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services. Source: 324
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XTable A.1.2
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2.6 3.4 3.4 2.7 2.2 1.5 – 1.1 2.8 3.6 3.4 2.9
3.3 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.3
7.4 7.8 6.6 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.3
4.9 3.8 1.8 2.1 3.1 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.8
2.6 3.4 3.4 2.7 2.2 1.5 – 1.1 2.8 3.6 3.4 2.9
– 2.2 – 1.8 – 1.0 – 1.2 – 1.8 – 1.5 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 1.7
1.9 6.1 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.5 0.3 1.7 – 2.3 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 0.9
– 0.7 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.9 – 1.4 – 2.0 – 4.5 – 0.5 0.4 0.2 – 0.3
1.1 1.9 2.7 2.4 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.5
1.9 6.1 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.5 0.3 1.7 – 2.3 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 0.9
2.3 7.7 2.8 1.2 – 0.1 0.3 – 1.0 – 0.7 1.3 1.8 0.3
49.5 57.1 59.8 61.0 60.9 61.2 60.2 59.5 60.9 62.7 63.0
9.9 10.5 7.4 4.0 2.5 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1
13.9 12.8 10.5 8.2 7.8 7.2 7.0 6.3 5.5 5.2 4.9
14.3 13.2 10.7 8.2 7.8 7.3 7.2 6.4 5.6 5.3 5.3
13.4 12.1 9.9 10.7 8.8 6.7 7.8 7.7 7.8 7.5 7.6
9.9 10.5 7.4 4.0 2.5 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1
– 13.0 – 11.7 – 9.8 – 10.7 – 8.7 – 6.7 – 7.6 – 7.5 – 7.7 – 7.3 – 7.2
1.0 2.0 5.0 3.6 3.9 4.1 6.8 6.9 4.4 2.2 2.1
– 4.0 – 2.3 – 3.1 – 4.2 – 5.3 – 5.4 – 5.1 – 4.9 – 4.3 – 4.1 – 3.9
0.9 1.1 0.7 – 2.5 – 0.9 0.6 – 0.6 – 1.2 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 2.2
1.0 2.0 5.0 3.6 3.9 4.1 6.8 6.9 4.4 2.2 2.1
– 2.3 0.8 2.6 – 3.1 – 2.4 – 0.8 1.2 0.8 – 2.1 – 3.9 – 4.0
107.9 108.7 111.3 108.2 105.8 105.1 106.2 107.0 104.9 101.0 97.0
(1) from 1991 including former East Germany
(2) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(3) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t – 1.
(4) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(5) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(6) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(7) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
SourceCommission services.325
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XTable A.2.3
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Spain
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Net borrowing (1) 2.5 6.2 4.2 4.3 4.0 6.7
2. Interest payments 0.4 1.9 3.9 3.7 4.3 5.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 3.4 5.8 10.4 9.4 10.4 11.2
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 14.9 11.1 11.4 9.7 7.7 3.5
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 2.5 6.2 4.2 4.3 4.0 6.7
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 1.9 – 3.7 – 4.3 – 3.8 – 3.2 – 1.6
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.3 2.7 1.9 0.2 1.6 6.4
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 1.8 4.3 0.3 0.6 – 0.3 1.7
9. Snowball effect (5) – 1.5 – 1.8 – 0.4 – 0.1 1.1 3.5
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.3 2.7 1.9 0.2 1.6 6.4
11. Change in gross debt (6) 1.8 5.2 1.8 0.7 2.4 11.6
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 17.0 42.7 44.0 44.7 47.1 58.7
France
1. Net borrowing (1) 0.0 2.8 1.5 2.0 3.9 5.6
2. Interest payments 1.4 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 7.7 10.5 9.0 8.6 9.3 8.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 12.9 7.0 5.6 4.0 3.5 1.4
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 0.0 2.8 1.5 2.0 3.9 5.6
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 2.4 – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.3 – 1.2 – 0.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.0 0.8 1.3 – 0.3 1.0 0.3
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 1.4 0.0 – 1.4 – 0.9 0.7 2.3
9. Snowball effect (5) – 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.6 2.0 2.8
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.0 0.8 1.3 – 0.3 1.0 0.3
11. Change in gross debt (6) – 1.5 1.8 1.1 0.4 4.0 5.5
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 20.4 31.8 36.3 36.7 40.6 46.1
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services. Source: 326
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XTable A.1.3
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
6.1 7.0 5.0 3.2 3.0 1.2 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1
4.7 5.3 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5
8.6 9.5 8.9 7.4 6.9 5.9 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.1
6.4 7.8 6.0 6.4 6.9 7.1 7.8 7.0 6.5 5.8 6.1
6.1 7.0 5.0 3.2 3.0 1.2 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1
– 3.5 – 4.4 – 3.6 – 4.1 – 4.3 – 4.3 – 4.6 – 3.9 – 3.5 – 2.9 – 3.0
– 0.3 0.1 2.9 – 0.6 – 0.8 1.6 1.2 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.9
1.4 1.7 – 0.4 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 3.0 – 2.8 – 2.2 – 2.4
1.2 0.9 1.7 0.6 0.0 – 0.7 – 1.3 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.5
– 0.3 0.1 2.9 – 0.6 – 0.8 1.6 1.2 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.9
2.5 2.8 4.2 – 1.5 – 2.0 – 1.4 – 2.6 – 3.6 – 3.0 – 1.5 – 2.0
61.2 64.0 68.1 66.6 64.6 63.2 60.6 56.9 54.0 52.5 50.5
5.7 4.8 4.1 3.0 2.7 1.8 1.4 1.5 3.1 3.7 3.5
3.5 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3
8.2 8.0 7.2 6.5 6.1 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.6
3.8 3.4 2.6 3.2 4.4 3.8 4.8 3.9 3.1 2.8 3.7
5.7 4.8 4.1 3.0 2.7 1.8 1.4 1.5 3.1 3.7 3.5
– 1.6 – 1.6 – 1.4 – 1.8 – 2.5 – 2.2 – 2.7 – 2.2 – 1.6 – 1.6 – 2.2
– 0.7 1.0 – 0.2 0.9 0.1 – 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.0
2.2 1.1 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.8 – 1.5 – 1.7 – 1.6 0.0 0.5 0.2
1.9 2.1 2.5 1.8 1.0 1.1 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.1
– 0.7 1.0 – 0.2 0.9 0.1 – 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.0
3.5 4.4 2.5 2.2 0.3 – 1.1 – 1.3 – 0.4 2.1 2.7 1.3
49.6 54.0 57.1 59.3 59.5 58.5 57.2 56.8 59.0 61.7 63.0
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as percentage of gross debt at end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excl. interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
SourceCommission services.327
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XTable A.2.4
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Ireland
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Net borrowing (1) 11.6 10.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3
2. Interest payments 6.0 9.4 7.4 7.2 6.7 6.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 10.7 10.5 8.2 8.2 7.7 7.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 18.3 8.5 7.3 3.8 6.3 8.0
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 11.6 10.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 10.3 – 7.6 – 6.6 – 3.3 – 5.5 – 6.7
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.2 0.2 – 1.6 2.2 – 0.1 8.3
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 5.6 0.9 – 5.3 – 5.0 – 4.3 – 4.0
9. Snowball effect (5) – 4.3 1.8 0.8 3.9 1.3 – 0.4
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.2 0.2 – 1.6 2.2 – 0.1 8.3
11. Change in gross debt (6) 1.6 3.0 – 6.4 – 0.3 – 2.6 4.2
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 72.3 105.3 97.5 97.3 94.7 98.8
Italy
1. Net borrowing (1) 8.7 12.5 11.0 10.0 9.5 9.4
2. Interest payments 5.5 8.0 9.4 10.1 11.4 12.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 11.3 11.9 10.9 11.3 11.9 11.5
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 25.6 12.2 10.4 9.1 5.3 3.0
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 8.7 12.5 11.0 10.0 9.5 9.4
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 12.4 – 8.2 – 9.0 – 8.1 – 5.1 – 3.2
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.0 2.3 – 0.2 1.4 2.8 4.2
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 3.2 4.5 1.6 – 0.1 – 1.9 – 2.6
9. Snowball effect (5) – 7.0 – 0.2 0.4 2.0 6.3 8.9
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.0 2.3 – 0.2 1.4 2.8 4.2
11. Change in gross debt (6) – 2.8 6.7 1.9 3.3 7.1 10.5
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 58.3 82.0 97.3 100.7 107.7 118.2
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services. Source: 328
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XTable A.1.4
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1.6 2.1 0.1 – 1.4 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 4.5 – 1.2 0.0 0.6 0.9
5.6 5.0 4.6 3.8 3.5 2.5 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.5
6.4 6.4 6.1 6.0 6.2 5.2 4.8 4.3 4.1 4.7 4.9
7.6 13.3 10.3 15.5 15.6 15.7 14.6 11.2 12.0 6.8 8.2
1.6 2.1 0.1 – 1.4 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 4.5 – 1.2 0.0 0.6 0.9
– 6.6 – 10.3 – 7.7 – 10.0 – 8.8 – 7.5 – 6.3 – 4.0 – 3.2 – 2.2 – 2.6
– 0.9 0.3 – 0.9 2.2 0.9 3.9 0.8 2.6 0.5 1.5 1.6
– 4.0 – 2.9 – 4.4 – 5.3 – 5.8 – 4.5 – 6.5 – 2.7 – 1.3 – 0.9 – 0.6
– 1.0 – 5.4 – 3.2 – 6.1 – 5.3 – 5.0 – 4.2 – 2.5 – 1.9 – 0.7 – 1.1
– 0.9 0.3 – 0.9 2.2 0.9 3.9 0.8 2.6 0.5 1.5 1.6
– 6.2 – 8.4 – 8.5 – 9.2 – 10.1 – 5.6 – 9.9 – 2.6 – 3.4 0.0 0.0
92.6 84.3 74.2 65.0 54.9 49.3 39.3 36.8 33.4 33.4 33.3
9.1 7.6 7.1 2.7 3.1 1.8 0.7 2.7 2.5 2.3 3.1
10.9 11.3 11.5 9.4 8.3 6.8 6.5 6.4 5.8 5.3 5.1
9.7 9.8 9.9 8.0 7.2 6.0 5.9 6.1 5.5 5.1 5.1
5.8 8.1 6.4 4.5 4.6 3.3 5.3 4.6 3.1 3.5 4.4
9.1 7.6 7.1 2.7 3.1 1.8 0.7 2.7 2.5 2.3 3.1
– 6.4 – 9.3 – 7.5 – 5.2 – 5.2 – 3.7 – 5.8 – 4.9 – 3.3 – 3.6 – 4.5
3.1 1.0 – 0.7 0.6 – 1.8 0.5 0.8 1.1 – 2.0 0.6 0.0
– 1.8 – 3.6 – 4.4 – 6.7 – 5.2 – 5.0 – 5.8 – 3.8 – 3.4 – 3.0 – 2.0
4.4 2.0 4.1 4.2 3.1 3.1 0.7 1.6 2.5 1.7 0.6
3.1 1.0 – 0.7 0.6 – 1.8 0.5 0.8 1.1 – 2.0 0.6 0.0
5.7 – 0.6 – 1.1 – 1.9 – 3.9 – 1.4 – 4.3 – 1.1 – 2.8 – 0.6 – 1.4
123.9 123.3 122.1 120.2 116.3 114.9 110.6 109.5 106.7 106.0 104.7
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as percentage of gross debt at end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excl. interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
SourceCommission services.329
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XTable A.2.5
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Luxembourg
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Net borrowing (1) 0.4 – 6.3 – 4.7 – 1.8 – 0.7 – 1.5
2. Interest payments 1.2 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 13.2 10.2 8.8 9.0 9.2 8.0
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 8.8 6.0 8.0 10.6 5.6 10.4
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 0.4 – 6.3 – 4.7 – 1.8 – 0.7 – 1.5
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.1 6.4 4.2 1.6 1.9 2.9
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 0.7 – 7.2 – 5.1 – 2.1 – 1.1 – 1.9
9. Snowball effect (5) 0.4 0.4 0.0 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.1 6.4 4.2 1.6 1.9 2.9
11. Change in gross debt (6) – 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.9 – 0.5 0.9 1.0
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 9.3 9.6 4.4 3.9 4.8 5.8
The Netherlands
1. Net borrowing (1) 4.1 3.5 4.9 2.8 3.8 3.1
2. Interest payments 3.7 6.2 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 9.4 10.0 8.0 8.2 8.3 8.0
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 6.8 4.9 6.4 5.4 4.1 2.8
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 4.1 3.5 4.9 2.8 3.8 3.1
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 2.7 – 3.0 – 4.6 – 3.9 – 3.0 – 2.1
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.3 4.0 – 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.1
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 0.4 – 2.6 – 0.8 – 3.1 – 2.3 – 2.9
9. Snowball effect (5) 1.0 3.1 1.2 2.0 3.1 3.9
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.3 4.0 – 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.1
11. Change in gross debt (6) 2.8 4.6 – 0.3 – 0.2 0.9 1.1
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 46.3 70.5 77.4 77.2 78.1 79.3
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services. Source: 330
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XTable A.1.5
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
– 2.7 – 1.8 – 2.0 – 3.2 – 3.1 – 3.5 – 6.0 – 6.3 – 2.5 0.2 1.2
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2
6.2 5.4 6.6 6.1 6.5 5.3 5.0 5.1 6.6 4.1 4.5
7.5 3.8 5.4 11.2 9.8 11.0 12.9 3.6 1.2 3.2 4.8
– 2.7 – 1.8 – 2.0 – 3.2 – 3.1 – 3.5 – 6.0 – 6.3 – 2.5 0.2 1.2
– 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2
2.7 2.3 2.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 6.2 6.4 2.7 – 1.6 – 1.7
– 3.0 – 2.1 – 2.3 – 3.6 – 3.4 – 3.8 – 6.2 – 6.5 – 2.9 0.0 1.0
– 0.1 0.1 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0
2.7 2.3 2.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 6.2 6.4 2.7 – 1.6 – 1.7
– 0.4 0.3 0.5 – 0.1 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.1 0.2 – 1.6 – 0.6
5.4 5.6 6.2 6.1 6.3 5.9 5.5 5.4 5.6 4.0 3.4
3.6 3.8 1.8 1.1 0.8 – 0.7 – 2.2 – 0.1 1.2 1.6 2.4
5.7 5.7 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.9
7.6 8.0 7.5 7.3 7.4 7.1 6.7 6.7 6.4 6.0 5.8
5.0 5.0 4.2 5.9 6.1 5.6 7.6 6.6 3.5 3.5 3.3
3.6 3.8 1.8 1.1 0.8 – 0.7 – 2.2 – 0.1 1.2 1.6 2.4
– 3.7 – 3.6 – 3.1 – 4.2 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 4.5 – 3.5 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 1.7
– 3.1 0.6 – 0.7 – 2.2 0.1 0.5 – 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.0 – 0.4
– 2.0 – 1.9 – 3.8 – 4.1 – 4.1 – 5.2 – 6.1 – 3.6 – 2.1 – 1.5 – 0.5
2.0 2.1 2.4 1.0 0.8 0.9 – 0.6 0.0 1.4 1.3 1.3
– 3.1 0.6 – 0.7 – 2.2 0.1 0.5 – 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.0 – 0.4
– 3.2 0.9 – 2.0 – 5.3 – 3.2 – 3.7 – 7.3 – 2.9 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.4
76.1 77.0 75.2 69.9 66.8 63.1 55.8 52.8 52.7 52.5 52.8
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as percentage of gross debt at end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excl. interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
SourceCommission services.331
A
N
N
E
XTable A.2.6
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Austria
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Net borrowing (1) 1.7 2.4 2.4 3.0 2.0 4.2
2. Interest payments 2.4 3.5 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 7.5 7.7 7.4 7.8 7.7 7.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 7.5 5.5 8.2 7.2 6.0 3.4
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 1.7 2.4 2.4 3.0 2.0 4.2
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 2.4 – 2.5 – 4.4 – 3.9 – 3.3 – 1.9
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 2.2 2.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 2.2
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 0.8 – 1.1 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 2.2 – 0.1
9. Snowball effect (5) 0.0 1.0 – 0.4 0.3 0.9 2.4
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 2.2 2.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 2.2
11. Change in gross debt (6) 1.5 2.0 – 0.8 0.2 – 0.2 4.6
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 36.4 49.4 57.5 57.7 57.5 62.1
Portugal
1. Net borrowing (1) 8.4 10.1 4.9 5.8 2.9 5.9
2. Interest payments 2.6 7.4 7.8 7.6 7.0 6.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 8.3 15.5 14.7 13.5 11.7 10.5
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 26.5 25.2 17.6 14.9 12.7 5.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 8.4 10.1 4.9 5.8 2.9 5.9
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 8.3 – 12.1 – 9.4 – 8.4 – 7.5 – 3.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 3.8 10.1 6.5 5.1 – 1.6 – 2.4
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 5.8 2.7 – 2.9 – 1.8 – 4.1 – 0.1
9. Snowball effect (5) – 5.7 – 4.6 – 1.6 – 0.8 – 0.6 3.0
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 3.8 10.1 6.5 5.1 – 1.6 – 2.4
11. Change in gross debt (6) – 3.6 8.0 2.0 1.8 – 7.1 3.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 34.9 66.6 63.1 64.9 57.8 61.1
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services. Source: 332
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XTable A.1.6
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
4.9 5.0 4.0 2.0 2.5 2.4 1.6 – 0.1 0.8 1.3 0.6
4.0 4.3 4.4 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.6
6.8 7.0 6.6 6.0 6.3 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.4
5.4 4.2 3.3 2.5 4.5 3.4 5.0 2.3 2.4 2.3 3.5
4.9 5.0 4.0 2.0 2.5 2.4 1.6 – 0.1 0.8 1.3 0.6
– 3.2 – 2.6 – 2.2 – 1.7 – 2.8 – 2.1 – 3.2 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 2.3
1.0 1.4 – 1.8 – 4.7 – 0.8 3.5 1.0 2.1 1.0 1.1 0.0
0.9 0.7 – 0.4 – 2.0 – 1.4 – 1.3 – 2.2 – 3.8 – 2.9 – 2.4 – 3.0
0.8 1.8 2.2 2.3 1.1 1.6 0.6 2.2 2.1 2.2 1.3
1.0 1.4 – 1.8 – 4.7 – 0.8 3.5 1.0 2.1 1.0 1.1 0.0
2.7 3.8 – 0.1 – 4.4 – 1.1 3.8 – 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.9 – 1.7
64.7 68.6 69.1 64.7 63.7 67.5 66.8 67.3 67.6 68.5 66.8
5.9 5.6 4.8 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.9 4.3 2.7 3.6 3.3
6.1 6.2 5.4 4.2 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.0
10.7 10.7 8.9 7.3 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.3 5.8 5.6 5.4
8.3 7.9 6.7 7.9 8.6 7.0 7.0 6.4 5.1 3.9 4.5
5.9 5.6 4.8 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.9 4.3 2.7 3.6 3.3
– 4.7 – 4.5 – 4.0 – 4.6 – 4.7 – 3.6 – 3.5 – 3.2 – 2.8 – 2.2 – 2.6
– 0.3 1.1 – 2.1 – 2.8 – 2.7 0.1 – 0.4 1.2 2.6 0.0 0.0
– 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.4 1.1 – 0.4 0.4 0.2
1.4 1.6 1.4 – 0.4 – 1.2 – 0.4 – 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.5
– 0.3 1.1 – 2.1 – 2.8 – 2.7 0.1 – 0.4 1.2 2.6 0.0 0.0
0.9 2.2 – 1.4 – 3.8 – 4.1 – 0.7 – 1.0 2.3 2.6 1.4 0.7
62.0 64.1 62.9 59.1 55.0 54.3 53.3 55.6 58.1 59.5 60.2
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as percentage of gross debt at end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excl. interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
SourceCommission services.333
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XTable A.2.7
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Finland
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Net borrowing (1) – 3.3 – 2.9 – 5.3 1.5 5.7 7.9
2. Interest payments 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.9 2.6 4.5
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 10.3 12.7 10.3 12.8 11.1 11.3
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 15.4 8.8 5.5 – 4.5 – 2.5 1.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) – 3.3 – 2.9 – 5.3 1.5 5.7 7.9
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 1.5 – 1.3 – 0.8 0.7 0.6 – 0.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 5.0 4.8 5.7 6.2 11.7 8.8
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 4.3 – 4.7 – 6.7 – 0.4 3.1 3.3
9. Snowball effect (5) – 0.5 0.6 0.7 2.6 3.2 4.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 5.0 4.8 5.7 6.2 11.7 8.8
11. Change in gross debt (6) 0.1 0.7 – 0.4 8.4 18.2 16.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 11.6 16.4 14.5 22.9 41.1 57.3
Sweden
1. Net borrowing (1) 3.9 3.7 – 4.0 1.1 7.5 11.5
2. Interest payments 4.0 8.1 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.8
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 12.7 14.1 12.1 12.5 10.2 9.3
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 13.6 8.9 10.0 6.1 – 0.8 4.1
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 3.9 3.7 – 4.0 1.1 7.5 11.5
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 4.3 – 5.1 – 4.0 – 2.4 0.4 – 2.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 5.0 0.8 6.3 10.3 5.9 – 2.9
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 0.1 – 4.4 – 8.9 – 3.9 2.3 5.7
9. Snowball effect (5) – 0.3 3.0 0.8 2.5 5.7 3.3
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 5.0 0.8 6.3 10.3 5.9 – 2.9
11. Change in gross debt (6) 4.6 – 0.6 – 1.7 9.3 13.9 10.0
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 40.0 61.9 42.0 51.3 65.1 75.1
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services. Source: 334
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XTable A.1.7
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
6.1 5.0 3.0 1.3 – 1.5 – 2.0 – 6.9 – 5.2 – 4.7 – 3.3 – 3.0
5.0 5.2 4.3 4.3 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.1
9.3 9.6 7.8 8.1 7.2 6.6 6.6 6.4 5.3 5.2 5.1
6.0 8.4 3.6 8.5 8.7 3.1 8.6 4.3 2.9 3.1 4.4
6.1 5.0 3.0 1.3 – 1.5 – 2.0 – 6.9 – 5.2 – 4.7 – 3.3 – 3.0
– 3.2 – 4.5 – 2.0 – 4.5 – 4.3 – 1.4 – 3.7 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 1.3 – 1.8
– 1.4 – 2.4 – 1.0 0.2 0.4 1.9 8.1 6.2 4.9 4.1 3.9
1.1 – 0.2 – 1.3 – 2.9 – 5.1 – 5.1 – 9.8 – 7.9 – 7.0 – 5.4 – 5.0
1.8 0.6 2.3 – 0.2 – 0.7 1.7 – 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.3
– 1.4 – 2.4 – 1.0 0.2 0.4 1.9 8.1 6.2 4.9 4.1 3.9
1.5 – 1.7 0.0 – 3.0 – 5.4 – 1.6 – 2.5 – 0.8 – 1.1 – 0.4 – 0.9
58.8 57.1 57.0 54.0 48.6 47.0 44.5 43.8 42.7 42.3 41.4
9.6 7.3 2.9 1.7 – 2.3 – 1.3 – 3.5 – 4.6 – 1.1 – 0.8 – 1.2
6.4 6.6 6.6 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.1 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.7
9.5 9.6 9.1 8.9 8.1 7.4 6.8 6.2 6.0 5.4 5.5
6.6 7.6 2.6 4.0 4.4 5.3 5.7 3.2 3.2 3.6 4.9
9.6 7.3 2.9 1.7 – 2.3 – 1.3 – 3.5 – 4.6 – 1.1 – 0.8 – 1.2
– 4.4 – 5.2 – 1.8 – 2.8 – 3.0 – 3.4 – 3.4 – 1.6 – 1.7 – 1.8 – 2.4
– 2.6 – 3.2 – 1.3 – 1.9 2.8 – 0.6 – 3.1 7.8 0.8 1.1 2.2
3.3 0.7 – 3.6 – 4.6 – 7.7 – 6.1 – 7.5 – 7.7 – 4.2 – 3.5 – 3.9
1.9 1.4 4.7 3.5 2.5 1.4 0.7 1.6 1.5 0.9 0.3
– 2.6 – 3.2 – 1.3 – 1.9 2.8 – 0.6 – 3.1 7.8 0.8 1.1 2.2
2.6 – 1.1 – 0.2 – 3.0 – 2.5 – 5.4 – 9.9 1.6 – 1.9 – 1.5 – 1.4
77.7 76.6 73.5 70.5 68.0 62.7 52.8 54.4 52.4 50.9 49.5
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as percentage of gross debt at end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excl. interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
SourceCommission services.335
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XTable A.2.8
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
United Kingdom
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Net borrowing (1) 3.4 2.9 0.9 2.3 6.1 7.7
2. Interest payments 4.7 5.0 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.8
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 10.1 9.8 9.0 8.2 8.0 7.3
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 16.9 9.5 8.4 5.2 4.2 5.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 3.4 2.9 0.9 2.3 6.1 7.7
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 7.9 – 4.8 – 2.9 – 1.7 – 1.4 – 2.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 4.0 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.4 1.3 0.9
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 1.3 – 2.1 – 2.2 – 0.4 3.4 4.9
9. Snowball effect (5) – 3.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.3 0.8
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 4.0 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.4 1.3 0.9
11. Change in gross debt (6) – 0.6 – 1.9 – 2.7 – 0.1 6.0 6.7
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 54.9 54.4 35.1 35.0 41.0 47.6
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services. Source: 336
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XTable A.1.8
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
6.7 5.4 4.4 2.2 – 0.2 – 1.1 – 4.0 – 0.8 1.3 2.5 2.5
3.2 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.6 2.9 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.1
7.0 7.3 7.5 7.5 7.5 6.4 6.5 6.0 5.6 5.5 5.6
6.1 5.6 6.0 6.4 6.0 5.0 5.3 4.5 5.1 5.0 4.7
6.7 5.4 4.4 2.2 – 0.2 – 1.1 – 4.0 – 0.8 1.3 2.5 2.5
– 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.9 – 3.2 – 2.9 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.8
– 2.0 – 0.6 – 1.0 – 0.6 0.0 0.9 3.2 – 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0
3.5 2.0 0.7 – 1.5 – 3.8 – 4.1 – 6.7 – 3.2 – 0.8 0.4 0.4
0.4 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3
– 2.0 – 0.6 – 1.0 – 0.6 0.0 0.9 3.2 – 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0
1.9 2.2 0.5 – 1.5 – 3.1 – 2.5 – 3.0 – 3.2 – 0.5 0.6 0.7
49.6 51.8 52.3 50.8 47.7 45.2 42.1 38.9 38.4 39.0 39.8
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as percentage of gross debt at end of t – 1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(4) Net borrowing excl. interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
SourceCommission services.337
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XTable A.2.9
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Euro area (1)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
1. Net borrowing (2) 3.4 4.9 4.3 4.7 4.8 5.6
2. Interest payments 2.6 4.4 4.9 5.1 5.5 5.6
3. Implicit interest rate (3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 10.1 6.8 9.1 6.9 5.4 1.1
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (2) 3.4 4.9 4.3 4.7 4.8 5.6
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 3.1 – 3.1 – 4.7 – 3.8 – 3.0 – 0.6
7. Stock-flow adjustment (4) 0.6 1.3 1.8 0.7 1.5 0.2
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (5) 0.8 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.7 0.0
9. Snowball effect (6) – 0.5 1.4 0.1 1.3 2.6 5.0
10. Stock-flow adjustment (4) 0.6 1.3 1.8 0.7 1.5 0.2
11. Change in gross debt (7) 0.9 3.2 1.4 1.7 3.4 5.2
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 35.2 52.9 59.2 60.9 62.5 67.7
EU-15 (8)
1. Net borrowing (2) 3.4 4.5 3.5 4.2 5.0 6.0
2. Interest payments 3.0 4.8 4.7 4.8 5.2 5.3
3. Implicit interest rate (3) 9.2 10.0 9.4 9.4 9.8 9.0
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 12.3 7.4 7.8 6.8 4.2 0.4
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (2) 3.4 4.5 3.5 4.2 5.0 6.0
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 4.0 – 3.5 – 3.9 – 3.5 – 2.2 – 0.2
7. Stock-flow adjustment (4) 1.9 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.4 – 0.3
Budgetary  constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (5) 0.4 – 0.3 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 0.1 0.8
9. Snowball effect (6) – 1.0 1.3 0.8 1.3 2.9 5.0
10. Stock-flow adjustment (4) 1.9 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.4 – 0.3
11. Change in gross debt (7) 1.3 2.1 0.8 1.7 4.3 5.6
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 38.5 53.9 55.0 56.7 59.7 65.4
(1) EU-15 excluding DK, S and UK; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Due to problems with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included.
(2) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(3) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t – 1.
(4) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(5) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(6) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(7) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
(8) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services. Source: 338
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XTable A.1.9
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
5.1 4.9 4.3 2.6 2.3 1.4 – 0.1 1.6 2.3 2.5 2.4
5.4 5.6 5.7 5.1 4.8 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.6
0.0 0.0 8.1 6.9 6.6 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.5 5.4 5.3
4.4 4.7 4.3 2.2 4.1 4.6 4.9 4.0 3.3 3.1 4.0
5.1 4.9 4.3 2.6 2.3 1.4 – 0.1 1.6 2.3 2.5 2.4
– 2.8 – 3.1 – 3.0 – 1.6 – 3.0 – 3.2 – 3.4 – 2.7 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 2.7
0.0 1.3 1.1 – 1.1 – 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.1 – 0.2 0.4 0.0
– 0.3 – 0.7 – 1.4 – 2.5 – 2.5 – 2.9 – 4.1 – 2.3 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 1.2
2.6 2.5 2.7 3.5 1.8 1.0 0.7 1.2 1.6 1.5 0.9
0.0 1.3 1.1 – 1.1 – 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.1 – 0.2 0.4 0.0
2.3 3.1 2.4 0.0 – 1.7 – 1.0 – 2.4 – 1.0 – 0.2 0.8 – 0.3
70.0 73.1 75.6 75.5 73.9 72.9 70.5 69.4 69.3 70.0 69.7
5.4 5.0 4.2 2.5 1.7 0.8 – 0.9 0.9 1.9 2.3 2.2
5.2 5.3 5.5 4.9 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.3
8.4 8.3 8.2 7.2 6.8 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.6 5.4 5.4
4.8 4.0 5.0 5.3 4.7 5.2 6.6 3.4 3.4 1.9 3.9
5.4 5.0 4.2 2.5 1.7 0.8 – 0.9 0.9 1.9 2.3 2.2
– 3.0 – 2.6 – 3.4 – 3.6 – 3.2 – 3.4 – 4.2 – 2.1 – 2.0 – 1.2 – 2.4
– 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.1 – 0.6 1.1 1.9 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.3 0.0
0.2 – 0.3 – 1.2 – 2.5 – 2.9 – 3.3 – 4.8 – 2.7 – 1.5 – 1.0 – 1.1
2.2 2.8 2.1 1.3 1.4 0.7 – 0.3 1.5 1.4 2.2 0.9
– 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.1 – 0.6 1.1 1.9 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.3 0.0
2.1 2.9 1.9 – 1.0 – 2.1 – 1.5 – 3.2 – 1.3 – 0.3 0.9 – 0.2
67.4 70.3 72.1 71.1 69.0 67.5 64.3 63.0 62.7 63.6 63.4
(1) EU-15 excluding DK, S and UK; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Due to problems with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included.
(2) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(3) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t – 1.
(4) Line 7 = line 10; due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(5) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(6) Due to a change in definition there are no data for 1996.
(7) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
(8) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
SourceCommission services.339
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XTable A.3.1
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Belgium
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 47.6 50.4 47.5 47.7 47.8 48.3
2. Cyclical component 0.5 – 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.5 – 1.0
3. Cyclically adjusted data 47.1 51.6 46.4 46.9 47.3 49.3
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 56.1 59.3 52.9 53.9 54.8 55.5
5. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.2
6. Cyclically adjusted data 56.2 59.1 53.1 54.1 54.9 55.3
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 8.6 – 8.9 – 5.4 – 6.2 – 6.9 – 7.2
8. Cyclical component 0.6 – 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.6 – 1.2
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 9.2 – 7.4 – 6.8 – 7.3 – 7.6 – 5.9
—  as % of potential GDP – 9.3 – 7.3 – 6.9 – 7.4 – 7.6 – 5.8
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 4.4 1.7 3.1 1.8 1.5 – 1.0
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.6 1.8 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.0
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 1.0 – 2.3 2.3 1.8 1.0 – 2.0
Denmark 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 50.8 55.3 55.1 54.7 56.0 57.9
2. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.7 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 1.1 – 2.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data 50.8 54.6 55.3 55.2 57.1 60.1
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 53.1 56.4 56.1 57.1 58.2 60.7
5. Cyclical component 0.0 – 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 53.1 56.7 56.1 56.9 57.7 59.7
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 3.2 – 2.0 – 1.0 – 2.4 – 2.2 – 2.8
8. Cyclical component – 0.1 1.0 – 0.3 – 0.7 – 1.6 – 3.2
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 3.1 – 2.9 – 0.7 – 1.7 – 0.6 0.4
—  as % of potential GDP – 3.1 – 3.0 – 0.7 – 1.7 – 0.6 0.4
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) – 0.6 3.6 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.0
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) – 0.2 1.3 – 0.4 – 0.9 – 2.1 – 3.9
Source: Commission services.340
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XTable A.1.1
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
48.9 48.9 48.5 49.1 49.5 50.0 49.6 49.6 49.8 50.4 49.7 49.4
– 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.1
49.3 49.2 48.8 49.8 49.5 50.0 49.2 48.5 49.3 50.4 50.1 49.5
53.7 52.7 52.8 52.9 51.4 50.7 50.1 49.5 49.4 50.4 50.0 49.6
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
53.6 52.7 52.8 52.7 51.4 50.7 50.3 49.7 49.7 50.4 49.9 49.5
– 4.8 – 3.9 – 4.3 – 3.8 – 2.0 – 0.8 – 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.2
– 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.9 – 0.1 0.0 0.6 1.3 0.6 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.1
– 4.3 – 3.5 – 3.9 – 2.9 – 1.9 – 0.7 – 1.1 – 1.2 – 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0
– 4.3 – 3.5 – 3.9 – 2.9 – 1.9 – 0.7 – 1.1 – 1.3 – 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0
3.2 2.4 2.4 1.2 3.6 2.0 3.2 3.7 0.8 0.7 1.2 2.3
2.0 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.5 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8
– 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.7 – 1.5 – 0.1 0.0 1.0 2.2 1.0 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.2
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
58.1 57.0 58.0 58.8 58.3 58.7 59.5 57.2 58.0 57.3 56.3 56.2
– 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1
58.5 57.1 58.1 58.8 58.0 58.3 58.9 56.3 57.6 57.1 56.5 56.3
60.7 59.2 60.3 59.8 58.0 57.6 56.3 54.7 55.0 55.4 54.7 54.2
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.1 0.0
60.5 59.1 60.3 59.8 58.1 57.8 56.6 55.1 55.5 55.5 54.6 54.2
– 2.6 – 2.2 – 2.3 – 1.0 0.4 1.1 3.2 2.5 3.0 1.9 1.6 2.0
– 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.3 0.7 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.1
– 2.0 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 1.0 – 0.2 0.5 2.4 1.2 2.1 1.7 1.9 2.1
– 2.0 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 1.0 – 0.2 0.5 2.4 1.2 2.1 1.7 1.9 2.1
5.5 2.8 2.8 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.6 2.9 1.4 1.6 1.5 2.2
2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1
– 0.7 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.7 0.9 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.2
Source: Commission services.341
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XTable A.3.2
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Germany (1)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 44.3 44.9 42.1 43.5 44.9 45.3
2. Cyclical component 0.9 – 0.8 0.7 1.8 1.7 0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data 43.4 45.7 41.4 41.8 43.2 45.1
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 47.1 46.0 44.1 46.8 47.6 48.8
5. Cyclical component – 0.2 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 47.3 45.8 44.3 46.9 47.8 48.8
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 2.9 – 1.1 – 2.0 – 3.3 – 2.8 – 3.5
8. Cyclical component 1.2 – 1.0 0.9 2.1 1.8 0.3
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 4.0 – 0.1 – 2.9 – 5.4 – 4.6 – 3.7
—  as % of potential GDP – 4.1 – 0.1 – 3.0 – 5.6 – 4.8 – 3.7
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.3 2.2 5.7 5.1 2.2 – 1.1
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.0 2.3 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.3
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 2.3 – 1.9 1.9 4.3 4.0 0.5
Greece 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 26.3 30.3 32.5 33.3 34.1 35.4
2. Cyclical component 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.3 – 0.1 – 1.3
3. Cyclically adjusted data 25.5 30.7 32.5 33.0 34.2 36.7
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 29.0 41.9 48.4 44.7 46.8 49.0
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 29.0 41.9 48.4 44.7 46.8 49.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 2.6 – 11.6 – 15.9 – 11.4 – 12.6 – 13.6
8. Cyclical component 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.3 – 0.1 – 1.3
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 3.4 – 11.2 – 15.9 – 11.7 – 12.5 – 12.3
—  as % of potential GDP – 3.5 – 11.1 – 15.8 – 11.8 – 12.5 – 11.9
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 0.7 2.5 0.0 3.1 0.7 – 1.6
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.2 0.8 1.6 2.1 1.8 1.7
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 3.1 – 1.1 – 0.1 0.9 – 0.2 – 3.5
(1)  From 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.342
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XTable A.1.2
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
45.9 45.6 46.1 46.9 46.6 46.6 47.3 47.0 45.5 45.0 45.4 45.5
0.3 0.2 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.8 – 0.5
45.5 45.4 45.9 47.1 47.0 46.8 47.3 46.4 45.3 45.3 46.2 46.0
48.4 49.0 49.6 50.3 49.4 48.8 48.8 45.9 48.3 48.6 48.9 48.4
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
48.5 49.0 49.6 50.3 49.3 48.8 48.8 48.4 48.3 48.6 48.8 48.4
– 2.6 – 3.4 – 3.5 – 3.4 – 2.7 – 2.2 – 1.5 1.1 – 2.8 – 3.6 – 3.4 – 2.9
0.4 0.3 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.8 – 0.5
– 2.9 – 3.6 – 3.7 – 3.2 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 1.5 – 2.1 – 3.0 – 3.3 – 2.6 – 2.4
– 3.0 – 3.6 – 3.7 – 3.1 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 1.5 – 2.1 – 3.0 – 3.3 – 2.6 – 2.4
2.4 1.7 1.7 0.8 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.9 0.6 0.2 0.4 2.1
2.1 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
0.8 0.5 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.8 – 0.5 0.0 1.4 0.5 – 0.7 – 1.7 – 1.1
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
36.9 38.1 39.3 40.3 42.4 44.1 44.7 47.0 45.6 45.1 46.0 45.2
– 1.3 – 1.2 – 1.3 – 1.2 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9
38.2 39.3 40.5 41.5 43.3 44.7 45.0 47.0 45.2 44.5 45.3 44.3
46.8 48.5 49.4 47.7 46.4 46.6 46.5 48.9 47.0 46.3 47.1 46.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
46.8 48.5 49.4 47.7 46.4 46.6 46.5 48.9 47.5 46.3 47.1 46.2
– 9.9 – 10.5 – 10.2 – 7.4 – 4.0 – 2.5 – 1.8 – 1.9 – 1.5 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.1
– 1.3 – 1.2 – 1.3 – 1.2 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9
– 8.6 – 9.2 – 8.9 – 6.3 – 3.2 – 1.9 – 1.5 – 1.9 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 1.9
– 8.3 – 8.9 – 8.6 – 6.1 – 3.1 – 1.8 – 1.5 – 1.9 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 2.0
2.0 2.1 2.1 2.4 3.6 3.4 3.6 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.6 3.8
1.9 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.6 2.8 3.5 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.3
– 3.3 – 3.3 – 3.3 – 3.1 – 2.2 – 1.5 – 0.7 – 0.1 0.9 1.4 1.7 2.3
(1)  From 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.343
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XTable A.3.3
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Spain
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 29.6 34.2 38.4 39.2 40.9 40.9
2. Cyclical component – 0.2 – 1.2 1.4 1.3 0.8 – 0.6
3. Cyclically adjusted data 29.8 35.4 37.0 37.8 40.1 41.6
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 31.7 40.4 42.6 43.5 44.9 47.6
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 31.6 40.3 42.7 43.6 44.9 47.6
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 2.5 – 6.2 – 4.2 – 4.3 – 4.0 – 6.7
8. Cyclical component – 0.2 – 1.3 1.6 1.5 0.8 – 0.7
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 2.4 – 4.9 – 5.7 – 5.8 – 4.8 – 6.0
—  as % of potential GDP – 2.3 – 4.7 – 6.0 – 6.0 – 4.9 – 5.9
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.3 2.3 3.8 2.5 0.9 – 1.0
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.8 2.4 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) – 0.6 – 3.6 4.2 3.9 2.0 – 1.7
France 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 45.3 49.1 48.2 48.2 48.0 48.4
2. Cyclical component 0.1 – 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.3 – 0.4
3. Cyclically adjusted data 45.3 50.1 47.5 47.8 47.7 48.9
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 45.4 52.0 49.7 50.2 51.8 54.1
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 45.4 51.7 49.9 50.3 51.9 54.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance 0.0 – 2.8 – 1.5 – 2.0 – 3.9 – 5.6
8. Cyclical component 0.1 – 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.4 – 0.5
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 0.1 – 1.6 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 4.3 – 5.1
—  as % of potential GDP – 0.1 – 1.6 – 2.4 – 2.6 – 4.3 – 5.0
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.6 1.5 2.6 1.0 1.5 – 0.9
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.7 2.0 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.4
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 0.2 – 2.8 2.1 1.2 1.0 – 1.3
Source: Commission services.344
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XTable A.1.3
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
39.8 38.0 38.4 38.8 38.6 38.3 39.0 39.0 39.2 39.6 39.3 39.5
– 0.8 – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.9 – 0.5 – 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.3 – 0.1 0.0
40.5 38.7 39.1 39.6 39.1 38.4 38.7 38.3 38.6 39.3 39.4 39.5
45.9 45.0 45.0 43.7 41.8 41.4 40.2 39.8 39.3 39.7 39.8 39.6
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
45.8 45.0 45.0 43.6 41.8 41.4 40.3 39.9 39.4 39.7 39.8 39.6
– 6.1 – 7.0 – 6.6 – 5.0 – 3.2 – 3.0 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.1
– 0.8 – 0.8 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 0.6 – 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.3 – 0.1 0.0
– 5.3 – 6.2 – 5.9 – 4.0 – 2.6 – 3.0 – 1.5 – 1.6 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.1
– 5.2 – 6.1 – 5.7 – 3.9 – 2.6 – 2.9 – 1.5 – 1.7 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.1
2.4 2.8 2.8 2.4 4.0 4.4 4.2 4.2 2.7 2.0 2.0 3.0
2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9
– 2.0 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 2.5 – 1.5 – 0.2 0.9 2.0 1.7 0.7 – 0.2 0.0
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
48.3 49.0 49.6 51.3 51.8 51.1 51.7 51.2 51.0 50.3 50.2 50.2
– 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2
48.6 49.3 49.9 51.8 52.3 51.1 51.4 50.5 50.5 50.2 50.4 50.4
54.0 53.8 55.1 55.4 54.9 53.7 53.5 52.6 52.5 53.5 54.0 53.7
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
53.9 53.7 55.0 55.2 54.7 53.7 53.5 52.8 52.7 53.5 53.9 53.7
– 5.7 – 4.8 – 5.5 – 4.1 – 3.0 – 2.7 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 3.1 – 3.7 – 3.5
– 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.6 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.3
– 5.3 – 4.4 – 5.1 – 3.5 – 2.5 – 2.7 – 2.2 – 2.3 – 2.2 – 3.3 – 3.5 – 3.3
– 5.3 – 4.4 – 5.1 – 3.4 – 2.4 – 2.7 – 2.2 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 3.4 – 3.5 – 3.3
2.1 1.7 1.7 1.1 1.9 3.4 3.2 3.8 2.1 1.2 1.1 2.3
1.6 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.3
– 0.8 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 1.4 – 1.4 0.0 1.0 2.2 1.5 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.6
Source: Commission services.345
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XTable A.3.4
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Ireland
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 34.6 38.8 35.9 36.7 37.0 37.0
2. Cyclical component 0.2 – 0.7 0.9 0.2 – 0.3 – 1.0
3. Cyclically adjusted data 34.4 39.5 35.0 36.4 37.3 38.0
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 46.2 49.1 38.1 38.9 39.4 39.3
5. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.1 0.3
6. Cyclically adjusted data 46.3 48.9 38.4 39.0 39.3 39.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 11.6 – 10.2 – 2.2 – 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.3
8. Cyclical component 0.3 – 0.9 1.2 0.3 – 0.4 – 1.3
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 11.9 – 9.3 – 3.4 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 1.0
—  as % of potential GDP – 12.0 – 9.1 – 3.5 – 2.6 – 2.0 – 0.9
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 3.1 3.1 7.6 1.9 3.3 2.7
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 3.9 2.7 4.3 4.9 5.4 5.4
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 0.8 – 2.5 3.8 0.8 – 1.2 – 3.7
Italy 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 34.4 39.0 42.8 43.8 44.5 47.7
2. Cyclical component 0.9 – 0.6 0.6 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.9
3. Cyclically adjusted data 33.5 39.5 42.2 43.4 44.6 48.7
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 43.0 51.5 53.8 53.8 54.0 57.1
5. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 43.2 51.4 53.9 53.9 54.0 57.1
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 8.7 – 12.5 – 11.0 – 10.0 – 9.5 – 9.4
8. Cyclical component 1.0 – 0.6 0.7 0.4 – 0.1 – 1.0
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 9.6 – 11.9 – 11.7 – 10.4 – 9.4 – 8.4
—  as % of potential GDP – 9.9 – 11.7 – 11.9 – 10.5 – 9.4 – 8.2
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 3.5 3.0 2.0 1.4 0.8 – 0.9
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 3.0 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.2
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 3.0 – 1.6 1.7 1.0 – 0.1 – 2.2
Source: Commission services.346
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XTable A.1.4
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
37.7 34.6 39.4 39.4 38.6 37.2 36.7 36.4 35.2 33.7 33.5 32.8
– 1.2 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.1 1.4 0.9 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.7
38.9 35.1 39.8 39.7 38.1 36.7 35.7 35.0 34.3 33.2 33.7 33.5
39.2 36.7 41.5 39.6 37.1 35.0 34.7 31.9 34.1 33.7 34.1 33.7
0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.2 0.1 0.3
38.9 36.6 41.4 39.5 37.3 35.1 35.0 32.4 34.3 34.1 34.0 33.4
– 1.6 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 0.1 1.4 2.3 2.0 4.5 1.2 0.0 – 0.6 – 0.9
– 1.6 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.4 1.9 1.2 0.7 – 0.4 – 1.0
0.0 – 1.5 – 1.5 0.2 0.9 1.6 0.6 2.6 0.0 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.1
0.0 – 1.5 – 1.5 0.2 0.9 1.7 0.7 2.7 0.0 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.1
5.8 10.0 10.0 8.1 10.9 8.8 11.1 10.0 5.7 6.0 3.3 4.5
6.3 7.0 7.0 7.4 8.1 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.0 7.6 6.9 6.6
– 4.2 – 1.6 – 1.6 – 1.0 1.7 1.9 4.4 6.0 3.7 2.3 – 1.1 – 3.1
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
45.5 45.3 45.8 46.1 48.4 46.8 47.1 46.2 45.8 45.2 45.1 44.3
– 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.4
46.1 45.2 45.7 46.1 48.2 46.7 47.0 45.7 45.5 45.4 45.6 44.7
54.6 52.9 53.4 53.2 51.1 49.9 48.9 46.9 48.5 47.7 47.5 47.5
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
54.6 52.9 53.4 53.2 51.1 49.9 48.9 48.1 48.5 47.7 47.4 47.4
– 9.1 – 7.6 – 7.6 – 7.1 – 2.7 – 3.1 – 1.8 – 0.7 – 2.7 – 2.5 – 2.3 – 3.1
– 0.6 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.4
– 8.5 – 7.7 – 7.7 – 7.1 – 2.9 – 3.2 – 1.9 – 2.4 – 3.1 – 2.2 – 1.8 – 2.7
– 8.4 – 7.8 – 7.7 – 7.1 – 2.9 – 3.2 – 1.9 – 2.5 – 3.1 – 2.2 – 1.8 – 2.7
2.2 2.9 2.9 1.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 3.1 1.8 0.4 1.0 2.1
1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.8
– 1.3 0.2 0.2 – 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.3 1.0 – 0.5 – 1.1 – 0.9
Source: Commission services.347
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XTable A.3.5
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Luxembourg
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 48.0 50.6      :       :       :       :  
2. Cyclical component      :       :       :       :       :       :  
3. Cyclically adjusted data      :       :       :       :       :       :  
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 48.4 44.4      :       :       :       :  
5. Cyclical component      :       :       :       :       :       :  
6. Cyclically adjusted data      :       :       :       :       :       :  
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 0.4 6.3 4.7 1.8 0.7 1.5
8. Cyclical component      :       :       :       :       :       :  
9. Cyclically adjusted balance      :       :       :       :       :       :  
—  as % of potential GDP      :       :       :       :       :       :  
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 0.8 2.9 5.2 8.6 1.8 4.2
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)      :       :       :       :       :       :  
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP)      :       :       :       :       :       :  
The Netherlands 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 50.7 52.5 48.1 50.6 50.2 51.0
2. Cyclical component 0.1 – 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.4 – 0.4
3. Cyclically adjusted data 50.6 52.9 47.2 49.8 49.9 51.3
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 54.8 56.1 53.0 53.4 54.0 54.1
5. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.3 0.2
6. Cyclically adjusted data 54.8 55.8 53.7 54.0 54.2 53.8
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 4.1 – 3.5 – 4.9 – 2.8 – 3.8 – 3.1
8. Cyclical component 0.2 – 0.6 1.6 1.4 0.6 – 0.6
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 4.3 – 2.9 – 6.5 – 4.2 – 4.4 – 2.5
—  as % of potential GDP – 4.3 – 2.9 – 6.7 – 4.2 – 4.4 – 2.5
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.2 3.1 4.1 2.5 1.7 0.9
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.8 2.1 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.6
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 0.3 – 0.9 2.4 2.0 0.9 – 0.8
Source: Commission services.348
A
N
N
E
XTable A.1.5
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
     :       :  47.6 47.5 46.6 45.1 44.5 44.6 45.4 47.2 45.2 44.3
     :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :     :          
     :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :     :          
     :       :  45.5 45.5 43.3 42.1 41.0 38.7 39.1 44.7 45.5 45.6
     :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :     :          
     :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :     :          
2.7 1.8 2.1 2.0 3.2 3.1 3.5 6.0 6.3 2.5 – 0.2 – 1.2
     :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :     :          
     :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :     :          
     :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :     :          
3.8 1.4 1.4 3.3 8.3 6.9 8.7 8.9 1.2 1.1 1.1 2.7
     :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :     :          
     :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :       :     :          
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
48.4 46.6 47.3 47.8 47.1 46.5 47.6 47.4 46.5 46.3 45.9 45.3
– 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.2 0.7 1.1 1.2 0.7 – 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.7
48.8 46.9 47.5 48.0 46.9 45.8 46.5 46.2 45.9 46.4 46.6 46.1
52.1 50.5 51.4 49.6 48.2 47.2 46.9 45.3 46.4 47.5 47.5 47.7
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.8 – 0.9 – 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.6
51.8 50.3 51.3 49.5 48.4 47.7 47.7 46.8 46.9 47.4 47.0 47.1
– 3.6 – 3.8 – 4.2 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 0.8 0.7 2.2 0.1 – 1.2 – 1.6 – 2.4
– 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.3 0.3 1.2 1.9 2.1 1.2 – 0.1 – 1.1 – 1.3
– 3.0 – 3.4 – 3.8 – 1.6 – 1.4 – 2.0 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.1
– 3.0 – 3.4 – 3.7 – 1.6 – 1.4 – 2.0 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.1
2.6 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.8 4.4 4.0 3.3 1.3 0.3 0.5 1.7
2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.0 2.0
– 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.4 0.5 1.8 2.8 3.3 1.8 – 0.2 – 1.7 – 2.0
Source: Commission services.349
A
N
N
E
XTable A.3.6
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Austria
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 45.6 47.8 47.1 47.7 49.2 49.9
2. Cyclical component 0.4 – 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.0
3. Cyclically adjusted data 45.1 48.3 46.7 47.0 48.7 49.9
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 47.2 50.2 49.6 50.6 51.2 54.1
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 47.2 50.2 49.6 50.6 51.2 54.1
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 1.7 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 3.0 – 2.0 – 4.2
8. Cyclical component 0.4 – 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.0
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 2.1 – 1.9 – 2.9 – 3.6 – 2.5 – 4.2
—  as % of potential GDP – 2.1 – 1.9 – 2.9 – 3.7 – 2.6 – 4.2
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.2 2.4 4.7 3.3 2.3 0.4
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.4 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 1.5 – 1.6 1.7 2.4 2.1 0.0
Portugal 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 27.8 32.7 33.9 35.2 38.1 36.8
2. Cyclical component 0.5 – 1.8 1.2 1.3 0.8 – 0.6
3. Cyclically adjusted data 27.3 34.4 32.7 33.9 37.3 37.4
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 36.2 42.8 38.8 41.0 41.0 42.7
5. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 36.2 42.6 38.9 41.2 41.1 42.6
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 8.4 – 10.1 – 4.9 – 5.8 – 2.9 – 5.9
8. Cyclical component 0.6 – 2.0 1.3 1.4 0.9 – 0.7
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 8.9 – 8.1 – 6.3 – 7.2 – 3.7 – 5.2
—  as % of potential GDP – 9.1 – 7.6 – 6.5 – 7.6 – 3.8 – 5.1
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 4.6 2.8 4.0 4.4 1.1 – 2.0
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 3.4 2.3 3.5 4.2 3.2 2.8
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 2.3 -6.9 4.7 4.9 2.8 -2.1
Source: Commission services.350
A
N
N
E
XTable A.1.6
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
48.6 49.2 52.0 52.8 52.1 51.7 51.8 50.7 52.2 51.5 51.0 50.7
0.0 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.1 – 0.1 0.0
48.6 49.4 52.2 53.1 52.6 51.7 51.6 50.1 51.9 51.4 51.1 50.7
53.5 54.2 57.3 56.8 54.1 54.2 54.2 52.4 52.1 52.2 52.3 51.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
53.5 54.2 57.3 56.8 54.1 54.2 54.2 52.8 52.1 52.2 52.3 51.3
– 4.9 – 5.0 – 5.3 – 4.0 – 2.0 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.6 0.1 – 0.8 – 1.3 – 0.6
0.0 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.1 – 0.1 0.0
– 4.9 – 4.8 – 5.1 – 3.7 – 1.5 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 0.6
– 4.9 – 4.8 – 5.1 – 3.7 – 1.5 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 0.6
2.6 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.6 3.9 2.7 3.5 0.7 1.0 1.2 2.0
2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6
0.2 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.9 – 1.5 0.1 0.7 2.2 1.0 0.2 – 0.3 0.0
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
36.3 37.1 39.6 41.0 41.2 41.0 42.4 42.3 42.1 43.5 43.5 43.7
– 1.2 – 0.7 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.8 – 1.0
37.4 37.8 40.2 41.5 41.3 40.7 41.9 41.5 41.7 43.8 44.4 44.7
42.1 42.7 45.0 45.8 44.8 44.1 45.3 45.2 46.4 46.2 47.1 46.9
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
42.0 42.7 45.0 45.8 44.8 44.2 45.3 45.6 46.4 46.2 47.0 46.9
– 5.9 – 5.6 – 5.5 – 4.8 – 3.6 – 3.2 – 2.9 – 2.9 – 4.3 – 2.7 – 3.6 – 3.3
– 1.3 – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.9 – 1.1
– 4.6 – 4.8 – 4.7 – 4.3 – 3.5 – 3.5 – 3.4 – 4.1 – 4.7 – 2.4 – 2.6 – 2.2
– 4.4 – 4.7 – 4.6 – 4.3 – 3.5 – 3.5 – 3.5 – 4.2 – 4.8 – 2.4 – 2.6 – 2.1
1.0 4.3 4.3 3.5 4.0 4.6 3.8 3.7 1.6 0.5 0.5 2.0
2.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.5
-3.8 -2.3 -2.3 -1.4 -0.3 1.0 1.7 2.4 1.3 -0.8 -2.6 -3.1
Source: Commission services.351
A
N
N
E
XTable A.3.7
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Finland
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 42.0 47.0 51.4 53.1 53.7 52.7
2. Cyclical component 0.5 – 0.2 2.3 – 1.4 – 3.1 – 3.6
3. Cyclically adjusted data 41.4 47.3 49.1 54.4 56.9 56.3
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 38.6 44.2 46.1 54.5 59.5 60.6
5. Cyclical component – 0.2 0.1 – 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.4
6. Cyclically adjusted data 38.9 44.1 46.9 54.1 58.3 59.2
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance 3.3 2.9 5.3 – 1.5 – 5.7 – 7.9
8. Cyclical component 0.8 – 0.3 3.1 – 1.8 – 4.3 – 5.0
9. Cyclically adjusted balance 2.6 3.2 2.2 0.4 – 1.5 – 2.9
—  as % of potential GDP 2.6 3.1 2.3 0.4 – 1.4 – 2.7
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 5.1 3.1 0.0 – 6.3 – 3.3 – 1.2
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 3.1 3.2 1.9 0.9 0.0 0.0
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 1.3 – 0.5 4.8 – 2.6 – 5.9 – 7.0
Sweden 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 56.1 59.2 62.6 59.6 59.1 56.4
2. Cyclical component 0.1 0.1 1.2 – 0.5 – 2.2 – 2.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data 56.0 59.1 61.4 60.0 61.3 58.5
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 60.0 63.0 58.5 60.7 66.6 67.9
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.0 – 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.6
6. Cyclically adjusted data 60.0 63.0 58.8 60.5 66.0 67.3
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 3.9 – 3.7 4.0 – 1.1 – 7.5 – 11.5
8. Cyclical component 0.2 0.1 1.5 – 0.6 – 2.9 – 2.7
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 4.1 – 3.9 2.5 – 0.5 – 4.7 – 8.8
—  as % of potential GDP – 4.1 – 3.9 2.6 – 0.5 – 4.5 – 8.4
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.7 2.2 1.1 – 1.1 – 1.7 1.1
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.1 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.4 1.1
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 0.2 0.2 2.1 – 0.9 – 4.0 – 3.9
Source: Commission services.352
A
N
N
E
XTable A.1.7
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
53.5 51.9 55.5 56.5 55.1 54.3 54.1 55.9 54.2 54.0 52.8 52.0
– 2.4 – 1.3 – 1.3 – 0.6 0.8 1.4 1.2 2.1 0.7 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.2
55.9 53.2 56.8 57.0 54.2 52.9 53.0 53.8 53.5 54.0 53.0 52.2
59.5 56.9 59.4 59.5 56.4 52.8 52.1 48.9 49.0 49.2 49.5 49.0
0.8 0.5 0.5 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1
58.7 56.4 58.9 59.3 56.7 53.3 52.5 49.7 49.3 49.2 49.4 48.9
– 6.1 – 5.0 – 3.9 – 3.0 – 1.3 1.5 2.0 6.9 5.2 4.7 3.3 3.0
– 3.2 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 0.8 1.1 1.9 1.6 2.9 0.9 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.3
– 2.8 – 3.3 – 2.1 – 2.3 – 2.5 – 0.3 0.5 4.1 4.2 4.8 3.7 3.3
– 2.7 – 3.2 – 2.1 – 2.2 – 2.5 – 0.3 0.5 4.2 4.3 4.8 3.6 3.3
4.0 4.1 4.1 3.9 6.4 4.9 3.4 5.5 0.7 1.6 2.2 2.9
1.3 2.1 2.1 2.4 3.5 3.7 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.8
– 4.5 – 2.5 – 2.5 – 1.1 1.7 2.8 2.3 4.3 1.4 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.5
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
55.3 55.0 60.4 62.4 61.5 63.1 61.7 60.9 61.8 59.6 59.9 59.7
– 1.0 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.1 0.8 1.6 0.7 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.3
56.2 55.2 60.6 63.1 62.0 63.2 60.9 59.4 61.0 59.3 60.2 60.0
64.9 62.3 67.8 65.4 63.2 60.8 60.4 57.5 57.2 58.5 59.1 58.5
0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.1 0.1
64.6 62.2 67.7 65.2 63.1 60.8 60.6 57.9 57.4 58.6 59.0 58.5
– 9.6 – 7.3 – 7.4 – 2.9 – 1.7 2.3 1.3 3.5 4.6 1.1 0.8 1.2
– 1.3 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.1 1.0 2.0 0.9 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.3
– 8.3 – 7.0 – 7.2 – 2.1 – 1.0 2.4 0.3 1.4 3.7 0.7 1.1 1.5
– 8.2 – 7.0 – 7.1 – 2.1 – 1.0 2.4 0.3 1.5 3.7 0.7 1.1 1.5
4.2 4.0 4.0 1.3 2.4 3.6 4.6 4.4 1.1 1.9 1.4 2.7
2.0 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.6
– 1.9 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 0.2 1.5 3.0 1.3 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.5
Source: Commission services.353
A
N
N
E
XTable A.3.8
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
United Kingdom
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 39.8 41.4 38.3 37.4 36.1 35.1
2. Cyclical component – 0.6 – 0.4 0.5 – 0.7 – 1.3 – 1.0
3. Cyclically adjusted data 40.3 41.8 37.8 38.1 37.3 36.1
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 43.2 44.3 39.2 39.7 42.2 42.8
5. Cyclical component 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2
6. Cyclically adjusted data 43.1 44.2 39.3 39.6 41.9 42.6
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 3.4 – 2.9 – 0.9 – 2.3 – 6.1 – 7.7
8. Cyclical component – 0.7 – 0.5 0.6 – 0.8 – 1.5 – 1.2
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 2.7 – 2.4 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 4.6 – 6.5
—  as % of potential GDP – 2.7 – 2.4 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 4.4 – 6.4
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) – 2.1 3.6 0.8 – 1.4 0.2 2.5
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.6 2.3 2.7 1.9 1.9 1.8
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) – 1.5 – 1.0 1.4 – 1.9 – 3.4 – 2.8
Source: Commission services.354
A
N
N
E
XTable A.1.8
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
35.6 36.7 38.9 38.6 38.9 40.1 40.3 40.9 41.0 39.4 39.5 39.7
– 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.4
35.8 36.6 38.8 38.5 38.5 39.7 40.0 40.5 40.9 39.6 39.8 40.1
42.3 42.1 44.6 43.0 41.1 39.8 39.1 36.9 40.2 40.6 41.9 42.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
42.3 42.1 44.6 43.1 41.2 39.9 39.1 39.3 40.2 40.6 41.8 42.1
– 6.7 – 5.4 – 5.8 – 4.4 – 2.2 0.2 1.1 4.0 0.8 – 1.3 – 2.5 – 2.5
– 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.5
– 6.5 – 5.4 – 5.8 – 4.5 – 2.6 – 0.3 0.9 1.2 0.7 – 1.0 – 2.0 – 2.0
– 6.5 – 5.4 – 5.8 – 4.5 – 2.7 – 0.3 0.9 1.2 0.7 – 1.0 – 2.0 – 2.0
4.7 2.9 2.9 2.6 3.4 2.9 2.4 3.1 2.1 1.8 2.2 2.6
2.2 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.6
– 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.8 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.9 – 0.9
Source: Commission services.355
A
N
N
E
XTable A.3.9
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Euro area (1)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 41.7 44.3 43.9 44.7 45.4 46.4
2. Cyclical component 2.0 0.7 2.2 0.9 0.6 – 0.5
3. Cyclically adjusted data 39.7 43.6 41.7 43.8 44.9 46.9
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 45.0 49.2 48.2 49.3 50.2 52.0
5. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 45.1 49.0 48.4 49.4 50.3 51.9
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 3.4 – 4.9 – 4.3 – 4.6 – 4.8 – 5.6
8. Cyclical component 2.1 0.5 2.4 1.0 0.6 – 0.6
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 5.5 – 5.4 – 6.7 – 5.6 – 5.4 – 5.1
—  as % of potential GDP – 5.6 – 5.3 – 6.9 – 5.7 – 5.5 – 5.0
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.0 2.2 3.7 2.7 1.5 – 0.8
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.6 2.0 2.8 2.5 2.3 1.9
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 1.3 – 2.4 2.2 2.4 1.6 – 1.2
EU-15 (2) 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total resources  (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 42.1 44.6 43.9 44.3 44.8 45.3
2. Cyclical component 1.5 0.5 1.9 0.6 0.2 – 0.6
3. Cyclically adjusted data 40.6 44.1 42.1 43.8 44.6 46.0
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data 45.5 49.1 47.4 48.5 49.8 51.4
5. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 45.5 48.9 47.6 48.5 49.8 51.2
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance – 3.4 – 4.5 – 3.5 – 4.1 – 5.0 – 6.0
8. Cyclical component 1.6 0.4 2.1 0.6 0.2 – 0.8
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 5.0 – 4.8 – 5.5 – 4.8 – 5.2 – 5.3
—  as % of potential GDP – 5.0 – 4.8 – 5.7 – 4.8 – 5.2 – 5.2
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.4 2.5 3.2 2.0 1.3 – 0.3
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.4 2.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of potential GDP) 0.8 – 2.0 2.0 1.6 0.7 – 1.5
(1) EU-15 excluding DK, SE and UK; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Due to problems with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.356
A
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XTable A.1.9
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
Former definitions ESA 95 definitions
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
46.0 45.7 46.4 47.2 47.6 47.1 47.6 47.2 46.5 46.1 46.0 45.8
– 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.4
46.3 45.9 46.6 47.6 47.9 47.1 47.4 46.5 46.2 46.2 46.5 46.2
51.0 50.7 51.5 51.5 50.2 49.4 48.9 47.1 48.1 48.4 48.5 48.2
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
51.0 50.6 51.5 51.5 50.2 49.4 49.0 48.3 48.3 48.4 48.4 48.1
– 5.1 – 4.9 – 5.1 – 4.3 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 1.4 0.1 – 1.6 – 2.3 – 2.5 – 2.4
– 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.5
– 4.7 – 4.7 – 4.9 – 3.8 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 1.6 – 1.8 – 2.1 – 2.2 – 1.9 – 1.9
– 4.7 – 4.7 – 4.8 – 3.8 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 1.7 – 1.9 – 2.1 – 2.2 – 1.9 – 1.9
2.4 2.2 2.2 1.4 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.5 1.5 0.8 1.0 2.3
1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1
– 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 1.1 – 0.8 0.0 0.6 1.7 1.0 – 0.3 – 1.2 – 1.0
1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
45.0 45.0 46.1 46.8 46.8 46.6 47.0 46.7 46.2 45.5 45.5 45.4
– 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.4
45.3 45.2 46.3 47.1 47.0 46.5 46.7 46.0 45.9 45.6 46.0 45.8
50.4 50.0 51.3 51.0 49.3 48.3 47.7 45.7 47.1 47.4 47.8 47.6
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
50.4 50.0 51.2 50.9 49.3 48.3 47.8 47.1 47.2 47.4 47.7 47.5
– 5.4 – 5.0 – 5.2 – 4.2 – 2.5 – 1.7 – 0.8 0.9 – 0.9 – 1.9 – 2.3 – 2.2
– 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.5
– 5.0 – 4.8 – 5.0 – 3.8 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 1.1 – 1.4 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 1.8
– 5.0 – 4.8 – 5.0 – 3.8 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 1.1 – 1.4 – 1.8 – 1.7 – 1.8
2.8 2.4 2.4 1.6 2.5 2.9 2.8 3.5 1.6 1.0 1.2 2.3
2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2
– 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.9 – 0.5 0.1 0.6 1.7 0.9 – 0.3 – 1.1 – 1.0
(1) EU-15 excluding DK S UK; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Due to problems with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
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XTable A.4.1
Current tax burden; total economy
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 45.7 49.2 46.6 46.8 46.9 47.5 48.4 48.5
DE (1) 41.7 41.4 39.2 40.8 41.5 42.0 42.5 42.5
EL 24.6 28.9 31.0 31.4 31.9 32.6 33.4 34.0
ES 26.1 30.6 35.4 35.7 37.5 36.5 36.1 35.0
FR 42.9 46.3 45.1 45.4 45.0 45.6 46.0 46.6
IE 31.2 34.9 33.6 34.0 34.4 34.5 35.5 32.9
IT 31.7 36.1 40.0 40.9 41.5 44.2 42.1 41.9
LU 39.2 42.1 : : : : : : 
NL 43.9 43.4 42.9 45.2 44.8 46.2 43.8 42.5
AT 42.7 44.8 42.6 43.2 44.4 45.3 44.0 44.7
PT 24.6 28.3 31.3 32.6 35.0 34.1 34.4 34.7
FI 38.3 42.3 45.8 46.6 46.5 44.9 47.2 45.5
Euro area (2) 38.8 40.8 40.8 41.6 42.1 43.0 42.8 42.7
DK 44.7 48.0 47.6 47.5 48.0 49.5 50.7 50.1
SE 51.0 52.6 57.0 54.3 52.7 50.0 49.4 50.1
UK 33.5 35.4 33.3 33.1 32.2 31.3 31.9 32.9
EU-15 (3) 38.5 40.5 40.4 40.9 41.2 41.7 41.6 41.8
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 1.7 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.0
DE (1) 0.4 0.3 – 1.7 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.0
EL – 0.5 – 0.1 2.8 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6
ES 1.4 0.8 0.0 0.3 1.8 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.1
FR 1.3 0.2 – 0.1 0.3 – 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6
IE 2.8 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 1.0 – 2.6
IT 1.7 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 2.7 – 2.1 – 0.2
LU 0.6 1.0 : : : : : :
NL 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.3 2.4 – 0.4 1.4 – 2.5 – 1.2
AT 0.6 0.9 – 0.5 0.6 1.2 0.9 – 1.2 0.7
PT 1.8 – 0.6 0.6 1.3 2.4 – 0.9 0.3 0.4
FI 0.3 1.7 1.9 0.8 – 0.1 – 1.6 2.3 – 1.7
Euro area (2) 0.7 0.2 – 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.9 – 0.2 – 0.1
DK 0.9 1.3 – 2.2 – 0.1 0.5 1.6 1.2 – 0.6
SE – 0.2 0.1 – 0.1 – 2.7 – 1.5 – 2.7 – 0.6 0.7
UK 1.9 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.8 – 1.0 0.6 1.1
EU-15 (3) 0.7 0.1 – 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 – 0.1 0.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services358
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XTable A.1.1
Current tax burden; total economy
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
46.8 47.0 47.5 48.0 47.6 47.5 47.6 48.1 47.7 47.3
42.3 43.1 43.1 43.1 43.8 43.9 42.1 41.5 42.0 42.1
34.4 34.8 36.0 38.1 39.3 40.6 38.9 38.3 38.0 37.5
34.0 34.4 34.8 35.0 35.6 36.1 36.0 36.6 36.4 36.3
45.2 46.4 46.5 46.4 47.0 46.5 46.2 45.5 45.2 45.2
35.1 35.0 34.2 33.4 33.0 33.1 31.7 30.4 30.3 29.7
42.3 42.9 44.4 43.2 43.5 43.0 42.7 41.9 41.4 41.2
42.5 42.6 41.7 40.4 40.3 40.6 41.0 42.7 42.2 41.0
41.5 41.7 41.5 41.1 42.4 42.2 40.7 40.3 40.4 39.7
44.9 45.9 46.7 46.4 46.3 45.5 47.4 46.2 47.3 47.7
33.8 34.5 34.8 34.9 36.1 36.7 36.1 37.0 36.9 37.0
46.3 47.4 46.7 46.4 46.8 47.8 45.7 45.6 44.6 44.0
42.2 42.9 43.2 43.0 43.5 43.4 42.5 42.0 41.9 41.8
50.2 50.7 50.7 51.0 52.3 50.2 50.6 50.1 49.8 49.8
49.6 52.4 52.4 54.1 53.4 53.0 54.7 52.4 53.1 53.0
36.5 36.1 36.6 37.8 37.9 38.6 38.4 37.1 37.4 37.6
41.8 42.5 42.6 42.6 43.0 42.9 42.3 41.5 41.6 41.6
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 0.3 0.4 0.6 – 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.4
: 0.9 – 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.1 – 1.8 – 0.7 0.5 0.1
: 0.4 1.2 2.1 1.2 1.3 – 1.7 – 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.5
: 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.5 – 0.1 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.1
: 1.2 0.1 – 0.1 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.2 0.0
: – 0.1 – 0.8 – 0.8 – 0.3 0.1 – 1.4 – 1.4 – 0.1 – 0.6
: 0.6 1.5 – 1.2 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.2
: 0.1 – 1.0 – 1.3 – 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.8 – 0.5 – 1.2
: 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.4 1.3 – 0.2 – 1.5 – 0.5 0.1 – 0.7
: 1.0 0.8 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.9 2.0 – 1.2 1.1 0.4
: 0.7 0.2 0.2 1.2 0.6 – 0.6 0.9 – 0.1 0.1
: 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.3 0.4 1.0 – 2.1 – 0.1 – 0.9 – 0.6
: 0.7 0.3 – 0.2 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.6 0.0 – 0.1
: 0.6 – 0.1 0.3 1.3 – 2.1 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.3 0.0
: 2.8 0.1 1.6 – 0.7 – 0.4 1.7 – 2.2 0.6 – 0.1
: – 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.0 0.7 – 0.1 – 1.3 0.3 0.2
: 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.8 0.1 – 0.1
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services359
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XTable A.4.2
Social contributions received; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 14.9 17.1 16.9 17.5 17.8 18.1 17.5 17.4
DE (1) 16.6 17.1 16.5 17.5 17.8 18.4 18.9 19.1
EL 9.4 11.6 11.5 11.1 11.0 11.9 12.1 12.4
ES 12.7 12.7 12.9 13.2 14.0 14.3 14.0 13.1
FR 19.1 20.8 20.6 20.7 20.9 21.1 20.7 21.0
IE 4.4 5.1 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.2 4.7
IT 12.9 13.5 14.3 14.6 14.9 15.4 14.8 14.7
LU 13.4 12.4 : : : : : : 
NL 17.5 19.8 16.4 17.3 17.8 17.8 18.4 18.2
AT 14.4 14.6 15.5 15.6 16.2 16.8 17.2 17.3
PT 8.0 8.6 10.1 10.5 11.1 11.7 11.5 11.7
FI 10.9 11.4 12.9 13.6 14.6 15.0 15.8 14.7
Euro area (2) 15.8 16.6 16.3 16.7 17.1 17.7 17.7 17.7
DK 1.6 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.6
SE 14.8 13.6 15.0 15.0 14.4 13.4 13.4 13.7
UK 6.0 6.8 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.2
EU-15 (3) 14.0 14.6 14.5 14.8 15.2 15.7 15.7 15.7
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.2
DE (1) 0.3 0.1 – 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.2
EL 0.4 0.2 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.3
ES 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.9
FR 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 – 0.3 0.2
IE 0.4 – 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.4
IT 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.1
LU 0.4 – 0.2 : : : : : :
NL 0.3 – 0.2 – 1.7 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.6 – 0.2
AT 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.1
PT 0.3 – 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 – 0.3 0.2
FI 0.2 0.9 1.4 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.8 – 1.1
Euro area (2) 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0
DK 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 – 0.2
SE 0.4 – 0.3 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.9 0.0 0.3
UK 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.3 0.0 – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
EU-15 (3) 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.1
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services360
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XTable A.1.2
Social contributions received; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
16.8 16.7 16.5 16.6 16.4 16.1 16.4 16.6 16.5 16.4
18.8 19.4 19.7 19.3 19.0 18.7 18.5 18.4 18.6 18.5
12.6 12.9 13.3 13.6 13.6 14.0 13.9 14.0 14.0 13.9
13.0 13.2 13.1 13.0 13.1 13.3 13.6 13.5 13.5 13.5
20.5 20.7 20.3 18.1 18.3 18.2 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.3
6.8 6.3 5.9 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.6
14.8 15.0 15.3 12.8 12.7 12.7 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.8
12.5 12.1 11.5 11.2 11.1 11.1 12.1 12.7 12.7 12.4
17.2 16.6 16.6 16.4 17.1 17.1 15.3 15.0 15.6 15.3
17.4 17.5 17.4 17.2 17.2 16.9 16.9 16.8 16.9 16.8
11.0 10.9 11.2 11.2 11.4 11.8 11.9 12.2 12.2 12.0
14.8 14.2 13.4 13.0 13.1 12.2 12.5 12.3 12.1 12.0
17.4 17.6 17.5 16.5 16.4 16.2 16.0 16.0 16.1 16.0
2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.2 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.6
13.7 14.7 14.5 14.5 13.2 14.9 15.5 15.6 15.4 15.2
7.5 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.3 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.9 8.1
15.7 15.8 15.5 14.6 14.5 14.3 14.2 14.2 14.4 14.4
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: – 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.2 0.3 – 0.2 0.0
: 0.6 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 – 0.1
: 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
: 0.2 – 0.4 – 2.2 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 – 0.1
: – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.0 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.1
: 0.3 0.3 – 2.5 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
: – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.0 – 0.3
: – 0.6 0.0 – 0.2 0.7 0.0 – 1.8 – 0.3 0.6 – 0.3
: 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 – 0.3 0.0 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.2
: 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.1
: – 0.6 – 0.8 – 0.4 0.2 – 0.9 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.1
: 0.2 – 0.1 – 1.1 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.0 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.5 0.0 0.0
: 1.0 – 0.3 0.1 – 1.3 1.7 0.6 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2
: – 0.1 0.1 0.1 – 0.3 0.3 0.1 – 0.1 0.5 0.2
: 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.9 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.2 0.0
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services361
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XTable A.4.3
Current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes); general government 
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 18.0 19.1 16.7 16.3 16.2 16.2 17.4 17.8
DE (1) 12.5 12.3 10.9 11.3 11.6 11.2 10.8 11.1
EL 4.6 4.6 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.7 6.8 7.2
ES 6.7 8.2 11.6 11.6 12.0 11.5 11.0 11.0
FR 8.2 8.9 8.7 9.2 8.8 9.0 9.2 9.4
IE 11.5 13.1 13.1 13.7 14.1 14.9 15.2 13.5
IT 9.7 13.0 14.3 14.4 14.6 16.1 14.8 14.5
LU 15.7 17.6 : : : : : : 
NL 15.2 12.3 15.0 16.3 15.3 16.1 13.6 12.5
AT 12.5 14.0 11.6 12.2 12.7 12.8 11.3 11.9
PT 5.6 7.8 7.9 8.8 9.8 9.0 8.8 9.1
FI 14.2 16.5 17.7 17.6 16.9 15.2 16.8 16.7
Euro area (2) 10.7 11.5 11.7 12.0 12.0 12.1 11.6 11.7
DK 25.1 27.8 28.3 28.5 29.0 30.1 30.6 30.3
SE 20.9 20.3 22.6 19.2 19.9 19.5 19.7 20.1
UK 13.4 14.5 13.8 12.8 12.1 11.4 11.8 12.6
EU-15 (3) 11.8 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.6 12.5 12.3 12.4
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 0.8 0.0 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.0 1.2 0.5
DE (1) 0.1 0.4 – 1.5 0.8 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.4 0.3
EL 0.6 – 0.3 0.9 0.1 – 0.1 0.3 1.1 0.5
ES 0.9 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.5 0.0
FR 0.6 – 0.1 0.0 0.4 – 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2
IE 1.3 – 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.3 – 1.7
IT 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.5 – 1.2 – 0.3
LU – 0.5 1.0 : : : : : :
NL 0.1 – 0.2 1.6 1.3 – 0.9 0.8 – 2.6 – 1.1
AT 0.2 0.7 – 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.1 – 1.5 0.6
PT – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 1.0 – 0.9 – 0.2 0.3
FI 0.1 0.6 1.2 – 0.1 – 0.8 – 1.7 1.6 – 0.1
Euro area (2) 0.4 0.2 – 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 – 0.4 0.0
DK 1.0 1.1 – 1.7 0.2 0.5 1.1 0.5 – 0.3
SE – 0.9 – 0.3 – 1.7 – 3.4 0.6 – 0.4 0.2 0.4
UK 0.7 0.2 0.2 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.7 0.4 0.8
EU-15 (3) 0.4 0.2 – 0.3 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.3 0.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services362
A
N
N
E
XTable A.1.3
Current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes); general government 
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
16.7 16.6 17.1 17.6 17.1 17.3 17.6 17.6 17.3 16.9
11.1 11.5 11.2 11.5 12.0 12.5 11.1 10.8 11.0 11.2
7.4 7.1 7.8 9.5 9.9 10.8 9.6 9.4 9.3 9.0
10.1 10.3 10.5 10.2 10.2 10.5 10.5 10.9 10.6 10.6
8.5 8.9 9.5 11.7 12.2 12.2 12.5 11.6 11.4 11.3
13.6 14.1 14.0 13.8 13.7 13.6 13.0 11.8 11.5 11.2
14.8 15.4 16.2 14.5 15.2 14.7 15.1 14.2 13.7 13.6
17.5 17.9 17.4 16.4 15.6 15.4 15.5 16.5 16.2 15.7
12.4 12.9 12.4 12.2 12.2 12.1 11.9 12.0 11.3 11.1
12.0 13.1 13.5 13.6 13.4 13.3 15.1 14.1 15.1 15.3
8.9 9.5 9.6 9.3 9.8 10.4 9.8 9.7 9.6 9.5
17.4 19.0 18.5 18.9 18.9 21.4 19.5 19.4 18.7 18.4
11.4 11.9 12.1 12.4 12.8 13.0 12.6 12.2 12.0 12.0
30.4 30.6 30.3 29.9 30.8 29.6 29.9 29.7 29.5 29.6
19.5 20.9 20.9 21.7 21.2 21.2 22.2 19.3 19.7 19.8
14.9 14.7 15.0 16.2 16.1 16.6 16.7 15.5 15.4 15.5
12.5 12.9 13.2 13.7 14.0 14.2 14.0 13.3 13.2 13.2
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: – 0.1 0.4 0.6 – 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.4
: 0.4 – 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 – 1.4 – 0.3 0.3 0.2
: – 0.3 0.7 1.7 0.4 0.9 – 1.3 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.3
: 0.1 0.2 – 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.5 – 0.3 0.0
: 0.5 0.6 2.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 – 0.9 – 0.2 0.0
: 0.5 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 1.3 – 0.3 – 0.3
: 0.6 0.8 – 1.6 0.7 – 0.4 0.4 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.1
: 0.4 – 0.5 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.2 0.1 1.0 – 0.2 – 0.6
: 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.3 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.2
: 1.1 0.4 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.1 1.9 – 1.1 1.0 0.2
: 0.6 0.1 – 0.3 0.5 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1
: 1.6 – 0.5 0.4 0.0 2.5 – 1.9 – 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.3
: 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.2 0.0
: 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.4 0.9 – 1.2 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.1
: 1.3 0.1 0.8 – 0.6 0.1 1.0 – 2.9 0.4 0.1
: – 0.2 0.3 1.2 0.0 0.4 0.1 – 1.2 – 0.1 0.1
: 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.2 0.0
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services363
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XTable A.4.4
Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes); general government 
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 12.2 12.0 12.2 12.1 12.1 12.3 12.6 12.2
DE (1) 12.9 12.3 12.1 12.2 12.4 12.7 13.1 12.7
EL 10.5 12.5 13.9 14.6 15.3 14.7 14.3 14.2
ES 6.3 9.1 10.3 10.3 10.9 10.1 10.6 10.3
FR 14.9 15.6 14.9 14.5 14.3 14.3 14.7 14.9
IE 15.3 16.8 15.6 15.2 15.2 14.4 15.3 14.6
IT 9.3 9.5 11.3 11.8 11.8 12.7 12.4 12.4
LU 12.5 14.9 14.9 14.7 15.3 15.9 16.1 16.2
NL 11.7 11.7 11.9 11.9 12.3 12.4 12.4 12.3
AT 15.8 16.3 15.7 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.7 15.5
PT 12.2 13.7 13.0 12.9 13.7 12.9 13.4 13.6
FI 13.1 14.1 14.9 15.0 14.7 14.5 14.2 13.5
Euro area (2) 12.2 12.5 12.6 12.6 12.7 13.0 13.2 13.1
DK 18.0 17.8 17.0 16.7 16.6 16.9 17.3 17.2
SE 13.1 16.0 16.5 17.2 15.8 14.6 13.9 13.4
UK 15.8 16.0 15.6 16.0 15.6 15.3 15.4 15.7
EU-15 (3) 12.9 13.3 13.3 13.4 13.3 13.4 13.6 13.5
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 0.4 – 0.2 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 – 0.4
DE (1) – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 – 0.4
EL – 1.5 0.1 1.7 0.7 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.1
ES 0.2 0.6 – 0.2 0.0 0.5 – 0.7 0.5 – 0.3
FR 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2
IE 1.1 – 0.6 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.0 – 0.8 0.9 – 0.7
IT 0.6 – 0.4 0.2 0.6 – 0.1 0.9 – 0.3 0.0
LU 0.8 0.2 0.1 – 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.0
NL – 0.4 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 – 0.1
AT 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.2 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.2
PT 1.9 0.2 0.0 – 0.1 0.8 – 0.7 0.5 0.2
FI – 0.1 0.1 – 0.3 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.7
Euro area (2) 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 – 0.2
DK – 0.4 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.3 0.4 – 0.1
SE 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.6 – 1.3 – 1.2 – 0.7 – 0.5
UK 0.8 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.3 0.1 0.3
EU-15 (3) 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 0.2 – 0.1
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services364
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XTable A.1.4
Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes); general government 
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
12.2 12.7 12.9 12.9 13.2 13.1 12.6 13.0 13.0 13.0
11.4 11.4 11.4 11.6 12.2 12.0 11.9 11.8 12.0 12.0
13.6 14.0 14.3 14.4 15.1 15.2 14.8 14.4 14.3 14.1
10.2 10.2 10.5 11.1 11.7 11.7 11.4 11.7 11.8 11.9
15.4 16.1 16.0 16.0 15.9 15.5 15.0 15.1 15.0 15.2
13.5 13.7 13.5 13.1 13.1 13.2 12.1 12.2 12.4 12.3
12.1 11.8 12.4 15.3 15.1 15.0 14.5 14.6 14.5 14.5
12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 13.5 14.1 13.4 13.5 13.3 12.9
10.7 11.2 11.4 11.6 12.2 12.1 12.6 12.7 12.6 12.5
14.3 14.5 14.9 14.9 15.0 14.6 14.7 15.0 14.6 14.9
13.6 14.0 13.8 14.3 14.8 14.5 14.4 15.1 15.2 15.5
13.4 13.5 14.2 14.0 14.2 13.6 13.2 13.5 13.5 13.2
12.5 12.7 12.9 13.5 13.8 13.6 13.3 13.4 13.4 13.4
16.9 17.3 17.5 18.2 18.1 17.2 17.3 17.5 17.5 17.4
15.7 16.1 16.3 17.2 18.4 16.3 16.4 17.1 17.5 17.5
13.1 13.2 13.5 13.4 13.8 13.8 13.6 13.7 13.6 13.5
12.8 12.9 13.2 13.7 14.0 13.8 13.5 13.6 13.6 13.6
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.5 0.3 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.2 0.0
: 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.2
: 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.0 – 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
: 0.7 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.5 0.1 – 0.1 0.1
: 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.4 0.0 0.1 – 1.1 0.1 0.2 – 0.2
: – 0.3 0.6 2.9 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.6 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.5 – 0.7 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.4
: 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.6 – 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 – 0.2
: 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 – 0.4 0.1 0.4 – 0.5 0.4
: 0.4 – 0.2 0.6 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.3
: 0.1 0.7 – 0.2 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.4 0.3 0.0 – 0.2
: 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
: 0.3 0.2 0.7 – 0.1 – 1.0 0.1 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.5 0.2 0.8 1.3 – 2.1 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.0
: 0.0 0.3 – 0.1 0.4 0.0 – 0.3 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services365
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XTable A.4.5
Other current resources; general government 
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 2.6 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5
DE (1) 2.3 3.1 2.6 2.6 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.7
EL 1.9 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.5 3.1 3.8 4.2
ES 3.9 4.2 3.7 4.1 4.0 5.0 4.2 3.6
FR 3.2 3.8 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.1 3.7 3.8
IE 3.3 3.9 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.1 1.8
IT 2.4 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.7
LU 6.3 5.7 : : : : : : 
NL 6.4 8.8 4.9 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.1 3.7
AT 2.8 2.9 4.4 4.4 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.5
PT 2.0 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.6 3.1 2.6 2.8
FI 3.8 5.1 5.9 6.8 7.6 8.0 6.7 6.9
Euro area (2) 3.0 3.7 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.3
DK 6.1 7.1 7.5 7.2 8.0 8.4 7.5 6.8
SE 7.3 9.3 8.4 8.2 9.1 8.9 8.3 7.9
UK 4.5 4.1 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2
EU-15 (3) 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.4
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 0.5 – 0.1 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.3 0.1
DE (1) 0.1 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 0.5 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.3
EL 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.5
ES 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 – 0.1 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.6
FR 0.3 0.2 0.4 – 0.1 0.2 0.0 – 0.4 0.1
IE 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.3
IT – 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.1
LU 0.8 0.5 : : : : : :
NL 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.4
AT 0.4 0.1 1.5 – 0.1 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.1
PT – 0.6 – 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.5 0.2
FI 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.4 – 1.3 0.3
Euro area (2) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1
DK 1.0 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.3 0.8 0.4 – 0.9 – 0.6
SE 0.4 0.3 0.0 – 0.2 0.8 – 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.4
UK 0.3 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0
EU-15 (3) 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services366
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XTable A.1.5
Other current resources; general government 
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
3.1 3.2 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8
3.5 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.8 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8
2.9 2.9 3.4 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.4
4.1 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.5
3.6 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.5
2.8 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3
3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0
5.7 5.4 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.9 4.9 4.5 4.4
6.0 5.8 5.5 5.0 4.7 4.8 5.2 5.2 4.9 4.6
5.7 5.2 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.5 4.5 4.1 4.1 4.0
4.1 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9
7.3 6.8 6.2 6.0 5.4 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.1 6.0
3.8 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3
6.8 7.1 6.7 6.6 6.0 5.8 6.1 5.7 5.4 5.3
8.2 7.8 6.9 6.9 6.1 5.9 5.0 5.0 7.1 7.1
2.9 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.2
3.9 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.2
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 0.1 – 0.3 0.0 – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 – 0.2 0.0
: – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.0 0.5 – 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.2
: 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.3 0.2 – 0.2 0.0 0.1
: 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0
: 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.4 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1
: – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.2
: – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.3
: – 0.5 – 1.4 – 0.3 0.0 – 0.1 1.0 – 0.3 0.0 – 0.1
: 0.2 – 0.3 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.3 0.1 0.2 – 0.1 0.1
: – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.6 0.8 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1
: 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.3 – 0.5 0.0 – 0.7 – 0.2 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.1
: – 0.4 – 0.9 0.0 – 0.8 – 0.2 – 0.9 0.0 2.1 0.0
: 0.1 – 0.3 0.0 0.0 – 0.2 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.1
: 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.0
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services367
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XTable A.4.6
Total current resources; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 47.6 50.4 47.5 47.7 47.8 48.3 48.9 48.9
DE (1) 44.3 44.9 42.1 43.5 44.9 45.3 45.9 45.6
EL 26.3 30.3 32.5 33.3 34.1 35.4 36.9 38.1
ES 29.6 34.2 38.4 39.2 40.9 40.9 39.8 38.0
FR 45.3 49.1 48.2 48.2 48.0 48.4 48.3 49.0
IE 34.6 38.8 35.9 36.7 37.0 37.0 37.7 34.6
IT 34.4 39.0 42.8 43.8 44.5 47.7 45.5 45.3
LU 48.0 50.6 : : : : : : 
NL 50.7 52.5 48.1 50.6 50.2 51.0 48.4 46.6
AT 45.6 47.8 47.1 47.7 49.2 49.9 48.6 49.2
PT 27.8 32.7 33.9 35.2 38.1 36.8 36.3 37.1
FI 42.0 47.0 51.4 53.1 53.7 52.7 53.5 51.9
Euro area (2) 41.7 44.3 43.9 44.7 45.4 46.4 46.0 45.7
DK 50.8 55.3 55.1 54.7 56.0 57.9 58.1 57.0
SE 56.1 59.2 62.6 59.6 59.1 56.4 55.3 55.0
UK 39.8 41.4 38.3 37.4 36.1 35.1 35.6 36.7
EU-15 (3) 42.1 44.6 43.9 44.3 44.8 45.3 45.0 45.0
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.0
DE (1) 0.4 0.3 – 1.9 1.2 1.3 0.4 0.6 – 0.3
EL – 0.2 0.0 2.8 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.1
ES 1.7 1.2 0.3 0.7 1.7 0.1 – 1.2 – 1.8
FR 1.9 0.5 0.4 0.0 – 0.2 0.5 – 0.1 0.7
IE 2.9 – 0.7 – 0.3 0.8 0.4 – 0.1 0.7 – 3.0
IT 1.6 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.7 3.2 – 2.2 – 0.3
LU 1.5 1.6 : : : : : :
NL 0.7 0.2 – 0.1 2.5 – 0.4 0.7 – 2.5 – 1.8
AT 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.6 0.7 – 1.3 0.6
PT 1.5 – 0.7 0.8 1.3 2.9 – 1.4 – 0.5 0.9
FI 0.4 1.9 2.7 1.7 0.7 – 1.0 0.8 – 1.6
Euro area (2) 1.0 0.4 – 0.2 0.7 0.8 1.0 – 0.4 – 0.2
DK 1.7 1.4 – 2.2 – 0.4 1.2 1.9 0.2 – 1.2
SE 0.2 0.4 – 0.3 – 3.0 – 0.5 – 2.7 – 1.2 – 0.2
UK 1.9 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.8 – 1.4 – 1.0 0.6 1.0
EU-15 (3) 1.0 0.4 – 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 – 0.3 0.0
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services368
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XTable A.1.6
Total current resources; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
48.8 49.3 49.4 50.0 49.5 49.4 49.5 50.1 49.5 49.1
44.8 45.7 45.5 45.5 46.2 46.0 44.6 44.1 44.5 44.5
36.5 36.9 38.8 40.3 41.5 43.2 41.9 41.4 41.1 40.4
37.4 37.8 38.0 38.0 38.6 38.9 39.0 39.5 39.3 39.4
47.9 49.6 49.6 49.3 49.9 49.4 49.3 48.5 48.2 48.2
36.7 37.0 36.1 35.0 34.5 34.6 33.5 32.1 31.9 31.3
44.8 45.5 47.2 45.9 46.3 45.5 45.3 44.6 44.0 43.8
48.2 48.1 47.0 45.6 45.0 45.2 45.9 47.6 46.7 45.4
46.3 46.5 45.9 45.2 46.2 46.1 45.1 44.9 44.4 43.5
49.4 50.3 49.5 49.2 49.1 48.2 51.1 50.0 50.6 50.9
37.6 38.7 38.6 39.0 40.0 40.3 39.8 40.9 40.7 40.9
52.8 53.6 52.3 51.8 51.6 53.4 51.6 51.5 50.4 49.7
45.1 45.9 46.1 45.8 46.3 46.0 45.4 44.9 44.8 44.6
56.8 57.7 57.1 57.4 58.1 55.8 56.5 55.6 55.0 54.9
57.1 59.5 58.6 60.3 58.9 58.3 59.1 56.9 59.7 59.6
38.4 38.2 38.6 39.8 39.9 40.4 40.5 39.0 39.0 39.3
44.8 45.6 45.5 45.4 45.8 45.6 45.2 44.4 44.4 44.4
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 0.5 0.2 0.6 – 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.4
: 0.9 – 0.2 0.0 0.7 – 0.2 – 1.4 – 0.6 0.4 0.0
: 0.5 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.7 – 1.3 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.7
: 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.5 – 0.2 0.1
: 1.7 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.8 – 0.3 0.0
: 0.2 – 0.9 – 1.1 – 0.5 0.1 – 1.1 – 1.3 – 0.2 – 0.6
: 0.7 1.7 – 1.3 0.4 – 0.8 – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.2
: – 0.1 – 1.1 – 1.4 – 0.5 0.1 0.8 1.7 – 0.9 – 1.4
: 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.8 1.0 – 0.2 – 1.0 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.9
: 0.9 – 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.9 2.9 – 1.1 0.6 0.3
: 1.2 – 0.1 0.4 1.0 0.3 – 0.5 1.1 – 0.2 0.1
: 0.7 – 1.2 – 0.5 – 0.2 1.8 – 1.8 – 0.1 – 1.1 – 0.7
: 0.9 0.2 – 0.3 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.2
: 0.9 – 0.6 0.3 0.7 – 2.3 0.7 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.1
: 2.4 – 0.9 1.7 – 1.4 – 0.5 0.8 – 2.2 2.8 – 0.1
: – 0.2 0.4 1.2 0.1 0.5 0.1 – 1.6 0.1 0.3
: 0.8 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.8 0.0 – 0.1
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services369
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XTable A.4.7
Interest payments 
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 5.9 10.3 10.4 10.0 10.6 10.6 9.9 8.8
DE (1) 1.9 3.0 2.5 2.6 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.7
EL 2.0 4.9 10.0 9.3 11.5 12.6 13.9 12.8
ES 0.4 1.9 3.9 3.7 4.3 5.0 4.7 5.3
FR 1.4 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.7
IE 6.0 9.4 7.4 7.2 6.7 6.3 5.6 5.0
IT 5.5 8.0 9.4 10.1 11.4 12.0 10.9 11.3
LU 1.2 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
NL 3.7 6.2 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.0 5.7 5.7
AT 2.4 3.5 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.0 4.3
PT 2.6 7.4 7.8 7.6 7.0 6.0 6.1 6.2
FI 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.9 2.6 4.5 5.0 5.2
Euro area (2) 2.6 4.4 4.9 5.0 5.5 5.6 5.4 5.6
DK 3.7 9.3 7.3 7.3 6.7 7.3 6.7 6.4
SE 4.0 8.1 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.8 6.4 6.6
UK 4.7 5.0 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.2 3.4
EU-15 (3) 3.0 4.8 4.7 4.7 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.3
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 0.9 0.8 0.3 – 0.4 0.6 0.0 – 0.7 – 1.1
DE (1) 0.2 0.0 – 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.4
EL 0.2 0.6 2.5 – 0.7 2.2 1.1 1.3 – 1.2
ES 0.1 0.7 0.0 – 0.2 0.5 0.8 – 0.4 0.6
FR 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2
IE 0.3 0.8 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.6
IT 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.7 1.3 0.6 – 1.1 0.4
LU 0.4 – 0.5 : – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 – 0.1
NL 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 – 0.3 0.0
AT 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 – 0.3 0.3
PT 0.2 0.8 1.8 – 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.9 0.0 0.1
FI 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.7 1.9 0.5 0.2
Euro area (2) 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.1 – 0.2 0.2
DK 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 – 0.6 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.3
SE 1.0 0.8 – 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.2
UK 0.3 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3
EU-15 (3) 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 – 0.1 0.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services370
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XTable A.1.7
Interest payments 
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
9.3 8.9 8.0 7.6 7.0 6.8 6.6 6.1 5.6 5.0
3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.3
11.2 10.5 8.2 7.8 7.2 7.0 6.3 5.5 5.2 4.9
5.2 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5
3.6 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3
5.4 4.6 3.8 3.5 2.5 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.5
11.5 11.5 9.4 8.3 6.8 6.5 6.4 5.8 5.3 5.1
0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2
5.9 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.9
4.4 4.4 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.6
6.3 5.4 4.2 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.0
4.0 4.3 4.3 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.1
5.6 5.7 5.1 4.8 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.6
6.4 6.1 5.7 5.3 4.8 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.3
6.6 6.6 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.1 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.7
3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 2.9 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.1
5.4 5.5 4.9 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.3
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: – 0.4 – 0.9 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.6
: 0.0 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0
: – 0.6 – 2.3 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.8 – 0.3 – 0.3
: 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.1
: 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
: – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.2 0.2 0.0
: 0.0 – 2.1 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.2
: 0.0 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1
: – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1
: 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.1
: – 0.9 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.2 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.3 0.0 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1
: – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.1
: – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.7 – 0.9 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.1
: 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.1
: 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.0
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
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XTable A.4.8
Final consumption expenditure of general government
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 17.3 16.7 13.9 14.3 14.2 14.6 14.5 14.5
DE (1) 19.9 19.6 17.8 19.0 19.5 19.6 19.4 19.5
EL 13.5 16.1 15.1 14.2 13.7 14.3 13.8 15.3
ES 12.9 14.2 15.0 15.6 16.4 16.9 16.2 16.0
FR 17.7 19.1 17.7 17.9 18.5 19.4 19.2 19.0
IE 18.2 16.9 14.2 15.1 15.4 15.3 15.2 14.2
IT 15.0 16.6 17.4 17.4 17.5 17.5 17.0 15.9
LU 14.5 13.7 12.5 12.1 12.3 12.0 11.9 12.6
NL 16.8 15.2 14.0 13.9 14.1 14.3 13.9 13.8
AT 17.4 18.4 18.4 18.7 19.1 19.9 20.0 19.8
PT 13.3 14.0 15.0 16.7 16.8 17.4 17.1 17.3
FI 17.6 19.8 20.8 23.8 24.3 22.8 21.8 21.2
Euro area (2) 17.3 17.9 17.1 17.6 18.0 18.4 18.1 17.9
DK 27.0 25.6 25.6 25.7 25.8 26.8 25.9 25.7
SE 28.5 27.1 26.4 26.4 27.1 26.3 25.3 24.0
UK 21.7 21.2 20.3 21.2 21.6 21.5 21.2 20.9
EU-15 (3) 18.6 18.9 18.0 18.6 19.0 19.2 18.9 18.6
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 0.2 0.1 – 0.3 0.4 – 0.1 0.4 – 0.1 0.0
DE (1) 0.5 0.0 – 0.5 – 0.6 0.6 0.1 – 0.2 0.1
EL 0.0 0.7 0.1 – 0.9 – 0.5 0.6 – 0.5 1.6
ES 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.2
FR 0.6 – 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.9 – 0.2 – 0.1
IE 1.6 – 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 1.1
IT 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 – 0.5 – 1.0
LU 0.6 0.3 0.6 – 0.4 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.2 0.7
NL – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.2 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.1
AT 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.1 – 0.2
PT 0.7 0.2 0.5 1.6 0.1 0.6 – 0.3 0.1
FI 0.2 0.9 1.4 3.0 0.6 – 1.6 – 0.9 – 0.7
Euro area (2) 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.2
DK 1.6 – 0.6 – 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.2
SE 0.6 – 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.8 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 1.2
UK 1.6 – 0.8 0.5 0.9 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.3
EU-15 (3) 0.6 – 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
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XTable A.1.8
Final consumption expenditure of general government
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
21.4 21.7 21.2 21.1 21.2 21.2 21.7 22.1 22.5 22.54
19.8 20.0 19.5 19.2 19.1 19.1 19.0 19.1 19.1 18.85
15.3 14.5 15.1 15.3 15.4 15.7 15.3 15.8 15.5 15.22
18.1 18.0 17.5 17.5 17.4 17.6 17.5 17.6 17.8 17.7
23.9 24.2 24.2 23.4 23.3 23.2 23.2 23.9 24.0 23.91
16.5 15.8 15.2 14.5 13.9 13.8 14.8 15.2 15.4 15.37
17.9 18.1 18.2 17.9 18.0 18.3 18.8 18.8 18.9 18.65
18.5 18.9 17.9 16.8 16.7 15.7 16.8 18.3 19.2 19.6
24.0 23.1 22.9 22.7 22.9 22.7 23.2 24.3 24.2 24.35
20.4 20.3 19.7 19.5 19.8 19.2 19.1 18.7 19.3 19.18
18.6 18.9 19.0 18.9 19.7 20.5 20.8 21.3 21.3 21.03
22.7 23.1 22.3 21.6 21.6 20.7 20.8 21.6 21.9 21.8
20.5 20.5 20.3 19.9 19.9 19.9 20.0 20.3 20.4 20.2
25.8 25.9 25.5 26.0 25.8 25.3 25.9 26.1 26.1 26.0
27.3 27.9 27.3 27.5 27.5 26.8 27.2 28.0 28.3 28.1
19.6 19.3 18.4 18.0 18.5 18.7 19.3 20.0 20.7 20.7
20.7 20.7 20.3 19.9 20.0 20.0 20.2 20.6 20.8 20.7
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.0
: 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.3 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.2
: – 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.3 – 0.4 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.3
: – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.0 0.2 – 0.1 0.1 0.2 – 0.1
: 0.3 0.0 – 0.8 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.1 – 0.1
: – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.1 1.0 0.4 0.3 – 0.1
: 0.2 0.1 – 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.5 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.2
: 0.5 – 1.0 – 1.2 – 0.1 – 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.0 0.4
: – 0.9 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.2 – 0.2 0.5 1.1 – 0.1 0.1
: – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.1 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.4 0.7 – 0.1
: 0.3 0.1 – 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.0 – 0.2
: 0.4 – 0.9 – 0.7 0.1 – 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.0
: 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.1 – 0.4 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.0 – 0.1
: 0.6 – 0.6 0.2 0.0 – 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.3 – 0.1
: – 0.4 – 0.9 – 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.1
: 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 – 0.1
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
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XTable A.4.9
Compensation of employees; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 13.4 13.0 11.2 11.5 11.6 12.0 12.0 12.1
DE (1) 10.8 10.4 9.5 10.1 10.4 10.6 10.3 10.2
EL 9.4 11.4 12.5 11.5 10.9 10.9 10.6 11.3
ES 9.4 10.2 10.7 11.1 11.8 11.8 11.3 11.2
FR 13.4 14.4 13.0 13.1 13.4 14.0 14.0 14.1
IE 11.8 11.5 9.9 10.5 10.7 10.8 10.5 9.6
IT 11.1 11.8 12.7 12.6 12.5 12.4 11.9 11.3
LU 10.2 9.8 : : : : : : 
NL 12.4 10.6 9.3 9.2 9.4 9.6 9.3 9.3
AT 11.6 12.4 11.7 11.8 12.0 12.5 12.4 12.4
PT 10.2 10.2 11.8 12.8 13.8 14.2 13.7 13.7
FI 12.1 13.9 14.4 16.8 17.3 16.2 15.3 14.8
Euro area (2) 11.7 11.9 11.4 11.6 11.8 11.9 11.7 11.6
DK 18.0 17.4 17.7 17.7 17.8 18.1 17.5 17.3
SE 20.2 18.3 18.1 18.3 18.8 18.0 17.0 16.1
UK 12.8 12.2 11.5 11.7 11.8 10.7 9.1 8.4
EU-15 (3) 12.3 12.3 11.8 12.0 12.2 12.1 11.6 11.4
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 0.3 0.0 – 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.1
DE (1) 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.2 0.3 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.1
EL 0.1 0.6 0.4 – 1.0 – 0.5 0.0 – 0.3 0.7
ES 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.0 – 0.5 – 0.1
FR 0.3 0.0 – 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.1
IE 1.0 – 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.8
IT 0.5 – 0.2 0.8 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.7
LU 0.4 0.1 : : : : : :
NL – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.2 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.1
AT 0.0 0.1 – 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 – 0.1
PT 0.6 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 0.4 – 0.5 0.1
FI – 0.1 0.6 0.8 2.4 0.5 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.5
Euro area (2) 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.1
DK 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.2
SE 0.4 – 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.5 – 0.9 – 0.9 – 0.9
UK 1.0 – 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 – 1.1 – 1.6 – 0.7
EU-15 (3) 0.4 – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
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XTable A.1.9
Compensation of employees; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
11.9 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.6 11.4 11.6 12.0 12.0 12.0
9.0 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.9 7.8
11.3 10.7 11.6 11.6 11.7 11.7 11.6 12.2 12.1 11.9
11.3 11.3 10.9 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.2 10.3 10.3
13.7 13.9 13.8 13.7 13.7 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.8 13.6
10.2 9.7 9.2 8.5 8.0 7.8 8.2 8.3 8.6 8.5
11.2 11.5 11.6 10.7 10.7 10.6 10.7 10.7 10.8 10.7
9.7 9.7 9.3 8.8 8.3 7.8 8.1 8.8 9.2 9.3
10.8 10.4 10.2 10.1 10.2 10.0 10.1 10.4 10.6 10.6
12.6 12.4 11.5 11.3 11.4 11.0 10.1 9.9 10.0 9.9
13.6 13.7 13.8 14.0 14.4 15.0 15.2 15.4 15.0 14.5
15.2 15.5 14.5 13.8 13.8 13.2 13.2 13.4 13.6 13.6
11.1 11.2 11.1 10.7 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.6
17.3 17.3 17.1 17.5 17.4 17.0 17.2 17.5 17.5 17.6
16.7 17.2 16.8 16.2 15.8 15.7 16.0 16.3 16.0 15.9
8.3 7.9 7.5 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.4 7.6 8.0 8.0
11.1 11.1 10.8 10.4 10.4 10.2 10.2 10.3 10.5 10.4
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 – 0.1
: – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.1
: – 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.2
: 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 0.0
: 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 – 0.2
: – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 – 0.1
: 0.3 0.1 – 0.9 0.0 – 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 – 0.2
: 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.1
: – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1
: – 0.3 – 0.9 – 0.2 0.0 – 0.3 – 1.0 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.5
: 0.2 – 0.9 – 0.7 – 0.1 – 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0
: 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.3 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 – 0.1
: 0.0 – 0.2 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
: 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.3 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.1
: – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0
: 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 – 0.1
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
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XTable A.4.10
Total current uses; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 51.3 56.2 51.1 52.2 52.9 53.4 51.9 50.9
DE (1) 41.9 42.4 40.8 42.3 43.4 44.8 44.9 45.6
EL 26.4 37.7 41.9 39.7 41.1 43.3 44.0 45.1
ES 27.7 33.9 36.8 38.0 40.2 42.6 41.3 40.3
FR 41.7 48.6 45.7 46.7 48.4 50.7 50.4 50.4
IE 39.5 45.1 36.7 37.9 38.2 38.0 37.1 34.8
IT 39.0 45.9 48.5 49.5 51.6 53.1 51.0 49.1
LU 40.8 39.5 : : : : : : 
NL 49.4 51.7 49.7 50.3 51.1 51.3 49.4 47.7
AT 41.3 44.7 44.9 45.9 46.5 49.1 48.6 49.6
PT 31.3 38.7 35.3 37.7 37.3 38.8 39.1 39.5
FI 34.6 40.5 42.2 50.5 55.8 57.7 56.4 54.1
Euro area (2) 40.5 44.9 44.1 45.2 46.7 48.2 47.5 47.2
DK 50.0 54.4 54.9 55.7 56.3 58.9 58.8 57.4
SE 55.4 59.3 56.3 58.1 62.4 63.1 61.7 59.4
UK 40.3 42.0 35.8 36.9 39.3 40.0 39.8 39.7
EU-15 (3) 41.2 45.2 43.5 44.7 46.3 47.7 47.1 46.8
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 0.8 0.1 – 0.1 1.0 0.7 0.6 – 1.5 – 1.0
DE (1) 0.6 – 0.4 0.4 1.4 1.1 1.4 0.1 0.7
EL 0.6 3.1 2.1 – 2.2 1.4 2.2 0.7 1.1
ES 1.8 1.8 0.9 1.2 2.2 2.4 – 1.3 – 0.9
FR 0.9 0.5 0.3 1.0 1.7 2.3 – 0.3 0.1
IE 3.2 0.6 0.4 1.2 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.9 – 2.3
IT 1.0 0.1 1.3 1.0 2.1 1.5 – 2.2 – 1.9
LU 1.4 – 0.6 : : : : : :
NL 0.8 – 1.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.2 – 1.9 – 1.7
AT 0.2 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 2.6 – 0.6 1.0
PT 3.8 – 0.9 3.2 2.4 – 0.4 1.5 0.3 0.4
FI – 0.3 1.8 3.0 8.2 5.3 1.9 – 1.3 – 2.3
Euro area (2) 0.9 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.5 – 0.7 – 0.3
DK 3.5 – 0.9 – 0.5 0.8 0.6 2.6 – 0.1 – 1.4
SE 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.9 4.2 0.7 – 1.4 – 2.3
UK 2.2 – 0.7 – 0.1 1.1 2.4 0.7 – 0.2 – 0.1
EU-15 (3) 1.1 0.1 0.6 1.2 1.7 1.4 – 0.6 – 0.3
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
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XTable A.1.10
Total current uses; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
50.7 50.8 48.9 48.3 47.4 46.8 47.3 47.9 47.8 47.2
44.9 46.2 45.6 45.0 45.0 44.6 44.4 44.9 45.2 44.7
43.3 42.2 40.2 40.2 39.8 40.5 39.2 38.7 38.0 37.3
39.2 39.1 37.6 36.8 35.8 35.6 35.1 35.3 35.3 35.1
49.1 49.9 49.6 48.3 47.8 47.0 47.1 48.1 48.6 48.5
36.7 35.1 32.8 30.7 28.0 26.6 28.0 28.2 28.9 28.5
48.6 49.2 47.4 45.8 44.6 44.1 44.4 44.1 43.8 43.4
40.2 40.3 38.6 37.0 36.3 34.3 36.1 39.3 41.1 41.8
47.4 45.9 44.7 43.4 42.8 41.5 41.4 42.6 42.5 42.5
49.8 49.4 47.7 47.4 47.5 46.5 47.5 47.7 48.3 47.9
39.6 39.6 38.2 37.7 38.7 39.6 40.0 41.0 41.4 41.3
53.6 53.0 50.5 47.4 46.8 44.0 43.7 44.1 44.6 44.3
46.4 47.0 45.9 44.9 44.3 43.7 43.6 44.0 44.2 43.8
57.3 56.8 54.9 54.6 53.2 51.6 52.0 52.2 51.8 51.4
60.2 59.0 56.9 55.8 54.3 52.1 51.6 52.7 55.7 55.1
41.3 40.6 39.2 38.0 37.3 37.6 38.2 38.6 39.2 39.3
46.4 46.7 45.4 44.3 43.6 43.0 43.0 43.5 43.8 43.5
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 0.1 – 1.8 – 0.6 – 0.9 – 0.6 0.6 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.6
: 1.3 – 0.6 – 0.6 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.5 0.3 – 0.4
: – 1.1 – 1.9 0.0 – 0.4 0.8 – 1.4 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.7
: – 0.2 – 1.5 – 0.7 – 1.1 – 0.1 – 0.5 0.2 0.0 – 0.2
: 0.8 – 0.3 – 1.3 – 0.5 – 0.7 0.0 1.1 0.5 – 0.1
: – 1.6 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 2.7 – 1.4 1.4 0.2 0.7 – 0.4
: 0.6 – 1.9 – 1.5 – 1.2 – 0.5 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.4
: 0.1 – 1.7 – 1.6 – 0.7 – 2.0 1.8 3.2 1.8 0.7
: – 1.5 – 1.2 – 1.3 – 0.6 – 1.3 – 0.1 1.1 – 0.1 0.0
: – 0.4 – 1.7 – 0.3 0.1 – 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.6 – 0.4
: 0.0 – 1.4 – 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.4 – 0.1
: – 0.5 – 2.5 – 3.1 – 0.6 – 2.9 – 0.3 0.5 0.5 – 0.3
: 0.6 – 1.1 – 1.0 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.1 0.4 0.1 – 0.4
: – 0.5 – 1.9 – 0.4 – 1.4 – 1.6 0.4 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.4
: – 1.2 – 2.1 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 2.1 – 0.6 1.1 3.0 – 0.6
: – 0.7 – 1.4 – 1.2 – 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.2
: 0.3 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.3 – 0.3
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
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XTable A.4.11
Gross saving; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 3.7 – 5.8 – 3.6 – 4.5 – 5.0 – 5.1 – 3.0 – 2.0
DE (1) 2.4 2.5 1.3 1.2 1.4 0.5 1.0 0.0
EL – 0.1 – 7.4 – 9.4 – 6.4 – 7.0 – 7.9 – 7.1 – 7.1
ES 0.6 0.3 1.7 1.2 0.7 – 1.7 – 1.5 – 2.3
FR 3.7 0.5 2.4 1.4 – 0.4 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 1.4
IE – 4.9 – 6.3 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 1.2 – 1.0 0.6 – 0.2
IT – 4.6 – 6.9 – 5.7 – 5.7 – 7.1 – 5.4 – 5.4 – 3.9
LU 7.2 11.2 : : : : : : 
NL 1.3 0.9 – 1.6 0.3 – 0.9 – 0.3 – 1.0 – 1.1
AT 4.2 3.1 2.2 1.8 2.7 0.8 0.0 – 0.4
PT – 3.5 – 6.0 – 1.4 – 2.5 0.8 – 2.0 – 2.8 – 2.3
FI 7.4 6.5 9.2 2.6 – 2.1 – 5.0 – 2.9 – 2.2
Euro area (2) 1.0 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 1.2 – 1.8 – 1.5 – 1.5
DK 0.7 0.9 0.2 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.5
SE 0.7 – 0.1 6.3 1.4 – 3.3 – 6.6 – 6.4 – 4.3
UK – 0.5 – 0.5 2.4 0.5 – 3.2 – 4.9 – 4.2 – 3.0
EU-15 (3) 0.8 – 0.6 0.4 – 0.3 – 1.6 – 2.4 – 2.0 – 1.7
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 1.5 0.2 0.7 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.1 2.1 1.0
DE (1) – 0.2 0.6 – 2.2 – 0.2 0.2 – 0.9 0.4 – 1.0
EL – 0.8 – 3.1 0.7 3.0 – 0.6 – 1.0 0.9 0.0
ES – 0.5 1.0 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 2.4 0.2 – 0.8
FR 0.9 – 0.1 0.1 – 1.0 – 1.9 – 1.8 0.2 0.6
IE – 0.3 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 0.4 0.0 0.2 1.7 – 0.8
IT 0.6 0.2 – 0.7 0.1 – 1.4 1.7 – 0.1 1.6
LU 0.1 2.2 : : : : : :
NL – 0.2 1.4 – 0.6 1.8 – 1.2 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.1
AT 0.8 0.1 0.3 – 0.4 0.9 – 1.9 – 0.8 – 0.4
PT – 2.4 0.2 – 2.4 – 1.1 3.3 – 2.8 – 0.7 0.5
FI 0.6 0.1 – 0.3 – 6.6 – 4.7 – 2.9 2.1 0.7
Euro area (2) 0.1 0.3 – 0.9 – 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.6 0.3 0.1
DK – 1.8 2.2 – 1.7 – 1.2 0.6 – 0.6 0.3 0.3
SE – 1.9 – 1.0 – 1.5 – 4.9 – 4.7 – 3.4 0.2 2.1
UK – 0.3 0.6 – 0.3 – 1.9 – 3.8 – 1.7 0.8 1.1
EU-15 (3) – 0.1 0.4 – 0.8 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 0.8 0.3 0.3
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services378
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XTable A.1.11
Gross saving; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
– 2.0 – 1.5 0.5 1.7 2.1 2.7 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.9
– 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.1 0.5 1.2 1.4 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.2
– 6.8 – 5.3 – 1.5 0.1 1.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0
– 1.8 – 1.3 0.4 1.2 2.9 3.2 3.9 4.2 3.9 4.3
– 1.1 – 0.3 – 0.1 1.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.3
0.0 1.8 3.3 4.3 6.5 7.9 5.5 3.9 3.0 2.8
– 3.8 – 3.7 – 0.2 0.1 1.7 1.4 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.4
8.0 7.8 8.4 8.6 8.7 10.9 9.9 8.3 5.6 3.6
– 1.1 0.6 1.3 1.8 3.4 4.6 3.7 2.3 2.0 1.0
– 0.4 0.9 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7 3.7 2.4 2.3 3.0
– 2.1 – 0.9 0.4 1.2 1.3 0.7 – 0.2 0.0 – 0.7 – 0.4
– 0.7 0.6 1.8 4.4 4.8 9.4 7.9 7.3 5.8 5.4
– 1.4 – 1.1 0.2 0.9 2.0 2.3 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.8
– 0.5 0.9 2.2 2.8 4.9 4.2 4.5 3.3 3.2 3.5
– 3.1 0.5 1.8 4.5 4.6 6.2 7.5 4.2 4.0 4.5
– 2.9 – 2.3 – 0.6 1.8 2.6 2.9 2.4 0.4 – 0.2 0.0
– 1.6 – 1.2 0.1 1.2 2.2 2.6 2.1 1.0 0.7 0.9
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 0.4 2.0 1.2 0.4 0.6 – 0.5 0.0 – 0.5 0.2
: – 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.2 – 1.2 – 1.0 0.2 0.4
: 1.6 3.8 1.5 1.6 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0
: 0.6 1.7 0.8 1.7 0.4 0.6 0.3 – 0.3 0.4
: 0.8 0.2 1.1 1.1 0.2 – 0.1 – 1.8 – 0.8 0.1
: 1.8 1.5 1.0 2.2 1.5 – 2.5 – 1.6 – 0.9 – 0.3
: 0.1 3.5 0.3 1.6 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.3 0.2
: – 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 2.2 – 1.0 – 1.6 – 2.7 – 2.0
: 1.7 0.7 0.5 1.6 1.1 – 0.9 – 1.4 – 0.3 – 1.0
: 1.3 1.0 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 2.0 – 1.3 0.0 0.6
: 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.9 0.2 – 0.6 0.3
: 1.3 1.3 2.6 0.4 4.6 – 1.5 – 0.6 – 1.5 – 0.4
: 0.3 1.2 0.7 1.1 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.2
: 1.4 1.3 0.7 2.1 – 0.7 0.3 – 1.2 – 0.2 0.3
: 3.6 1.3 2.7 0.1 1.6 1.3 – 3.3 – 0.2 0.5
: 0.5 1.8 2.4 0.8 0.3 – 0.5 – 2.0 – 0.6 0.2
: 0.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.3 – 0.4 – 1.2 – 0.3 0.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services379
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XTable A.4.12
Gross fixed capital formation; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 4.4 2.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.4
DE (1) 3.5 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.3
EL 2.1 3.7 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.3
ES 1.8 3.6 4.9 4.8 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.7
FR 3.3 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.2
IE 5.4 3.7 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.4
IT 3.2 3.7 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.2
LU 6.5 4.0 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.0 4.2 4.5
NL 3.2 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9
AT 4.3 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 2.8
PT 4.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.9 3.5 3.6
FI 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.5 2.8 2.9 2.7
Euro area (2) 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.6
DK 3.3 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8
SE 4.1 3.0 2.3 2.2 2.6 1.0 2.8 2.7
UK 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7
EU-15 (3) 3.2 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.5
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 – 0.2
DE (1) 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.2
EL – 0.5 0.2 – 0.2 0.3 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.2
ES 0.1 0.7 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.8 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.3
FR 0.1 0.2 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.1
IEIE 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.1 – 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0
IT 0.5 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.1
LU 0.9 – 0.3 : 0.1 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.8 0.3
NL 0.3 – 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.1
AT – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 – 0.5
PT 0.5 – 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 – 0.4 0.2
FI – 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.7 0.1 – 0.2
Euro area (2) 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1
DK – 0.3 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0
SE – 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 – 0.1 0.5 – 1.6 1.8 – 0.1
UK – 0.2 – 0.1 0.5 – 0.2 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0
EU-15 (3) 0.1 0.0 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services380
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XTable A.1.12
Gross fixed capital formation; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.5
2.3 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6
3.2 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.5 4.1 3.9 3.8 4.0 3.9
3.7 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4
3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0
2.3 2.4 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.7 4.6 4.4 3.9 3.9
2.1 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 1.8 2.1 2.6
4.6 4.7 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.6 5.1 5.4
3.0 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.5
3.1 2.8 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
3.7 4.2 4.4 4.0 4.2 3.9 4.1 3.6 3.7 3.6
2.7 2.9 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7
2.7 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5
1.8 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7
4.0 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.2 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3
2.0 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.9
2.6 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.4
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 – 0.3 0.2 – 0.2 0.0
: – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.1
: 0.0 0.2 0.2 – 0.1 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.2 – 0.1
: – 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 – 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
: – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.1 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0
: 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.9 – 0.2 – 0.5 0.0
: 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 – 0.6 0.2 0.5
: 0.1 – 0.5 0.3 0.0 – 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3
: 0.2 – 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 – 0.1
: – 0.2 – 0.9 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
: 0.4 0.2 – 0.4 0.2 – 0.3 0.3 – 0.5 0.0 0.0
: 0.1 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1
: – 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 – 0.2 0.1 0.1
: 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 – 0.2 0.0 0.0
: – 0.4 – 0.4 0.1 0.0 – 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
: – 0.5 – 0.3 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1
: – 0.2 – 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 0.1 0.1
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services381
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XTable A.4.13
Total uses; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 56.1 59.3 52.9 53.9 54.8 55.5 53.7 52.7
DE (1) 47.1 46.0 44.1 46.8 47.6 48.8 48.4 49.0
EL 29.0 41.9 48.4 44.7 46.8 49.0 46.8 48.5
ES 31.7 40.4 42.6 43.5 44.9 47.6 45.9 45.0
FR 45.4 52.0 49.7 50.2 51.8 54.1 54.0 53.8
IE 46.2 49.1 38.1 38.9 39.4 39.3 39.2 36.7
IT 43.0 51.5 53.8 53.8 54.0 57.1 54.6 52.9
LU 48.4 44.4 : : : : : : 
NL 54.8 56.1 53.0 53.4 54.0 54.1 52.1 50.5
AT 47.2 50.2 49.6 50.6 51.2 54.1 53.5 54.2
PT 36.2 42.8 38.8 41.0 41.0 42.7 42.1 42.7
FI 38.6 44.2 46.1 54.5 59.5 60.6 59.5 56.9
Euro area (2) 45.0 49.2 48.2 49.3 50.2 52.0 51.0 50.7
DK 53.1 56.4 56.1 57.1 58.2 60.7 60.7 59.2
SE 60.0 63.0 58.5 60.7 66.6 67.9 64.9 62.3
UK 43.2 44.3 39.2 39.7 42.2 42.8 42.3 42.1
EU-15 (3) 45.5 49.1 47.4 48.5 49.8 51.4 50.4 50.0
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 0.9 – 0.2 – 0.1 1.0 0.9 0.7 – 1.8 – 0.9
DE (1) 0.7 – 0.5 0.3 2.5 0.9 1.1 – 0.3 0.5
EL 0.0 3.2 4.5 – 3.7 2.1 2.2 – 2.2 1.7
ES 2.2 2.6 1.0 0.9 1.4 2.8 – 1.8 – 0.9
FR 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.5 1.7 2.3 – 0.1 – 0.2
IE 4.0 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.5 – 0.1 0.0 – 2.5
IT 1.2 1.3 1.9 0.0 0.2 3.1 – 2.5 – 1.7
LU 2.5 – 1.5 : : : : : :
NL 1.9 – 1.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.1 – 2.0 – 1.6
AT 0.3 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.6 2.9 – 0.6 0.8
PT 4.3 – 0.8 3.4 2.2 – 0.1 1.7 – 0.5 0.6
FI – 0.3 1.7 3.6 8.5 4.9 1.1 – 1.0 – 2.6
Euro area (2) 1.1 0.5 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.8 – 1.0 – 0.4
DK 3.2 – 0.7 – 0.8 1.0 1.1 2.5 0.0 – 1.5
SE 1.0 1.2 0.9 2.1 6.0 1.3 – 3.1 – 2.6
UK 2.1 – 1.1 1.5 0.6 2.4 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.3
EU-15 (3) 1.2 0.2 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 – 1.0 – 0.4
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services382
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XTable A.1.13
Total uses; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
52.8 52.9 51.4 50.7 50.1 49.5 49.4 50.4 50.0 49.6
49.6 50.3 49.4 48.8 48.8 45.9 48.3 48.6 48.9 48.4
49.4 47.7 46.4 46.6 46.5 48.9 47.0 46.3 47.1 46.2
45.0 43.7 41.8 41.4 40.2 39.8 39.3 39.7 39.8 39.6
55.1 55.4 54.9 53.7 53.5 52.6 52.5 53.5 54.0 53.7
41.5 39.6 37.1 35.0 34.7 31.9 34.1 33.7 34.1 33.7
53.4 53.2 51.1 49.9 48.9 46.9 48.5 47.7 47.5 47.5
45.5 45.5 43.3 42.1 41.0 38.7 39.1 44.7 45.5 45.6
51.4 49.6 48.2 47.2 46.9 45.3 46.4 47.5 47.5 47.7
57.3 56.8 54.1 54.2 54.2 52.4 52.1 52.2 52.3 51.3
45.0 45.8 44.8 44.1 45.3 45.2 46.4 46.2 47.1 46.9
59.4 59.5 56.4 52.8 52.1 48.9 49.0 49.2 49.5 49.0
51.5 51.5 50.2 49.4 48.9 47.1 48.1 48.4 48.5 48.2
60.3 59.8 58.0 57.6 56.3 54.7 55.0 55.4 54.7 54.2
67.8 65.4 63.2 60.8 60.4 57.5 57.2 58.5 59.1 58.5
44.6 43.0 41.1 39.8 39.1 36.9 40.2 40.6 41.9 42.2
51.3 51.0 49.3 48.3 47.7 45.7 47.1 47.4 47.8 47.6
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 0.1 – 1.5 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.7 – 0.1 1.0 – 0.4 – 0.4
: 0.7 – 0.9 – 0.6 0.0 – 2.9 2.5 0.3 0.3 – 0.4
: – 1.7 – 1.3 0.2 – 0.1 2.4 – 1.9 – 0.7 0.8 – 0.9
: – 1.3 – 1.9 – 0.4 – 1.1 – 0.4 – 0.5 0.3 0.1 – 0.2
: 0.3 – 0.5 – 1.1 – 0.3 – 0.9 – 0.1 1.0 0.5 – 0.2
: – 1.9 – 2.4 – 2.2 – 0.3 – 2.8 2.1 – 0.3 0.3 – 0.4
: – 0.2 – 2.1 – 1.1 – 1.0 – 2.0 1.6 – 0.8 – 0.2 0.0
: 0.0 – 2.2 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 2.4 0.5 5.6 0.8 0.1
: – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.0 – 0.3 – 1.7 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.2
: – 0.5 – 2.7 0.1 – 0.1 – 1.8 – 0.3 0.2 0.1 – 1.0
: 0.8 – 1.0 – 0.7 1.1 – 0.1 1.2 – 0.2 0.9 – 0.1
: 0.1 – 3.1 – 3.6 – 0.7 – 3.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 – 0.5
: 0.0 – 1.3 – 0.9 – 0.4 – 1.8 1.0 0.2 0.2 – 0.3
: – 0.5 – 1.8 – 0.4 – 1.3 – 1.6 0.3 0.4 – 0.8 – 0.4
: – 2.4 – 2.2 – 2.4 – 0.5 – 2.9 – 0.3 1.3 0.6 – 0.5
: – 1.6 – 2.0 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 2.2 3.3 0.4 1.3 0.3
: – 0.3 – 1.7 – 1.0 – 0.5 – 2.0 1.4 0.3 0.4 – 0.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services383
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XTable A.4.14
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–); general governments
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 8.6 – 8.9 – 5.4 – 6.2 – 6.9 – 7.2 – 4.8 – 3.9
DE (1) – 2.9 – 1.1 – 2.0 – 3.2 – 2.8 – 3.5 – 2.6 – 3.4
EL – 2.6 – 11.6 – 15.9 – 11.4 – 12.6 – 13.6 – 9.9 – 10.5
ES – 2.5 – 6.2 – 4.2 – 4.3 – 4.0 – 6.7 – 6.1 – 7.0
FR 0.0 – 2.8 – 1.5 – 2.0 – 3.9 – 5.6 – 5.7 – 4.8
IE – 11.6 – 10.2 – 2.2 – 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.3 – 1.6 – 2.1
IT – 8.7 – 12.5 – 11.0 – 10.0 – 9.5 – 9.4 – 9.1 – 7.6
LU – 0.4 6.3 4.7 1.8 0.7 1.5 2.7 1.8
NL – 4.1 – 3.5 – 4.9 – 2.8 – 3.8 – 3.1 – 3.6 – 3.8
AT – 1.7 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 3.0 – 2.0 – 4.2 – 4.9 – 5.0
PT – 8.4 – 10.1 – 4.9 – 5.8 – 2.9 – 5.9 – 5.9 – 5.6
FI 3.3 2.9 5.3 – 1.5 – 5.7 – 7.9 – 6.1 – 5.0
Euro area (2) – 3.4 – 4.9 – 4.3 – 4.6 – 4.8 – 5.6 – 5.1 – 4.9
DK – 3.2 – 2.0 – 1.0 – 2.4 – 2.2 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 2.2
SE – 3.9 – 3.7 4.0 – 1.1 – 7.5 – 11.5 – 9.6 – 7.3
UK – 3.4 – 2.9 – 0.9 – 2.3 – 6.1 – 7.7 – 6.7 – 5.4
EU-15 (3) – 3.4 – 4.5 – 3.5 – 4.1 – 5.0 – 6.0 – 5.4 – 5.0
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 1.7 0.5 0.7 – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.2 2.4 0.9
DE (1) – 0.3 0.8 – 2.1 – 1.3 0.5 – 0.7 0.9 – 0.8
EL – 0.2 – 3.3 – 1.7 4.5 – 1.2 – 1.0 3.7 – 0.6
ES – 0.9 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.2 0.3 – 2.7 0.6 – 0.9
FR 0.8 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 1.8 – 1.8 0.0 0.9
IE – 1.2 – 1.3 – 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 0.7 – 0.5
IT – 0.2 – 0.9 – 1.2 1.0 0.5 0.1 0.3 1.5
LU – 1.1 3.0 : – 2.9 – 1.0 0.8 1.1 – 0.9
NL – 1.2 1.8 – 0.4 2.2 – 1.0 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.2
AT 0.7 0.1 0.3 – 0.6 1.0 – 2.2 – 0.7 – 0.1
PT – 2.8 0.1 – 2.6 – 0.9 3.0 – 3.1 0.1 0.3
FI 0.7 0.2 – 0.9 – 6.8 – 4.3 – 2.1 1.8 1.0
Euro area (2) – 0.3 0.0 – 1.1 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.8 0.6 0.2
DK – 1.5 2.0 – 1.3 – 1.4 0.2 – 0.6 0.2 0.4
SE – 1.1 – 0.9 – 1.1 – 5.1 – 6.5 – 3.9 1.9 2.3
UK – 0.1 1.1 – 1.9 – 1.4 – 3.8 – 1.7 1.1 1.3
EU-15 (3) – 0.3 0.2 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 0.9 – 1.0 0.7 0.4
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services384
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XTable A.1.14
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–); general governments
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
– 4.3 – 3.8 – 2.0 – 0.8 – 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.2
– 3.5 – 3.4 – 2.7 – 2.2 – 1.5 1.1 – 2.8 – 3.6 – 3.4 – 2.9
– 10.2 – 7.4 – 4.0 – 2.5 – 1.8 – 1.9 – 1.5 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.1
– 6.6 – 5.0 – 3.2 – 3.0 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.1
– 5.5 – 4.1 – 3.0 – 2.7 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 3.1 – 3.7 – 3.5
– 2.1 – 0.1 1.4 2.3 2.0 4.5 1.2 0.0 – 0.6 – 0.9
– 7.6 – 7.1 – 2.7 – 3.1 – 1.8 – 0.7 – 2.7 – 2.5 – 2.3 – 3.1
2.1 2.0 3.2 3.1 3.5 6.0 6.3 2.5 – 0.2 – 1.2
– 4.2 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 0.8 0.7 2.2 0.1 – 1.2 – 1.6 – 2.4
– 5.3 – 4.0 – 2.0 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.6 0.1 – 0.8 – 1.3 – 0.6
– 5.5 – 4.8 – 3.6 – 3.2 – 2.9 – 2.9 – 4.3 – 2.7 – 3.6 – 3.3
– 3.9 – 3.0 – 1.3 1.5 2.0 6.9 5.2 4.7 3.3 3.0
– 5.1 – 4.3 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 1.4 0.1 – 1.6 – 2.3 – 2.5 – 2.4
– 2.3 – 1.0 0.4 1.1 3.2 2.5 3.0 1.9 1.6 2.0
– 7.4 – 2.9 – 1.7 2.3 1.3 3.5 4.6 1.1 0.8 1.2
– 5.8 – 4.4 – 2.2 0.2 1.1 4.0 0.8 – 1.3 – 2.5 – 2.5
– 5.2 – 4.2 – 2.5 – 1.7 – 0.8 0.9 – 0.9 – 1.9 – 2.3 – 2.2
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 0.5 1.9 1.2 0.3 0.6 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.3 0.1
: 0.0 0.7 0.5 0.7 2.6 – 3.9 – 0.8 0.2 0.5
: 2.7 3.4 1.6 0.7 – 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1
: 1.7 1.8 0.2 1.9 0.4 0.6 0.1 – 0.4 0.4
: 1.4 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.4 – 0.1 – 1.6 – 0.6 0.2
: 1.9 1.6 0.8 – 0.2 2.4 – 3.3 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 0.3
: 0.5 4.4 – 0.4 1.3 1.1 – 2.0 0.2 0.1 – 0.8
: – 0.2 1.3 – 0.2 0.4 2.5 0.3 – 3.8 – 2.7 – 1.0
: 2.3 0.7 0.4 1.4 1.5 – 2.0 – 1.3 – 0.4 – 0.8
: 1.3 2.0 – 0.5 0.1 0.8 1.8 – 0.9 – 0.6 0.8
: 0.7 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.0 – 1.4 1.6 – 0.9 0.3
: 0.9 1.7 2.8 0.5 4.9 – 1.8 – 0.4 – 1.5 – 0.3
: 0.8 1.7 0.3 1.0 1.4 – 1.7 – 0.7 – 0.2 0.1
: 1.3 1.4 0.8 2.1 – 0.7 0.5 – 1.1 – 0.3 0.3
: 4.5 1.2 4.0 – 0.9 2.1 1.1 – 3.5 – 0.3 0.4
: 1.3 2.2 2.4 0.9 2.8 – 3.2 – 2.1 – 1.2 0.0
: 1.0 1.7 0.8 0.9 1.7 – 1.8 – 1.0 – 0.4 0.1
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services385
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XTable A.4.15
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) excluding interest; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 2.7 1.4 5.0 3.8 3.7 3.5 5.1 4.9
DE (1) – 0.9 1.8 0.6 – 0.6 0.4 – 0.2 0.7 0.4
EL – 0.7 – 6.7 – 5.9 – 2.1 – 1.1 – 1.0 4.0 2.3
ES – 1.8 – 4.3 – 0.3 – 0.6 0.3 – 1.7 – 1.4 – 1.7
FR 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.9 – 0.7 – 2.3 – 2.2 – 1.1
IE – 5.6 – 0.9 5.3 5.0 4.3 4.0 4.0 2.9
IT – 3.2 – 4.5 – 1.6 0.1 1.9 2.6 1.8 3.6
LU 0.7 7.2 5.1 2.1 1.1 1.9 3.0 2.1
NL – 0.4 2.6 0.8 3.1 2.3 2.9 2.0 1.9
AT 0.8 1.1 1.6 1.2 2.2 0.1 – 0.9 – 0.7
PT – 5.8 – 2.7 2.9 1.8 4.1 0.1 0.2 0.6
FI 4.3 4.7 6.7 0.4 – 3.1 – 3.3 – 1.1 0.2
Euro area (2) – 0.8 – 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.7
DK 0.7 7.6 6.3 4.9 4.4 4.5 4.1 4.2
SE 0.1 4.4 8.9 3.9 – 2.3 – 5.7 – 3.3 – 0.7
UK 1.3 2.1 2.2 0.4 – 3.4 – 4.9 – 3.5 – 2.0
EU-15 (3) – 0.4 0.3 1.2 0.6 0.1 – 0.8 – 0.2 0.3
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 0.7 1.3 1.0 – 1.2 – 0.1 – 0.2 1.6 – 0.2
DE (1) – 0.1 0.8 – 2.2 – 1.1 1.0 – 0.7 1.0 – 0.4
EL 0.0 – 2.7 0.9 3.8 1.0 0.1 5.0 – 1.8
ES – 0.8 – 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.3 0.9 – 2.0 0.3 – 0.3
FR 0.9 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 1.5 – 1.6 0.2 1.0
IE – 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.3 0.1 – 1.2
IT 0.1 – 0.9 – 0.6 1.7 1.9 0.7 – 0.8 1.8
LU – 0.6 2.5 : – 3.0 – 1.1 0.8 1.1 – 0.9
NL – 0.8 2.0 – 0.4 2.3 – 0.9 0.6 – 0.9 – 0.2
AT 0.8 0.3 0.4 – 0.4 1.1 – 2.2 – 1.0 0.2
PT – 2.6 0.9 – 0.8 – 1.1 2.3 – 4.0 0.1 0.4
FI 0.8 0.3 – 0.9 – 6.3 – 3.6 – 0.2 2.3 1.2
Euro area (2) 0.0 0.1 – 0.9 – 0.2 0.4 – 0.8 0.4 0.3
DK – 1.1 2.3 – 1.3 – 1.4 – 0.4 0.0 – 0.4 0.1
SE – 0.1 – 0.1 – 1.5 – 5.0 – 6.2 – 3.4 2.4 2.6
UK 0.2 1.2 – 2.5 – 1.8 – 3.8 – 1.5 1.4 1.5
EU-15 (3) 0.0 0.3 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.9 0.5 0.6
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services386
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XTable A.1.15
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) excluding interest; general government
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
4.9 5.0 6.0 6.8 6.5 6.9 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.8
0.2 0.3 0.9 1.4 2.0 4.5 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.3
1.0 3.1 4.2 5.3 5.4 5.1 4.9 4.3 4.1 3.9
– 1.4 0.4 1.6 1.3 2.4 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.2 2.4
– 1.9 – 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.5 1.7 1.6 0.0 – 0.5 – 0.2
3.3 4.4 5.3 5.8 4.5 6.5 2.7 1.3 0.9 0.6
3.9 4.4 6.7 5.2 5.0 5.8 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.0
2.5 2.3 3.6 3.4 3.8 6.2 6.5 2.9 0.0 – 1.0
1.7 3.8 4.1 4.1 5.2 6.1 3.6 2.1 1.5 0.5
– 0.9 0.4 2.0 1.4 1.3 2.2 3.8 2.9 2.4 3.0
0.8 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.4 – 1.1 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.2
0.1 1.3 2.9 5.1 5.1 9.8 7.9 7.0 5.4 5.0
0.5 1.4 2.5 2.5 2.9 4.1 2.3 1.4 1.1 1.2
4.2 5.1 6.1 6.5 8.0 6.8 7.0 5.6 5.1 5.3
– 0.8 3.6 4.6 7.7 6.1 7.5 7.7 4.2 3.5 3.9
– 2.1 – 0.7 1.5 3.8 4.1 6.7 3.2 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.4
0.2 1.2 2.5 2.9 3.3 4.8 2.7 1.5 1.0 1.1
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 0.1 1.0 0.8 – 0.3 0.4 0.1 – 0.9 – 0.8 – 0.5
: 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.6 2.5 – 4.0 – 0.9 0.2 0.5
: 2.1 1.1 1.1 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.2
: 1.8 1.2 – 0.3 1.1 0.2 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.6 0.2
: 1.6 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.3 – 0.1 – 1.6 – 0.5 0.3
: 1.2 0.8 0.5 – 1.3 2.0 – 3.8 – 1.4 – 0.4 – 0.3
: 0.5 2.3 – 1.5 – 0.2 0.8 – 2.1 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 1.0
: – 0.2 1.3 – 0.2 0.4 2.5 0.3 – 3.7 – 2.9 – 1.0
: 2.0 0.3 0.0 1.1 0.9 – 2.5 – 1.5 – 0.6 – 0.9
: 1.3 1.6 – 0.6 – 0.1 0.8 1.7 – 1.0 – 0.5 0.6
: – 0.2 0.1 – 0.4 0.1 0.0 – 1.5 1.5 – 0.8 0.2
: 1.2 1.7 2.2 0.0 4.7 – 1.9 – 0.9 – 1.6 – 0.4
: 0.9 1.1 0.0 0.4 1.2 – 1.8 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.0
: 1.0 0.9 0.4 1.5 – 1.2 0.2 – 1.4 – 0.5 0.2
: 4.4 1.0 3.2 – 1.6 1.4 0.3 – 3.5 – 0.7 0.3
: 1.4 2.2 2.3 0.3 2.7 – 3.5 – 2.4 – 1.3 0.0
: 1.1 1.2 0.5 0.4 1.5 – 2.0 – 1.3 – 0.5 0.0
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services387
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XTable A.4.16
General government consolidated gross debt
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 78.6 122.3 129.2 130.9 132.5 138.2 135.9 134.0
DE (1) 31.2 40.7 42.3 40.4 42.9 47.0 49.3 57.0
EL 25.0 53.6 79.6 82.2 87.8 110.1 107.9 108.7
ES 17.0 42.7 44.0 44.7 47.1 58.8 61.1 63.9
FR 19.8 30.8 35.1 35.8 39.6 45.3 48.4 54.6
IE 75.2 109.6 101.5 102.9 100.2 96.3 90.5 82.7
IT 58.2 81.9 97.2 100.6 107.7 118.1 123.8 123.2
LU 9.4 9.7 4.4 3.8 4.8 5.7 5.4 5.6
NL 46.0 70.1 77.0 76.9 77.8 79.0 76.4 77.2
AT 36.2 49.2 57.2 57.5 57.2 61.8 64.7 69.2
PT 32.3 61.6 58.3 60.8 54.5 59.1 62.1 64.3
FI 11.5 16.2 14.3 22.6 40.6 56.0 58.0 57.1
Euro area (2) 34.7 52.1 58.3 58.8 62.1 67.3 69.6 73.2
DK 36.5 70.0 57.8 62.5 66.3 78.0 73.5 69.3
SE 40.3 62.4 42.3 51.3 65.2 71.2 73.8 73.6
UK 53.3 52.8 34.0 34.4 39.2 45.4 48.5 51.8
EU-15 (3) 37.9 53.0 54.1 55.0 59.1 64.7 66.9 70.3
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 8.3 4.9 0.1 1.7 1.6 5.7 – 2.3 – 1.9
DE (1) 2.0 0.6 1.6 1.0 2.6 4.0 2.3 7.7
EL – 0.2 7.7 7.6 2.6 5.6 22.3 – 2.2 0.8
ES 1.8 5.2 1.8 0.7 2.4 11.6 2.4 2.8
FR – 1.4 1.8 1.0 0.6 3.8 5.7 3.1 6.2
IE 1.7 3.1 – 6.7 1.4 – 2.7 – 3.9 – 5.8 – 7.9
IT – 2.8 6.7 1.9 3.3 7.1 10.5 5.7 – 0.6
LU – 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.9 – 0.6 0.9 0.9 – 0.3 0.3
NL 2.7 4.6 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.9 1.2 – 2.7 0.9
AT 1.5 2.0 – 0.8 0.2 – 0.3 4.7 2.9 4.5
PT – 3.3 7.4 1.9 2.5 – 6.3 4.7 3.0 2.2
FI 0.1 0.7 – 0.4 8.4 18.0 15.4 2.0 – 0.9
Euro area (2) 0.9 3.1 1.4 1.8 3.3 5.3 2.3 3.6
DK 7.0 – 2.9 – 0.2 4.7 3.8 11.7 – 4.6 – 4.2
SE 4.7 – 0.6 – 1.7 9.0 13.9 6.0 2.6 – 0.2
UK – 0.5 – 1.8 – 2.6 0.3 4.9 6.2 3.2 3.3
EU-15 (3) 1.3 2.1 0.8 1.9 4.1 5.6 2.2 3.4
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services388
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XTable A.1.16
General government consolidated gross debt
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
134.0 130.2 124.8 119.6 114.9 109.6 108.5 105.8 103.2 99.4
57.0 59.8 61.0 60.9 61.2 60.2 59.5 60.9 62.7 63.0
108.7 111.3 108.2 105.8 105.1 106.2 107.0 104.9 101.0 97.0
63.9 68.1 66.6 64.6 63.2 60.6 56.9 54.0 52.5 50.5
54.6 57.1 59.3 59.5 58.5 57.2 56.8 59.0 61.7 63.0
82.7 74.2 65.0 54.9 49.3 39.3 36.8 33.4 33.4 33.3
123.2 122.1 120.2 116.3 114.9 110.6 109.5 106.7 106.0 104.7
5.6 6.2 6.1 6.3 5.9 5.5 5.4 5.6 4.0 3.4
77.2 75.2 69.9 66.8 63.1 55.8 52.8 52.7 52.5 52.8
69.2 69.1 64.7 63.7 67.5 66.8 67.3 67.6 68.5 66.8
64.3 62.9 59.1 55.0 54.3 53.3 55.6 58.1 59.5 60.2
57.1 57.0 54.0 48.6 47.0 44.5 43.8 42.7 42.3 41.4
73.2 75.6 75.5 73.9 72.9 70.5 69.4 69.3 70.0 69.7
69.3 65.1 61.2 56.2 53.0 47.3 45.4 45.3 42.7 40.0
73.6 73.5 70.5 68.0 62.7 52.8 54.4 52.4 50.9 49.5
51.8 52.3 50.8 47.7 45.2 42.1 38.9 38.4 39.0 39.8
70.3 72.1 71.1 69.0 67.5 64.3 63.0 62.7 63.6 63.4
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: – 3.9 – 5.4 – 5.3 – 4.7 – 5.3 – 1.1 – 2.8 – 2.5 – 3.9
: 2.8 1.2 – 0.1 0.3 – 1.0 – 0.7 1.3 1.8 0.3
: 2.6 – 3.1 – 2.4 – 0.8 1.2 0.8 – 2.1 – 3.9 – 4.0
: 4.2 – 1.5 – 2.0 – 1.4 – 2.6 – 3.6 – 3.0 – 1.5 – 2.0
: 2.5 2.2 0.3 – 1.1 – 1.3 – 0.3 2.1 2.7 1.3
: – 8.5 – 9.2 – 10.1 – 5.6 – 9.9 – 2.6 – 3.4 0.0 0.0
: – 1.1 – 1.9 – 3.9 – 1.4 – 4.3 – 1.1 – 2.9 – 0.6 – 1.4
: 0.5 – 0.1 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.1 0.2 – 1.6 – 0.6
: – 2.0 – 5.3 – 3.2 – 3.7 – 7.3 – 2.9 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.4
: – 0.1 – 4.4 – 1.1 3.8 – 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.9 – 1.8
: – 1.4 – 3.8 – 4.1 – 0.7 – 1.0 2.3 2.6 1.4 0.7
: 0.0 – 3.0 – 5.4 – 1.6 – 2.5 – 0.8 – 1.1 – 0.4 – 0.9
: 2.4 0.0 – 1.7 – 1.0 – 2.5 – 1.0 – 0.2 0.7 – 0.3
: – 4.2 – 3.9 – 4.9 – 3.3 – 5.6 – 2.0 – 0.1 – 2.5 – 2.8
: – 0.2 – 3.0 – 2.5 – 5.4 – 9.9 1.6 – 1.9 – 1.5 – 1.4
: 0.5 – 1.5 – 3.1 – 2.5 – 3.0 – 3.2 – 0.5 0.6 0.7
: 1.9 – 1.0 – 2.1 – 1.5 – 3.2 – 1.3 – 0.3 0.9 – 0.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services389
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XTable A.4.17
Cyclically-adjusted total resources of general government
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 47.1 51.6 46.4 46.9 47.3 49.3 49.3 49.2
DE (1) 43.4 45.7 41.4 41.8 43.2 45.1 45.5 45.4
EL 25.5 30.7 32.5 33.0 34.2 36.7 38.2 39.3
ES 29.8 35.4 37.0 37.8 40.1 41.6 40.5 38.7
FR 45.3 50.1 47.5 47.8 47.7 48.9 48.6 49.3
IE 34.4 39.5 35.0 36.4 37.3 38.0 38.9 35.1
IT 33.5 39.5 42.2 43.4 44.6 48.7 46.1 45.2
LU : : : : : : : : 
NL 50.6 52.9 47.2 49.8 49.9 51.3 48.8 46.9
AT 45.1 48.3 46.7 47.0 48.7 49.9 48.6 49.4
PT 27.3 34.4 32.7 33.9 37.3 37.4 37.4 37.8
FI 41.4 47.3 49.1 54.4 56.9 56.3 55.9 53.2
Euro area (2) 39.7 43.6 41.7 43.8 44.9 46.9 46.3 45.9
DK 50.9 54.6 55.6 55.3 57.0 59.7 58.1 56.8
SE 56.0 59.1 61.4 60.0 61.3 58.5 56.2 55.2
UK 40.3 41.8 37.8 38.1 37.3 36.1 35.8 36.6
EU-15 (3) 40.6 44.1 42.1 43.8 44.6 46.0 45.3 45.2
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 1.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 2.0 0.0 – 0.1
DE (1) 0.7 0.3 – 3.0 0.2 1.4 1.9 0.5 – 0.2
EL 0.2 – 0.5 3.3 0.5 1.2 2.4 1.5 1.1
ES 1.9 1.3 0.0 0.8 2.3 1.4 – 1.0 – 1.8
FR 2.2 0.7 0.3 0.3 – 0.1 1.2 – 0.3 0.8
IE 3.0 – 0.9 – 1.1 1.5 0.9 0.7 0.9 – 3.8
IT 1.5 0.2 0.8 1.3 1.2 4.1 – 2.6 – 0.9
LU : : : : : : : :
NL 0.9 – 0.2 – 0.6 2.6 0.1 1.5 – 2.5 – 1.9
AT 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.3 1.6 1.3 – 1.4 0.8
PT 1.2 – 0.9 0.7 1.2 3.4 0.1 0.1 0.4
FI – 0.5 1.9 3.4 5.3 2.4 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 2.7
Euro area (2) 1.2 0.4 – 0.4 0.7 1.0 2.0 – 0.6 – 0.3
DK 2.6 0.6 – 2.0 – 0.3 1.7 2.8 – 1.6 – 1.4
SE 0.4 0.2 0.5 – 1.3 1.3 – 2.8 – 2.3 – 1.0
UK 3.2 – 0.6 0.3 0.4 – 0.8 – 1.3 – 0.3 0.9
EU-15 (3) 1.5 0.2 – 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.4 – 0.6 – 0.1
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services390
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XTable A.1.17
Cyclically-adjusted total resources of general government
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
48.8 49.8 49.5 50.0 49.2 48.5 49.3 50.4 50.1 49.5
45.9 47.1 47.0 46.8 47.3 46.4 45.3 45.3 46.2 46.0
40.5 41.5 43.3 44.7 45.0 47.0 45.2 44.5 45.3 44.3
39.1 39.6 39.1 38.4 38.7 38.3 38.6 39.3 39.4 39.5
49.9 51.8 52.3 51.1 51.4 50.5 50.5 50.2 50.4 50.4
39.8 39.7 38.1 36.7 35.7 35.0 34.3 33.2 33.7 33.5
45.7 46.1 48.2 46.7 47.0 45.7 45.5 45.4 45.6 44.7
: : : : : : : : : : 
47.5 48.0 46.9 45.8 46.5 46.2 45.9 46.4 46.6 46.1
52.2 53.1 52.6 51.7 51.6 50.1 51.9 51.4 51.1 50.7
40.2 41.5 41.3 40.7 41.9 41.5 41.7 43.8 44.4 44.7
56.8 57.0 54.2 52.9 53.0 53.8 53.5 54.0 53.0 52.2
46.6 47.6 47.9 47.1 47.4 46.5 46.2 46.2 46.5 46.2
57.8 58.6 57.9 58.3 59.0 56.5 57.7 57.2 56.5 56.3
60.6 63.1 62.0 63.2 60.9 59.4 61.0 59.3 60.2 60.0
38.8 38.5 38.5 39.7 40.0 40.5 40.9 39.6 39.8 40.1
46.3 47.1 47.0 46.5 46.7 46.0 45.9 45.6 46.0 45.8
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 1.0 – 0.3 0.5 – 0.9 – 0.7 0.8 1.2 – 0.4 – 0.6
: 1.2 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.5 – 0.9 – 1.1 0.0 0.9 – 0.2
: 0.9 1.8 1.5 0.3 2.0 – 1.8 – 0.7 0.8 – 1.1
: 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.7 0.3 – 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.1
: 1.9 0.5 – 1.2 0.3 – 0.9 0.0 – 0.3 0.2 0.0
: – 0.2 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 1.2 0.6 – 0.2
: 0.4 2.1 – 1.5 0.3 – 1.3 – 0.2 0.0 0.2 – 0.9
: : : : : : : : : :
: 0.5 – 1.0 – 1.2 0.8 – 0.3 – 0.3 0.5 0.2 – 0.5
: 0.9 – 0.5 – 0.9 – 0.1 – 1.5 1.8 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.3
: 1.2 – 0.1 – 0.7 1.2 – 0.3 0.2 2.1 0.6 0.3
: 0.3 – 2.8 – 1.3 0.0 0.8 – 0.3 0.5 – 1.0 – 0.8
: 1.0 0.2 – 0.8 0.3 – 0.8 – 0.4 0.0 0.3 – 0.3
: 0.7 – 0.7 0.4 0.6 – 2.5 1.2 – 0.5 – 0.8 – 0.2
: 2.5 – 1.1 1.1 – 2.3 – 1.5 1.7 – 1.8 0.9 – 0.2
: – 0.3 0.0 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 – 1.3 0.2 0.3
: 0.9 – 0.1 – 0.5 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.2 – 0.3 0.4 – 0.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services391
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XTable A.4.18
Cyclically-adjusted total uses of general government
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 56.2 59.1 53.1 54.1 54.9 55.3 53.6 52.7
DE (1) 47.3 45.8 44.3 46.9 47.8 48.8 48.5 49.0
EL 29.0 41.9 48.4 44.7 46.8 49.0 46.8 48.5
ES 31.6 40.3 42.7 43.6 44.9 47.6 45.8 45.0
FR 45.4 51.7 49.9 50.3 51.9 54.0 53.9 53.7
IE 46.3 48.9 38.4 39.0 39.3 39.0 38.9 36.6
IT 43.2 51.4 53.9 53.9 54.0 57.1 54.6 52.9
LU : : : : : : : : 
NL 54.8 55.8 53.7 54.0 54.2 53.8 51.8 50.3
AT 47.2 50.2 49.6 50.6 51.2 54.1 53.5 54.2
PT 36.2 42.6 38.9 41.2 41.1 42.6 42.0 42.7
FI 38.9 44.1 46.9 54.1 58.3 59.2 58.7 56.4
Euro area (2) 45.1 49.0 48.4 49.4 50.3 51.9 51.0 50.6
DK 53.1 56.7 55.9 56.9 57.7 59.9 60.7 59.2
SE 60.0 63.0 58.8 60.5 66.0 67.3 64.6 62.2
UK 43.1 44.2 39.3 39.6 41.9 42.6 42.3 42.1
EU-15 (3) 45.5 48.9 47.6 48.5 49.8 51.2 50.4 50.0
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE 1.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 1.0 0.8 0.4 – 1.7 – 0.9
DE (1) 0.6 – 0.5 0.6 2.7 0.9 1.0 – 0.3 0.5
EL 0.0 3.2 4.5 – 3.7 2.1 2.2 – 2.2 1.7
ES 2.2 2.6 1.0 0.9 1.3 2.7 – 1.8 – 0.9
FR 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.4 1.6 2.1 – 0.1 – 0.2
IE 4.0 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.1 – 2.3
IT 1.2 1.3 1.9 0.0 0.1 3.1 – 2.5 – 1.7
LU : : : : : : : :
NL 1.7 – 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.3 – 0.4 – 2.0 – 1.5
AT 0.3 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.6 2.9 – 0.6 0.8
PT 4.3 – 0.8 3.4 2.2 – 0.1 1.6 – 0.6 0.7
FI 0.0 1.7 3.3 7.1 4.3 0.9 – 0.5 – 2.3
Euro area (2) 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.6 – 1.0 – 0.4
DK 2.7 – 0.3 – 0.9 0.9 0.9 2.1 0.8 – 1.4
SE 0.9 1.3 0.7 1.7 5.5 1.3 – 2.7 – 2.3
UK 1.8 – 1.0 1.4 0.3 2.3 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.2
EU-15 (3) 1.1 0.3 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.5 – 0.9 – 0.4
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
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XTable A.1.18
Cyclically-adjusted total uses of general government
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
52.8 52.7 51.4 50.7 50.3 49.7 49.7 50.4 49.9 49.5
49.6 50.3 49.3 48.8 48.8 48.4 48.3 48.6 48.8 48.4
49.4 47.7 46.4 46.6 46.5 48.9 47.5 46.3 47.1 46.2
45.0 43.6 41.8 41.4 40.3 39.9 39.4 39.7 39.8 39.6
55.0 55.2 54.7 53.7 53.5 52.8 52.7 53.5 53.9 53.7
41.4 39.5 37.3 35.1 35.0 32.4 34.3 34.1 34.0 33.4
53.4 53.2 51.1 49.9 48.9 48.1 48.5 47.7 47.4 47.4
: : : : : : : : : : 
51.3 49.5 48.4 47.7 47.7 46.8 46.9 47.4 47.0 47.1
57.3 56.8 54.1 54.2 54.2 52.8 52.1 52.2 52.3 51.3
45.0 45.8 44.8 44.2 45.3 45.6 46.4 46.2 47.0 46.9
58.9 59.3 56.7 53.3 52.5 49.7 49.3 49.2 49.4 48.9
51.5 51.5 50.2 49.4 49.0 48.3 48.3 48.4 48.4 48.1
60.4 59.9 58.2 57.8 56.5 55.1 55.4 55.4 54.6 54.2
67.7 65.2 63.1 60.8 60.6 57.9 57.4 58.6 59.0 58.5
44.6 43.1 41.2 39.9 39.1 39.3 40.2 40.6 41.8 42.1
51.2 50.9 49.3 48.3 47.8 47.1 47.2 47.4 47.7 47.5
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: – 0.1 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.5 0.0 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.4
: 0.7 – 1.0 – 0.5 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.2 0.2 – 0.4
: – 1.7 – 1.3 0.2 – 0.1 2.4 – 1.4 – 1.2 0.8 – 0.9
: – 1.3 – 1.9 – 0.4 – 1.1 – 0.3 – 0.5 0.3 0.1 – 0.2
: 0.2 – 0.5 – 1.0 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.1 0.8 0.4 – 0.3
: – 1.9 – 2.2 – 2.2 – 0.1 – 2.7 2.0 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.6
: – 0.2 – 2.1 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 0.8 0.4 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.0
: : : : : : : : : :
: – 1.7 – 1.2 – 0.7 0.0 – 0.9 0.1 0.5 – 0.4 0.1
: – 0.5 – 2.7 0.1 – 0.1 – 1.4 – 0.7 0.2 0.1 – 1.0
: 0.8 – 1.0 – 0.6 1.2 0.3 0.8 – 0.2 0.8 – 0.1
: 0.4 – 2.6 – 3.4 – 0.8 – 2.8 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.2 – 0.5
: 0.0 – 1.3 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.1 0.1 0.1 – 0.3
: – 0.5 – 1.7 – 0.4 – 1.2 – 1.5 0.4 0.0 – 0.9 – 0.4
: – 2.6 – 2.1 – 2.3 – 0.2 – 2.7 – 0.5 1.2 0.4 – 0.5
: – 1.6 – 1.9 – 1.3 – 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.4 1.2 0.3
: – 0.3 – 1.7 – 1.0 – 0.5 – 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.4 – 0.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
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XTable A.4.19
Cyclically-adjusted net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) of general government
(Percentage of GDP)
Former definitions
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 9.2 – 7.4 – 6.8 – 7.3 – 7.6 – 5.9 – 4.3 – 3.5
DE (1) – 4.0 – 0.1 – 2.9 – 5.1 – 4.6 – 3.7 – 2.9 – 3.6
EL – 3.4 – 11.2 – 15.9 – 11.7 – 12.5 – 12.3 – 8.6 – 9.2
ES – 2.4 – 4.9 – 5.7 – 5.8 – 4.8 – 6.0 – 5.3 – 6.2
FR – 0.1 – 1.6 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 4.3 – 5.1 – 5.3 – 4.4
IE – 11.9 – 9.3 – 3.4 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 1.0 0.0 – 1.5
IT – 9.6 – 11.9 – 11.7 – 10.4 – 9.4 – 8.4 – 8.5 – 7.7
LU : : : : : : : : 
NL – 4.3 – 2.9 – 6.5 – 4.2 – 4.4 – 2.5 – 3.0 – 3.4
AT – 2.1 – 1.9 – 2.9 – 3.6 – 2.5 – 4.2 – 4.9 – 4.8
PT – 8.9 – 8.1 – 6.3 – 7.2 – 3.7 – 5.2 – 4.6 – 4.8
FI 2.6 3.2 2.2 0.4 – 1.5 – 2.9 – 2.8 – 3.3
Euro area (2) – 5.5 – 5.4 – 6.7 – 5.6 – 5.4 – 5.1 – 4.7 – 4.7
DK – 3.0 – 3.0 – 0.4 – 1.6 – 0.8 – 0.2 – 2.6 – 2.5
SE – 4.1 – 3.9 2.5 – 0.5 – 4.7 – 8.8 – 8.3 – 7.0
UK – 2.7 – 2.4 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 4.6 – 6.5 – 6.5 – 5.4
EU-15 (3) – 5.0 – 4.8 – 5.5 – 4.8 – 5.2 – 5.3 – 5.0 – 4.8
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BE – 2.8 0.6 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.3 1.6 1.6 0.8
DE (1) 0.0 0.8 – 3.5 – 2.5 0.6 0.9 0.8 – 0.7
EL 0.2 – 3.8 – 1.2 4.2 – 0.9 0.2 3.7 – 0.6
ES – 0.8 – 0.9 – 0.9 – 0.1 1.0 – 1.2 0.7 – 0.9
FR 1.2 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.2 – 1.7 – 0.8 – 0.2 0.9
IE – 0.9 – 1.5 – 1.6 0.9 0.6 1.0 1.0 – 1.5
IT – 0.4 – 1.1 – 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.0 – 0.1 0.8
LU : : : : : : : :
NL – 0.8 1.1 – 1.2 2.3 – 0.2 1.9 – 0.5 – 0.4
AT 0.7 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.7 1.1 – 1.7 – 0.7 0.1
PT – 3.1 – 0.1 – 2.8 – 1.0 3.5 – 1.5 0.7 – 0.3
FI – 0.5 0.2 0.2 – 1.8 – 1.9 – 1.4 0.1 – 0.5
Euro area (2) 0.0 – 0.1 – 1.4 – 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.0
DK – 0.1 0.9 – 1.0 – 1.2 0.8 0.6 – 2.4 0.1
SE – 0.8 – 1.1 – 0.3 – 3.0 – 4.2 – 4.1 0.4 1.3
UK 1.4 0.4 – 1.1 0.0 – 3.1 – 2.0 0.1 1.1
EU-15 (3) 0.2 0.0 – 1.3 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.3 0.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
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XTable A.1.19
Cyclically-adjusted net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) of general government
(Percentage of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
– 3.9 – 2.9 – 1.9 – 0.7 – 1.1 – 1.2 – 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0
– 3.7 – 3.2 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 1.5 – 2.1 – 3.0 – 3.3 – 2.6 – 2.4
– 8.9 – 6.3 – 3.2 – 1.9 – 1.5 – 1.9 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 1.9
– 5.9 – 4.0 – 2.6 – 3.0 – 1.5 – 1.6 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.1
– 5.1 – 3.5 – 2.5 – 2.7 – 2.2 – 2.3 – 2.2 – 3.3 – 3.5 – 3.3
– 1.5 0.2 0.9 1.6 0.6 2.6 0.0 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.1
– 7.7 – 7.1 – 2.9 – 3.2 – 1.9 – 2.4 – 3.1 – 2.2 – 1.8 – 2.7
: : : : : : : : : : 
– 3.8 – 1.6 – 1.4 – 2.0 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.1
– 5.1 – 3.7 – 1.5 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 0.6
– 4.7 – 4.3 – 3.5 – 3.5 – 3.4 – 4.1 – 4.7 – 2.4 – 2.6 – 2.2
– 2.1 – 2.3 – 2.5 – 0.3 0.5 4.1 4.2 4.8 3.7 3.3
– 4.9 – 3.8 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 1.6 – 1.8 – 2.1 – 2.2 – 1.9 – 1.9
– 2.6 – 1.3 – 0.3 0.6 2.4 1.4 2.3 1.8 1.9 2.1
– 7.2 – 2.1 – 1.0 2.4 0.3 1.4 3.7 0.7 1.1 1.5
– 5.8 – 4.5 – 2.6 – 0.3 0.9 1.2 0.7 – 1.0 – 2.0 – 2.0
– 5.0 – 3.8 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 1.1 – 1.4 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 1.8
(Change in percentage points of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
: 1.0 1.0 1.2 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.1 – 0.2
: 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.5 – 0.6 – 1.0 – 0.3 0.7 0.2
: 2.7 3.1 1.3 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.4 0.5 0.0 – 0.2
: 1.9 1.4 – 0.3 1.4 – 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.3
: 1.6 1.0 – 0.2 0.5 – 0.1 0.1 – 1.1 – 0.2 0.2
: 1.7 0.7 0.8 – 1.0 2.0 – 2.6 – 0.9 0.6 0.4
: 0.7 4.2 – 0.4 1.3 – 0.6 – 0.7 0.9 0.4 – 0.9
: : : : : : : : : :
: 2.2 0.1 – 0.5 0.8 0.6 – 0.4 0.0 0.6 – 0.6
: 1.4 2.2 – 1.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 2.5 – 0.7 – 0.4 0.7
: 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.7 2.3 – 0.2 0.5
: – 0.1 – 0.2 2.1 0.8 3.6 0.2 0.6 – 1.1 – 0.4
: 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.7 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.3 0.0
: 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.9 – 1.0 0.9 – 0.5 0.1 0.2
: 5.1 1.1 3.4 – 2.1 1.1 2.2 – 3.0 0.5 0.4
: 1.3 1.9 2.4 1.1 0.3 – 0.5 – 1.7 – 1.0 0.0
: 1.2 1.5 0.5 0.7 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.4 0.0 0.0
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991 including former East Germany.
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XTable A.5.1
Gross domestic product at current market prices 
(Billion EUR)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
BE 87.7 109.5 155.3 163.5 174.3 184.5 198.4
DE (1) 594.0 839.2 1215.1 1432.7 1561.7 1670.8 1763.7
EL 35.0 53.6 66.2 73.1 77.0 79.8 84.4
ES 159.1 226.3 401.7 443.7 463.3 425.9 425.1
FR 491.1 702.2 957.6 987.2 1040.5 1089.4 1139.3
IE 15.2 27.3 37.2 38.6 41.4 42.5 46.1
IT 323.2 562.1 867.8 939.6 951.2 849.0 863.4
LU 3.8 5.2 8.7 9.7 10.4 11.8 13.0
NL 128.1 175.4 231.8 244.4 258.4 277.7 293.8
AT 57.2 88.6 127.3 136.6 147.0 158.5 168.1
PT 21.5 32.2 56.3 65.5 75.5 73.6 76.3
FI 37.8 72.0 107.7 99.8 83.9 73.6 84.4
Euro area (2) 1949.9 2888.4 4224.0 4624.7 4874.1 4925.3 5142.9
DK 49.3 79.1 105.1 108.5 113.7 118.5 128.0
SE 92.7 137.0 187.6 200.1 197.2 169.4 179.8
UK 385.5 602.7 780.7 836.1 828.1 823.5 878.1
EU-15 (3) 2477.4 3707.1 5297.3 5769.4 6013.0 6036.8 6328.9
(1) From 1991, including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.
Table A.5.2
Gross domestic product at constant market prices 
(Annual percentage change)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
BE 4.4 1.7 3.1 1.8 1.5 - 1.0 3.2
DE (1) 1.3 2.2 5.7 5.1 2.2 - 1.1 2.4
EL 0.7 2.5 0.0 3.1 0.7 - 1.6 2.0
ES 1.3 2.3 3.8 2.5 0.9 - 1.0 2.4
FR 1.6 1.5 2.6 1.0 1.5 - 0.9 2.1
IE 3.1 3.1 7.6 1.9 3.3 2.7 5.8
IT 3.5 3.0 2.0 1.4 0.8 - 0.9 2.2
LU 0.8 2.9 5.2 8.6 1.8 4.2 3.8
NL 1.2 3.1 4.1 2.5 1.7 0.9 2.6
AT 2.2 2.4 4.7 3.3 2.3 0.4 2.6
PT 4.6 2.8 4.0 4.4 1.1 - 2.0 1.0
FI 5.1 3.1 0.0 - 6.3 - 3.3 - 1.2 4.0
Euro area (2) 2.0 2.3 3.6 2.5 1.5 - 0.8 2.4
DK - 0.6 3.6 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.0 5.5
SE 1.7 2.2 1.1 - 1.1 - 1.7 1.1 4.2
UK - 2.1 3.6 0.8 - 1.4 0.2 2.5 4.7
EU-15 (3) 1.3 2.5 3.0 1.8 1.2 - 0.3 2.8
(1) From 1991, including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.396
A
N
N
E
XTable A.1.1
Gross Domestic Product at current market prices 
(Billion EUR)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
211.6 212.5 216.1 223.7 235.6 247.5 254.3 260.7 268.6 279.4
1880.2 1878.2 1863.5 1916.4 1978.6 2030.0 2071.2 2108.2 2143.0 2203.6
89.9 98.0 107.1 109.0 118.1 123.1 130.9 141.1 151.6 163.2
446.9 480.5 495.6 525.5 565.2 609.3 651.6 693.9 733.8 778.7
1188.1 1224.6 1241.1 1297.6 1355.1 1420.1 1475.6 1520.8 1562.7 1620.5
50.8 57.7 70.7 77.7 89.8 102.9 114.5 128.2 136.9 148.2
839.0 971.1 1030.0 1068.9 1108.0 1166.5 1220.1 1258.3 1302.1 1359.8
13.8 14.3 15.4 16.9 18.9 21.3 22.1 22.3 23.1 24.2
317.3 324.5 332.7 351.7 374.1 402.6 429.2 444.0 459.4 474.5
179.8 182.4 181.6 189.3 197.2 207.0 211.9 216.8 221.8 229.7
82.6 88.3 93.9 100.4 108.0 115.6 123.0 129.2 134.3 140.3
99.2 100.7 108.3 115.7 120.0 130.2 135.8 139.7 144.1 150.4
5385.5 5618.3 5740.6 5975.7 6249.6 6554.9 6818.1 7041.1 7258.3 7548.2
137.8 144.2 149.2 154.1 162.4 171.8 177.8 182.8 189.7 197.1
189.9 213.4 218.5 221.4 236.0 260.1 244.9 255.4 264.4 276.7
867.7 936.6 1171.5 1270.5 1370.0 1559.4 1597.0 1659.1 1598.2 1652.9
6580.9 6912.5 7279.8 7621.6 8018.0 8546.2 8837.8 9138.5 9310.6 9674.8
(1) From 1991, including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.
Table A.1.2
Gross domestic product at constant market prices 
(Annual percentage change)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2.4 1.2 3.6 2.0 3.2 3.7 0.8 0.7 1.2 2.3
1.7 0.8 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.9 0.6 0.2 0.4 2.1
2.1 2.4 3.6 3.4 3.6 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.6 3.8
2.8 2.4 4.0 4.4 4.2 4.2 2.7 2.0 2.0 3.0
1.7 1.1 1.9 3.4 3.2 3.8 2.1 1.2 1.1 2.3
10.0 8.1 10.9 8.8 11.1 10.0 5.7 6.0 3.3 4.5
2.9 1.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 3.1 1.8 0.4 1.0 2.1
1.4 3.3 8.3 6.9 8.7 8.9 1.2 1.1 1.1 2.7
3.0 3.0 3.8 4.4 4.0 3.3 1.3 0.3 0.5 1.7
1.6 2.0 1.6 3.9 2.7 3.5 0.7 1.0 1.2 2.0
4.3 3.5 4.0 4.6 3.8 3.7 1.6 0.5 0.5 2.0
4.1 3.9 6.4 4.9 3.4 5.5 0.7 1.6 2.2 2.9
2.3 1.4 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.5 1.5 0.9 1.0 2.3
2.8 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.6 2.9 1.4 1.6 1.5 2.2
4.0 1.3 2.4 3.6 4.6 4.4 1.1 1.9 1.4 2.7
2.9 2.6 3.4 2.9 2.4 3.1 2.1 1.8 2.2 2.6
2.4 1.6 2.5 2.9 2.8 3.4 1.6 1.1 1.3 2.4
(1) From 1991, including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
(3) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.397
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XTable A.5.3
Potential (1) GDP at constant market prices 
(Annual percentage change)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
BE 2.6 1.8 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.0
DE (2) 2.0 2.3 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1
EL 2.2 0.8 1.6 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.9
ES 1.8 2.4 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7
FR 2.7 2.0 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.6
IE 3.9 2.7 4.3 4.9 5.4 5.4 6.3
IT 3.0 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.2 1.4
LU : : : : : : : 
NL 1.8 2.1 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.6
AT 2.4 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4
PT 3.4 2.3 3.5 4.2 3.2 2.8 2.8
FI 3.1 3.2 1.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.3
Euro area (3) 2.6 2.0 2.8 2.5 2.3 1.9 1.9
DK 1.4 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.0
SE 2.1 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.4 1.1 2.0
UK 1.6 2.3 2.7 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.2
EU-15 (4) 2.4 2.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 2.0
(1) For Germany, Spain and Austria the trend GDP rather then potential GDP is taken.
(2) From 1991, including former East Germany.
(3) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
(4) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.
Table A.5.4
Gap between actual and potential (1) GDP at constant market prices 
(% of potential GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
BE 1.0 – 2.3 2.3 1.8 1.0 – 2.0 – 0.8
DE (2) 2.3 – 1.9 1.9 4.3 4.0 0.5 0.8
EL 3.1 – 1.1 – 0.1 0.9 – 0.2 – 3.5 – 3.3
ES – 0.6 – 3.6 4.2 3.9 2.0 – 1.7 – 2.0
FR 0.2 – 2.8 2.1 1.2 1.0 – 1.3 – 0.8
IE 0.8 – 2.5 3.8 0.8 – 1.2 – 3.7 – 4.2
IT 3.0 – 1.6 1.7 1.0 – 0.1 – 2.2 – 1.3
LU : : : : : : : 
NL 0.3 – 0.9 2.4 2.0 0.9 – 0.8 – 0.9
AT 1.5 – 1.6 1.7 2.4 2.1 0.1 0.2
PT 2.3 – 6.9 4.7 4.9 2.8 – 2.1 – 3.8
FI 1.3 – 0.5 4.8 – 2.6 – 5.9 – 7.0 – 4.5
Euro area (3) 1.3 – 2.4 2.2 2.4 1.6 – 1.2 – 0.8
DK – 0.3 1.3 – 0.9 – 1.1 – 1.8 – 3.3 0.1
SE 0.2 0.2 2.1 – 0.9 – 4.0 – 3.9 – 1.9
UK – 1.5 – 1.0 1.4 – 1.9 – 3.4 – 2.8 – 0.5
EU-15 (4) 0.8 – 2.0 2.0 1.6 0.7 – 1.5 – 0.8
(1) For Germany, Spain and Austria the trend GDP rather then potential GDP is taken.
(2) From 1991, including former East Germany.
(3) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
(4) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.398
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XTable A.1.3
Potential (1) GDP at constant market prices 
(Annual percentage change)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2.3 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.5 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8
2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
2.0 2.2 2.7 2.6 2.8 3.5 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.3
2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9
1.9 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.3
7.0 7.4 8.1 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.0 7.6 6.9 6.6
1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.8
: : : : : : : : : : 
2.7 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.0 2.0
2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6
2.6 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.5
2.1 2.4 3.5 3.7 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.8
2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1
2.3 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0
2.5 2.1 2.3 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.6
2.4 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.6
2.1 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2
(1) For Germany, Spain and Austria the trend GDP rather then potential GDP is taken.
(2) From 1991, including former East Germany.
(3) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
(4) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.
Table A.1.4
Gap between actual and potential (1) GDP at constant market prices 
(% of potential GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
– 0.7 – 1.5 – 0.1 0.0 1.0 2.2 1.0 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.2
0.5 – 0.5 – 0.8 – 0.5 0.0 1.4 0.5 – 0.7 – 1.7 – 1.1
– 3.3 – 3.1 – 2.2 – 1.5 – 0.7 – 0.1 0.9 1.4 1.7 2.3
– 2.1 – 2.5 – 1.5 – 0.2 0.9 2.0 1.7 0.7 – 0.2 0.0
– 1.0 – 1.4 – 1.4 0.0 1.0 2.2 1.5 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.6
– 1.6 – 1.0 1.7 1.9 4.4 6.0 3.7 2.3 – 1.1 – 3.1
0.2 – 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.3 1.0 – 0.5 – 1.1 – 0.9
: : : : : : : : : : 
– 0.6 – 0.4 0.5 1.8 2.8 3.3 1.8 – 0.2 – 1.7 – 2.0
– 0.6 – 0.9 – 1.5 0.1 0.7 2.2 1.0 0.2 – 0.3 0.0
– 2.3 – 1.4 – 0.3 1.0 1.7 2.4 1.3 – 0.8 – 2.6 – 3.1
– 2.5 – 1.1 1.7 2.8 2.3 4.3 1.4 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.5
– 0.6 – 1.1 – 0.8 0.0 0.6 1.7 1.0 – 0.3 – 1.2 – 1.0
0.4 0.4 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.4 0.6 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.2
– 0.4 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 0.2 1.5 3.0 1.3 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.5
0.1 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.8 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.9 – 0.9
– 0.5 – 0.9 – 0.5 0.1 0.6 1.7 0.9 – 0.3 – 1.1 – 1.0
(1) For Germany, Spain and Austria the trend GDP rather then potential GDP is taken.
(2) From 1991, including former East Germany.
(3) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
(4) EU-15 excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.399
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